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The, methods and principles of cybernetics are applied 
to a discussion of stability and regulation in social sys- 
tems to : ing a global. viewpoint,, The fundamental but still 
classical notion of stability as applied to homeostatic and 
ultrastable s_ystýems is discussed", with a particular reference 
to a specific wel: t. -studied example of a closed social group 
(the Tsembaga studied by Roy Rappaport in New Guinea). 
The discussion extends to the problem of evolution in 
large systems and the question of regulating evolution is 
addressed without special qualifications. A more comprehen- 
sive idea of stability is introdu. cýed as the argument turns 
to the problem of evolution for viability in nene. ral 
Concepts pertaining to . he problem of evolution are 
exempla fiel by computer. =L-mulation model of an abstractly 
defined ecosystem in which various dynamic processes occur 
allowing the study of adaptive and evolutionary behavior. 
In particular, the role of coalition formation and cooperative 
behavior is stressed as a key factor in the evolution of com- 
plexl tY ., 
The model consists of a population of several species 
of dimensionless automata inhabiting a geometrically define. 
environment in which a commodity eisen iti l for metabolic 
requirements (food) appears. 
Au 
L. oTaCU 
t".., can sense properties 
of their ený;, ironmen-t, move about it, compete for food, repro- 
-_ ý 
duce or combine into coalitions thus for mtiýzg new and more 
complex species. Each species is associated with a specific 
genotype from which the species' behavioral characteristics 
(its phenotype) are derived. Complexity and survival effi- 
ciency of species increases through coalition formation, an 
event which occurs when automata are faced with an "unde- 
cidabie" situation that is resolvable only by forming a new 
and more complex organization. 
Exogenous manipulation of the food distribution pattern 
and other critical factors produces different environmental 
conditions resulting in different behavior patterns of auto- 
mata and in different evolutionary "pa hways, " 
Eve. --l,, the computer program developed to implement 
this model, accepts ah gh-level command language which 
allows for the setting of parameters, definition of initial 
configurations, and control of output formats. Results of 
the simulation are produced graphically and include various 
pertinent tables. The program was given a modular hi. erarchi- 
cal structure which allows easy generation of new versions 
incorporating different sets of rules. 
The model strives to capture the essence of the evolu- 
tion of complexity viewed as a general process rather than 
to describe the evolution of a particular "real" system. 
this respect it is not context-specific, and the behaviors 
which are observable in different runs can receive various 
interpretation depeý: d. inq on specific identifications. Of 
In 
-il- 
these, biological, ecological, and sociological . 't_nteLpreta- 
tions are the most obvious and the latter, in particular, 
is stressed. 
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INTRODUCT ION 
Many valuable investigations and practical enterprises 
have brought the methods and principles of cybernetics to 
bear upon the regulation of large systems; societies, firms 
and other business organizations, command and control systems, 
some special and relatively tractable cases of closed social 
groups studied by anthropologists (for example, the Tsembaga, 
discussed as an outstandingly clear study in section 1.2) 
and more. In general, the classical notion of "stability" 
has been employed, i. e., the maintenance of dynamic or static 
equilibrium, wholly or partly invariant with "goal" condition::, 
that are specified within the framework of sensibly chosen 
but predetermined state variables. 
This approach, though indubitably correct as far as 
it goes, runs into difficulties when the system is evolu- 
tionary; a point which is readily exemplified by considering 
the other than closed aspects of the Tsembaga society, i. e. 
the reassignment of people to local groups who perform the 
ritual and thus maintain ecological stability as well as 
social identity. One manifestation of the difficulties is 
as follows: although the principles of cybernetics are piece- 
meal applicable, it is difficult to apply the cybernetic para- 
digms which have burgeoned since the early 1970vs to provide, 
as they can, a unifying theory and its proper interpretations. 
In this thesis I try to extend the cybernetics of large 
- Ar 
social systems in order to obtain a greater degree of unifi- 
cation and show, by considering special simulation and model- 
ling programs (Chapter 3 which contains the burden of the 
argument) that essays of this kind are implementable o The 
other chapters of the thesis are concerned with the requisite 
background and an outline of an interpretation of the imple- 
mented calculus related to historical data the details of 
which are presented in Appendix C and Appendix D of the work. 
The thesis contents are thus arranged in the following 
manner. (See also the diagrammatic representation below. ) 
Chapter 1 describes the fundamental but still classical notion 
of stability as applied to homeostatic and ultrastable systems 
giving general examples in section 1.1 and a specific, well- 
studied example (the Tsembaga ritual cycle) which is discussed 
and reanalyzed in section 1.2. Much of the historical acknowl- 
edgment together with detailed exemplification is relegated 
to Appendix B. Chapter 2 addresses the problem of evolution 
(with biological, social, ecological and other large systems 
in mind); the question of "regulating" evolution is discussed 
without special qualifications in section 2.1, - and the more 
comprehensive idea of stability as "organizational closure" 
(self-reconstruction and P Individuation are nearly equisig- 
nificant) is introduced in section 2.2 where the argument 
turns to evolution for viability, survival and development; 
growth in structural sophistication and/or distribution of 
control being prerequisites for correct establishment of 
- 3-., 
"viability. " 
Chapter 3, by far the more lengthy, is devoted to a 
simulation model Eve-1, intended to exemplify my thesis and 
also to provide the basis for a variety of practical, predic- 
tive and regulatory tools. The behavior and characteristics 
of the Eve-1 computer program are described globally in this 
chapter since the detailed construction, listing and data 
organization of Eve-1 are dealt with in Appendix A. (However, 
typical runs are discussed and given an interpretation in 
Chapter 3. ) It should be stressed that Eve-l, or any other 
computer program of its kind, is a simulation and not a reali- 
zation; not, that is, an actual doing. The point is impor- 
tant because concepts like "organizational closure" or "evo- 
lution°' refer to realizations. The simulating program acts 
as a guide and highlights imperfections of any simulation, a 
fact which became obtrusive as the Eve-1 program was designed. 
But it is equally important to notice that a realization, in 
the genuine sense, is possible and requires only a slight 
departure from the available technology. Chapter 4 includes 
an interpretative discussion, addressed particularly to a view 
of society and of the dynamics of stability in social systems, 
together with conclusions and some speculative comments. 
An important application of the work (others are imp l i-- 
cit in the argument even if not explicitly spelled out in the 
body of the thesis) concerns problems of social development 
in their broadest sense. One conclusion, appropriate in that 
-4-- 
context, is that "sane" social development (evolution) and 
decentralized/distributed/control are not as often supposed 
incompatible but simply different facets of the same innate 
mutualism which promotes evolution and is the more recently 
advanced, peculiarly cybernetic concept of stability; 
The material delegated to Appendices B, C and D con- 
tains a review of cybernetics and system theoretic concepts 
which are pertinent to the content of chapters 1,2,3 and 
4, This background material could be helpful to a reader 
who is not familiar with the now classical concepts of cyber- 
netics. Otherwise, Chapter 1 is the logical place to begin 
and brief reference to the appendices can be made according 
to indications in the text. Notes to Chapters 1,2,3 and 
4 appear immediately after Chapter 4 whereas notes related 
to Appendices B, C and D follow each appendix respectively. 
5. _ 
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A Schematic Representation of the Contents 
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1. HOMEOSTASIS AND STEAD' STATE REGULATION 
IN A WELL ADAPTED SOCIETY 
1-1. Homeostatic Regulation 
1-1.1. Stability and Homeostasis 
The concept of homeostasis is crucial to the under- 
standing of processes that maintain equilibrium in viable 
systems. It provides a uniffying principl3 underlying those 
activities which mediate the stability of \, iahle organiza- 
tions under certain conditions of displacement from estab- 
lished norms. 
The term "stability, " when it is used in relation 
to dynamic systems, implies that some fundamental. condition 
remains invariant in spite of changes that a. system may be 
undergoing. Such an invariance--the state that is not 
changed by the system's transformations'--represents the state 
of equilibrium for that system, and this state of equilibrium 
will be more or less stable, depending on now- sensitive it is 
to disturbances acting to displace it. 
In viable systems of even a relatively moderate 
complexity, equilibrium is rarely associated with a single 
r 
state. Instead, it is defined by a set of states, and sys-" 
tems of this kind will be stable, as long as disturbances do 
not lead to a permanent displacement from states that belong 
to that set. (! ) An important feature of systems that are 
characterized by multiple states of equilibrium is that their 
stability is a composite property of tie whole. It pr_ esu>>__ 
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poses that the system's interacting components are stable and 
it depends on some degree of coordination between the activi-- 
ties of these components. (2) 
Depending on. the type of system that is under con- 
sideration, conditions of equilibrium may assume substantially 
different forms. Von Foerster, for example, has emphasized 
this point in discussing the different types of equilibrium 
that are associated with mechanical, thermodynamic and hom. eo- 
static systems respectively. (3) In the case of mechanical 
systems, Von Foerster has pointed out, the notion of equilib-- 
rium is associated with motion. Specifically, "with that 
motion--among all possible motions--for which a certain 
mechanical quantity--action----is minimized. " In thermodynamic 
systems, where behavior is described in statistical terms 
because of a fundamental uncertainty about the system's 
microscopic states, equilibrium is associated with "the set 
of all states for which a certain probabilistic quantity-- 
entropy--is maximized. " Finally, in the case of homeostatic 
systems, "equilibrium is obtained by an organized structure 
which channels available energy in such a way that it opposes 
deviations from a certain state of the system. " (4 ) 
The term "homeostasis" was originally coined by 
Cannon (5) in order to describe the condition of dynamic 
equilibrium by virtue of which organisms maintain their 
integrity in spite of impinging environmental disturbances. 
Living organisms are vulnerable, healthy life being able to 
thrive only within a narrow range of conditions. A living 
-8- 
organism is an open system (see Appendix C, section C-5) en- 
gaged in a continuous exchange of materials with its external 
world. Entropic processes act to dissolve the orderly co- 
herence characterizing a functioning organism and make it 
uniform with its surrounding. These processes are countered 
by an opposing activity by which environmental constituents 
are being continuously synthesized into a stable pattern, and 
by which the integrity of the organism is, at least tempo- 
rarily, maintained. 
The idea that living organisms are stable entities 
maintaining a fragile integrity in the face of constant en- 
vironmental flux was not altogether new to 20th Century biol- 
ogists. In its primitive form, Cannon traced the concept to 
Hippocrates. It is only in the 19th Century, however, that 
earlier "vitalistic" notions gave way to essentially physio- 
logical explanations anticipating the key cybernetic ideas of 
feedback and control. In 1817, Magendie used the term 
"reflexis" to define the cyclical activity produced by a dis- 
turbance which traveled along specific channels from the 
affected part of the body to the central nervous system, to 
be reflected along other channels back to the point of origin, 
where it reversed or inhibited the effects of the disturbance 
which initiated it. (6) Later (1878), Claude Bernard suggested 
that in order to survive perturbations originating from the 
external world, an organism must be able to maintain an in- 
ternal environment, its "milieu interne, " in a constant con- 
dition. He wrote : "It is the fixity of the 'milieu interieur' 
_gp 
which is the condition of free and independent life, and all 
the vital mechanisms, however varied they may be, have only 
one object, that of preserving the internal environment. "(7) 
Following these ideas Cannon was able to demon- 
strate that the stability of the animal's internal environ-- 
ment is mediated by complex interactions of specific physio- 
logical process. He defined homeostasis as the steady states 
maintained in the organism by the coordinated activity of its 
interacting physiological processes. (8) These, he showed, 
were organized in a cyclic chain of cause and effect whereby 
a displacement from a normal condition set in motion compen- 
sating actions reversing the effects of the displacement. 
While the idea of reflexis was conceived in rela- 
tion to the organism's automatic "behavioral" reactions to 
external disturbances, homeostasis has been associated with 
processes that maintain its internal environment stable. 
Cybernetics has shown both mechanisms to be essentially of a 
similar type. In both, an established condition constituting 
a "norm, " is maintained by complex cyclic chains of activi- 
ties. Both are goal-directed and self-regulating (in the 
sense of Appendix C, section C-7) and belong to the general 
class of purposeful mechanisms whose universal operating 
structure was brought to light by Bigelow, Wiener and Rosen- 
blueth. 
Homeostatic mechanisms operate as error-controlled 
regulators following the scheme of a typical feedback system. 
The structure of the mechanism entails the following func- 
-10-- 
tional elements: a goal setting device defining the desired 
state of the system; an arrangement by which the actual con- 
dition of the system can be monitored; a means for comparing 
the actual with the desired state and computing the discrep- 
ancy between the two; and finally a mechanism which is acti- 
vated to correct for deviations when a discrepancy between 
the actual and the desired state of the system is registered. 
These basic functions are organized in a closed. 
loop structure that is characteristic of a feedback system. 
In the case of homeostatic mechanisms, the feedback around 
the circuit is negative. (For the generalized block-diagram, 
see Figure C-3 of section C-7 in Appendix C. ) The mechanism 
operates as follows: an input signal representing the goal, 
and a signal representing the actual state of the system are 
fed into a comparator where the value of the latter is sub- 
tracted from the former to obtain a measure of deviation. 
From this measure of deviation a control signal is derived. 
It is used to activate the appropriate "effector" which acts 
to reduce the detected error and restore the system to its 
desired state. There is a constant monitoring of the system's 
actual condition and measures of discrepancy are continuously 
fed back around the closed circuit with the result of keeping 
the system stable around its assigned equilibrium. 
In technological devices such as a man-made servo- 
mechanism, elements represented in the typical feedback loop 
diagram, and the information channels which connect them, 
normally coincide with specific and functionally distinct 
-11- 
pieces of hardware. In biological systems, on the other 
hand, where physiological processes involving chemical reac-- 
tions are concerned, complexity may rule out the possibility 
of resolving the functioning of the whole mechanisms into 
distinct entities. (9) The general principle of self-r_egula- 
tion underlies both, and it is universally applicable to all 
the physiological processes which operate to maintain vital 
conditions constant. 
A typical case is that of temperature regulation in 
warm-blooded animals. (10) A drop in the temperature of the 
body stimulates the appropriate centers in the nervous system 
and these activate various heat-producing mechanisms as well 
as processes which act to reduce heat losses. The actual 
body temperature is monitored back to the controlling center 
(which is located in the diencephalon in the base of the 
brain) either by the temperature of the blood or by nerve im- 
pulses arriving from the surface of the body. By means of 
such continuous monitoring and the activation of appropriate 
mechanisms that oppose deviations from the norm, the temper- 
ature of the body's internal environment is kept uniform. 
Similar homeostatic mechanisms regulate the con- 
stancy of a great number of other physiological conditions. 
In addition to thermoregulation, they involve the regulation 
of osmotic pressure and body posture, the reg ui_ation of salt 
concentration in the blood, of blood sugar, blood protein, 
blood fat and calcium, the regulation of adequate oxygen 
supply and respiration in general, the regulation of the 
-12-- 
coagulation of blood, blood clotting and many more. Notwith-- 
standing their specific mode of functioning, 11) the basic 
operational features of these varied mechanisms are similar. 
They all operate promptly and automatically to reverse the 
effects of adverse conditions that threaten internal st_abi_l- 
ity. 
The automatic operation of homeostatic mechanisms 
is essential in guaranteeing a high likelihood of success in 
maintaining critical conditions constant. These mechanisms 
have been perfected by countless generations and by a long 
evolutionary experience. They operate by following precise 
procedures, built into the organism by a long adaptive inter- 
action with a particular environment, and by the survival. 
optimizing experiences that such an interaction entails. 
There seems to be a principle involved, which turns a prob- 
lem threatening survival, once it is effectively "solved, " 
into a prescription for action that can be followed routinely 
and automatically. This automatic functioning of physiolog- 
ical homeostatic mechanisms is particularly significant to 
higher animals, as it makes possible the investment of 
"creative" energies in higher forms of behavior. As Cannon 
suggested: "We find the organism liberated for its more 
complicated and socially important tasks because it lives in 
a fluid matrix which is automatically kept in a constant con- 
dition. " (12) 
While the underlying principles are similar, the 
simplicity implied in a negative feedback system with a 
L -"1 3- 
single loop rarely coincides with the structure of homeostatic 
mechanisms in the body. Homeostatic mechanism in biologica) 
organisms are embodied in a complex web-like -. 4ructure of 
interacting processes, such that unique partitioning is often 
quite impossible. Thus, different physiological processes 
may interact to maintain a single equilibrium, or the very 
same processes may be involved with the functioning of a few 
different homeostatic systems. The point has been stressed 
by Goldman, (13) who demonstrated the great redundancy associ- 
ated with mechanisms regulating blood sugar. Such a use of 
redundancy is typical to physiological processes and to bio- 
logical organisms in general. (14) It ensures a reduction in 
operational errors and offers a considerable factor of safety 
against possible malfunctioning of vital mechanisms. It is 
precisely this redundance in mechanisms that ensures adaptive 
capabilities and guarantees the flexible viability and enor- 
mous stability of biological organisms. 
1-1.2. Homeostasis and Ultrastability 
Cannon's original concept of homeostasis has been 
extended significantly by Ashby who developed a rigorous 
formulation, (15) linking the idea of homeostasis to the gen- 
eral problems of adaptation and survival. The key idea in 
Ashby's formulation is that the concept of a. system's sur- 
vival can be objectively defined with respect to a set of 
critical variables-- its "essential" variables--the nature 
and value of which will vary for different systems. In 
-l4 -- 
biological organisms, for example, essential variables are 
physiological in nature. They are fixed (genetically) and 
species specific. For an animal to survive requires keeping 
the value of its essential variables within specific physio- 
logical limits. This end is mediated by homeostatic mechan- 
isms which maintain the stability of essential variables in 
spite of impinging disturbances. 
Homeostasis is achieved when regulation is exer- 
cised such that the effect of a disturbance is so matched to 
the actions of a regulating mechanism that the outcome of 
their interaction restores the value of an essential variable 
even after a displacement. Such regulation is affected by 
physiological processes (such as those brought to light by 
Cannon) but higher manifestations of behavior operate to en- 
sure the same end. The principles of homeostasis which 
underlie both are identical. (16) 
A system's homeostasis is a manifestation of its 
adaptation to a specific environment in the sense that homeo-- 
static mechanisms relate to specific disturbances which are 
typical features of a given environments If such an environ- 
ment is orderly, if it is subject to the operation of a set 
of unvarying constraints, some "disturbances" will occur, and 
reoccur, with a higher probability than others. The homeo- 
static mechanisms that are actually operative in a system. 
reflect a measure of this probability. They are set up to 
coincide with the typical pattern of events dominating the 
system's interaction with its world. 
-15- 
The same idea can be stated differently by saying 
that the transfer function which determines a system's counter- 
disturbance action, its "behavioral" output, must bear some 
specific relation to inputs originating from its surroundings. 
If we assume varying input signals representing different ex- 
ternal conditions, we would say that a system has adapted to 
its environment if its activities coincide with a particular 
distribution of signals characterizing conditions in the en- 
vironment, such that an overall stability is maintained. 
Ashby's thesis is that "adaptive" behavior corre- 
sponds to a behavior which maintains essential variables 
within their physiological limits. (17) The idea of adapta- 
tion is thus linked to the notion of a behavior of a stable 
system, "the region of the stability being the region of the 
phase-space in which all the essential variables lie within 
their normal limits. "(18) Seen in this perspective, the con- 
cept of homeostasis can be extended from the animal's inborn, 
internal processes to the wide range of activities it directs 
towards the world, and it is equally applicable to the simple 
activities of lower organisms and to the more complex behavior 
of higher animals. All these have one common goal: promoting 
survival. 
Here, a problem is encountered. In simple servo- 
mechanisms, as in the vegetative system of biological organ- 
isms, homeostatic mechanisms respond correctly because crit- 
ical disturbances have been anticipated and the appropriate 
responses have been prescribed in advanced (By the designer 
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in the case of a servomechanisms, and by the long experience 
of interacting with a specific environment in the case of an 
organism. ) Such simple homeostatic mechanisms, in which 
actions restoring stability are wholly prespec fled, cannot 
account for the general problem of adaptive behavior. The 
original concept of homeostasis had to be extended, therefore, 
in order to explain a capability of preserving stability even 
in the face of unpredictable perturbations. This extension 
is provided by the concept of ultrastability. 
An ultrastable system is capable of restoring a 
stable state even under conditions where remedial actions are 
not fully specified by its transfer function. This capability 
involves an alteration of the transfer function itself. in a 
way that adjusts it to varying disturbances. There clearly 
is a limit to the magnitude of displacement that a given sys- 
tem can tolerate. The essence of the idea of adaptation, 
however, is that within an acceptable range of perturbations 
an adaptive system can maintain stability even if it is con- 
fronted with a new and "unfamiliar" disturbance. Effects of 
such a disturbance can be reversed if the value of an exist- 
inch transfer function is altered, continuously or by a step 
function, until a configuration is hit upon under which 
stability is restored. A process of trial and error is im- 
plied which underlies the search for an appropriate trans- 
formation. As Ashby argues, "The basic rule for adaptation 
by trial and error is: ---if the trial. is unsuccessful, change 
the way of behaving; when and only wehen it is successful, 
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retain-the way of behaue inq ." (i9 ) 
In the ultrastable system, Beer points out, there 
is no need to predict disturbances or even to understand 
their origin. "To be aware of something happening and label 
it disturbances, and to. be able to alter internal states 
until the effects of the disturbance are offset, is enough, "(2 0) 
The difference is in the strategy employed by a simple auto- 
matic controller on the one hand, and an adaptive controller 
on the other. (21) In the former, there is a specific deci- 
sion rule available which specifies explicitly what correc- 
tive action is to be taken for each defineable change of 
state in the environment. In the latter, unpredictable dis- 
turbances are admitted and there is no unique decision rule 
for the system to follows Instead, there is a general 
strategy (underspecified in the sense of section C-8 in 
Appendix C) directing the system to "experiment" with a set 
of possible state transformations in a search which, follow- 
ing a displacement, is to be continued until a former state 
of stability is restored, or a new state of stability found. 
Adaptation by ultrastability, according to Ashby, 
can be explained by assuming a mechanism of "self-vetoing" 
which excludes all partial states of equilibrium accepting 
only those states for which all the system's essential vari- 
ables are within their normal limits. (2,2) This is to say 
that for a dynamic system with multiple equilibria to be 
stable, all its interacting parts must each be in a state of 
equilibrium. If we imagine two parts, A and B, coupled to 
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each other such that the output of one is the input of the 
other and vice-versa, the system as a whole can reach a state 
of equilibrium only if both A and B are in an equilibrial 
condition. If only one part settles into a state of equilib- 
rium, the instability of the other will force it out and the 
process will continue until a condition of stability is found 
which includes both. There is a process of selection in- 
volved acting towards the condition of equilibrium which sat- 
isfies the whole. It accounts for the dynamic stability that 
is typical to adaptive processes, lending the concept of 
ultrastability its great generality. 
1-1.3. The Universality of Homeostatic Mechanisms 
The concept of homeostasis articulates the prin_ci- 
ple of a particular type of stability where deviations from 
a system's states of equilibrium are opposed by the appro- 
priate, self-induced, counter actions. The concept is em- 
bodied in mechanisms which are characterized by a specific 
structure and it is associated with processes involving goal 
directedness and self-regulation. The operation of homeo- 
static mechanisms has been identified with the working of 
the internal vegetative system in biological organisms and 
it has been extended to account for various higher manifesta- 
tions of behavior as well. The principle extends even 
further as it is manifest in a. great variety of systems in 
all levels of reality. Consequently, while the concept 
originated in physiology, it is now used quite universally 
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to describe a principle of regulation and a condition of 
stability that are -typical under certain circumstances to 
dynamic systems in general. 
The ideas of homeostasis and error-controlled regu- 
lation in physiology and man-made servomechanisms have pro- 
vided an important source to early developments in cyber- 
netics, and, in this context, they have been discussed ex- 
tensively. (23) These concepts have subsequently been found 
useful in accounting for the characteristics of regulatory 
processes in significantly diverse phenomena. A few cases, 
selected from different fields ranging from genetics to 
ecology, will illustrate the point. 
Lerner, for example, has suggested that homeostatic 
mechanisms can be identified on the genetic level of an inter- 
breeding population. In such a population, he has shown, 
there is a tendency to equilibrate the genetic compositon and 
there are self-regulating processes at work which resist 
sudden changes from established genetic equilibrium. (24) 
Similarly, Jung has described the psyche in terms of self- 
regulating processes which operate to maintain a state of 
equilibrium and which are characterized by compensating 
actions that follow stressful evens. (25) 
On the level of social systems, the concept of 
homeostasis has found an extensive use and the working of 
homeostatic mechanisms in society have been linked to the 
function of established traditions, social conventions, 
rituals and the like. Cannon himself emphasized the sig- 
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nificance of viewing various social processes with the notion 
of homeostatic stability in mind and in the epilogue to The 
Wisdom of the Body he suggested the existence of an analogy 
between physiological and social homeostasis. Wiener dis- 
cussed the stability in small and "closely knit" communities 
in similar terms, (26) and since the advent of the Macy Con- 
ferences immediately following the Second-World War, the 
notion of steady state regulation in social systems has 
become an important tool in the conceptual kit of anthro- 
pologists. (27) Specifically, there are models like Wilkins', 
for example, who proposed that the distribution of certain 
attributes in a population, such as different occupations, 
are characterized by statistical regularities which are main- 
tained by various social pressures acting to keep an estab- 
lished status-quo. (28) A different kind of model portraying 
social homeostasis is offered by Rappaport, (29) in a study 
which emphasizes the regulatory function of rituals in main- 
taming a society stable in the context of its environment. 
In the more specialized area of management science, Beer has 
provided models of homeostatic regulation in industry and 
business organizations. (30) 
On yet another level, that of ecological systems, 
it is now recognized that there are many complex homeostatic 
mechanisms at work. Wynne Edwards, for example, discussed 
the role of communication-related processes in maintaining 
population densities of animals stable, and he emphasized 
the symbolic function of display behavior in mediating this 
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stability. (31) Slobodkin performed a series of convincing 
laboratory experiments showing the tendency of an ecosystem 
consisting of various animals and plants to settle into a 
condition of steady state. When perturbations are introduced 
into such stable environments, various compensating mechan- 
isms are brought into play involving changes in reproduction 
rate, body size, development rate, and so forth. (32) 
These are only few and brief examples, but they 
serve to illustrate a crucial point, namely that from the 
viewpoint of regulation there is clearly a general principle 
at work cutting across the levels into which reality is con- 
ceptually demarcated, and integrating its dynamic manifesta- 
tions in a complex heterarchy of mutually interacting and 
interaccommodating self-regulating processes. 
In the following pages attention will be focused 
on an example of steady state regulation in a social system. 
This from a particular viewpoint that seeks to emphasize the 
global characteristics of homeostatic regulation in a well- 
adapted society viewed as a who? e. Rappaport`s work on the 
Tsembaga, a New Guinea people, has brought to light the regu- 
latory function of rituals in mediating the homeostatic 
stability of a specific society in the context of its ecology. 
It is a particularly suitable illustration, and it will be 
discussed extensively below. 
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1-2. Steady State Regulation in a Well. --Adapted Social 
System 
1-2.1. The Tsembaga--General Background 
In Pigs for the Ancestor_s, (33) Rappaport provides 
an anthropological account of the Tsembaga, a small and. 
closely bounded cluster of clans who inhabit a remote and 
physically isolated territory within the "Bismarck Mountains" 
range of New Guinea. At the time when Rappaport's fieldwork 
was carried out (October 1962 to December 1963), the Tsembaga 
had still been only minimally exposed to Europeans. They 
could thus offer a case study of an isolated local culture 
adapted to the specific circumstances of its particular en- 
vironment. A major concern of Rappaport`s study is with an 
interpretation of the function of religious behavior, specif- 
ically the function of rituals shared by the Tsembaga, in 
affecting the fundamental relationships between major com- 
ponents comprising their local system. 
The study emphasizes the role of rituals in the 
context of the adaptation of a social system to specific en- 
vironmental circumstances. It brings to light not only the 
function of rituals in mediating the relationships between 
members of a closely knit community, but also the ways in 
which rituals regulate relationships between such a community 
and pertinent entities in its environment. Rituals, in other 
words, are shown to have an important practical effect on the 
external world, namely, the environment in which the social 
system exists and of which it is an integral part. The 
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regulating function of rituals is interpreted in essentially 
cybernetic terms, thus making the study especially useful in 
illustrating the kind of stability which is typical to well 
adapted societies existing in environments that are character- 
ized by a low rate of change. 
Before we move to discuss the functioning of ritual 
as a mechanism of regulation, a few brief notes on the Tsem- 
baga and their background may be appropriate. (34) The Tsem- 
baga consists of a group which includes approximately 200 
individuals occupying an area of roughly three square miles. 
They are one of about 20 similar local groups that range in 
size from 100 to 900 individuals, comprising a total popula- 
tion of roughly 7000 people sharing a common language (haring) 
and living in a close proximity within the adjacent "Jimi" 
and "Simbai" valleys. The terrain of the region they inhabit 
is mountainous and heavily forested, and within the small 
territory occupied by the Tsembaga E, ltitudes range from 2,200 
to 7,200 feet, with slopes becoming pronouncedly steep above 
5,000 feet. Measured orthographically, Tsembaga territory 
includes some 2,033 acres, almost half (48%) of which are 
covered by virgin forest or growth resembling virgin forest. 
Computed by the total orthographic area, population density 
is about 64 persons per square mile. 
The local technology is extremely simple including 
such tools as digging sticks, steel axes and bushknives that 
are used for gardening. Bows and arrows are used for hunting 
as well as for warfare, where they are supplemented with 
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spears, axes, and wooden shields. Vaiious simple traps are 
also used and gourds as well as bamboo tubes are utilized as 
containers and cooking vessels, although most cooking is done 
on open fires or in earth ovens. Various local fibres are 
employed for weaving such items as loin cloths, net bags, 
caps, strings, aprons, and so forth. Prior to exposure to 
the Australians who now administer their territory, the 
Tsembaga used to manufacture salt (by boiling mineral water), 
some of which was traded for stone ax blades produced by a 
neighboring group. 
Tsembaga subsistence depends on horticulture, sil- 
viculture, hunting, gathering, and the domestication of 
animals. Gardens are cut in the forest and they are planted 
with taro, yam, sweet potatoes, and sugar cane. Manioc, 
bananas, other fruits and various greens are also included. 
Various trees bearing edible materials are planted, some in 
groves, providing the population with edible green leaves 
and fruits. Hunting, trapping, and gathering contribute a 
large variety of non-domesticated resources, ranging from 
wild animals and additional vegetables to fire wood, building 
materials, and other essential substances. Animal husbandry 
includes pigs, dogs, chickens, and cassowaries, but pigs are 
by far the most important. 
In addition to providing the Tseznbaga with a source 
of nutrients, pigs assist in the cultivation of gardens where, 
by digging for roots, they eliminate weeds and seedling trees, 
turning and softening the ground thus making future planting 
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easier. Pigs also help keep residential areas clean by feed- 
ing on garbage and human feces, and they provide an easily 
accessible source of protein when protein is needed at times 
of stress or physical injury. Tsembaga ritual is closely 
bound up with pigse Various rituals require sacrificial 
slaughter of pigs and the length of the ritual cycle itself; 
as well as the occurrence of specific events that mark it, 
depend on the size and composition of the pig herd. Pigs, 
especially young ones, are cared for with a great deal of 
attention, sharing living quarters with women until they are 
about one year old. During this time pigs are subjected to 
a great deal of petting and stroking and are provided with 
choice food, thus becoming strongly bound to humans. The 
bond that is established is so strong that, as Rappaport 
points out, "it is hardly facetious to say that the pig 
through its early socialization becomes a member of a Maring 
family. " (3 5) 
Like other similar local groups, the Tsembaga form 
a single territorial unit as far as defense and the sharing 
of local resources are concerned. Within the boundaries of 
their territory, all Tsembaga share the rights to non-domes- 
ticated resources. These rights are exclusive to the Tsem- 
baga in that they exclude all other local groups which are 
associated, in turn, with their own exclusive areas.. It is 
within their well-defined, jointly defended and shared terri-- 
tory that the Tsembaga form a coherent population in a social 
as well as ecological sense. Inside this shared territory 
i 
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there is a division into smaller sub-territories associated 
with memberships in clans and sub--clans. Within these, par- 
ticular garden sites are claimed by individual males. Title 
to the land is normally associated with patrilineal inherit- 
ance or the clearance of a new site. It is not very rigidly 
established, however, and men who lack sufficient. land for 
cultivation may obtain it simply by approaching a better en_- 
dowed member of their sub-clan and asking for a transfer of 
ownership. Similar transfers may also occur between whole 
sub-clans, with the result that inequities do not tend to 
reinforce themselves. 
Inside Tsernbaga territory, residential patterns do 
not follow land use, and they change significantly during the 
ritual cycle. A residential pattern may be highly nucleated 
at one point in the cycle, but as the pig herd grows a more 
scattered pattern becomes typical. The structure and nature 
of social relationships depend, to a great extent, on the 
residential pattern and how the latter fluctuates with vary- 
ing densities. Social relations and intermingling intensifies 
as density rises until a point of intolerable density is 
reached where fusion occurs, decreasing thereby the intensity 
of social contacts. As a rule, men and women live in separate 
quarters. Men share communal houses, whereas married women 
and widows have each a separate house in which they live with 
unmarried daughters, young sons, and pigs. 
Among the Tsembaga there are no designated chief- 
tains or privileged individuals who hold substantial authority 
7. _ 
over others. While some men are especially admired for their 
experience, capabilities, or "knowledge, " decisions are 
reached communally and are not generated repeatedly by a 
specific powerful individual. Decisions are reached during 
seemingly unstructured discussions and they tend to reflect 
a spontaneous concensus formed during the-general "airing" of 
opinions. Following such discussions, specific decisions are 
not ac, ý.. ually formulated, but any individual may initiate an 
act that is pertinent to the problem under discussion. If 
the general concensus is in agreement with his initiatory 
action, he will be joined eventually by others. Otherwise, 
the action will not be pursued. 
Relationships with other local groups are either 
friendly or hostile. If relations are friendly; they are 
manifest in the exchange of women, goods, and pork, and in 
alliances during warfare. If relations are hostile f they are 
characterized by rigidly self-enforced "mutual avoidance" and 
by occasional outbreaks of actual. warfare. Because of the 
stiff requirements to avenge all casualties that bind both 
sides, and because an even score is difficult to achieve, 
local wars tend to perpetuate themselves. Nei. -ertheless, a 
truce may put a temporary end to fighting even if the score 
remains uneven. Like all other important features of Tsem-" 
baga life, both friendly and hostile relations are regulated 
by the performance of specific rituals. The ritual dominates 
the behavior of the entire system, integrating -J. is various 
components and mediating the stability of particular variable. 
.. -2S- 
as well as the viability of the systern as a who , 'c. 
1-2.2. T'-, e Ritual Cycle 
Rituals performed by the Tsembaga in the context of 
their ritual cycle affect entities which, together with the 
Tsembaga themselves, constitute the entire local ecosystem. 
The major components of this local ecosystem interact in many 
complex ways and they affect one another continuously. The 
crucial issue in Rappaport's study centers around his inter- 
pretation of the role of rituals in mediating the relations 
between entities that interact to form the entire system. 
These entities include the Tsernbaga population, 
other living organisms, especially pigs, the local vegetation, 
the non--living components of the environment arid, in a sense, 
the spirits which constitute for the Tsernba_ga a 
"real_, " part 
of the world. In the context of a larger and more inclusive, 
regional system, other neighboring human group gare also in-- 
cluded. (36) Specifically, as Rappaport points out, the per- 
formance of rituals affects the following: 
*The relationships between humans, pigs, and gardens. 
*The killing of pigs and the distribution and con- 
sumption of pork. 
*The hunting and consumption of non-domesticated 
animals. 
*The density of human population and the distribu- 
Lion of land. 
*The frequency and severity of warfare. 
*The exchange of goods and people between local 
groups. 
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The ritual cycle functions as a regulating mechan- 
ism, operating to maintain pertinent system's variables 
within desired limits. "Essential" variables in the sense 
of Ashby are here associated with such quantities as the size 
of the local human population, the amount of land under cul- 
tivation, the number of pigs, and others. To an outside ob- 
server (such as the anthropologist), the system as a whole 
appears as self-regulating in that any "internal" deviation 
from a desired norm initiates automatically a process that 
restores stability. The initiation of an appropriate stabil- 
izing process is regulated entirely by the ritual cycle,.. and 
the nature of each such process relates to the performance of 
a specific ritual. 
The Tsernbaga ritual cycle is characterized by the 
performance of rituals in a prescribed routine consisting of 
related events that follow each other sequentially. The 
cycle is marked by four major events which are associated 
with the performance of specific rituals and which signal 
significant transition points of the whole system. According 
to Rappaport the cycle may take twelve to fifteen years to 
complete (significant departures from this mean are possible), 
depending on the conditions of the pig population and other 
relevant factors. Events which occur durinc, the cycle are 
contingent upon states of various components in the regional 
system. and the rituals that are performed during the cycle 
affect the value of these components and the relations between 
them, For example, the completion of the "Kaiko, " the year- 
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long festival during which the size of the pig herd is dras- 
tically reduced, signals the beginning of a period in which 
warfare between local groups may be initiated. On the other 
hand, performance of the ritual in which "rumbim, " a local 
plant, is planted ceremonially, terminates the period of war- 
fare and signals a strict prohibition on the initiation of 
open hostilities. This prohibition lasts until the state of 
the whole system "requires" that the Kaiko will be staged 
once more, to be followed by the eruption of fightings, and 
so the cycle repeats itself. 
Rituals that are performed in conjunction with the 
four major events in the cycle rarely relate to a single 
state of the system. They effect the whole system in 
dif- 
ferent and complex ways. Thus, the Kaiko which serves to 
reduce the number of pigs when the herd reaches an intoler- 
able size, also affects regional. distribution of goods, the 
stimulation of matings between members of friendly local 
groups, and the encouragement of various other manifestations 
of social interaction and social exchange. Similarly, the 
planting of rumbim, which signifies the termination of fight- 
ing, serves to redefine the association of individuals with 
particular local groups as well. 
To illustrate the nature of the processes involved, 
some of the major features of the ritual cycle as well as the 
dynamics of the mechanisms that regulate the size of the pig 
population, local trade, the distribution of wealth and the 
exchange of people between local groups, are summarized in 
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Figures 1 to 6 below. 
Figure 1 provides a simplified representation of 
the structure of the ritual cycle showing the sequence of 
major events that dominate it. A somewhat more detailed 
representation is given in Figure 2, where the major events 
of the cycle are depicted as transition points for the whole 
system (circles), and the characteristics of the periods 
that follow each such. transition are described (rectangular. 
boxes). The most prominent feature of the cycle, as illus- 
trated by Figures 1 and 2, is the regulation of alternating 
periods of peace and fighting, and of a time in which the 
pig herd is allowed to grow in size and a time in which it 
is deliberately reduced. 
The cycle, according to Rappaport-`s account, cul- 
minates. with the "Kaiko, " a year-long festival marked by an 
extensive slaughter of pigs. The Kaiko is initiated by a 
ritual in which the rumbim, planted ceremonially after pre- 
vious termination of fighting, is uprooted. The signal that 
the time has come to uproot the rumbim, and consequently to 
initiate the Kaiko, is provided by rising social tension, and 
especially by increasing women's discontent expressed in ex- 
tensive wailing. This discontent results from an increase in 
the number of pigs which puts a growing pressure on the women 
who have to tend them. Actual preparations for the Kaiko 
begin with a ritual in which stakes are planted at the terri- 
tory's boundary. This ritual, in which members of other 
friendly local groups paz: tici pate, acts to redefine territorial 
-32-- 
Figure 1. The Tsemhaga Ritual Cycle - General Structure. 
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boundaries claimed by particular groups, as well as to reaf- 
firm alliances for joint territorial defense. The stake 
planting ritual may also be associated with annexation of 
new land. This will occur if a hostile group that had been 
driven out of its own territory during a previous period of 
fighting did not return to plant r. umbim. In such a case, 
claim can be made to enemy's territory and the stakes are 
planted in new locations. Otherwise they are planted at the 
old boundary, thus reaffirming its validity. 
Following the uprooting of the rumbim, the pig 
festival begins with the performance of the appropriate 
rituals. As previously mentioned, the number of pigs is 
drastically reduced (by slaughter) during 4 -he year-long fes- 
tival. But the Kaiko is also characterized by large-scale 
entertainment of friendly local groups who are invited to 
join the festivities. These festive occasions are marked by 
ceremonial dancing during which, following the display beha- 
vior of male dancers, indirect contact is made between eli- 
gible members of the opposite sexes. Actual courtship, how- 
ever, must await the terminat: ion. of the Kaiko. The same 
festivities facilitate trade as well, and men who have as- 
sembled for the ceremonies use these occasions for exchang- 
ing objects of value. 
The Kaiko reaches its peak with a series of events 
during which most of the pigs are slaughtered. These events, 
which build up towards the -termination of the Kaiko, are 
associated, among other things, with the abrogation of taboos 
-35-- 
affecting intergroup relations. The significance of such 
events extends to the regulation of regional relations as 
well, as they involve regional distribution of pork through 
ceremonial presentations, and the payment of all debts and 
outstanding obligations to friends and allies. 
The Kaiko, in summary, does not only act to reduce 
the number of pigs, but it facilitates mate selection and 
marriages, as well as the exchange of goods between friendly 
groups. It affects the regional distribution of pork, the 
payment of all debts and obligations due, for example, for 
help in previous fights, and it involves a reconfirmation of 
alliances in anticipation of new hostilities. The Kaiko of 
fects regional as well as intergroup relations and it brings 
the whole system to a point where a new cycle can begin. 
As soon as the Kaiko is brought to conclusion, 
truces which had been established after the last round of 
fighting become invalid, and according to Rappaport, at for- 
mer times warfare would have normally broken out again within 
a short time. (37) Like other aspects of Tsembaga life, war- 
fare, too, is regulated by rituals which specify the nature 
and extent of military activity. Due to the reciprocal need 
of avenging losses, wars tend to be self--perpetuating. 
Fighting may be temporarily terminated, however, when one 
group establishes dominance over another or when antagonists 
reach a compromise and establish a truce. The ending of war- 
fare and the establishment of truce is associated with the 
ritual of planting rumbim and participation in this ritual 
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serves to define membership of individuals in a particular 
group. The ritual signifies peace, and a strict prohibition 
of warfare, and it reorients the population towards a period 
of peaceful activity and growth. The pig herd is allowed to 
increase once more, and the whole system moves toward the 
point at which conditions will demand that the Kaiko be 
staged again, bringing yet another cycle to its end. 
While Figures 1 and 2 provide an overview of the 
ritual cycle, Figures 3,4 and 5 that follow represent the 
mechanisms involved with regulating the pig population. The 
general outline of processes which regulate the size of the 
pig herd is depicted in Figure 3. As shown in this Figure, 
the size of the pig population depends essentially on the 
general well-being of the human population in that various 
misfortunes such as sickness or frequent deaths require con- 
stant slaughter of pigs. A stressful existence of humans 
puts a heavy demand on sacrificing pigs, and -the herd can 
only increase slowly, if at all. When conditions are good, 
on the other hand, and the human population prospers, the 
herd can expand rapidly and the number of pigs will increase. 
A point will be reached sooner or later, however, at which 
the growing size of the herd will begin to exert pressure on 
the social system, thus affecting the well-being of the human 
population. Such pressure will result in a public demand to 
uproot the rumbim and stage a Kaiko, the ultimate outcome of 
which will be a significant reduction in the number of pigs. 
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Representing a finer resolution level, Figure 4 
shows the effects that the size of the herd has on the human 
population and how these effects relate to the Kaiko. As 
the diagram indicates, an expanding pig population has vari- 
ous adverse effects on the social system. The combined re- 
suit is growing agitation and tension which ultimately build 
up to an intolerable point. Actions are then taken through 
the Kaiko to bring down the number of pigs. Adverse effects 
of a growing number of pigs relate to the following: 
1. With a growing herd, an increasing physical 
effort in tending the pigs is re_quired. 
2. With a growing number of pigs, more and 
more incidents of pigs transgressing 
gardens occur. 
3. With an expanding herd, the human habitat 
becomes increasingly more scattered. 
4. A growing herd has the effect of reducing 
social contact (related to 3 above). 
Outcomes of these adverse effects are manifest respectively 
in the following: 
1. A growing discontent of women who have 
to tend to the pigs and who express their 
growing burden by voicing complaints. 
2. Garden transgression causes damage, occa- 
sional killing of pigs, fights between 
neighbors, and thus an increasing social 
tension. 
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3. As the pattern of habitat becomes more 
dispersed, local groups become more 
vulnerable to attack. 
4. As opportunities for social contact are 
reduced, the process of "decision making" 
becomes less effective due to the fact 
that consensus is usually reached by in- 
formal communal conversations. 
All these accumulate to produce a growing sense of social 
pressure, agitation, and discontent which at a certain point 
outweighs the overall utility value of pigs. At this point. 
the relationship between pigs and humans changes fundamentally. 
Pigs cease to be a source of support and become a major source 
of burden. Their parasitic dependency puts growing demands 
on human efforts and increasingly more pressure on the social 
system. Under this pressure a public demand to uproot the 
rumbim develops and a consensus is finally reached to stage 
the Kaiko, by the end of which the number of pigs is sub- 
stantially reduced. 
From the viewpoint of another resolution level, the 
regulation of the size of the pig population is part of a 
comprehensive mechanism which regulates the combined demand 
of humans and pigs on the carrying capacity of the terri- 
tory, (38) ensuring that the carrying capacity will not be 
exceeded. The general feature of this regulating mechanism 
is shown in Figure 5. Here, both humans and pigs are re- 
garded as interacting components of one total population. 
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Their relative size makes a combined demand on the carrying 
capacity of the territory as well as on the social system 
itself. If the combined demand of humans and pigs were to 
exceed the actual carrying capacity of the territory, two 
processes could be put into action in order to restore bal- 
ante. Firstly, the size of the human population could be 
kept down through various density-dependent processes such 
as dispersion, suppression of copulation, and the like (loop 
C in Figure 5). Secondly, the number of pigs could be re- 
duced through the Kaiko and other sacrificial rituals. One 
would expect that when the carrying capacity comes under 
pressure, the mechanism which reduces the number of pigs 
will be activated first (loop A). The mechanism regulating 
the demand on the carrying capacity has an inbuilt redundancy, 
however, which ensures that effective action will be taken 
before the carrying capacity is actually threatened. This 
redundancy is provided by the effects that a growing pig herd 
has on the social system. (These are the same effects which 
have been discussed in detail with respect to Figure 4 above. ) 
The crucial point is that the accumulating pressure on the 
social system activates processes leading to the Ka. ko and 
subsequently to a reduction in the number of pigs (loop B}, 
long before the limit of the carrying capacity is reached. 
The mechanism acts as an important safety device ensuring 
that the competitiveness of pigs for available resources will 
be effectively limited, and that she carrying capacity of the 
territory will not be seriously threatened. 
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The homeostatic characteristics of the, ritual cycle 
viewed as a whole are also manifest by the structure of some 
specific classes of activities which are responsible for re- 
turning parts of the system to a stable condition when devia- 
tions occur. A typical example is offered. by Rappaport's 
interpretation of the way trade and excess wealth affect the 
regional distribution of population. The homeostatic fea- 
tures of the processes involved are summarized in Figure 6. 
The diagram represents the interaction of two neighboring 
populations (from the Simbai and Jimi valley respectively), 
and it portrays a typical situation as it existed prior to 
contact with the Australian administration. At that time, 
the two populations traded their respective primary products 
--stone axes and salt. 
Let us start following the diagram on its left-hand 
side with the box depicting the population of the Simbai val- 
ley. People in the Simbai valley manufacture salt and they 
generate a demand for stone axes. Axes, in turn, are produced 
in the Jimi valley by people who cannot obtain salt locally. 
Axes and salt are thus traded between the two populations, but 
if the demand for one item is greater than the demand for the 
other, the difference will be accumulated as excess wealth in 
the form of objects of value. An increase in the population 
of the Simbai valley, for example,, may cause a significant 
increase in the demand for axes, resulting in an accumulation 
of wealth in the Jimi valley. This excess wealth allows men 
from the Jimi valley to obtain ]arides from the Simbai valley 
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thus affecting the local birth rate. Ultimately, the size of 
the population in the Simbai valley will fall, as will the 
demand for axes. In the same way, an accumulation of surplus 
wealth in the Simbai valley is likely to affect the popula- 
tion of the Jimi valley. Thus, trade and excess wealth, 
which are mutually dependent, provide a mechanism by which 
distribution of people in the region is mediated as they ai- 
fect a tendency to adjust difference in the population dynam"- 
ics of the two neighboring groups. (39) 
1-2.3. The Ritual Cycle--Further Cybernetic Considerations 
In the previous section, we have followed Rappaport's 
description and interpretation of the role of ritual in the 
ecology of the Tsembagae As Rappaport has shown, the ritual 
cycle fulfills an important regulatory role. In its capacity 
as a regulator, it functions as a complex homeostatic mechan- 
ism in that the performance of the various rituals associated. 
with the cycle operate to maintain the system's "essential" 
variables within the range of their acceptable values. 
"The system" has been defined in an ecological or 
regional context, and its essential variables have been iden- 
tified with the size of the human population, the number of 
pigs, the amount of land under cultivation, the general qual- 
ity of the environment c the severity and frequency of fight- 
ing, the density and distribution of the regional population, 
and so forth. Signals indicating that essential variables 
are exceeding, or are about tc exceed their limits, are con- 
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veyed by women's dissatisfaction, increase ;n social tension, 
and various other social and ecological manifestations, and 
the actions which function to restore the system's stability 
are triggered by specific rituals and are associated with 
such activities as the Kaiko, termination or initiation of 
fighting, and so on. 
Other important cybernetic features that character- 
ize the behavior of the Tsembaga and-the operation of the 
ritual cycle are brought to light by Rappaport's study. 
These include the idea that the ritual cycle, in addition to 
fulfilling a homeostatic function, also operates as a trans- 
ducer in that it converts changes of states in one part of 
the system into meaningful information that is made available 
to, and often affects, other parts of the system. For ex- 
ample, Rappaport points out, the act of uprooting the rumbim 
provides a well-defined message about the specific state of a 
particular local group, and it gives a good idea of what ac- 
tion may be expected from that group. Since much of the in- 
formation conveyed by events associated with the ritual cycle 
is binary in nature, the operation of the homeostatic regula- 
tion that is affected by the cycle is greatly simplified. 
This binary aspect of rituals means that states of the system 
are specified unambiguously. It thus reduces the possibility 
of error by ensuring the clarity of messages and by eliminat- 
ing the need for selection in securing the appropriate re- 
sponse.. (40) 
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Yet another significant cybernetic feature is ex- 
hibited by a redundancy in the structure of rituals and in 
the structure of decision making amongst the Tsenmbaga. In 
both cases, this redundancy is interpretable in terms of 
McCulloch' s model of the functioning of networks having a 
"redundancy of potential command. " (See section D-4 of Ap- 
pendix D. ) 
Concentrating only upon the homeostatic character- 
istics of the ritual cycle and the general problem of regu- 
lation in the context of social systems, the most important 
fact about the homeostatic function of the ritual is the 
fixed and automatic execution of its typical procedures. 
When carried out in response to specific events, such pro- 
cedures maintain (or restore) the system's stability in a 
way that is mechanically analogous to the aspects of in- 
stinctive behavior in animals that are discussed in Appendix 
D (section D-7). In both cases the concern is with a system 
that has become adapted to a particular environment. The 
adaptation is exhibited by activities conducive to the sys- 
tern's survival that are triggered automatically by specific 
conditions. In this respect, Rappaport's account of ritual 
regulation in the Tsembaga fits the "organizational model, "(41) 
and it can be easily portrayed in terms of organizations of 
related classes of programs, resembling -the hierarchies of 
goal-directed processes that are embodied in configurations 
of TOTE-.. like units. (42) From this viewpoint, stable condi- 
Lions of essential variables in the Tsembaga ecology are 
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identified with specific goal states. In response to discrep- 
ancies between the actual and the "desired" value of goal 
states, specific programs are automatically triggered and 
their execution has the effect of returning deviating values 
of particular variables to their stable condition. The cor- 
rective action is prescribed by the conventions of the ritual 
cycle which provide a formula specifying what action should 
be taken under what conditions. 
Because of its particular structure which is char- 
acterized by events that follow eacý-I other sequentially, the 
ritual cycle can be described as a sequential program, (43) 
and components of the cycle can be regarded as subroutines 
prescribing specific algorithms for actions that should be 
taken in particular situations. As conditions in the ecosys- 
tem change in a cyclical repetitive manner, the appropriate 
programs are triggered and executed in a sequence of responses 
that is synchronized with the sequence of changing events. 
There is, however, a definite control hierarchy contained in 
this sequence, in that different rituals, or different "pro- 
grams, " relate to different levels that characterize the sys- 
tem as a whole. Thus, while some programs mediate regional 
relationships, others regulate intergroup processes and yet 
others affect individual behavior. All these levels interact 
strongly and they integrate the various aspects of social 
behavior into a stable and coherent whole. (44 11 
There is another form of hierarchy involved in con- 
nection with specific classes of rituals relating to cases 
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where prescribed actions are organized in stages of intensity 
or scale. A good example is the class of rituals which regu- 
late fighting. This ritual can be represented as a hierarchy 
of programs with the goal of mitigating the severity of figh-lt- 
ing and keeping the loss of life within reasonable limits. 
The programs are organized on different levels corresponding 
to different aspects of warfare. On one level they regulate 
the frequency of fighting; on another level they provide tem- 
porary "stop" rules for fighting, once fighting has broken 
out; at another level they prescribe stages of confrontations 
with different degrees of severity. Finally, the programs 
define actions which are undertaken prior to a fight and 
which tend to limit its duration. For example, rituals in-- 
volving all-night dancing, the consumption of pig's fat at 
dawn, and a strict taboo on subsequent intake of water, ensure, 
as Rappaport suggests, that combatants will not be able to 
fight virorously for a lengthy interval. 
Viewed as a whole, the ritual cycle is a regulator 
containing a finite repertoire of programs that specify a set 
of possible behaviors. It is the specific means by which a 
particular society has adapted to its environment and the ef 
fectiveness of the programs provide a measure of this adapta- 
tion. The viability of the Tsembaga as a coherent social 
entity depends upon a repertoire of actions (prescribed by 
the cycle) rich enough to match the variety of conditions 
presented by the enviLonment. In other words, the stability 
which characterizes the Tsemhaga as a social system is due 
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to the fact that regulative procedures mediated by the cycle 
are capable of providing a "correct" response for each one of 
the various conditions that are presented to the system in 
the context of its well defined and isolated environment. 
For the Tsembaga, regulation is affected by a homeo- 
static mechanism, similar in principle to a simple thermostat. 
The effectiveness of the ritual cycle in regulating the rela-- 
tionships between the various components in the Tsembaga sys-- 
tem depends entirely on a totally stereotyped response. The 
programs embodied in the ritual cycle are fixed, fully speci- 
fled, and unambiguous and, like a simple homeostatic device, 
they employ a well defined decision rule. This decision rule 
determines what corrective action (prescribed by a program 
contained in the repertoire) will follow which change in the 
state of the system or its environment. As the environment 
does not represent essentially novel situations, the rigidity 
and automatic functioning of the ritual cycle ensure that the 
possibility of human error in deciding or formulating an ap- 
propriate course of action is kept to a minimum. The Tsembaga. 
need only perceive that the system has reached a particular 
state. Once this is recognized, the ritual specifies what 
action should be taken. The Tsembaga do not, for example, 
have to understand (and in fact they do not understand) the 
real operating principles involved in their activities. (As 
Rappaport emphasizes, all rituals are directed towards, and 
explained in relation to, supernatural entities, specifically 
the spirits, which the Tsembaga assume to be an important part 
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of their environment. ) 
This stereotype, automatic mode of regulation can 
be very effective even in cases where complex processes re- 
quiring precision and delicacy have to be controlled. For 
example, as Bronowsky points out, (45) Japanese metallurgy, 
and especially the art of forging swords which reached a high 
degree of perfection in Japan by the 9th Century, have always 
been associated with rituals. Lacking chemical formulae and 
scientific understanding, the correct repetition of a sequence 
of complex actions, involving precise control of temperatures 
and a combination of chemical ingredients, was ensured by fol- 
lowing a prescribed sequence of steps which were embodied in 
the structure of a ritualized ceremony. For this kind of 
regulation to be effective, one condition is essential, namely 
that circumstances underlying the processes that are being 
regulated will not change. The fixed and stereotyped solution 
can be effective only when the problem posed to the regulating 
mechanism remains essentially the same problem. 
This condition characterizes the Tsembaga world. 
Changes in the local system are cyclical, repetitive, and con- 
tain no fundamental deviations from conditions which have 
occurred in the past. Once the appropriate programs have 
been perfected through a long adaptive interaction with the 
environment, there is little need 
for further development for 
as long as the rate of change in the environment 
does not vary 
sigxii_ficantly. 
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Ritual regulation in the Tsembaga is associated with 
mechanisms by which a fixed systemic structure is maintaineC. 
The mechanism involved does not have to deal with the problem 
of continuous adaptation and it does not have to effect funda- 
mental changes in the system's structure in response to new 
environmental conditions. The rate of change in the Tseirbaga's 
world is negligible to the point of being imperceptible, and 
the basic conditions affecting their existence must appear 
much the same generation after generation. (46) The stereo- 
typed behaviors prescribed by the ritual cycle thus provide 
an effective survival strategy, and this effectiveness is re- 
inforced by the sacred nature of the rituals. The sanctity 
that is involved provides a level of ''meta-control'' ensuring 
that deviations from prescribed actions that have been proven 
successful in the past will not occur. 
Should conditions underlying the system's existence 
alter in any fundamental way, or should the system's environ- 
ment be characterized by a high rate of change, the strategy 
of following stereotyped actions may prove disastrous. In 
this sense, the simple homeostatic regulation that is suf- 
ficient for maintaining stability in the Tsembaga ecosystem 
must be regarded as a special case of regulation (although it 
can be found in a wide variety of systems). The more general 
case will be associated with a changing environment in which 
homeostatic mechanisms have to be continuously optimized by 
an evolutionary process. If there is a significant change in 
an. environment, continuous adaptation. will. be essential. In 
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such a case, continuous "learning" must be involved in a pro- 
cess in which a system's preferred states are continuously re- 
defined, the "programs" regulating its activities continuously 
"rewritten, " and its manifest behaviors continuously integrated 
in the context of a new and more comprehensive framework. 
It is interesting to note in this respect that, 
although in the face of it ritual regulation in the Tserhaga 
has the characteristics of simple homeostatic processes, the 
system is potentially ultrastable. A new potential variety 
is being continuously injected into the system by the con- 
stant reshuffling of the population that is affected by the 
exchange of people between local. groups. The fixed and rela- 
tively static environment precludes, however, the need for 
change, innovation, or reorganization, and the potential for 
evolution, which is inherent to the system, is thus suppressed. 
In closing the discussion of ritual regulation in 
the Tsembaga, it may be appropriate to stress, once more, the 
difference between the specialized "stationary" stability of 
simple homeostasis, and the more general case of "non-station- 
ary" stability that is characteristic to continuous adaptation 
and evolution. Any comprehensive view of society which cen- 
ters around the question of the nature of social regulating 
processes, and which is directed by a sense of history, must 
recognize the creative and essentially evolutionary forces 
that are involved in the dynamics of social systems. Social 
systems, unless they represent "blind allies" 
in the sense of 
Toynbee, are evolving systems. In this sense, they are char- 
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acterized by a fuzziness of processes, an underspecificity of 
goals and a redundancy in mechanisms of regulation. These 
characteristics are in fundamental contrast to the rigid fix- 
ity of an insect society, and for this matter of the Tsembaga 
ritual. It is this fuzziness, underspecificity, and re- 
dundancy, which underlie the open-ended process we call evo- 
lution. 
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2. AMPLIFYING REGULATION AND VARIETY 
INCREASE IN EVOLVING SYSTEMS 
2-l. Regulation and Evolution 
2-1.1. Evolution as a Type of Stability 
Viability of complex dynamic systems inexorably 
relates to two aspects of sys. temi. c behavior which find 
their expression in the ideas of constancy and change. These 
two aspects are not incompatible. Indeed, the notions of 
stability and adaptive behavior revolve, to a great extent, 
around the problem of maintaining a balance between constancy 
and the preservation of steady state on the one hand, and 
change, variability and reorganization on the o ther. (l) 
Constancy and change are essential features of via- 
ble existence and they are related to the operation of speci- 
fic regulation mechanisms; those which maintain critical 
steady states and those which ensure adaptation and evolution. 
Both are implicit in the concept of survival and thus in con- 
cepts relating to the internal stability of viable organiza- 
tions, to their integrity as a unity and to the dynamics of 
their interaction with the world. A self-maintaining constan- 
cy is a logical prerequisite to the idea of evolution (2) and, 
in this respect, it is convenient to regard constancy and 
the typical mechanisms which maintain it as a starting point, 
in relation to which change and the mechanisms underlying 
selective change can be understood. 
In the typical viable system that is of interest to 
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cybernetics, constancy is maintained by homeostatic regu- 
lation mechanisms. These underlie the self-stabilizing pro- 
cesses which preserve steady state by triggering the appropri- 
ate restoring actions returning a system to its "normal" con- 
ditions after displacement. For a given system in a given 
environment, homeostatic mechanisms maintain internal proces- 
ses in balance and they extend to the system's mode of inter- 
action with the world. In a dynamic environment, however, the 
very parametric constraints upon which the system's survival 
is predicated may alter, thus requiring some essential modi- 
fications and a restructuring of the system itself. Therein 
lies the key to evolution and to the related topics of learn- 
ing, adaptation and development. 
While homeostasis and steady state are a precondition 
for viable existence, evolution can be regarded as a process 
through which the homeostatic mechanism itself is being opti- 
mized. (3) This optimization is a self-organizing, goal-seek- 
ing process, with survival being its open-ended goal. It 
operates not only in order to keep up with changeful events, 
but even more significantly, in order to produce selective 
improvements on previous norms. In so far as the optimizing 
process requires a reorganization of already existing struc- 
tures, it implies a need to extend the notion of homeostatic 
stability to a conceptual framework capable of accounting for 
the dynamic and "progressive" characteristics of evolution. 
Such an extension is quite possible, as Beer points 
out, (4) if we allow for occasional "excursions" from a state 
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of equilibrium in a process which may hit upon other possible 
configurations corresponding to new levels of stability. The 
crucial idea is that a given regime of stability is associated 
with some measure of "survival" success, a "pay--off" function, 
which is determined by the mode of interaction with a specific 
environment. The latter acts as an external arbiter, encour- 
aging some configurations and eliminating others. in this 
manner, selection in the Darwinian sense is affected. Excur- 
sions from an established state of stability, (which may be 
biased by past "experience" and are thus not necessarily en- 
tirely random) will either be ruled out as unstable or they 
may fit an ecological niche yielding a higher pay-off. If the 
latter is the case, novel sets of states corresponding to pa- 
rametric and internal constraints will be defined, and a new 
systemic integration will take place - more survival worthy 
in some specific sense. Such a new systemic integration will 
in itself assume typical homeostatic characteristics both in 
the structure of its internal regime and the mode of its in- 
teraction with the world. 
From an organization viewpoint, the process is em- 
bodied in a hierarchy of control, "control of control" in the 
sense of Pask, (5) in which the homeostatic stability affected 
by one level of control is mediated by the operation of a 
higher level of control. The concept of such a hierarchy is 
essential when we model the evolutionary process by an organi- 
zation of goal directed processes reduced to units of control, 
the procedures they contain and the modalities of their inter- 
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action. (See sections D-6 and D-8 of Appendix D). The stra- 
tification is needed in order to distinguish between the dif- 
ferent contexts of commands, interpretations, descriptions 
and operations that have to be employed in order to reflect 
the structure and dynamics of the regulatory mechanisms that 
underlie an evolutionary process. 
The entire arrangement can be envisioned as follows. 
On one level, there is a homeostat or a group of interacting 
homeostats operating jointly on a specific environment so that 
a particular stability is brought about and maintained (repro- 
duced over time). This interaction is ultrastable in Ashby's 
sense, and the stability involved is contingent upon the inter- 
vention of the next, higher level of control. On this highe-- 
level, the environment acts*as the context from which an ex- 
ternal "reinforcing" signal is derived. The value of this re- 
inforcing signal constitutes the pay-off function which acting 
as an input to the higher level control guides its selection 
strategies. It provides the criteria for success by which sta- 
bility configurations "presented" by the lower level are se- 
lected, established and reinforced. (For the ikonic represen- 
tation of an evolutionary process embodied in a control hier- 
archy, see section D-9, Appendix D). 
Evolution, from this viewpoint, is characteristic of 
a particular type of dynamic behavior in systems, reflecting 
a particular aspect of the logic of. mechanisms. (v) It corres- 
ponds to a specific type of regulation and it is embodied in 
a particular kind of organization. This statement is s. gnif i- 
-59. - 
cant in so far as it stresses the idea that evolution is a 
type of stability, and that as such, it is a general condi- 
tion typical to environments characterized by a particular 
structure of constraints. 
The organization underlying an evolutionary process 
can be abstractly represented in various ways. In general, 
it can be depicted by a system of interacting goal-seeking 
elements having to secure a stability, namely their own sur- 
vival, in an environment representing"a given set of constraints. 
Evolutionary activity in such a system is a consequence of 
changeful environmental conditions and a redundency in the 
structure of the system itself. This redundency can be regarded 
as a source of active variation and it implies a potential re- 
pertoire of behaviors which can become manifest as conditions 
change with time. As long as redundency is maintained, the 
system has self-organizing properties in the sense of Von 
Foerster. (See section C-8, Appendix C). 
Some additional-ideas are important. (7) Firstly, 
survival must be conditional. It is not guaranteed and it will 
be enhanced by some conditions and some behaviors but not by 
others. Secondly, overall goals in the system must be under-- 
specified and generally open-ended, implying a tendency for 
"exploratory" behavior. In the process of seeking for a via- 
ble stability, various organizations and modes of behavior will 
arise, subject to satisfying the conditions for stability under 
existing constraints. Favorable organizations and modes of 
behavior will be allowed to persist (survive, reproduce, remain 
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stable) and those that entail an improvement will beencour- 
aged to develop, thus generating a trend that an observer 
would deem "evolutionary". 
Generated by a progression of time related organiza- 
tions, the evolutionary trend represents the "necessarily time 
dependent character of a self-o. rganizing. system" . (8) The se- 
quence of steps that is implied obtains its coherence by virtue 
of the topic an observer entertains., Some ambiguity may exist, 
however, as to the precise boundaries of the evolving entity 
since the shifting stability that is involved obscures the dis- 
tinction between the evolving organization and its environment. 
On the level of an abstract representation at which evolution 
is regarded as a general process, the essential features of 
reproduction, variation and selection appear as unifying prin- 
ciples. The particular characterisitics of mechanisms through 
which evolution is mediated will vary, however, with specific 
identifications. It is when we focus on an actual "real-world" 
organization that such mechanisms will assume specific identi- 
ties, coinciding with specific embodiments. 
2-1.2. The Evolutionary Perspective and the Cybernetic Paradigm 
Scientific discussions of evolution since Darwin have 
centered around essentially biological issues related to the 
emergence and subsequent history of species. A broader concept 
of evolution as a creative principle embracing all cosmic phe- 
nomena, including but not limited to terrestrial forms of life, 
has been advocated by religious mystics, notably, Teilhard de 
Chardin (9), but such visionary contributions remain alien to 
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established scientific disciplines. Recent developments in 
the physical sciences, however, have articulated the princi- 
pies governing the evolution of complexity in physico-chemical 
systems. These principles, formulated in the field of non- 
equilibrium thermodynamics (10) have been applied to an analy- 
sis of some biological processes (11) and they have been used 
by way of analogy to discuss the evolution of socio-psycholo- 
gical and conscious phenomena as well. (12) 
The formulation offered by non-equilibrium thermody- 
namics holds that the increase of complexity and organization 
in physical systems is a consequence of specific kinetic prin- 
ciples and that the concept of evolution in physics and biology 
are reconcilable under a single physical law. (13) This formu- 
lation can be interpreted as reaffirming the intuitive concept 
of the unity underlying natural phenomena, but since it involves 
mathematical concepts describing the dynamics of energy flows 
subject to strictly defined constraints., its "extrapolated" 
projection into the domain of socio-psychological systems may 
be questionable. 
An approach taken by cybernetics, on the other hand, 
offers a different perspective which, by emphasizing organiza- 
tional aspects that are independent of material considerations, 
is free of similar limitations r The approach 
involves a for- 
mulation of a concept of regulation linking the notion of s. ur- 
vival, in its broadest sense, to ideas of information and con- 
trol. In this context, evolution can be regarded as an out- 
come of a particular "survival strategy", applicable to a spe- 
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cific constellation of circumstances and subject to the gene-- 
ral laws of regulation. These laws are conceived on a level 
of abstraction which makes their transfer across systemic 
boundaries particularly convenient. The cybernetic paradigm 
can therefore contribute significantly to a unified view of 
evolution and it provides for a consistent interpretation of 
both the dynamics of special case evolutionary process and the 
overall direction of evolutionary trends. 
From the cybernetic viewpoint, a complex dynamic 
environment puts a definite premium on an increase in potency 
of regulation capabilities. Thus, a perception of the world 
as a hierarchy of structures, differentiated by discontinuities 
and characterized by an increasing order of complexity and 
organization (14) obtains a specific functional meaning. Such 
a hierarchy can be regarded as a stratified organization of 
controllers interacting such that across its levels regulation 
is amplified. 
2-2. Regulation. for Effective Viability 
2-2.1 The Cybernetic Formulation 
A regulator is a mechanism which interacts with a 
system to bring about, or maintain, a particular outcome. This 
outcome corresponds to a goal representing a condition of sta- 
bility for the system under regulati. on.. From the cybernetic 
viewpoint, a condition of stability in a system implies the 
functioning of a regulator. The latter can be identified with 
a specific part of a system, the brain in a mammal, for example, 
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or it can be regarded as a source of action external to a sys"- 
tem, as in the case of selection in evolution. Whether a reg- 
ulator is identified with a specific part of a system or with 
a source external to it depends, to a great extent, on lines 
of demarcation imposed by an observer. Actual boundaries may 
be ambiguous, especially in cases where there is no clear cut 
physical partitioning. 
Regulators in the real world span a broad spectrum 
of types and mechanisms through which control is mediated vary 
widely in their characteristics. They may, for example, in- 
volve direct mutual effects of interacting chemical processes, 
as in the body's physiology, or be affected -through specialized 
communication channels carrying specific signals, as in the 
central nervous system and in various man-made electronic de- 
vices. They may be mediated by complex behavioral patterns 
as in ecologies of animals, or they may be associated with in- 
tricate symbolic relations as is typical to social systems, 
human in particular. The subject matter of regulation is thus 
extensive and it relates to many diverse activities in physi° 
ology, psychology and sociology, ecology, economic affairs, 
engineering and more. The cybernetic formulation provides an 
abstract representation which highlights the fundamental fea- 
Lures common to all. 
The central idea is that regulation achieves a goal 
in the face of a set of disturbances. The approach i due to 
Sommerhoff and Ashby, (15) who defined the process of requla- 
tion as a function of five key variables and the manner in which 
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they interact. These variables include e. regulator, a regu- 
lated system, a source of disturbance, a set of possible out- 
comes and a set defining desired outcomes. The role these 
variables play in the process of regulation is specified as 
follows (16): for a given situation, there is a total set'Z of 
all possible events which may occur whether restrictions are 
applied or not. Of these, a sub-set G defines desired outcomes 
those that correspond to a condition of stability for the 
system under regulation. In addition, t1iere is a set R of 
events in the regulator, a set S of events in the system which 
is being regulated, and a set D of disturbances. Events in D 
produce conditions in S that cause outcomes to be driven out 
of G. Effective regulation is achieved if for a given value of D, 
events in R and S relate such that the outcome is bounded by G. 
The relations between disturbances and the actions 
taken by a regulator can be formalized in terms of game theore- 
tic concepts. (17) From this viewpoint, a set D of disturbances 
di is countered by a set R of responses rj producing a matrix 
of outcomes zig from a set Z of possibilities. The values 
taken by D and R correspond to a pair of moves selected by each 
of two players and the table of outcomes is identical with the 
pay-off matrix of game theory which specifies values of some 
desired commodity that is assigned to each move. A successful 
outcome will encourage a player to retain a particular strategy 
whereas a failure to achieve a desired payoff will cause a change 
of strategy in the following move. As before, of all. the possible 
entries in Z, obtained by the interaction of b and R, only a sub- 
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set G contains acceptable outcomes representing values which 
are compatible with a system's "essential variables". R is 
considered an effective regulator if it can produce a counter 
action ri for each di in D keeping the outcome within G. 
The nature of the relation between D. R, Z and G is 
such that the concept of regulation implies selecting from 
a few possible actions the one most likely to achieve a goal. 
This selective aspect is a dominant feature of regulation es- 
pecially in complex dynamic systems where regulation takes its 
more interesting and active form. Since effective selection 
depends on the availability and processing capacity of infor- 
mation, there is an obvious sense in which communication and 
information play a central role in regulatory processes. Ashby 
has stressed the intimate relation between regulation and in- 
formation (18) and he had shown how regulation depends upon 
information transfer between pertinent system's components. 
From a qualitative viewpoint, regulatory actions are subject 
to information about specific disturbances, about the state of 
the system which is being regulated and about the outcome. 
This relation can be given a precise quantitative expression 
using information theoretic concepts, (19) and various regula- 
tory schemes can be reduced to the characteristic structure of 
their respective information processes. For example, error- 
controlled regulation can be regarded as a special case of re- 
gulation in which R receives its information from variations 
in the outcome. It can thus react only after the effect of 
In other types of regulatory a disturbance has been manifest. 
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schemes, R is pro-, rided with an information channel directly 
from the disturbance, making "anticipatory" strategies possi- 
ble. In such cases, the regulator is activated before the 
actual effects of a disturbance have been registered and its 
counter actions are directed at the source of disturbance it- 
self . (20) 
2-2.2 Limits on Regulation 
According to the formulation given above, the pro- 
cess of regulation can be regarded as a sequence of events in 
which R selects a move rj from a finite repertoire for each 
value di taken by a disturbance from the set D. The variety 
in R's repertoire of actions puts a limit on its capacity as a 
controller since in order to regulate effectively, the variety 
of actions available to R must be at least equal to the variety 
in the disturbance. This concept is fundamental to the theory 
of regulation and it is expressed in Ashby's law of "requisite 
variety". The law states that for a given variety in the dis- 
turbance, only variety in R can force down the variety in the 
outcome. (21) 
This dependency can be interpreted in terms of commu- 
nication theory, in which case, the process of regulation 
is 
related to the flow of variety between R, D and Z. 
From this 
viewpoint, D threatens to transmit 
its full variety to Z. R's 
function as a regulator is to block the transmission of variety 
from the disturbance to the outcome, so that <a "desired" vari- 
ety in Z is maintained. The crucial point 
is that without R's 
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intervention, the ultimate variety in Z would be large. With 
R's response it can be reduced. R can thus be regarded as a 
channel of communication between D and the outcome, and Ashby's 
law is extended to its more general form stating that "R's ca- 
pacity as a regulator cannot exceed R's capacity as a channel 
of communications". (22) 
The law of requisite variety puts an absolute limit 
on the amount of regulation which can be achieved by a regula- 
tor with a finite capacity. The implications to the concept 
of viable organizations and particularly to the concept of 
adaptation are important. A viable system that is adapted to 
its environment can be regarded as a successful regulator in 
the sense that the repertoire of its actions (or behaviors), 
matches effectively the variety in the disturbances threaten- 
ing its stability. The concept of selection can be interpreted 
accordingly as entailing a process which operates to encourage 
an appropriate match between a regulator's variety and the va-- 
riety in its environment. In a complex dynamic world it will 
favor the formation of high variety regulators. 
2-2.3. Amplifying Regulation, Strategies for Effective Viabi- 
lity and Variety Increase in Evolving Systems 
The need for variety in the regulator is greatly re- 
duced if the environment is characterized by fundamental regu- 
larities such as a continuity or a repetitive pattern of events. 
Thus, when a regulator faces a large and complex world, a situ- 
ation that is conunon in biology as it is in social and econo- 
mit affairs, there are circumstances which make effective regu- 
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lation actually possible even with a relatively low varietys(23) 
Nevertheless, a system may be exposed to patterns of distur- 
bances requiring an augmented regulation capacity. In such a 
case, an extension in regulation potential will be essential, 
and if systemic disintegration is to be avoided, the regula- 
tory capacity will have to be increased until it becomes ade- 
quate. 
The limitation implied by the law of requisite vari-- 
ety prohibits any direct increase in the capacity of a regula- 
tor but it does not rule out supplementation. As Ashby has 
shown, if there is a continuity in an environment, a number of 
regulators can be linked in stages to form a more potent regu- 
lator with an increased overall capacity. When regulation is 
applied in stages, for example, when a regulator R1 uses its 
selective power to form another regulator R2, the capacity of 
the latter need not be bounded by that of the former. The pos- 
sibility thus exists that a small amount of regulation proper- 
ly exercised at one stage will make available a higher regula- 
tion potential at the next stage. The procedure can be repeat- 
ed over a number of steps with the result that a significant 
increase in regulation capacity is achieved, the process as a 
whole showing an amplification. 
The possibility of amplifying regulation has played 
a major role in the evolution of stable organizations on earth 
where circumstances favor the formation of regulators that me- 
diate local stabilities, selecting for those, that are partic- 
ularly effective in securing a viable survival under a wide 
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range of dynamic events. This condition in itself, is suffi- 
cient for explaining the persistent tendency of forming strati- 
fied organizations of increasing complexity, since only through 
such organizations an increasing advantage in regulating capa- 
bilities can be achieved. In the terrestrial environment this 
tendency has been manifest in the emergence of a hierarchy of 
organizations ranging from the simple chemical elements to 
the genetic material and whole ecosystems, encompassing the 
myriad organisms and their societies, and including a host of 
different mechanisms all of which contribute to the end of en- 
surfing "survival". Each level in this hierarchy corresponds 
to a class of regulators and these become more potent as they 
ascend the scale of complexity. Evolution is the process 
through which such a complexification is achieved, and in this 
sense, it can be regarded as an essential regulation strategy 
for achieving stability in a dynamic environment in which the 
context for stability is changing. 
Depending on underlying conditions, various methods 
for achieving stability are possible. For example, if the en- 
vironment is simple, meaning that the pattern of 
its charac- 
teristic events is predictable, a regulator can be built as a 
physical barrier for blocking the effects of disturbances, or 
it can be made to embody a set of decision rules specifying 
an appropriate counter-action for each 
disturbance. Both me- 
thods require an ability to specify all 
disturbances in advance 
and they imply 
building into the regulator a variety which would 
exactly match all contingencies. 
This regulation strategy is 
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manifest in special cases of adaptation where the range and 
magnitude of variations is sufficiently consistent to make 
it adequate. 
When the pattern of disturbances is particularly 
complex, or when it is constant for too short a time, compu- 
tation of all possible configurations may be impractical. In 
such a case, an advantage can be gained if the regulator is 
made to incorporate a large amount of variety, and if instead 
of a fixed set of rules it will contain an underspecifi. ed pro- 
vision for modifying internal states in a search for a match 
with specific conditions as they occur. This is the more 
general method of adaptation by ultrastability. As a regula- 
tory strategy, it can be greatly enhanced if it is directed 
not only towards "experimental" modification of internal states, 
but also towards forming linkages with selected parts of the 
environment so that new organizations incorporating a higher 
variety emerge. (24) Here in particular, a significant ampli- 
fication of regulation capabilities can be obtained. The 
increase in variety that is involved is typical to the evolu- 
tionary process. It is slow in biological evolution where it 
is manifest in the emergence of increasingly more complex organ- 
isms, it is made more rapid by simple forms of learning, and 
it is accelerated even further, becoming more flexible and 
richer in scope, in the symbolic environment of culture and 
ideas. 
A distinction can be made, accordingly, between three 
major and basically different regulation strategies. The 
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simplest involves a precise specification of contingencies 
that is manifest in a mechanical adaptation or the incor- 
poration of a fixed decision rule in a simple homeostatic 
mechanism, The second involves adaptation by ultrastab-ji_lity 
where a sufficient amount of variety is "built" into a system 
so that changes in its environment, can be matched by appro- 
priate internal modifications, even when a specific decision 
rule is not available. The third is adaptation by evolution. 
As a strategy for ensuring an effective viability it involves 
incorporating additional variety from the "environment, " 
forming a new and more complex "unity". The latter corres- 
ponds to a new level of systemic 'integration which is marked 
by an increase in regulating capacity, and which is subject 
to selection for some specific survival advantage. 
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3-1. 
3. EVE--1: A SIMULATED ECOLOGY WITH SOME 
CHARACTERISTICS OF EVOLUTIONARY PROCESSES 
Introduction 
3-1.1. Simulation of Evolutionary Processes 
"Eve-l" is a computer model of a simulated "ecology" 
in which various dynamic processes occur, some of which are 
interpretable as showing characteristics of evolutionary be- 
havior. In the general philosophy of its approach, as well 
as in its structure and its basic logic, the model relates to 
various other typical cases in which simulating aspects of 
evolution has been attempted by other workers. Like some of 
these attempts, the model presented below strives to capture 
the essence of a general process rather than to describe a 
particular "real" system. In this respect it is not context- 
specific, and the behaviors that are observable in the dif- 
ferent runs that were performed can receive various interprets 
tations depending on pertinent identifications. Of these, 
biological and sociological interpretations are the most 
obvious, and some such interpretations are stressed or implied 
in the context of describing the model and the results that 
were obtained through simulated experimentation with its be- 
havior under various conditions. 
In recent years there have been numerous attempts 
at simulating evolutionary processes, attempts that were 
greatly stimulated by the advent of large, reliable, and fast 
digital computers which provide a particularly appropriate 
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tool for such experimentation. These attempts have taken dif- 
ferent approaches and they have addressed themselves to a 
large variety of problems, some of which do not deal directly 
with the specific problem of evolution, but all relating to 
questions that, in one way or another, are relevant to the 
understanding of evolutionary processes. Thus, the various 
efforts involved include such diverse items as simulating 
problem solving and game playing systems, modeling various 
aspects of cognition, pattern recognition and learning as well 
as adaptive and predictive control systems, self-reproducing 
systems, development and growth processes, self-organizing 
systems, and more. In addition, there are evolutionary models 
addressing themselves to problems of evolution specifically. (l) 
Various arguments in the literature have been ques- 
tioning the real effectiveness of such attempted simulations 
in actually replicating a true evolutionary process. Pattee, 
for example, points out that in spite of the complexity and 
sophistication of many of the models that have been developed, 
"their evolutionary potential has been non-existent or disap- 
pointing. "(2) The disappointing performance of evolutionary 
simulations, he feels, relates particularly to the problem of 
the origin of life and to the more general question of generat- 
ing novelty and new levels of control in hierarchical organi- 
zationso The difficulty is clearly in explaining and repli- 
sating such phenomena that are usually conceived of as 
"spontaneous" emergence of new properties in complex organiza- 
tions 6 
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It may well be, however, that the problem is not 
technical but philosophical in nature, having to do with the 
approach to the question of evolution and of replicating evo- 
lutionary processes, and thus with what is actually expected 
from evolutionary models. There is clearly a definite sense 
in which an actual evolutionary process cannot come entirely 
under the strict control of the experimenter. By its very 
nature, the process is incompletely determined. The under- 
specificity that is involved is quite fundamental and it 
cannot be circumvented by a simple-minded attempt at sirnulat- 
ing an actual complex evolving system, no matter how complex 
the model (program) involved. (There are obviously practical 
limitations. ) It is quite possible, however, to abstract the 
relevant principles and to construct a dynamic process, in a 
computer or otherwise, (3) which will mimic the essence, or 
some selected aspects, of evolutionary behavior. 
The behavior produced by such a model may thus help 
reveal the working of the mechanisms which underlie evolution, 
and it can be particularly useful for gaining a better under- 
standing of specific evolutionary processes that occur in 
nature with which a correspondence can be shown. Furthermore, 
it may be especially helpful in articulating those character- 
istics which are invariant to evolution in general. Note the 
difference in approach. The goal is not to simulate a par- 
ticular system that is evolving, but to abstract the principles 
involved in evolution, embody those in a dynamic model the 
behavior of which may then be subject to interpretation -and 
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identification with the appropriate behaviors that are ob- 
servable in nature. The identification itself is a function 
of demonstrating a correspondence which may be on the level 
of a metaphor, an analogy, or an actual isomorphism. 
The point is subtle but important and it was made 
clear by Pask when he pointed out that questions of repli. cat- 
ing evolutionary processes can be approached on three dif- 
ferent levels: highly abstract, particular, or intermediate. (4 ) 
On the one extreme there is the entirely abstract level typ- 
ical, for example, to the approach taken by Ashby when he 
suggests that self-reproduction is a concept of great gener- 
ality, transcending the specific reality of the biological 
world, and having to do with a well defined concept of equi- 
librium in generalized dynamic systems. (5) Ashby has shown 
that reproduction can be regarded as a special case of adapta- 
tion to a particular class of disturbances and thus that the 
particular stability that is involved can be described fully. 
by the abstract concepts of the theory of mechanisms using 
the logic of sets and mappings (see note 16, Chapter 1). 
These, it will be recalled, contain no reference to the actual 
physical characteristics of a particular system. (6) Similarly, 
the gist of this entirely abstract conceptioning is manifest 
in Ashby's powerful statement that "every isolated determinate 
dynamic system obeying unchanging laws will develop "organisms" 
that are adapted to their "environment. "(7) When there is an 
observable trend of increasing efficiency in such adaptation, 
an observer will be inclined to speak about evolution. 
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On the other extreme, Pask points out, there is the 
approach which focuses attention on a particular "real" sys- 
tem. The system may be a particular population of animals, a 
specific society, or processes -that occur in a brain. It is 
in such cases, when the system under consideration is intrin- 
sically complex and dynamic in a self-organizing sense, in 
other words, when evolutionary events constitute an important 
feature of its behavior, that modeling by straightforward 
simulation becomes impractical. The complexity and inherent 
uncertainty which an experimenter will face preclude a pre- 
cise replication of the process under observation through the 
setting up of a detailed one-to-one correspondence between 
the actual system and the model, and the experimenter may 
therefore have to resort to other techniques. For example, 
he may choose to study the system's behavior statistically as 
in the case of Wilkins' model of social homeostaÜis. (8) Such 
an approach, however, will gloss, over the operating mechanisms 
which underlie evolutionary processes. 
Finally, there is what Pask refers to as the "inter- 
mediate" approach which occupies a level between the entirely 
abstract and the particular. The basic ideas involved have 
already been alluded to above. It is this approach which is 
characterized by an abstraction of the basic principles under- 
lying the essence of evolutionary processes. Such principles 
are then embodied in a set of rules which regulate the 
inter- 
action of simple abstract entities 
(simple automata, finite 
state machines, or sets of numbers, as 
the case may be), con- 
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stituting the basic elements with which the model is con- 
structed. The behavior or organization that is thus gen- 
erated is then open to interpretation which, as we have 
already seen, depends on identification with "real" systems 
that-exhibit a similar behavior. 
Eve-1, the model that will be described below, 
belongs to this class of simulations. The advantages of the 
approach are clear. It can be used when a study of an actual 
evolving system is impossible due to complexity and/or tem- 
poral constraints; the abstraction involved, though basically 
simple, can in itself be designed to embody an arbitrary com- 
plexity and thus one model may yield a wealth of diverse 
behaviors. Finally, the fact that the model depends on the 
abstraction of basic principles means that the essence of 
such principles and their effectiveness in explaining observed 
phenomena can be studied without being confused with those 
specific details that characterize an actual system (materi- 
ality for example) but which may not be directly relevant to 
the logic and dynamics of the process itselý. It may thus be 
particularly useful in testing hypotheses about the working 
of mechanisms that underlie evolution. 
This particular approach is apparent in several sim- 
ulations of developmental and evolutionary processes that are 
described in the literature. Typical examples are Burks' dis- 
cussion of "growi ng" automata, (9) as well as Apter' s simulation 
of developmental processes, where 
"Turing machine"-like auto- 
manta are used to generate various growth processes. 
(10) There 
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are models advanced by Barricelli who uses the interaction 
between numerical entities to generate evolutionary processes. (ll) 
There are simulations developed by Fogel, Owens, and Walsh, 
where finite state machines go through successive steps of 
reproduction; mutation, and selection, replicating an evolu- 
tionary process which results in an increased ability of such 
machines to predict events in their previously experienced en- 
vironment. (12) There is a model described by Glushkov in which 
simple automata mimic biological evolution and the formation 
of species, (13) and there are models developed by Pask where 
similarly conceived automata interact to generate a dynamic 
behavior through which processes such as reproduction, differ- 
entiation, induction, and population density control can be 
studied. (14) In its spirit and basic structure, Eve-1 owes 
much to the latter, and although different aspects of evolu- 
tion and of ecological dynamics have been emphasized, the 
model can, in fact, be regarded as a variation on and a con- 
tinuation of Pask's original experiments. 
3-1.2. Conditions Underlying Evolution 
Most simulations of evolutionary processes reflect 
the fundamental fact that the basic conditions underlying evo- 
lution are exceedingly simple. These basic conditions are 
central to Darwin's theory which maintains that the prerequi- 
sites for evolution demand a dynamic continuity maintaining 
the integrity of a given entity, a variation in its structure, 
and a selective process that operates upon 
it. Such conditions 
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entail a differentiation between a focal entity, an organism, 
for example, and an environment in which it exists and in 
which evolution takes place. If such an entity is associ- 
ated with mechanisms of continuity which preserve its integ- 
rity over time (reproduction, for example), if there are 
mechanisms of variation operative which produce changes in 
its structure thus introducing new variables, and if these 
are subject to environmental selection which reinforces 
trends that are particularly survival worthy, inhibiting 
those that are not, an evolutionary process may result. If 
it does, it will be manifest in a measurable trend progress- 
ing through a succession of iterative reproductions, varia- 
tions, and selections, the product of which relates to an 
overall optimization of the system's performance with respect 
to its overriding goal, namely--survival. Such an optimizing 
trend is a function of the system's interaction with its en- 
vironment and in this sense evolution is seen as a process by 
which systems develop, are modified and optimized in relation 
to the specific conditions of their particular environment. 
Various means can be used to embody the basic con- 
ditions referred to above in simulating an evolutionary be- 
havior. For example, in Barricelli's model, (15) a process 
similar to a typical Darwinian evolution is obtained by using 
numerical entities which "exist" in a computing environment. 
The properties of the specific numerical. entities used and 
the behavior they can generate are specified by a set of rules 
embodied in a computer program. They are thus entirely under 
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the control of the experimenter. The crux of the matter is 
that a class of numbers can be so defined that they will gen- 
erate a process of self--reproduction. To this process a 
mutation rule is applied (in cases when two numbers collide 
in the same space) with the result that variability is intro- 
duced in the form of a new number, different from the two 
colliding ones. In this manner both conditions of reproduce 
tion and mutation are satisfied and as the process continues 
through a succession of steps, numbers which have a greater 
survival value under the ruses specifying their universe will 
"survive" (be selected) and dominate the environment as other 
less "fit" numbers are eliminated little by little. 
In a subsequent and more elaborate experiment, 
Barricelli(16) used similar numerical entities to represent a 
genetic code where the latter is interpreted as a program 
specifying a survival strategy. This strategy is related to 
a particular task that simulated organisms have to perform. 
In this case, it is applied to deciding on a move in a simple 
game ("Tac Tix"). Once again there is a provision for "muta- 
tion" by which strategies can be modified when collision 
between two numerical entities occurs. Selection for the 
best strategy with respect to the game is applied, and the 
overall result shows an evolutionary improvement in game per- 
formance. This is interpreted as an improvement in perform- 
ing operations essential for survival which is achieved 
through an evolutionary process. 
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Another example is offered by the model proposed by 
Fogel, Owens and Walsh, (17) where the same principles of iter- 
ative mutation and selection are used to generate evolutionary 
processes although they are embodied in a different method. 
In this particular case an evolutionary approach is chosen 
for a. simulation of intelligent behavior where the latter is 
related to an ability to predict the behavior of an observed 
environment. The environment consists of a sequence of sym- 
bols to which a finite state machine is exposed. At each 
time interval the output of the machine is compared with the 
next input signal and a match between the two, a correct score, 
provides a measure of the machine's ability to predict its en- 
vironment on the basis of the symbols it has previously ex- 
perienced. From this machine an "offspring" is then derived 
and a mutation rule is applied to this derivation. The muta- 
tion process takes the form of producing a modification in the 
parent machine with the result that the offspring is made to 
differ from it in some specific respect. This modification 
may affect the state transition, the number of states, and so 
forth. 
The offspring machine which is thus derived is sub- 
sequently exposed to the same sequence of symbols and its pre- 
diction capability is tested. If its score equals or is 
higher than that of the parent machine it will survive and be 
used to generate new offsprings, otherwise it will be dis- 
carded and the original parent machine will be used again. 
In this manner, successive generations of finite state machines 
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are obtained and this succession is characterized by an over- 
all evolutionary trend. that is manifest in a measurable in- 
creased ability to predict the already experienced sequence 
of symbols representing the environment. Selective processes, 
the authors point out, can be severe or more relaxed. In the 
case of the former, only one parent machine exists at a given 
time and when an offspring is derived one which shows evi- the 
dence of a better performance will survive while the other 
will become extinct. In the case of the latter, there are 
always a few machines existing simultaneously. From one of 
these an offspring is derived and if it scores successfully, 
it will replace that machine the performance of which is low- 
est in the group. The model also provides for production of 
offsprings by "mating" two or more machines, thus enhancing 
the evolutionary process by retaining successful traits 
through a combined "majority rule. " 
In yet another approach, exemplified by Pask's 
model, (18) selection is applied to simple automata on the 
basis of success in the task of capturing a basic commodity, 
which appears in the environment and from which the fabric of 
these automata is synthesized. If such a commodity is scarce, 
competition may result and variants which show an advantage 
in this competition will thrive, inhibiting the development 
and survival of others. Survival thus 
depends on inherent 
capabilities and behavioral patterns which are particularly 
suited for specific environmental conditions and 
these may be 
such that they will favor cooperative 
behavior between 
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automata whicr, by correlating their strategies and activities 
increase their overall survival efficiency. 
Notwithstanding the specific method used, the basic 
principles of reproduction, mutation, and selection are cen- 
tral to all these models. A point which must be emphasized, 
however, is that these basic conditions are general in the 
sense that they do not apply to biological phenomena alone. 
The latter is but a specific manifestation whereby reproduc- 
tion takes its known biological forms, mutation is manifest 
in genetic variations, and "natural" selection operates on 
phenotypes. In the biological world, successful selection is 
normally measured in terms of the relative rate of producing 
new viable offsprings. It operates by "reinforcing" success- 
ful mutations thus guiding life forms towards the underspeci. - 
Pied goal of ever-increasing efficiency for more effective 
survival. The whole process is embodied in the specific 
properties of protein molecules, especially nucleic acids, 
which as Bonner points out, (19) are complex enough to allow 
for processes of reproduction and of minor variations in 
molecular structure that are repeated in subsequent genera- 
tions. 
But there is no need to assume that evolution is 
restricted to the biological domain. A general theory of 
evolution must be regarded as a theory about a general proc- 
ess and thus the uniqueness of biological evolution 
is lim- 
ited to the fabric of its mechanisms but not to the princi- 
pies underlying their operation. 
This is precisely the point 
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that emerges out of the theory of self-reproducing and evoýv-- 
ing machines, a theory which demonstrates that reproduction 
and evolution are possible in generalized logical environ- 
ments in which certain constraints are operatives(20) Thus 
for example, on the level of underlying principles, there ex- 
ists a definite correspondence between biological evolution 
and "symbolic" evolution where the latter is viewed as the 
specific domain of cognitive processes in which concepts, or 
procedures for control and computation evolve. (21) Fogel, 
Owens, and. Walsh(22) make an important comment about this 
correspondence when they stress the logical similarity that 
exists between natural evolution and the scientific method. 
Individual biological organisms, they point out, may in fact 
be regarded as hypotheses concerning the characteristics of 
their environment. Like hypotheses in science, they will sur- 
vive only if "successful. " In conclusion one would add that 
the claim for generality which underscores such correspond- 
ences is particularly significant because it provides a log- 
ical link between the processes of biology and the "cultural, " 
abstract domain, in which much that is relevant to psycho- 
logical and social evolution takes place. 
3-1.3. The Role of Coalition Formation and Cooperative 
Interactions in Evolution 
Most discussions of evolutionary processes, bio- 
logical or otherwise, accept the basic Darwinian premises 
which regard self-reproduction, random mutations, and selec- 
Lion as the fundamental mechanisms the combined operation of 
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which is essential for explaining evolution. Nevertheless, a 
significant number of critics(23) have been arguing that the 
Darwinian theory is lacking in that while its basic premises 
are indeed a prerequisite for evolution, they are not suffi- 
cient in themselves for actually explaining the rise of com- 
plexity and great diversity characterizing the evolution of 
life. 
Problems seem to relate to both temporal and quali- 
tative aspects of evolution. With regard to the former, 
Beer, (. '-4) for example, points out that rough calculations 
categorically rule out the possibility that random mutations 
(followed by selection) alone could be responsible for an 
evolutionary progression leading from the first simple protein 
molecule to man. The essence of his argument is that the time 
that such a progression would require, assuming a dependency 
on the mechanism of random mutations as proposed by Darwin, is 
very significantly longer than the time that was actually 
available for biological evolution on earth. The concept of 
random mutation is an essential prerequisite for evolution, 
but in itself it is not enough. If it is to retain its use- 
fulness, Beer suggests, it must be qualified by assuming a 
process "that would impart a directional mechanism"(25) to the 
adaptive process. In other words, the randomness of mutations 
is not really "pure? y" random but is conditioned by the selec- 
tine processes that are a function of the interaction of an 
organism and a particular environment. These actually bias 
mutations by reinforcing those organizations that are partic- 
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ularly survival worthy. The underlying randomness of muta- 
Lion processes is therefore subject to a "higher level" con- 
trol, which, by seeking to reinforce survival-worthy patterns, 
strongly conditions the direction (probabilities) that muta- 
tions might actually take. The process is self-regulating 
in that as it unfolds it changes conditional probabilities 
along its own path, the overall result being a gradual but 
"directed" increase in organization (with respect to more 
effective survival) and a great economy in the required time. 
Barricelli, on the other hand, stresses another 
kind of difficulty(26) when he argues that the Darwinian 
theory is not sufficient to explain those major qualitative 
aspects of evolution that involve actual emergence of novelty 
and the formation of ever more complex organizations that are 
comparable to living organisms. The gist of Barricelli's 
argument is that Darwin's theory cannot explain the evolution 
of living organisms, and the great increase in variety that 
this evolution entails, if one starts with simple entities 
possessing only the capability to reproduce and mutate. More 
specifically, he argues that the evolutionary potential in- 
herent in recombinational genes, the typical units of heredi- 
tary material, is quite limited in that a recombinational 
gene with n allelic states possesses a total variety which 
cannot exceed n different possibilities. Evolution is thus 
restricted to selecting the fittest from this total of n 
available possibilities (where n in this case is typically a 
small number). With this limitation 
in mind, Barricelli con- 
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tinues, "it is hard to visualize how such a self-reproducing 
element could, simply by mutation and selection, develop into 
a homo 'sapiens' or anything able to construct a homo sapiens 
even if allowance is made for the fact that the number of 
allelic states may be generally, or very often, underesti- 
. mated ." (2 7) 
As Barricelli shows in his convincing experiments, (28) 
the difficulty can be removed if one assumes that in addition 
to reproduction, mutation, and selection, another principle 
is operative which tends to promote symbiosis and "co-operative" 
interaction between elementary self-reproducing entities. If 
such a principle of association is introduced, the limited 
number of allelic states in each self-reproducing entity no 
longer imposes the same limitation on possible variety, in 
that even if only two allelic states are assumed for each re- 
combinational gene, the association of n such genes (where n 
in this case may be measured in several thousands) would pro- 
duce a variety of 2n possible states, thus dramatically in- 
creasing the total variety to which evolutionary selection 
can be applied. 
This idea, which ties the notion of emergent novelty 
to the formation of symbiotic associations in which simple 
entities interact to form a new and more complex whole, is 
central to the so-called "symbiogenesis" theory which, accord- 
ing to Barricelli, seeks to explain the evolutionary process 
that led to the formation of cells as being a function of 
symbiotic associations between a number of virus-like organ- 
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isms. (29) The crucial notion is that the products of such 
symbiotic interactions may in themselves retain the proper- 
ties of self-reproduction and mutation while the concept of 
selection would now apply to the new organization which was 
formed by such an association. The important role of co- 
operative processes is thus brought to the fore. In fact, 
the lack of sufficient consideration of the role of coopera- 
tive processes in evolution has been a major source of crit- 
icism that has been leveled at Darwin's theory, (30) and 
since the turn of the present century various writers have 
emphasized the importance of integrative factors and coopera- 
tive interactions in organic as well as social evolution. (31) 
From the viewpoint of effective survival, the crit- 
ical point about the formation of such integrated associations 
is that when individual entities interact to form what may be 
called in effect a coalition, task: may be jointly performed 
which could not have been accomplished by individual elements 
separately. Integrative factors which hold such coalitions 
together may be chemical in nature, or they may depend on com- 
munication processes and behavioral patterns of various com- 
plexities. Whichever the case, the net result translates 
into an effective increase in survival value that is achieved 
only by virtue of the new properties inherent in the coalition, 
which in itself may now be ragarded as a new single organism 
of higher complexity. (32) 
The idea can be expressed in various ways. Firstly, 
from a functional viewpoint, new emergent properties of coali- 
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tions are the result of a synergetic effect, or a "super 
additive composition -rule, " (33) where not only are such new 
properties unpredictable from the separate parts, but the re- 
lated measure of the sum of the new whole is effectively 
larger than the sum of its parts. Similarly, from the view- 
point of regulation, the formation of a coalition accounts 
for a significant increase in variety (in the sense of pro- 
ducing a more effective regulator--as in Chapter 2). This 
increase can be viewed, in a sense, as being the result of a 
"hook up" of an element possessing a finite internal variety, 
to an "external" source. Finally, from an epistemological 
viewpoint, the notion of forming a coalition can be inter- 
preted with respect to the idea of a single element facing an 
undecidable situation which can only be resolved by forming a 
new, more complex organization, containing sufficient variety, 
for which the situation is no longer undecidable. (34) 
Coalition formation is thus an important evolution- 
ary strategy and evidence of the integrative and cooperative 
processes that are implied is manifest in the various forms 
of systemic organizations that are found in nature. We have 
already mentioned the basic idea of "symbiogenesis theory" 
which sees the formation of cells as being the result of 
symbiotic association of more primitive elements. Much the 
same notion is applicable to various multicellular organiza- 
tions. Indeed, Bonner(35) has stressed the essential role of 
cooperative processes in specific 
developmental stages of 
various simple organisms where 
the ability to aggregate results 
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in a considerable survival advantage. The same principle, of 
an evolutionary stability which is manifest in "a continuous 
pressure towards integration, "(36) is evident in communities 
of animals and in human societies. The former are rendered 
stable by behavioral patterns which rely on the automatic op- 
eration of innate mechanisms of the type discussed by Lorenz 
and Tinbergen, while the latter depend on the externalized 
medium of a language and the framework of tradition and social 
conventions. 
Eve-l, the model which. will be described below, 
seeks to emphasize the role of cooperation and coalition for- 
mation in the evolutionary process. 
3-2. Description of the Model 
3-2. i. Design Objectives and Rationale 
Eve-i was conceived as a non-deterministic computer 
model of an abstract system which, when allowed to operate 
under pre-specified constraints, can be seen to exhibit evo- 
lutionary behavior. This behavior is exhibited by populations 
of simple automata the identity of which is not related to any 
particular ""real"" populations Attention was focused particu- 
larly on "cooperative" interaction between such automata, 
where "cooperation" was interpreted 
in its broadest sense. 
Thus, the emphasis was put upon the general role of coalition 
formation in evolution rather than on details concerning the 
working of mechanisms of reproduction and 
mutation. In the 
model, selective processes operate 
on specific coalitions, 
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such selective processes being a function of a relation be-- 
tween attributes of given coalitions and particular environ- 
ments. 
In addition to the primary objective of mimicking 
evolutionary processes whereby complexity and survival effi- 
ciency of simple automata increase through the formation of 
coalitions, basic design criteria were related to some funda- 
mental notions about evolution, a choice of an appropriate 
means to express them and a desire to achieve simplicity and 
clarity in presentation. 
For example, Conrad and Pattee(37) point out that 
known evolutionary processes seem to operate on populations 
of individuals through a statistical selection process, al- 
though the specific differentiation mechanisms operate on 
individuals at a genetic level. It was intended to stress 
this fundamental notion and incorporate it in the structure 
of the model. Accordingly, it seemed logical to follow other 
investigators in selecting the general context of a population 
of randomly interacting individual entities defined as pheno- 
types, whose characteristics are derived from underlying geno- 
types according to a set of deterministic rules. This broad 
requirement is not sufficient, however, to define a specific 
type of system. Indeed, several types of abstractly defined 
systems possessing similar properties could be postulated, in- 
cluding topologically defined populations of interconnected 
nets such as those described by Kaufman (, 38) and Pask, (39) or 
patterns of numbers, such as described by Barricelli_. (40 ) 
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Since the basic objective presented a field allow- 
ing a wide range of choice, further design criteria were in- 
troduced before a specific context was selected for imple- 
mentation. Of these, the most important was the requirement 
that both the definition and the observed behavior of the 
model could be readily communicated and comprehended at an 
intuitive level even by someone who had no previous famili- 
arity with it. This requirement, it was felt, could be 
satisfied by the use of a geometrically defined environment, 
various points of which could be occupied by localized en- 
titres so that an instantaneous "snapshot" of the system 
could be easily pictured on the computer printout. This 
type of approach was suggested by the work of other investi-- 
gators, notably Pask, (41) but also Varela, Maturana, and 
Uribe. (4 2) 
Basic entities in these models are typically de-- 
fined as point-automata which can occupy the nodes of a 
planar grid constituting the "environment. " The primary 
activities of these automata consist of movement from node 
to node and interaction with other automata.. For the con- 
cept of evolution to be applicable in models utilizing this 
strategy it is necessary to allow for differentiation proc- 
esses in the phenotypes of the automata as well as 
for a 
measure of fitness. The latter 
is usually incorporated by 
making survival conditioned upon 
the successful capture of 
some abstractly defined commodity, 
interpretable as "food, " 
which is essential for the survival 
of the automata and which 
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becomes available, by various means, in the environment. 
some models, for example in Pask's, (43) the production of 
food is exogenous whereas in others, such as Conrad and 
Pattee`s, (44) a closed system is defined in which food and 
the automata are "made" of the same substance the total 
amount of which is conserved during the operation of the 
model. 
When confronted with simulations of this general 
In 
class, one is likely to interpret the use of such concepts as 
movement, reproduction, food, gene, genotype, phenotype, 
species, etc., as though they stood directly for real physi- 
cal systems, typically of a biological nature. It should be 
emphasized that this is not intended in Eve--l. The intui- 
tively understood concepts mentioned above are used for the 
purpose of making it easy to follow the behavior of the model, 
but they should not be taken literally. In fact, several 
features of Eve-l, such as the rules for differentiation and 
the lack of decay by aging, were defined in ways which bear 
little similarity to the laws of biological. systems. 
In order to maximize the ease of using the model, a 
final objective was formulated: namely that as many of its 
features and functions as possible should be parametrized in 
a way which would allow changes in both environmental condi° 
tions and in the definition of phenotypes and their interac- 
tions, to be introduced at any time during an actual computer 
run. Unless a specific statement to the contrary 
is made, 
all parameters described 
in the following pages may be so 
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defined. Clearly, by varying such parameters, practically an 
infinity of different specific models may be generated. Fur- 
thermore, small changes in the parameters may produce very 
significant discontinuous changes in the behavior of the 
model. To this date, only a few of the parameter combinations 
and only one of the environmental geometries that are possible 
in Eve-1 have been tried. The results will occupy the fol- 
lowing sections of this chapter where a general description of 
the model is given and its observed behaviors are discussed. 
Exact specifications, in an abbreviated form, and information 
on the software design and the hardware used may be found in 
Appendix A. 
3-2.2. Eve-l: General Overview 
Following the considerations described in the previ- 
ous section, a specific model was formulated and implemented 
on a digital computer. The context of the model is that of an 
abstract eco-system in which simple automata of several dif- 
ferent species can move about, compete for "food" which is 
present in their environment, reproduce, and combine with 
other automata to produce automata of new and more complex 
species. The system is an open one in. the sense that food 
becomes available in the environment through an exogenous 
process, and unsuccessful automata which die of "hunger" dis- 
appear completely without having any of their fabric return 
to the system in any way. The model was deliberately defined 
in this way so that its adaptive and evolutionary behavior 
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could be studied with a variety of food availability patterns 
which are exogenously defined and modified by the investigator. 
In this way, differences in the evolution of the system may 
be studied under various conditions, for example under condi- 
tions where food appears in a uniform distribution, in local- 
ized high concentrations, etc. 
Each'automaton has the capacity to "see" food par- 
ticles as well as other automata in its vicinity, and it can 
"move" according to what it sees. These capabilities of sens- 
ing and movement are considered to be the "primary character- 
istics" of the automata, and it is with respect to these 
characteristics that various species essentially differ. 
(There are also differences among species with respect to 
metabolic requirements and other such "secondary character- 
istics. " 
Food appears in the model in the form of discrete 
particles associated with different "food values. " When an 
automaton moves to a node containing a food particle, it may 
"eat" that particle, in which case its "food store" is incre- 
mented by the particle's food value and the particle is re- 
moved from the environment. The food store of every automaton 
is decremented each time step by an amount (the "metabolic 
rate") which depends on the species to which the automaton 
belongs. 
If the food store of an automaton becomes zero or 
negative, the automaton dies; 
if it reaches or surpasses a 
particular threshold value, the automaton reproduces. 
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Finally, a way is provided for "hungry" automata to combine 
and form automata of new species. Survival in the system 
thus clearly depends on the ability of an automaton to cap- 
ture enough food to cover its metabolic cost. Its sensing 
and movement characteristics determine this ability. 
Each species is defined in terms of an abstractly 
conceived "genotype" consisting of two small integers which 
are thought of as "genes. " The "phenotype" of each species 
(consisting of its primary and secondary characteristics) is 
derived from, its genotype according to a set of rules which 
may be externally changed between or during simulations. The 
processes responsible for the introduction of new variety 
(new species) into the system operate at the genetic level 
whereas the processes responsible for the survival of a spe- 
cies operate at the population level of the total system, 
The effects of both are non-deterministic when seen macro- 
scopically, since they are affected by random variables in 
the environment and in the actions and interactions of the 
automata themselves. (Microscopically, however, random ac- 
tions are taken only in undecidable situations. ) 
When observing and analyzing the operation of the 
model, we may speak of the "fitness" of a species as mani-- 
fested by its survival when steady state is reached. In 
addition, it is possible to think of the "efficiency" of the 
total system of all automata as manifested by their ability 
to keep the amount of free food in the environment at a mini- 
mum. This concept of efficiency 
is similar in scope to the 
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concept of "utilization ratio" that is used in the model of 
Conrad and Pattee. (45) It will be discussed more fully in 
sections 3-4.2 and 3-4.3 below. 
3-2.3. The Environment 
a. Topology and Geometry 
In Eve-l, the environment consists of the nodes of 
a planar rectangular grid the size of which may be varied. 
(Most of the computer runs were made on a square grid of 30 
x 30 = 900 nodes, although sizes up to 100 x 100 = 10,000 
nodes are possible in the same computing environment. ) Each 
node of the grid is assumed to be "linked" to all of its 
eight immediate neighbors, except that nodes on the boundary 
are linked to three other nodes (corners) or five other nodes 
(edge). Although the grid is depicted for simplicity as a 
geometrically uniform one (see Figure 7), only its topology 
(connectivity) is of interest in this model. The distance 
between two nodes of the grid is defined in terms of the num- 
ber of links in the shortest path between them. Thus, when 
the grid is drawn with uniform geometrical spacing, the locus 
of all nodes which are equidistant from a given node P is the 
perimeter of a square (not a circle) centered at P. Figure 7 
shows a typical portion of the 30 x 30 grid with all links 
between nodes drawn. The heavy dots indicate the locus of 
all nodes at distance 2 from P. 
Each node of the grid may be specified as "accessible" 
or "inaccessible" for a particular computer run so 
that the 
1 
--- ý, __ 
1 
Figure 7: A segment of the environment where nodes 
are indicated by dots. Heavy dots represent the 
locus of all nodes at distance 2 from node P. 
actual shape of the environment may be arbitrarily defined to 
include continuous fields, mazes, barriers, etc. Every access- 
ible node (hereafter, reference to a node will imply an access- 
ible node unless otherwise noted) may contain no more than one 
automaton and one food particle at any given time step, so 
that a "snapshot" printout is able to show all automata that 
are occupying the grid at a given instant. 
b. Food 
Food is introduced into the environment (exogenously) 
in the form of food particles, each of which appears and re- 
mains on one node until eaten by an automaton. Each food 
particle has a certain "food value" which remains constant 
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until the particle is eaten. Each node may contain at most 
II1t 
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one food particle (gin addition to one automaton). A certain 
maximum number of food particles is introduced into the en- 
vironment every time step on randomly selected nodes which 
(a) are accessible, and (b) have no food particle already on 
them. This is done in a number of trials in each of which a 
node is selected randomly from all nodes and tested for 
accessibility and food content. If the node is accessible 
and contains no food particle already, a new particle is in- 
troduced there. The process ends when the maximum number of 
particles per step (NFOOD) has been placed or a maximum num- 
ber of trials (NFTRY) has been reached. In this way, an in- 
crease in the concentration of food particles in the environ- 
ment leads to a statistical decrease in the rate of introduc- 
tion of new food. This rate, however, does not explicitly 
depend on the number or concentration of automata. 
The food value of each particle is set at the time 
of its generation to a random value in a prespecified range 
(FVMIN, FVMAX), and it is measured in the same units as the 
food store levels and metabolic requirements of the automata. 
(see below). In some of the simulations, FVMIN was set equal 
to FVMAX so that all food particles had equal values. In all 
cases, an automaton can sense and eat only food particles 
whose value is greater than or equal to the amount of food it 
needs per time step in order to survive (its ; metabolic rate). 
This particular constraint provides for the generation of eco- 
logical niches and may induce symbiotic behavior among species. 
(If food particles of a particular value are never eaten, then 
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they will gradually accumulate and fill the environment so 
that other kinds of particles will find no free space to 
"grow. ") 
Collectively, the parameters NFOOD, NFTRY, FVMIN, 
and FVMAX are referred to as "the food availability pattern" 
since they control the number and value of the food particles 
introduced into the system. In certain runs, a special 
change was made in the program so that parts of the environ- 
ment were accessible to automata but no food could be gener-- 
ated there. This, however, was not introduced as a permanent 
feature in the program. 
3-2.4. The Automata 
a. Species Characteristics: The Phenotypes 
Automata are defined as dimensionless entities each 
of which may occupy one grid node in any given time step. At 
most one automaton may be present on a node, and if this hap- 
pens the node is "occupied. " Automata are able to sense the 
environment in their vicinity and to move from node to node 
according to rules which will be described below. There are 
24 different possible types (species) of automata, and each 
species is defined by a genotype. The behavioral character- 
istics of a species (its phenotype) are a function of its 
genotype. (The way in which one relates to the other is de- 
scribed in section 3-2.4. d. ) The automata " live"and function 
in a stream of discrete time steps. Although the program 
remembers each automaton's age, none of the characteristics 
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of the automata are affected by aging. 
The two primary characteristics of species have to 
do with the extent of their ability to sense the environment 
and to move in it. The sensing characteristic (which may be 
thought of as "vision") is defined as the value of the "radius 
of sensing" (RS), and the movement characteristic as the value 
of the "radius of movement" (RIvi) for each species in each time 
step. RM and RS are small integers, different for each spe- 
cies, which define the distance from an automaton, expressed 
in numbers of nodes, within which it can "see" and "move" each 
time step. Since automata can see and move in all eight 
possible directions on the grid, these radii actually delimit 
square regions of vision and possible movement around each 
automaton at each time step. If an automaton sees a food par- 
ticle the value of which is at least as great as the automal 
ton's metabolic rate, then it moves towards that particle and, 
upon reaching it, eats it. If an automaton sees no food par- 
ticles in a particular time step, then its movement is influ- 
enced by whether it sees other automata. If none are within 
sight range, it moves randomly as far as it can. If, on the 
other hand, it detects the presence of other automata, it will 
either move towards its closest neighbor seeking coalition (if 
it is hungry) or away from it (if well fed). Note that the 
radius of movement per time step is equivalent to a measure 
of speed. 
Some species are able to see further than they can 
move in one step (RS>RMM), and 
thus may home in on a target 
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(e. g. ,a food particle) in a sequence of time steps. Others 
can move further than they can see (RS<RM), and these will in 
fact move about even if they cannot see a target within their 
radius of vision. As may be seen in Figure 7, a square region 
with radius R contains (2R+i. )2 nodes. Thus an automaton with 
RS =1 can "see" 9 nodes whereas one with RS =5 can see 121 
nodes at any given time. 
In addition to the primary characteristics of range 
of vision and movement, species have secondary characteristics 
having to do with their metabolic requirements, reproduction, 
etc. These secondary characteristics are described further 
below. 
b. Genetic Definition: The Genotypes 
Each species has two "genes, " corresponding to the 
two primary characteristics: a sensing gene (Gs) and a move- 
ment gene (Gn). Each gene can have an integer value between 
0 and 4. The genotype of a species is defined by the values 
of its two genes, and it may therefore be represented by the 
ordered pair (Gsf Gm). The translation of the gene values 
into the corresponding species characteristics depends on the 
currently prevailing rules for generating a phenotype from a 
genotype. These rules may vary with dif event runs in a manner 
which will be described in section 3®2.4ed below. 
Since each gene may have one of five values (0 to 4), 
there can be 5x5= 25 possible genotypes. Of these, 
(0,0) 
is referred to as "null" and 
is not allowed to exist. Thus, 
the actual number of possible genotypes 
is 24. The reason for 
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this limitation is twofold: (a) the requirement of easily 
readable printed output could be easily fulfilled by repre- 
senting each species by one alphabetical. character (a -x are 
used) ; and (b) the same requirement is also served by the 
fact that the 24 species (plus the null species) can be tabu- 
lated in a5x5 "species matrix" in which the sensing gene s 
value increases in the horizontal. direction and the movement 
gene's value increases in the vertical direction. Such a 
tabulation showing the one-letter label of each species is 
shown in Figure 8. 
Gs value } 
01234 
Gm 
1 
value 2 
3 
4 
A D P 
E k 
E 
i 
J 
Q X 
Figure 8: Species matrix showing species lables tabulated by gene 
values. 
As may be seen from this matrix, species A has geno- 
type (1,0) , species T has genotype 
(4,2) , etc. (The null 
species has genotype (0,0) and no label; no automata of this 
species are ever generated. ) The gene values are not neces- 
sarily the same as the corresponding radii of sensing and 
movement (for further discussion see section 3-2.4. d below). 
For the purpose of discussion, a species is referred 
to as "advanced. " if the numerical sum of 
its two genes' values 
is high. X is the most advanced species (Gs + Gm = 8), r A and 
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B are the least advanced (Gs + Gm = 1), W is more advanced 
than N, etc. In the species matrix described by the table of 
Figure 8, the level of advancement increases from the top 
left to the bottom right, and the matrix is symmetric about 
its main diagonal with respect to advancement level. The 
assignment of letter labels to species, though formally arbi- 
trary, has been made so that the relative order of the letters 
in the alphabet roughly corresponds to relative advancement 
levels, a feature aimed at improved readability of the printed 
output. 
Note that the level of advancement is not enough to 
identify a species, nor is it to be interpreted as an absolute 
measure of fitness. The latter is a qualitative attribute of 
the phenotype which is relative to current environmental con. -- 
ditions but is not "internally" defined in the model. Al- 
though the level of advancement itself plays no formal role in 
the model, it was in practice often used as a guide in assign- 
ing metabolic costs and other metabolism-related character- 
istics, to each species for specific runs. In most cases, 
this could be interpreted as meaning that (a) a unit of vision 
capability is metabolically equal to a unit of movement capa- 
bility, and (b) the total metabolic cost of an automaton de- 
pends on the sum of these two capabilities plus a 
fixed cost. 
In this regard it should be added that the level of advance- 
ment is meaningful only if the relative sizes of gene values 
match the relative values of 
the corresponding specie's char- 
acteristics (movement and sight) 
in particular assignments. 
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The structure, number and properties of genotypes 
are fixed in Eve-1 and they cannot be changed for different 
simulations. The ways in which phenotypes are derived from 
genotypes, however, are easily controllable. These may be 
changed between or during specific simulations to produce an 
essentially infinite variety of behaviorally different species 
(although no more than 24 of them may exist at one time). 
c. Generation of New Automata: Reproduction and Coalition 
Formation 
There are two ways for new automata to be generated. 
In the first, defined as "reproduction, " an automaton whose 
food store level has increased beyond a certain threshold 
(REPROL), gives "birth" parthenogenetically to another auto- 
matcn of the same species. (The new automaton receives an 
"initial food store" which is subtracted from the parent. ) 
In the second, defined as "coalition formation, " two automata, 
of the same or of different species, may combine to form one 
or two new automata which in general are of different species. 
The exact rules for coalition formation are given in Appendix 
A, but the following will provide a general description of the 
event. 
When the food store of an automaton has been de- 
pleted beyond a certain level 
(COMBL), a fact indicating that 
the automaton has been unsuccessful 
in its recent attempts to 
capture food, then it will seek 
to approach and combine with 
any other automaton it can see. 
If it manages to approach 
another automaton, and 
if this second automaton is also "hungry" 
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in the same sense of having had its food store level depleted 
to a critical level, then the two will combine by numerically 
adding their gene values, to form a new automaton of a more 
advanced species. If this addition of the values for either 
gene yields a number g greater than 4 (which is the maximum 
allowed), then a second new automaton is generated. The first 
of the two new automata will then receive a value of 4 for 
each of the genes that caused an addition overflow, and the 
second will receive the surplus value (g-4). With this com- 
bination rule, the sum of the values of all sensing and move- 
ment genes of the population is conserved under coalition 
formation. 
The automata generated by a coalition formation 
have "zero" age, but their food stores add up to the sum of 
the food stores of the automata that combined. Automata whose 
age is less than a specified number (MCOAGE) cannot form new 
coalitions, a rule which ensures that automatic recombination 
will not occur immediately after the formation of a new coali- 
tion for which food store levels are initially low. Each 
specific coalition formation may be written as a production 
where the symbol "-}" shows the direction of the coalition event. 
Examples of such events written in this way in both the geno- 
type and the sumbollc (letter) notations are the following 
(for clarity refer also to Figure 8): 
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GENOTYPE NOTATION 
(1) (1,0) + (0,1) } (1,1) 
f2) (1,1) + (1,2) -- (2,3) 
(3) (2,2) + (2,3) - (4,4) 
(4) (4.4) + (1,2) -* (4,4) + (1,2) 
SYMBOLIC NOTATION 
A+B}C 
C+G}N 
H -f- N -} X+H 
X+C}X+G 
Note that in each coalition formation the first new automaton 
produces is in general more advanced than either of the two 
that formed the coalition. The second new one, however, if a 
second one is produced, is less advanced than either of them. 
Therefore, coalition formation introduces variety into the 
population by continuously generating both more and less ad- 
vanced species, although the latter at a frequency lower than 
the former. This condition is peculiar to the model and is a 
result of the specific constraint which imposes an upper limit 
on the possible levels of genotypes` values. 
Because of this very same constraint, certain coali- 
tion events produce no new variety. For example, a coalition. 
of any species with X will yield the same two species. This 
is due to the fact that the genotype of X (4,4) has both its 
values already saturated. In general, a coalition will pro- 
duce no variety in one gene if either of the two species com- 
bining has a value of 0 or 4 for that gene. If this happens 
for both genes in a certain coalition event, and if the event 
is such that two automata are produced, then these will be 
identical to the original automata forming the coalition. 
Clearly the great majority of possible coalition events do 
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not belong to this class. 
Thus, in the model, coalition formation is respon- 
sible for the introduction of variety into the population, 
whereas reproduction is responsible for numerical multipli- 
cation within each successful species. In this way the evo- 
lutionary and the ecological behavior of the total system may 
be studied and controlled separately. The easiest way to 
achieve this control is by changing the food store thresholds 
required for reproduction or coalition formation in some or 
all of the species. 
d. Derivation of Phenotypes from Genotypes 
The phenotype of each species is the set of its six 
characteristics, all of which are numerically defined. These 
include: sensing radius, movement radius, initial food store, 
metabolic rate, (minimum)food store level required for repro- 
auction, and (maximum) food store level required for coalition 
formation. The first two of these are considered as primary 
characteristics, while the remaining four are secondary. 
As previously mentioned, the characteristics of a 
species are a function of its genotype, i. e., its two gene 
values. Although it would have been possible to define alge- 
braic Formulas for the derivation of the characteristic values 
from the gene values, the method used in Eve--l for this deri- 
vation is a series of table look-ups. This 
is made conceptu- 
ally (and functionally) simpler 
by the fact that all species 
may be tabulated in a5 x5 matrix 
(as in Figure 8 above) with 
resp ect to any of their characteristics. 
Thus, the program 
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maintains six such 5x5 matrices at all times, one for each 
of the species characteristics. To find the metabolism rate 
of species (Gs, Gm), the corresponding matrix is simply in- 
dexed with the numbers Gs Gm. (The structured form of these 
six matrices enables a table look-up to be performed without 
spending any time in a search--for further details, see Ap- 
pendix A. } 
The content of the six characteristics matrices 
are an input to the model and may be modified at any time 
during a simulation. These six matrices, together with the 
geometry of the environment and the food availability pattern 
(sections 3-2.3. a and 3-2.3. b respectively), completely spe- 
cify a particular "universe. " Different simulations may be 
run on the same universe by changing the initial configuration 
of automata and/or by changing the initialization of the ran- 
dom number generating subroutine of the program. Figure 9 
below shows a complete specification of a typical universe 
(excluding the environmental geometry). The behavior of the 
model with different such specifications is discussed in Sec- 
tion 3- 3. 
From the species label matrix in Figure 8, we see 
that species R. for example, has the genotype (4,1). Using 
these gene values we can find (see Figure 9) that under the 
specifications of that particular universe, the sensing 
radius of species R is 5, its movement radius 
is 2, its 
metabolism rate is 20, its 
initial food store is 200, its 
reproduction threshold 
is 300, and its coalition formation 
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MODEL PARA11ETERS 
.. ----------------------------------Mo VE RADIUS 
7= I A= I D= I I= I P= 
B= 2 C= 2 F= 2 K= 2 R= 2 
E= 3 G= 3 1-1= 3 M= 3 T= 3 
J= 4 L= 4 N= 4 0= 4 V= 4 
Q-= 5 S= 5 U= 5 1"i= 5 X= 5 
------------- - ------------------- SEE RADIUS 
7= I A= 2 D= 3 I= 4 P= 5 
B= I C= 2-. F= 3 K= 4 12= 5 
E= I G= 2 11= 3i S= 4 T= 5 
J= I L= 2 14= 3 0= 4 V= 5 
Q= I S= 2 U= 34=4 X= 5 
-------- ----- ---------------------- INITIAL FOOD STOI E 7=1 00. A=1 20. D= 140. 1-160. P=180 . B=120. C=140. F=I60. K=I80. k=200. 
E= 140. 3=160. H= 180. 1.1=200. T=220. 
J= I60. L=180. Iß=200. 0=1 22. V=240. 0= I80. - S=200. U=220. U=240. X=260. 
--------"-------- --------------------- ýMETABOLI SM RATE 
?=10. A= 12. D= 14 ." I= 16. P= ! 8. B- 12. C= 14. . F= 16. K= 19. 14= 20. 
E= 14. G= 16. 11= 18. M= 20. T= 22. 
J= 16. L= I8. N= 20. 0= 22. V= 24. 
Q- 18. S= 20. U= 22. W= 24. X= 26. 
__-_--_------ --------------__ I? EPRODUCTI ON THRESHOLD (MIN) 
7=150. A=180. D=210. 1=240. P=270. 
B=180. C=210. F=243. 1%=270. 14=300. 
E=210. G=240. 11=270. M=300. T=330. 
J=240. L=270. U=300. 0=330. V=360. 
0-270. S=300. U=330. i1=360. X=390. 
" COALITION THF RESFIOLD (MAX) 
?= 50. A= 60ý D= 70. 1= 80. P= 90. 
B= 60. C= 70. F= 80. K= 90. 4=1 00. 
E= 70. G= 80. H= 90. M=1GJ. T=110. 
J= 80. L= 90. 11=100. 0=110. V=120. 
" 0= 90. S=100. U=110. N=120. X=130. 
IIFU(1D NFTI4Y MC OAGE FVMIýl FV:; AX '. {M NN MAXK 
10 20 
-------------- 
5 50. 
----------- 
50. 
----------- 
30 30 600 
------------ --------- 
Figure 9: Model parameters specifying a typical 
Universe. (See also Appendix A). 
threshold is 100. Although the secondary characteristics 
were varied somewhat in different simulations (see section 
3-3), vision and movement radii for different species were 
kept at the values shown in Figure 9 for all runs. Each of 
these values was arrived at (quite arbitrarily) by adding 1 
to the corresponding gene value for each species. Thus the 
value of the radii of movement and vision ranged between 1 and 
5 for different species. As previously mentioned, these val- 
ues correspond to square regions containing 9 to 121 nodes 
(for radius values of 1 and 5 respectively). Intermediate 
radius values correspond to regions with 
intermediate numbers 
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of nodes. 
3-2.5. Implementation of Parallel and Random Events in Eve--i 
Some specific information on the computer program 
is included in Appendix A. In the present section are dis- 
-cussed only those aspects of the implementation which affect 
the stochastic operation of the model. 
Models like Eve-I are usually defined so that their 
various processes are assumed to occur simultaneously, i. e., 
in parallel. Implementation on a digital computer such as 
those available today, however, is of necessity serial. Since 
Eve-1 is not meant to be a model of a real-world parallel 
system, this is not, in principle, seen as a limitation. 
Nevertheless, severa? steps have been taken to minimize the 
effect of serial computation on the behavior of the model so 
that the observed events could be explained more easily, 
These steps include the following: 
(a) A double-array scheme (see also Appendix A) 
allows all actions in time step ti, having to do with posi- 
tions of automata and food particles, to be made on the basis 
of exactly the same information, namely the state of the uni- 
verse at the end of time step ti--l. The two sets of arrays 
are referred to as "old" (for ti-l) and 
"new" (for ti) , and 
they exchange their names (rather than 
their content, which 
might be more expensive) at the end of 
the processing of each 
time step. It should also 
be noted that, since at most one 
automaton may occupy one node, 
automata can only move to nodes 
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which are free both in the "new" and "old" arrays. This means, 
in fact, that the same node may not be occupied by two differ- 
ent automata in two consecutive time steps. 
(b) The processing of automata in each time step 
is done in four distinct passes, each of which involves a 
scan of the list of all automata. In the first pass, automata 
age and metabolize, and those whose food store becomes nega- 
tive die and are removed from the system. In the second pass, 
automata sense their environment, move, and feed if they have 
reached a food particle. In the third pass, automata which 
are ready to reproduce are allowed to do so. Finally, in the 
fourth pass, Coalitions are formed between pairs of automata 
which are adjacent and "willing" to combine (i. e., "hungry"). 
Abbreviated flow charts for these four passes can be found in 
Appendix A. 
(c) Although the four-pass processing method goes 
a long way towards improving the parallel character of the 
model, an important problem of serial processing still remains 
within the second pass: when two or more automata are within 
vision and movement range of a food particle, 
the one that 
gets it is the one that is processed first by the program. 
To 
eliminate this bias in favor of specific automata 
in the sec- 
and pass, Eve"-l scans the list of automata 
in alternate direc- 
tions (top/down, bottom/up) in consecutive time steps. 
Thus, 
the bias works alternately in favor and against a specific 
automaton, and the statistical result 
is that no automata are 
favored over a long sequence of steps. 
(The order of scanning 
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also affects the third and fourth passes to a certain extent, 
but there the effect is less systematic and was not felt 
capable of altering the statistical behavior of the model. ) 
Besides the order of scanning the automata in each 
of the four passes each time step, there are other features 
of the implementation of specific individual- events that 
could create unwanted systematic trends. When an automaton 
reproduces, for example, a node immediately adjacent to it 
must be found which is free in both the "old" and "new" arrays. 
In order to sind such a node, the program first selects one 
of the eight adjacent nodes at random, then looks at the re- 
maining seven (if necessary) in a sequence that depends on 
which the first one was. (If no free nodes are found, the 
reproduction does not take place because of crowding. ) This 
procedure makes certain that no preferred geometrical direc- 
tion of reproduction will exist. Similarly randomized 
searches are also used in other cases when the neighborhood. 
of a node is searched for something (for example, during coal 
lition formation events in the fourth pass). 
The random number generator used in Eve-l will re- 
produce the same sequence of random numbers if initialized in 
the same way. This feature proved useful, since one run could 
be repeated with different output options when increased detail 
of the operation was desired in the printout. 
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3-2.6. Using the Model 
a. Inputs 
Although all simulations to date have been made in 
an off-line mode, the program has been written so that it can 
be run interactively. Accordingly, input to the program is 
made through one-line commands, each of which consists of a 
command name and one or more arguments. For example, the 
command FVAL 10 40 sets the values of FVMIN and FV-MAX (see 
section 5-2.3. b) to 10 and 40 respectively, whereas the com- 
mand GO 400 causes the simulation to proceed for 400 steps. 
When running off-line, sequences of such commands are written 
which then effectively constitute higher level programs con- 
trolling the execution of Eve-i. The program prints each 
command it receives on the printout followed by any further 
output that the execution of that command may produce. 
bo Outputs 
One of the commands that the program accepts causes 
the printout of the complete current specifications of the 
model, i. e., the kind of information contained in Figure 9 
of section 3-2.4. d. In addition, other commands set param- 
eters and "logical switches" which control the type of 
infor- 
mation printed during an actual simulation. Each 
type of 
information printout is associated with a variable 
frequency, 
so that it is only produced whenever a certain number 
of time 
steps has elapsed. 
One type of printed output that has already been 
mentioned is the 
"snapshot" of the universe, showing the en- 
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vironment with the automata and food particles on it. The 
automata are represented with the one-letter labels shown in 
the species label matrix (see page 103), the food particles 
are represented as asterisks, and nodes with neither an 
automaton nor a food particle on them are represented as dots. 
When a node contains both an automaton and a food particle 
(This can be the case at the end of a time step only if the 
particle is too small to be eaten by the particular automaton, 
or, if the automaton was created in that time:. step. ), then 
only the automaton is shown. Figure 10 below shows "snap- 
shots" of time step 0,20,40,100,160, and 400 of a typical 
simulation. (Step 0 corresponds to the initial configuration, 
defined by a sequence of input commands. ) The model par_am- 
eters in this run had values corresponding to those shown in 
Figure 9. 
Although the snapshot printouts are useful in gain- 
ing an intuitive understanding of the model and in visually 
detecting spatially differentiated patterns (see section 
3-3.2. e), most of the data analysis was done using primarily 
printed "vital statistics. " This printout starts with a line 
giving the current time step number (STEP), total number of 
automata (AUTOM), total number of food particles (FOODP), 
total number of automata created since step 0 (CREATED), total 
number of coalition formations since step 
0 (COMBINED), and 
total number of "hunger deaths" since step 
0 (DIED). This 
data is followed by a printout of a5x5 species matrix show-- 
ing the population of each species. 
(This matrix is similar 
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.............................. AA ........... ... .. ..... 
............... <. <............ *. *............. *............ 
.................. .. 
.......... *. 
. 
..... ý. B... .......... x.. 
.............................. . *. . *. *.. *............. *.. ... ..................... ......... *... *. *.. *... **AA.. . **... *. *. .............................. 
. *........ *... .. 
.............................. . *.. ... *. *... ......... .............................. .... *.. *........... A... *...... 
............................. . B. ***... *. *.. .......... .............................. . *B.. B. *. ........ A,....... 
......... 6......... A.......... 
.......................... 
....... * ............... 
.... .............................. 
.............................. *. ................... ..... ..................... ........ *, r.......... ...... *...... 
.............................. ..... **. *............. *. *.. *.. 
.............................. *.... *. *B... *.......... *. *. *.. 
Step 0 Step 20 
3.. B. B.......... A..... B...... 
..... i1 .................. 
... 8. .... B . ............. c. ..... *.. 
. H... 
B ...................... B .. D........................ 
... ....... ....... ............ .... H. 
BB.. B............ *..... C...... 
................ <.. .. 0< ü ............................. .......... ................... 
........... ............ A... .. *...... 0 .................... 
...... ... .1................. . *............... ............. 
...... tt................... ... < F........ *..... * ............... 
... li........... AD.. A.... *.. .. F............ *.......... . 
....... ............ AA .......................... *.. 
.. *... . C. ............ ...... ..... * ............. (). A.... A. A... I. . 8... ....... ....... F....... * ............. H 
........ ... *..... . CA... ............................. 
..... .. H... ....... 8...... AC. ... .............. ........ 
..... B...... *........ B........ ... HA.......... >.... H......... 
.. A......... .......... ..... * ........................ 
... *A........... B. B........... ...... ............... ... ****A ..... * .............. AD.. ....... *......... <..... . ().... 
.... A..... *.. ... ....... 3.. ........ ............. ()..... A..... * ......... ....... 0 .................... 
...... ...... B.. ...... ... H.... A ................. 0... 
....... B............ 4........ E. ................... ....... H 
........... B........ C. E.... A.. ............... 0...... ...... 
......... ..... C ............. .................. .:...... 
Step 40 Step 100 
................ t.............. . x... x........................ 
.. o......... ............... . ....... .................... 
......... 0 
................ 
........ 
x.............. 
.... 
..................... ........................ 
x..... 
........................... 
c). 
......................... .... 
............ ............. 
c) *... .......................... 
............. x.......... . .. .............. ........ 
...................... <c)..... . .. <................... X..... o<..... ...................... X............ ................. 
.............. ....... <..... ..............,.. <..,... <. *... 
........................ 
x..... 
.......... 
x....... 
<........... 
........... o .................. .... ........... ......... 
..................... ...... ..... 
x........................ 
........... ..... <.. x....... .................... ....... 
........... O............ ... ..... 
X..... X..... <............ 
......................... *.... 
*.... X..... ................. 
....................... ()...... ...... ........ 
X.............. 
Step 160 Step 400 
Figure 10: A typical run made with the specifications 
of Figure 3 showing snapshots of the universe at 
time 
steps 0,20,40,100,160 and 
400. 
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Figure 11: Vital statistics corresponding to the 
snapshots of Figure 10. 
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to those shown in Figure 8, except that its columns and rows 
are labeled by sensing and movement radius values rather than 
by the corresponding gene values. ) Figure 11 below shows the 
vital statistic printouts corresponding to the snapshots of 
Figure 10. 
The program also generates on the printout sheet 
rough plots of species populations and a variety of other 
quantities as they change in time. Figure 12 shows typical 
plots representing the species populations (bottom) and the 
sum of the values of all free (uncaptured) food particles in 
the environment for the same run depicted in Figures 10 and 
11. 
Finally, a specific simulation or portion of a sim- 
ulation may be analyzed in detail by asking the program to 
print out a complete record of every single event. This, of 
course, can generate enormous volumes of printout, and was 
useful mainly for program verification in the beginning. In 
this mode, each food particle generation, automata reproduc- 
tion, coalition formation, and hunger death is identified by - 
location on the grid and all other pertinent information. Of 
particular. interest is the printout of coalition formations, 
as it is given in the production format mentioned earlier 
(for example: C+A}F, V+F}X+D, etc. 
). 
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3-3. Some Results of Experimenting with Eve-1 
3°3.1. Introductory Remarks on the Behavior of the Model 
On the most general level an important result after 
over a hundred computer runs of Eve-1 has to do with the fact 
that non-trivial events in both ecosystem behavior and evolu- 
tionary behavior were observed in all cases. Although both 
the species characteristics and the environmental parameters 
could be changed in different runs, it was decided to experi- 
ment primarily with changes in the environment, specifically 
in the food availability pattern. Thus, in most of the runs 
to date, the species characteristics were kept unchanged 
(with a few exceptions) whereas the number and sizes of the 
food particles introduced into the environment were changed 
in several different ways. These changes, as is described 
below, resulted in significant variations in the behavior of 
the automata populations. The only species characteristic 
that was varied significantly in some runs was the metabolic 
rate, and the reason, as well as results of this change, are 
explained in subsequent sections. On the other hand, the 
primary characteristics (vision and movement radius) of each 
species were the same in all runs, and all secondary charac- 
teristics matrices were always symmetric about the main dia- 
gonal (i. e., vision and movement were assumed to 
have equal 
metabolic requirements). This equality 
in the internal 
treatment of vision and movement assured that the prevalence 
of one or the other in 
different environmental conditions was 
a consequence only of 
their relative performance and not in 
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any way influenced by a preprogrammed bias. 
In every run, an initial state of the system was ex- 
ternally defined before the operation of the model was started. 
The initial states always consisted only of species A and B, 
which may be considered as building blocks since they are the 
least advanced species and since all other species can emerge 
from them through various coalition formations. Most runs 
were started with no food present in the environment--an 
arbitrary condition. 
In a typical run (see Figures 1.0,11 and 12 above), 
food accumulates in the environment in the early stages and 
the A and B populations grow quickly as long as more food ap- 
pears in each time step than is consumed by them. This popu- 
lation growth comes to an end when the food consumption rate 
starts to exceed the food production rate. At this point, 
hungry A's and B's either die or combine to form more advanced 
species. Those of the new automata that can successfully com- 
pete for enough food survive and multiply, whereas the unsuc- 
cessful ones repeat the cycle of death or further coalition 
formations. Thus, a period of great variety in the species 
populations follows before a steady state is reached in which 
a relatively small number of successful species survive. 
One of the initial unknowns in the development of a 
model like Eve-1 is how large a universe and how many tine 
steps will be required before non-trivial, consistent results 
will be obtained. In this case, 
it was determined empirically 
that a square universe consisting of 
30 x 30 = 900 nodes would 
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yield such results in all cases, and that a steady state 
could be reached in a few hundred time steps. Information of 
this sort is of great value, and may in itself constitute an 
important result of developing and experimenting with Eve-i. 
It ýs perhaps only with such items of experience that the in- 
tuition required to design more sophisticated stochastic 
models and explore their potential uses can be developed. 
3-3.2. Description of Some Selected Computer Runs 
a. Simple Evolutionary Runs 
In the very first simulation run with Eve-l, all 
species were set to have the same metabolic rate and all food 
particles the same value. In this case, greater capability 
(e ., greater range of RS and RM) was not more expensive 
metabolically, and more advanced species quickly evolved from 
initial populations of A's and B's until the most advanced 
species, X, was generated and ultimately dominated the uni- 
verse. 
The next simulation attempted was that defined in 
Figure 9, whose relevant behaviors were shown in Figures 10, 
11, and 12 in previous sections. In this simulation, food 
particles were again of the same value, but the more advanced 
species were metabolically more expensive. Again, however, X 
prevailed after a short time, as may be seen 
in Figures 10, 
11, and 12. Clearly for that particular 
food availability 
pattern, X would always prevail as 
long as it remained meta- 
bolically viable (i. e., as long as its metabolic rate was kept 
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lower than the value of the food particles). Indeed, when in 
subsequent runs the metabolic rate of X was raised to a value 
higher than that of the food particles, species 0 or species 
V prevailed (for relative position on species matrix, tabula- 
tion of species labels, and other characteristics see Figure 
9 on page 110). When species X. 0, and V were all made meta- 
bolically expensive, species H or species T became dominant. 
Thus, although some prevalence of vision over movement (spe- 
cies V, T) was seen, species with equal vision and movement 
capabilities (X, 0, H) were also seen to prevail in certain 
runs. This ambivalence was not fully understood until further 
insights into the operation of the model were gained with 
subsequent runs (see below). In any case, the particular 
runs referred to above clearly emphasized the relative aspect 
of fitness in that under different environmental conditions 
entirely different species emerged as dominant. 
b. Vision and Movement Capabilities Prevail in Different 
Environments 
In order to study the relative usefulness of vision 
and movement under different environmental conditions, several 
runs were made in which all species with advancement levels 
of 5 and above were defined as metabolically enviable. This 
restricted the total variety of species to the top left half 
of the species matrix (see Figure 9), but had the desirable 
effect of producing a greater variety in most advanced viable 
species (those with advancement level 4, i. e., species W. T, 
H, K, P). Being equally advanced, these species had equal 
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metabolic costs but varied dramatically in their vision and 
movement capabilities. Thus for Q, RS =1 and RM = 5; for 
P, RS =5 and Rm = 1; the other three have intermediate val- 
ues for their seeing and movement radii. The food particles 
were again kept equal in value. 
Using this particular version of the model, several 
runs were made with different food availability patterns. 
These runs fell into three categories, and a typical one of 
each is described below. 
In the first category are runs in which food parti- 
Iles appeared in very small numbers (maximum of three per 
time step), but had a relatively high value (typically 150). 
Figure 13a shows "snapshots" and Figure 13b vital statistics 
for the initial state, and for steps 40,80, and 200 of one 
of these runs. The results were as might be expected: the 
scarcity of food particles in the environment made vision 
more important than movement, and, after the usual period of 
emergence of a variety of species, evolution proceeded along 
the top row of the species matrix (see Figure l3b), where 
species have the minimum movement capability (RM = 1). The 
most prevalent species, P, has RS = 5, RM = 1, hence it can 
see five times further than it can move in one step. If it 
sees a food particle at the perimeter of its range of vision, 
it will home in on it and capture it in five time steps (un- 
less, of course, another automaton gets to the food particle 
first). In some such runs species I predominated instead of 
species P, indicating that under the same 
food availability 
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Figure 13a: Snapshots of steps 0,40,80 and 200 
of a simulation showing prevalence of vision over 
movement. (See also Figure 
13b on following page). 
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STEP AUTO?, FOODP CRý_AThD COMBINED DIED 
0 9 0 9 00 ö 
---- -------------------------- ------ SPECIES POPULATIONS NS= I RS= 2 1? S=3 RS=4 RS=5 
Pý= 02 0 00 7 A I. ) I P 
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Hs= I RS=2 R S=3 u S=4 R S=5 
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fý ý, ý=3 30 0 00 E G HM T 
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kfi=5 00 0 00 0 S U IN X 
STEP ACJT O; c FO ODP CREATED C; c); SRT? 1 D DI :D 
80 19 10 113 '3 4 9.4 0; 
--------- -------------------------- SPECIES POP UL AT T' 1 ,S 
RS=i TES=2 RS=3 RS=4 RS=5 
RM=1 0 0 3 0 12 ? A 1) I P 
RM=2 0 0 4 00 B. CF K ; 
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STEP Au"rO -0c»? CfEATED C0.; }rI NF-- J) 
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---- ------------------------- ----- SprE rIrS POP IJLAT I OT-) IS 
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Figure 13b: Vital statistics for steps 0,40,80 
and 200 of the simulation showing prevalence of 
vision over movement. 
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pattern P's longer radius of vision is not enough of an ad- 
vantage to make up for its greater metabolic cost. 
In the second category of this group of simulations, 
the number of particles entering the. environment per time 
step was increased (to about 10) whereas their food value 
was reduced to 50. Figures l4a and 14b show a -typical run 
at steps 0,50,125, and 400. Here it is clear that movement 
and vision seem to be equally useful, since evolution pro- 
ceeds through C to H. in both of which RS = RM. H is the 
most advanced viable species in this group of runs with equal 
RS and RM, and it remains dominant. 
Finally, Figures 15a and 15b show an example from 
the third category of runs. Here, a very large number of 
food particles (NFOOD = 250) is introduced with each time 
step, and the particle food value has been decreased to 25. 
Now food particles are almost everywhere, and there is a high 
probability that one will appear on a node already occupied. 
by an automaton, or immediately next to it. Vision, there- 
fore, is no longer critical (in fact, it's quite useless) and, 
for that matter, so is great movement capability. The dom- 
inant species turns out to be B, one of the two simplest ones, 
with RS =1 and RM = 2. Since food is now so plentiful, se- 
lection is less severe. Accordingly, a larger number of dif- 
ferent species exist at steady state, but as the vital sta- 
tistics at step 400 (Figure 15b) show, they become less popu- 
lous the further they are from B on the species matrix. The 
fact that random movement beyond the radius of vision may be 
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Figure 14a: Snapshots for steps 0,50,125 and 400 
of a simulation showing equal usefulness of vision 
and movement. (See also Figure 
14b on following page). 
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STEP AU 014 FO)()DP CREATED COMBINED DIED 
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Figure 14b: Vital statistics for steps 0,50,125 
and 400 of the simulation showing equal usefulness 
of vision and movement. 
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. JC. B.......... B. B.. E. B. 3... B. 
... DC. B. CBEB... BABB.. B.. B..... CBK...... 8*B. BB.. B3.. J.. }', B.. B. 
F CCC.. S.. BBB. ....... E. B... BBJ 
.. A. 3C.... BB. B3. BB.. BB. B.. B.. J 
... u. S. B.. BBBB.. B.. BCA. A. ABB. B.... C.... DB. B. *. *. B.. B. .. E.. B C.... B.... B.... B.... A. A. AECBB. 
A. A.. *AB. *...... A.. B. B..... BB. 
. BF.. BA. C... B.. E.. BB. A...... B K. A... A.. A.. W.. B. BBB. BEB.. EB.. 
t. . DC. rCSA. AAI)A. B... *B.... AB. eB F-AAA... C. A. QBA. C. AA....... *E. *B 
".... DCE...... AC. B. BB"B..... A. 
. AA... DA.. B. BA.. AFI.. BB. **. B. *. 
AC.. A.. **ýAABAE.. EB. BBBABA.. B. 
A. CBACAB.... A. ýAABBB. AA.. E.... 
... CC. AA. C... BB. D.. B.... LB. DAA 
. UAAA. A... S. F..... ALi..... B. a. B 
. C.. A. DC. A., ..... G.. A. A... A... 
.. AV. rA. C. CACAA.. AACBB.. AA. 3. F LFA.. '. AA.. A. AA... BC... A.. BCAB. 
... CA. A.. F. PA..... AA....... C.. B 
Step 300 
Figure 15a: Snapshots of steps 0,25,75 and 
300 of 
a simulation showing prevalence of movement over 
vision (See also Figure 
15b on following page) . 
C) 
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STEP AU TOM FO ()DP CREATED COMBINE! ) DIED 
0 14 0 14 0 0% 
--- - . -- . -_- -- -_-_-- ---- --_--- -----SPECIES POPULAT IONS 
p5=1 RS=2 RS=3 t: S=4 RS=5 
XMM=1 0 5 0 0 0 ? A D I P 
RM=2 9 0 0 0 0 B C F K H 
R M=---3 0 0 0 0 0 E G H 14 T 
HM =4 0 0 0 0 0 J L N U V 
HMM°5 0 0 0 0 0 Q S U x 
S"i P AUTOM Fi)i)DP CREATED COMB Ifei=D DIED 
25 153 491 153 0 0 % 
---- ---------------- --------------- SP FCI ES POPULAT IONS 
RS=1 RS=2 PS=) RS=44 RS=5 
HIS=1 0 54 0 00 ? A D I 1" 
H ºM=2 99 0 0 00 B C F K 
H14=3 00 0 00 E G ! -t M T 
Rtj=4 00 0 00 J L N 0 V 
H1.4=5 00 0 00 Q S U IN X 
STEP AUTOM FUt)DP CREATED Ct)MB I NED IED DIED 
75 419 35 607 171 188 ýö 
------------------ ------ SPECI ES POPULAT IONS 
RS= l RS=2 RS=3 RS=. 4 RS=5 
RSA=1 0 134 14 02 ? A D I P 
R'. M =2 199 25 3 10 B C F K N 
RM =3 21 2 0 01 E G H M T 
RM=4 9 4" 0 00 J L N () V 
HM=5 21 1 00 0 s U X 
STEP AUTOM FOODP CREATED COMBINED DIED 
300 388 45 1938 1261 1550 :ä 
---- ---------- -- -__------_---_-_--SPECI ES POPULAT IONS 
RS=1 R S=2 RS=3 IRS=4 PS=5 
R14=1 0 90 9 01 7 A D I P 
H M=2 178 46 9 20 B- C F K R 
RM =3 27 2 1 00 E G H M T 
H1: ß=4 12 3 0 01 J L 11 t) V 
1114=5 24 0 10 0 S U W X 
Figure 15b: Vital statistics for steps 0,25,75 
and 300 of the simufatioi showing prevalence of 
movement over vision, 
U 
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advantageous (as it is in this case) may seem paradoxical. 
It becomes plausible, however, when we consider the very high 
concentration of food particles; if there is no food particle 
within an automaton's range of vision, there is a high proba- 
bility that a move away from the food-depleted location will 
bring a food par tic; le into view even if the move is random. 
Some further remarks pertinent to this particular result are 
included in section 3-4.2 below. 
c. Variety in the Environment Creates Ecological Niches 
and Induces Symbiosis of Species 
In another group of simulations, food particles of 
different sizes were introduced. As previously explained, 
this is done by assigning each new food particle a random 
value lying in a prespecified range. This feature beccmes 
meaningful if the range of food values overlaps with the 
range of metabolic rates of the species, since an automaton 
cannot eat (or even see) particles the values of which are 
lower than its metabolic rate. Now the smaller food parti- 
Iles may be eaten only by "small" automata, and if they re- 
main uneaten they continue to occupy positions in which other 
food particles cannot appear. All automata still compete, 
however, for the larger food particles, so although niches 
exist for the less advanced species, competition 
is still 
present. This kind of model can yield two 
kinds of results, 
both of which. were actually observed. 
In the first case, exemplified by the runs shown in 
1) 
Figure 16a and 16b, the food availabilitypartern 
induces the 
-ý133ý 
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Figure 16a: Snapshots of steps 0,80 300 and 600 
of a. simulation showing symbiosis of species 
C, 
H, 0, X. (See also Figure 16b on following page). 
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STEP AUTO,,; FOODP C, ýI' EATED COMBINED DIED 
0 4 0 4 0 0ö 
---- --------------------- ------ ----- SPECIES POPULAT IONS JS= I RS=2 RS=3 RS=4 ;; S= 5 
HM= ý 02 0 0 0 ? A D I P 
k'i 2 20 0 0 0 B C F K 
R, M=3 00 0 0 0 E G H M T 
RM=4 00 0 0 0 J L N () V 
1M=5 00 0 0 0 0 S U N X 
STEP AUTOM FOODP CREATED C()'-, tBII, NED DIED 
80 51 59 119 35 69 
---------------------------------- SPECIES POP ULAT IONS 
RS=1 RS=2 RS=3 RS=4 RS= 5 
HM, t=1 0 16 2 00 ? A U I P 
I U4=2 16 9 3 
.10 3 C F K R RM=3 21 0 00 E G H M T 
k1, ß=4 10 0 00 J L N () V 
I? 1A =5 00 0 00 0 S U 4V X 
STEH AUT0,14 F0()DP CiREAT E[) COMBINED DIED 
300 39 49 246 106 207 
---- ------------------------------- SPECIE S POP ULAT IONS 
RS=1 RS=2 P5=3 iP5=4 iPS=5 = 
PM=1 00 0 00 ? A D I P 
RM=2 C) 14 1 00 B C F K P 
PM=3 00 17 01 E G H 1.1 T 
PM=4 00 1 22 J L N 0 V 
K'. 4-5 00 0 01 0 S U rV x 
STEP AUT0M FOODP CPEATED COMBINED DIED 
600 36 68 374 1 73 33(9 A) 
---- --------------- ---------------- SPECIE S POP ULAT IONS 
HS= l 1-P5=2 PS=3 P5=4 P5=5 
1 00 0 00 ?. A U I P 
Rfi-2 il 0 00 B C F K P 
RM=3 00 16 00 E 0 i-1 M T 
10=4 00 0 60 J L N 0 V 
KM =5 0o 0 03 0 S U 11 x 
Figure 16b: Vital statistics for steps 0,80, 
300 and 600 of the simulation showing symbiosis 
of species C, H, 0, X. 
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symbiosis of species C, H, 0, and X, all of which have each 
equal movement and vision capabilities. Figure 17 shows a 
plot of the species populations vs. time for the same run. 
All of the species populations are evenly dispersed in the 
environment during symbiosis. 
In the second case, shown in Figures 18a and 18b, 
the food particle value range was shifted down so that the 
smallest value was equal to the metabolic rate of species A 
and B. This meant that A and/or B had to survive in the 
steady state if the whole ecosystem were to be viable in the 
long run. As is evident from Figure 18b, however, both A and 
B have disappeared by step 300. This is because A and B have 
to compete with each other for the few food particles that 
are edible only by them, and with the more advanced species, 
for the larger particles. They are unable to do so success- 
fully, however, and eventually their populations perish. Now 
there are no automata to eat the small food particles, which 
consequently accumulate continuously, making less and less 
space available for the larger particles feeding the more ad. - 
vanced automata (H. 0, X). At this point the fate of the 
system depends somewhat on chance. If a new small automaton 
is generated through a coalition formation between more ad- 
vanc` d automata (e . g. ,H+M -} X+ A), then 
it will quickly 
multiply and "clean up" the environment of all small parti- 
cles. Otherwise the trend of clogging up the environment 
with small food particles will continue. Note that, at step 
300, the species H and M are present, so the possibility of 
-137- 
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Figure 18a: Snapshots for steps 0,300, and 1200 of 
a simulation showing 
failure of symbiosis and clogging 
up of the environment with uneaten 
food particles. 
coo 1 -n Figure 18b on following page). k L-; %, ý------ ý-A 
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STEP AUT OM FOODP CREATEi) Ccýý B IavED D IED 
0 4 0 4 0 0% 
_-______ _ _------_- w_-. -__---__ ,... _.,. __ SPECIES POPULAT ION'S 
FAS=1 RS=2 PS =3 RS=4 [S=5 
uM= i 0 2 0 00 ? A D I P 
PM=2 2 0 0 00 3 C F K Eý 
0 0 0 00 E G ri 14 T 
1? 'A=4 0 0 0 00 1 L ',. 4 () V 
R14=5 0 0 0 00 
.0 
S u vi X 
STEP AUTOM FO0DP Ci? EA T CD CUý. 1i3 I Cý(cll CSI ýJ 
3 00 34 1 38 224 101 1 90 /0 
---- -------------------------- ----- SPEC I .S POPULAT 
IONS 
1S=1 ISS=2 1? S=3 IS=4 R5=5 
; t'. I=1 00 0 00 ? A D I P 
uý11A=21 0 15 2 00 ß C F K d 
H114=3 00 6 .10 E G H 141. T 
KM =4 00 0 23 J L 14 0 V 
H"ýý5 00 0 05 Q 5 U 11.1 X 
STEP AUTO. F()OODP CREATED COMBINED DIED 
1200 18 534 473 235 455 % 
____ . _4______ _____ _____ -__e__ ----- SPECIES POPULAT IONS 
RS= l RS=2 RS =3 RS=4 R3 =5 
F? MM =i 0 0 0 0 0 ? A D I P 
KM =2 0 0 0 0 0 B C F K R 
HM, =3 0 0 14 0 0 E G H M T 
U, 1,1=4 0 0 0 0 0 J L Nil () v 
f:;: i=5 0 0 0 0 4 0 3 U W X, 
, Figure 
18b: Vital statistics for steps 0,300 
and 1200 of the simulation showing failure of 
symbiosis and clogging up of the environment 
with uneaten food particles, 
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regeneration of A is still there. Such generation does not 
happen, however, and by step 7.200, A and B can no longer be 
generated. So the small food particles keep accumulating, 
and, after enough time steps, all nodes in the universe will 
be found to contain only small food particles. By that time 
the advanced automata will have also starved to death, vic- 
tiros, in a sense, of their own early high fitness which 
eliminated the smaller "house cleaning" automata. The popu-- 
lation plot for this run is shown in Figure 19, and a clear 
conclusion is that there is a definite advantage of maintain- 
ing a sufficient variety in the ecology for its overall and 
long range stability. (Some additional remarks about the 
possible outcomes of this model may be found in section 3--4.1 
below. ) 
It should be emphasized at this point that "collab- 
orative" behavior among automata (that is manifest for example 
in a symbiotic steady state), is not in any way "explicitly 
programmed in" in Eve'-1, nor are the rules of the model. ever 
changed to reward collaboration explicitly. Symbiosis, when 
it is observed, is strictly a result of the stochastic opera- 
tion of the model as defined in earlier sections, and 
it is 
for this reason that under certain conditions it fails to 
materialize even though it would 
have been the only way for 
automata to survive in the long run. 
-140- 
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d. The Introduction of Barren Territory Accelerates 
Evolution and/or Favors Vision 
In some simulations a temporary modification was 
introduced to the program preventing food particles from ap- 
pearing in one-third of the nodes which constitute the uni- 
verse. Figure 20 shows the vital statistics for a run with- 
out this modification, and Figure 21 shows a run where all 
parameters are the same except that the "barren" territory 
was introduced. As these Figures show, the introduction of 
barren territory has introduced prevalence of vision (see, 
for example, step 500 in both Figures). This is easily 
understood, since longer vision makes it less likely that an 
automaton will enter the barren territory, and, in the case 
that it does enter such a barren territory, a longer vision 
range would make it easier for the automaton to move back to 
a territory where food is available, before it starves to 
death. 
In a different set of runs of a similar sort, with 
different food availability pattern, X predominated both in 
the presence and in the absence of barren territory--but the 
evolution from A and B to X took less time 
in the case when 
the barren territory was present. This acceleration of the 
evolutionary process was, of course, 
due to the fact that 
more automata found themselves 
in difficulty (and therefore 
formed coalitions) from the very beginning of 
the simulation 
when much of the territory 
had no food. 
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Figure 20: Species population at 
steps 100,150,250 and 500 for 
a simulation without barren 
territory. 
Figure 21: Species population in 
the same steps (0,150,250 and 
500) when barren territory was 
introduced. 
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e. Spatial Uniformity of Population Distribution--And 
Some Exceutions 
Since both the location and the sizes of food par- 
ticles are selected randomly by the program, one would expect 
the population of each species to diffuse randomly throughout 
the environment. This indeed is the case most of the time 
when steady state is reached in typical runs. 
Before steady state, however, and occasionally for 
brief periods after it is reached, some definite spatially 
non-uniform patterns may be observed. Figure 22 shows snap- 
shots from one run showing interesting spatial variations. 
Early in the run, the few automata in existence live and 
multiply in one portion of the universe, while food accumu- 
lates unconsumed in other regions. In time, the automata 
deplete the food in the region they occupy and begin dying 
or forming coalitions. At the same time, those automata 
which are near the "frontier" of the inhabited region dis- 
cover the food-rich region, and move into it, multiplying at 
a high rate. The snapshots in Figure 22 show a whole front 
of such automata actually sweeping this region clean and 
proceeding almost in formation until they reach the opposite 
boundary of the universe. Figure 22 also shows that more ad- 
vanced automata start to evolve 
in the depleted territory, 
while most of the "new conquest" 
is still made by the simpler 
ones. When the entire field 
has been cleared of the initial 
high food concentration, certain regions which 
have been 
empty of automata for 
long enough sometimes become rich in 
w 
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Figure 22: Snapshots of steps 100,120,140 and 
Ihn of a simulation showing spacially non-uniform 
patterns. 
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food again, and so there starts a similar advance back to 
these original regions. A definite spatial oscillation is, 
then, observed, but it dies out, given enough time, when the 
steady state is reached. (Nevertheless, phenomena of this 
sort were occasionally seen even after steady state was 
reached; a temporary disturbance may induce such oscillations, 
but the same steady state is eventually recovered. ) 
In one particular case, the observation of a mark- 
edly non-uniform pattern was traced to a programming detail 
that could create anisotropic results in certain situations. 
Figure 23, for example, shows the early stages of a simula- 
tion with a very high food particle production rate. Al- 
though the initial state contained a few automata evenly 
distributed, all populations moved rapidly to one end of the 
universe while the rest of it became completely filled with 
food particles. Eventually the automata swept across the 
entire environment in one almost solid front, but the initial 
move to one direction, given a uniform initial distribution, 
was hard to explain. 
The problem was finally traced to the program sub- 
routine which searches the region visible by an automaton for 
the closest food particle. Unlike other similar subroutines, 
this particular one did not have a randomized search, but 
scanned the visible region always in the same orderly pattern, 
always selecting the first of all equidistant closest parti- 
cles. This type of search would not produce problems 
in most 
cases, since it is generally rare 
that two or more food 
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Figure 23: Snapshots for steps U, 15, /5 and iuu 
of a simulation showing spurious non-uniform 
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particles are equidistant from an automaton (and are the 
closest ones to it at the same time), thus requiring that a 
choice be made. When, however, there is a very high food 
concentration and a small number of automata, this particular 
condition arises often enough to influence the direction of 
movement of the automata. The problem was removed by intro- 
during a random variable in the choice among equidistant food 
particles. But this experience exemplifies the care that 
must be taken in implementing a truly random stochastic model 
if errors of omission and oversight in the implementation are 
to be kept from interfering with interpretation of the re- 
suits. 
3-4. General Observations on the Behavior of the Model 
A number of general statements may be made in con- 
clusion on the basis of the experience which was gained with 
Eve-1 to date. These include the following: 
3°4.1. Characteristics of the Steady State 
Many of the processes occurring in Eve-i are random: 
food particles appear at-random locations and, in some of the 
simulations, have random values; automata move randomly when- 
ever they see no food or neighbors, and they search their 
visible regions in a random order when selecting nearest tar- 
gets, choosing a neighbor to form a coalition, or looking for 
a free adjacent node where they reproduce. Nevertheless, a 
steady state is always reached after a 
few hundred time steps 
in which all the viable species populations are evenly 
dis- 
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persed in the environment retaining their magnitudes with re- 
markable consistency. In practically all cases, only one or 
very few species are present in significant populations in 
the steady state--a significant fact, since automata of new 
species are normally being continuously generated through 
coalition formation, and furthermore since there is no col- 
laboration among automata of the same species. 
The steady state is also characterized by a rela- 
tively constant amount of free food in the environment and a 
stable total population of all species. There are, of course, 
oscillations about the mean values of these quantities, but 
these tend to be regular and never large enough to upset the 
overall system balance. The total system seems to operate as 
a very efficient control mechanism which quickly attenuates 
and reverses all local disturbances. 
The adaptability and great stability of the statis- 
tical steady state of this stochastic system becomes more 
remarkable when one reflects its relatively low complexity 
(as compared to any real-world ecological or biological sys- 
tem, for example). Furthermore, it is interesting that this 
stable steady state is extremely dynamic, as it is character- 
ized by consistently high birth and death rates of automata. 
(It should be remembered, in this respect, that automata die 
only of hunger and, never by decay due to aging. 
) All species 
populations are constantly renewing themselves, and 
there is 
a large number of . "' i .nr 
deaths" even in successful species-- 
all this while the 
individual species populations remain 
. -149- 
remarkably constant. In addition, there is always a non-zero 
rate of coalition formations in the steady state which (except 
in degenerate cases discussed further in section 3-4.2 below) 
constantly introduces automata of new species into the system. 
One possible exception to the above remarks concern- 
ing the steady state could be certain types of systems in 
which the long term survival of the population of automata 
depends on the symbiosis of two or more species. As previ- 
ously mentioned (section 3-3.2. c), in certain cases this 
symbiosis is stable, and a steady state will be reached; in 
other cases, however, the symbiosis fails to continue beyond 
a certain point and eventually all species become extinct; 
finally, it would be possible for the symbiosis to assume a 
cyclical pattern in which one or more species may become 
periodically extinct and be regenerated when their corre- 
sponding niches have grown sufficiently. The latter phenom- 
enon has not actually been observed during experiments with 
Eve-l, although it seems perfectly possible. It seems that 
by using a larger universe, for example (which would have in- 
creased the probability of occurrence of rare events such as 
the regeneration of a particular species at a particular time), 
it should be possible to induce such a cyclical steady state. 
3-4.2. Evolutionary Pathways and Barriers 
In Eve-l, coalition formations are responsible for 
the generation of new species of automata 
(as well as, in some 
cases, of already existing ones). A specific coalition 
forma- 
t ion. event has a random component 
(the adjacency of two "hungry" 
.,.. ýýc- 
automata in a certain time step) as well as a deterministic 
one. (Its results are uniquely determined by the genotypes 
of the two automata that form it. ) 
The deterministic aspect of the coalition formation 
rules allows for the occurrences of irreversible transitions 
in the composition of the automata populations. In other 
words, although every species may be generated as a result of 
some coalition formation, it is possible that the total sys- 
tem may enter a state after which a particular coalition for- 
mation can never occur. This, of course, happens if the 
types of automata required to bring about such a specific 
coalition do not exist and cannot themselves be generated for 
the same reason. Once a system has entered such a state, 
then the production of certain types of species is not possi- 
ble any more, and evolution may only proceed along certain 
restricted "pathways. " An evolutionary "barrier" now exists 
that precludes the generation of certain species, and the 
species that prevail in the steady state may not be the best 
equipped to compete for food. 
In practice, when the initial state contains species 
A and B, such barriers are generated only after the model has 
operated for a considerable number of time steps and is ready 
to reach its steady state, in which case the number of surviv- 
ing species would normally be relatively small. Recall that 
in the early part of each simulation, a relatively 
large num- 
ber of species is usually generated, which means that the 
generation of all species remains possible 
(and often happens) 
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for a significant number of time steps. Nevertheless, the 
fact that normally the model will eventually follow restricted 
pathways is important and it warrants the extension of the 
concept of fitness in Eve-l. Thus, although the fitness of 
an individual automaton depends only on its success in compe- 
tition for food, the fitness of a species population, as a 
whole, depends also on the stability of the genetically de- 
termined evolutionary pathway(s) to which it belongs. 
Examples of absence or presence of such pathways 
may best be discussed with reference to the species matrix 
(reproduced here for convenience as Figure 24), and of the 
rules for coalition formation (section 3-2.4. c and Appendix 
A). It may easily be seen that when species A and B exist 
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Figure 24: Species Label Matrix 
(in any numbers) then all other species may be generated. 
This is true since any species combining with A will increase 
its sensing gene value by 1 and any species combining with 
B 
will similarly affect the value of 
its movement gene; all 
species may therefore be generated whenever 
A's and B's are 
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present, and no restricted pathways are then in effect. 
There are many other simple cases in which a small number of 
species can, with successive coalitions, generate all others. 
For example, species K can generate A as follows: 
SYMBOLIC NOTATION GENOTYPE NOTATION 
K+K -} T+D (3,1)+(3,1) -ý (4,2)+(2, O) 
K+D -ý E+A(3,1)+(2,0) -* (4,1) + (1,0) 
Similarly, species L can generate B, so in effect K and L 
together are also capable of generating all other species. 
On the other hand, species C and H can only gener- 
ate the set{C, H, Of X}, therefore a restricted pathway will 
be entered when only C's and H's survive in an environment. 
Other sets of species defining restricted pathways include 
{A, D, If P}f {B, E, J, Q} and {A, D, I, P, K, R, T, V, X}. 
The first of these is a subset of the third one, indicating 
that a restricted pathway may further restrict itself if cer- 
Lain of the species that define it (in this case K, R, T, V, 
X) become extinct. 
The existence of restricted evolutionary pathways 
in Eve-1 illustrates the possibility that an evolving system 
may "trap" itself and lose its adaptability if it allows it- 
self to lose redundancy in an effort to optimize its perform- 
ante in response to a specific set of conditions. If the 
food availability pattern is drastically changed when a simu- 
lation has entered its steady state, the system may not be 
able to generate the species 
(variety) that could "handle" 
the new conditions in an optimal way. 
This kind of limitation 
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I 
could be removed, or made less severe, by introducing into 
the model the concept of random mutations or by changing the 
coalition formation rules. This was not done, however, since 
the existence of the evolutionary pathways was felt to make 
the model more useful, corresponding as it does to various 
biological and certainly social pathologies. It should also 
be noted that, if niches for species A and B are defined (as 
described earlier), then A and B will never disappear en- 
tirely and the flexibility of the whole system will not be 
lost. 
3-4.3. Efficiency of the Total Population of Automata 
As previously mentioned, the fact that food appears 
exogenously in Eve-1 makes it possible to define a. measure of 
efficiency of the total population in maintaining as little 
unconsumed food in the environment as possible. As long as 
the food availability pattern does not change, evolution in 
the model seems always to follow a path that decreases this 
amount of free food. (Initially, of course, there is a pe- 
riod during which free food accumulates; this is because the 
system takes a while to correct the inefficiencies usually 
contained in the externally defined initial state. ) With the 
minor modifications mentioned at the end of the previous sec- 
Lion, it would be possible to make Eve-1 maximize efficiency 
even when the food availability pattern changes 
drastically. 
This increasing efficiency may be interpreted as a 
goal of the total system; 
however, it is important to empha- 
size that this goal has not 
been explicitly programmed into 
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the model, neither at the macroscopic nor at the microscopic 
level. Furthermore this phenomenon suggests at least the 
possibility that stochastic systems of this type could be 
developed as control systems for real-world applications, 
specifically in cases where the environment is characterized 
by randomness and great variety. In a similar vein, such 
models could also be used as tools for the solution of com- 
plex design problems (in structural design, for example) 
where direct analytical or numerical methods cannot be ap- 
plied. 
3-4.4. Evolutionary Events in Eve-l: An Interpretation 
Evolutionary events in Eve-i occur through the for- 
mation of coalitions which is brought about by simp'Le automata 
combining to form more complex ones. The degree of complexity 
is arbitrarily defined with respect to the primary properties 
of such automata, namely vision and movement, and whsle these 
have a specific meaning for survival efficiency relative to 
the particular environment defined in the model, they are in- 
tended to stand as general tokens for any property which may 
increase survival advantage. For example, these properties 
may be regarded as different states that a system can assume 
as it meets environmental challenges and they may thus be 
taken to represent a system's behavioral repertoire, or, in 
other words, its total effective variety. Variety 
in this 
context is meant in the sense of a measure of 
the actual num- 
ber of different "moves" a system can make 
in its "struggle" 
for survival, where a 
"move" may stand for a behavioral 
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strategy, an actual action, and so forth. 
The formation of a coalition, therefore, always in- 
4 
volves an increase in such variety interpretable as an in- 
crease in available behavioral possibilities, which increase 
results in a higher survival advantage. In the model this is 
manifest in the condition whereby initial simple elements, 
once they are generated in the universe, tend to form more 
complex aggregates. Like their subcomponents, these can re- 
produce and they become subject to further selection in them- 
selves. 
The evolutionary event of forming a coalition can 
be interpreted with respect to the general problem of resolv- 
ing undecidable situations. A system A1 may encounter a sit- 
uation in which the object language Lal of its interaction 
with an environment is proven insufficient for handling a 
novel circumstance which may threaten its survival. The rep- 
ertoire available to Al in Lal may be such that it simply 
does not contain the vocabulary essential for maximizing sur- 
vival pay-offs under the new conditions. In such an event, 
and particularly if the problem persists because of scarce 
resources, for example, the system may either stagnate and 
eventually perish, or it may evolve into a more complex sys- 
tem A` with a more comprehensive object language Lat. Rela- 
tive to the previous system, the new Lag may be regarded as 
a metalanguage within the scope of which the situation can 
now be resolved. Such an effective resolution 
is in itself a 
source of a selective reward which encourages the evolutionary 
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trend from Al to A2" (46) 
In the mode]., an undecidable situation is encoun- 
I 
tered when an automaton finds itself in a condition in which 
its available behavioral repertoire (the specific capabilities 
of vision and movement) is insufficient to secure an adequate 
food supply. In such a case it can survive only if it will 
form a coalition, the new combined properties of which (again 
with specific respect to vision and movement) may now make 
possible the capture of food particles within the allotted 
critical time limits. From the viewpoint of the "organiza- 
tional model" (see Appendix D), the general implications of 
such an event are clear. If a system's interaction with its 
environment is stable (homeostatic) and if there are sudden 
changes in environmental circumstances, a radically different 
type of organization may be required if survival is to be en- 
sured. In such an event, a change in organizational structure 
will also entail a change in the procedures (programs) regu- 
lating the system's behavior. In other words, the appropriate 
'language' must evolve synchronously with the prosessor. (A 
change in structure, or form, for example, but not in content, 
is a common institutional pathology. ) 
This remark is applicable to viable systems in gen- 
eral and while it may clearly . relate to biological evolution, 
it is particularly relevant to the domain of human social 
systems. In this level, coalition 
formation, interpreted in 
its broadest sense, plays a major evolutionary role. Indeed 
the great evolutionary advangage of man 
lies precisely in a 
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comprehensive strategy which allows him to selectively form 
and reform coalitions with other men and with other animate 
or inanimate parts of his environment. 
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4. SOCIETY AS A BRAIN 
4-l. Society as a Product of Evolution 
Contemporary concepts of evolution hold that in order to 
explain the build-up of stable organizations and the general 
tendency of evolution to proceed in the direction of forming 
I 
structures of increasing complexity, a principle of ''stratified 
stability" must be assumed. Bronowski, who coined the term (1) 
argued that the stable organizations which have emerged during 
the course of evolution must each be regarded as a specific 
realization of a potential strata of stability, inherent to 
the variety of possible energy configurations. 
The concept is applicable to the sequential build-up of 
the chemical elements as it is to the emergence and subsequent 
evolution of increasingly more complex forms of life. It 
accounts for the general process by which, step by step, simple 
units interact to form more complex entities and these, in 
turn, serve as basic components in forming still more complex 
ones. Each new level of complexity is built on the next lower 
level which is stable in itself . (2) Each level actualizes a 
potentially stable configuration and it involves the emergence 
of novel properties. The process as a whole is conditioned 
upon a continuous input of energy into the evolving region, 
and the operation of a process of selection which, especially 
among life forms, speeds up the realization of 
intrinsically 
stable configurations. 
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Thus, as Bronowski points out, the build-up of the chem- 
ical elements proceeds step by step from the formation of 
hydrogen to helium to carbon and on to heavier atoms, and 
stable atoms combine, in turn, to form molecules and macr. omo- 
lecules expressing "the potential stability that lay hidden in 
the primitive building blocks of cosmic hydrogen. "(3) The 
sequence continues with the establishment and evolution of life 
forms; as stable atoms build the four base molecules (thymine, 
adenine, cytosine and guanine) which as stable configurations 
themselves are essential components for the formation of nu- 
cleic acids. Nucleic acids are the essential building blocks 
of genes, and so the process continues through the formation 
of the sub-units of proteins, to the proteins and on to the 
cells and to multi-cellular organism of increasing complexity. 
The concept can be extended further still, since there 
is a definite sense in which social systems can be viewed as 
organizations generally dependent on, and historically related 
to, specific patterns of energy flow. This view becomes ap- 
parent when the technological aspects of society are studied 
emphasizing the available means and organization of essential 
metabolic support. (4) Similarly, local ecosystems and the bio- 
sphere as a whole can be regarded as energetically stable sys- 
tems associated with specific food chains and with the broader 
aspects of mutually interdependent processes involving energy 
transformations. 
The continuous sequence of steps that is implicit to the 
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concept of stratified stability is normally divided by studies 
of evolution into three distinct phases broadly corresponding 
to evolutionary problems of a different kind. The first is the 
prebiotic "chemical" phase. The second is the phase dealing 
I 
with the organization of matter into stable self-replicating 
entities and the transition from "non-living" to "living. " 
The third phase involves the evolution of individual species. (5) 
Each phase in itself comprises a number of distinguishable 
stages and while all the specific mechanisms underlying the 
existence of each are not yet entirely understood, there is a 
basically similar logic applicable throughout. It relates to 
the idea of a succession of levels involving a progressive com-- 
plexity, _an 
increase in variability and the related emergence 
of novel properties. (6) 
The third phase, in particular, involves a succession of 
stages which mark the ascent of living organisms and the evolu- 
tion of a hierarchy of survival related mechanisms. These 
range from mechanisms associated with differentiation and the 
formation of specialized organs, to mechanisms such as those 
involved with sexual reproduction, the formation of nervous 
systems and complex brains and the development of various modes 
of perception and communication. They include social organiza- 
Lions of increasing complexity and lead ultimately to the rise 
of such properties as self-consciousness, logical reflection 
and moral judgment- From the view point of cybernetics, this 
succession is interpretable as manifesting an expansion in re- 
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gulation capabilities (see Chapter 2), and living organisms, 
as they ascend the scale of complexity, show their ascent by 
a growing potency for regulating their environment under a 
greater range of conditions. 
This view is implicit to Ashby's formulation of the cyber- 
netic concept of regulation and its implications to the notion 
k 
of adaptation. Two ideas emerge in this context as crucial. 
Firstly that in any complex dynamic system subject to the oper- 
ation of unvarying constraints, some properties will be more 
resistant to change than others. These will tend to "survive" 
and gradually dominate their environment appearing as being 
particularly well adapted to its demands. If the total system 
is of an exceedingly high complexity, the selective processes 
leading to local stabilities will involve a wide range of dy- 
namic activities rich in a variety of intriguing manifesta- 
tions. (7) Complex as such activities may be, they are all 
traceable to the phenomenon of adaptation. In this sense, given 
the elaborate nature of the earth's surface, its age and the 
fact that it has been characterized by the operation of consis- 
tent constraints, then the evolution of dynamic self-preserving 
local stabilities (such as the existing forms of life) must be 
regarded as inevitable. (8) 
Secondly, the active interactions of co-existing organý- 
nations (which are only partially autonomous 
in any case) con- 
tinuously alter the properties of the medium in which they oc- 
cur. (9) As initial constraints are modified, and with 
them 
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the norms of "survival success, " new needs and conditions for 
further evolution are being continuously established and the 
whole cumulative process proceeds with new possibilities and 
challenges created. at each evolutionary step. The mutually 
adaptive processes that are inherent to the interaction of 
evolving organizations thus generate, as they unfold, the re- 
quirement for further adaptation. It is this feature in par- 
ticular, which is interpretable by an observer as lending the 
evolutionary process its expansive qualities as well as its 
direction and. logical continuity in time. 
The idea that adaptation functions as the orienting fac- 
tor, giving evolution the appearance of direction and "purpose, " 
(10) obtains a specific functional meaning when it is subject 
to a cybernetic interpretation. The emphasis is on the close 
relation between the concepts of adaptation and regulation. 
From the cybernetic view point, the adaptive processes which 
underlie evolution are subject to the laws of control, speci- 
fically to the law of requisite variety and the possibility, 
in principle, of amplifying regulation. In so far as it reflects 
the requirements of such laws, selection in a dynamic environ- 
raent will favor diversity, encouraging the formation of high 
variety regulators. This selective process works simultaneously 
on two distinct levels. On one level it operates to increase 
the regulation potential of specific organisms producing a 
better match between such organisms and the variety of their 
environment. On a higher, "meta-level", however, it operates 
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not just by selecting particular organizations at random, but 
by encouraging variability in general. The result is an in- 
crease in the range and variety of adaptive possibilities, and 
a consistent general trend characterized by a succession of 
progressively more capable regulators. (11) 
I 
The succession of dynamic organizations which have emerged 
in the course of organic evolution can be clearly traced to the 
operation of such a. consistent trend. The outcome has been the 
rise of forms showing a remarkable power to resist the unstabi- 
lizing effects of their dynamic environment. As Ashby points 
out, they are resistant, not in the static and uninteresting 
way that a piece of granite, or a run-down clock, is resistant, 
but in the dynamic and much more interesting way of forming in- 
tricate dynamic systems around themselves (their so called 
'bodies', with extensions such as nests and tools) so that the 
whole is homeostatic and self--preserving by active defense. " (12) 
The progression of increasingly more complex organizations 
which results is underlied by the operation of two essential 
mechanisms. One is the mechanism of self-regulation, or self- 
maintenance, expressed in the idea that organisms, at all levels 
of complexity, can be regarded as control systems with their 
own survival as the goal. (They are autopoietic systems in the 
sense of Maturana. ) The other is the mechanism of evolutionary 
change which secures the attainment of self-regulation under 
variable conditions, allowing, through. amplification, an 
in- 
crease in regulation possibilities. 
Social systems, like brains 
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and other specialized mechanisms which have emerged as the 
products of evolution, can all be seen in this light as sur- 
vival related tools. Their relative position on the evolu- 
tionary "ladder" is identified by successive increases of va- 
riability, and regulation effectiveness in an expanding niche. 
The general trend of increasing variability, and hence, 
0 
regulation potential, can be illustrated with respect to spe- 
cific developments which mark major steps in evolution. (13) 
For example: 
The formation of multi-cellular colonies with 
functional differentiation and a division of 
labor, brought about a significant increase in 
the potential variety inherent to single cells. 
The development of the sexual mechanism of re- 
production has affected a considerable increase 
in the range of genetic variation present in a 
given population. This increase is brought 
about by the constant reshuffling of genetic 
material during meiosis. 
On another level, this variety has been ensured 
and further increased by the cycle of birth and 
death and the mechanisms responsible for the 
alternation of generations. These mechanisms 
replace old organizations with 
fresh new ones, 
constantly opening the way 
for novel possibilities. 
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The evolution of learning as an adaptive 
mechanism made possible an increase in the 
finite amount of regulation exercised directly 
through the genes. By supplementing the in- 
formation provided by the gene pattern with 
information reaching the organism from the 
environment, an ultimate amount of regulation 
can be achieved, far exceeding the original 
capacity inherent to the genes alone. (14) 
In relation to the above, the development of 
complex brains and particularly of intelligence 
produced a definite advantage over simple forms 
of instinctive behavior, by elaborating the 
working of response mechanisms, providing the 
possibility of choice between alternative ac- 
tions, and generally increasing the range of 
behavioral options. 
A striking increase in survival advantage has 
been brought about by the development of so- 
ciali. za_tion and of ever more effective modes 
of communication. In the most obvious sense, 
socialization and coalition formation make 
joint efforts possible which far exceed the 
capabilities inherent to individual organisms. 
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The examples given above illustrate the evolutionary 
trend of increasing variability in general. From a more 
specific "functional" view point, increases in regulation 
capabilities have been achieved through the elaboration and 
constant perfection of mechanisms of perception, mechanisms 
a 
of computation, selection and communication, mechanisms with 
which an organism could increase the range of its operations 
and the possibilities of actively effecting its environment, 
and ultimately through the continuous integration of all these, 
into viable stable organizations. 
Gains in capacity, efficiency and potentiality of self- 
regulation achieved during the course of biological evolution, 
have been expanded many folds with the emergence of human 
social systems and the more recent development of civilization. 
(15) In social systems, underlying biological regulation capa. - 
city has been amplified by two fundamental "inventions. " One 
is the development of language the high versatility of which 
made possible the generation, accumulation and communication 
of highly complex information, rendering personal knowledge and 
individual experience easily transferable within and across 
generations. (16) The other is the development of technology 
and of specialized tools, which brought about a tremendous ex- 
tension in the range and capabilities of vital organs. Tech- 
nology and the essentially symbolic nature of regulatory social 
processes have cumulatively extended the limits inherent to 
physical mechanisms of biological orginsv They have resulted 
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in a comprehensive survival advantage which has ultimately re- 
placed adaptation by direct selection of genetic variants with 
a far more efficient method. 
Social systems integrate single humans into super-indi- 
vidual organizations sharing augmented physical resources and 
t a collective "mind. " Nevertheless, within the social organi- 
zation, the carriers of cognition, volition and consciousness 
are individual human beings who, through their unique insights, 
experience, capabilities and drive, can contribute to shaping 
the course of evolution itself. 
4-2. The Dynamics of Stability in Social Systems 
Social systems are evolving organizations. (17) As such, 
they belong to a class of systems sharing a common type of 
underlying processes and an invariance in particular organiza- 
tional aspects which 1) make possible adaptive modifications 
of structure and function in response to environmental changes 
and 2) allow for improvements in the mechanisms through which 
such adaptive modifications are achieved. The common features 
appear on a level of abstraction stressing the principles of 
reproduction, variation and selection (applicable to competing 
and/or cooperating organizations), although domains in which 
such principles find their expression differ greatly in appear- 
ance, in behavior and in the specific fabric by which they are 
sustained. The special peculiarities of mechanisms mediating 
evolution in such different domains may obscure the invariant 
characteristics, which nevertheless are central 
to the logic 
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of evolution in animals, machines, cognitive processes and 
sociocultural systems. 
In particular, the similarity between'the evolution of 
concepts in brains (or groups of brains) and the evolutionary 
processes occurring in sociocultural systems has been pointed 
out. (18) This similarity goes beyond a simple analogy since 
I 
in social systems, as in brains, regulation is affect by pro- 
cesses which are essentially symbolic in nature. In both cases, 
such regulatory processes can be represented by organizations 
of specific classes of goal-directed programs involving va. ri- 
ous modes of computation and including, for example, the possi- 
bility for prediction (as in the model offered by Fogel, Owens 
and Walsh) and resolution of undecidable situations (as in Eve-l). 
Moreover, there is a definite sense in which a social 
system can be regarded as a "brain, " computing and bringing 
about the near optimal relations which maintain its (the social) 
overall stability. Individual human brains, together with 
their mechanical extensions, function as the computational ele- 
ments in such a macro-brain, and the classes of programs they 
run are temporarily subservient to the "externalized" macro- 
programs integrating the social purpose and regulating social 
goals. (These are manifest in conventions and traditions, 
rules, mores, rituals and the like. ) Single 
brains are essen- 
tial, however, for the process of evolution since they provide 
the source of required variety 
by generating new concepts, 
articulating a new purpose and rejecting 
established norms. 
A social system can thus 
be identified with a named class 
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(or classes) of . goal-directed programs, (19) executed in a 
particular kind of hierarchical organizations (see section D-9 
in Appendix D) where they can be reproduced and, under certain 
conditions, evolve. Selection among competing and cooperating 
programs is typical to the evolutionary process, cooperation 
being particularly important in psychological and social sys- 
tems. The simulated processes mediated by the execution of 
Eve-1 (see Chapter 3) portray the role of cooperative behavior 
in the evolutionary process and emphasize a more general char- 
acteristic of evolution, namely, that under certain "undecid- 
able" situations evolutionary change becomes essential. An 
undecidable situation is interpretable as resulting from a 
modification in the conditions underlying a system's interac- 
tion with an environment. If such a modification exceeds the 
system's repertoire of adaptive responses, the range of toler- 
ance which is compatible with its survival (as defined by its 
"essential variables") will be threatened. Ultimately, the 
system will either perish, or, by expanding its repertoire of 
survival related options, it will evolve. 
The cogency of the evolutionary processes simulated by 
Eve-1 can be enhanced with respect to a societal interpreta- 
tion if we allow: 1) that properties of simple automata stand 
for classes of goal-directed programs, 2) that such programs 
are embodied in adaptive controllers like Pask's unit of con- 
trol or the TOTE unit of Miller, Galanter and Pribram 
(see 
sections D-6 and D-8 in Appendix D) and 
3) that such units of 
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control can be made to represent regulatory processes of arbi- 
trary complexity when they are organized in configurations re- 
ducible to sequences and hierarchies of TOTE units such that 
the whole organization is a TOTE unit itself. 
A redundancy of mechanisms is inherent to such an organ- 
ization, where the task of computation is distributed over a 
large number of components involved now in one computational 
activity, now in another. This property is essential for re- 
presenting the dynamics of sociocultural processes since, in 
reality, the programs by which such processes are mediated, 
are run in a large number of different brains and in various 
artifacts, all interacting in a complex manner such that pre- 
cise identification or localization is made impossible. In 
addition, the hierarchy employed in such organizations allows 
for self-referential capabilities. These interpret current 
states of computation in the system's components and are an 
essential condition for evolution. (20) In a more specific 
vein, evolution will occur under "crisis" conditions, for ex- 
ample, when a conflicting situation develops due to concurrent 
computation of incompatible programs, or due to conflicts be- 
tween "internal" and "external" goals. In such cases resolu- 
tion will require appropriate modifications in existing pro- 
grams, or the production and integration of new programs 
in a 
more comprehensive repertoire. 
The concept of a "conversational" interaction and the 
constructs employed by Pask to represent 
the dynamics of cog- 
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nitive processes and learning (see section D-9 in Appendix D 
with the related references) are applicable to a rep resenta- 
tion of sociocultural evolution. The correspondence is impor- 
tant, (21) and since we are concerned with enhancing the socie- 
tal interpretation of evolutionary processes embodied in Eve-1 - 
a far simpler model - some additional comments are crucial. 
Firstly, while social processes can be imaged as programs 
embodied in, and executed by, TOTE like organizations, they 
cannot be performed (simulated) by such. The intricate web of 
interactions which mediate social stability and underlie social 
evolution is not constrained by seriality. In reality it in- 
volves many concurrent events, and the concept of concurrent 
computation (22) is therefore essential. Next, in a concurrent 
processor, computations in initially asynchronized centers of 
control may become synchronized due to cooperative interactions. 
Synchrony is brought about by means of information transfer (23) 
and it is interpretable as a conflict-resolving interaction. 
As a result, an evolutionary process will be manifest in the 
development of dependencies among initially independent loci of 
computations. Finally, the development of such dependencies 
is analogous to an increase of coupling between components 
(single automata) and their integration into a new "larger" sys- 
tem. The latter may be, or may not be more efficient than ear- 
her configurations. Here judgment can be made only in retro- 
spect, after pertinent selection processes have 
had their 
effect. 
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With the ideas discussed above in mind, a simple model 
can be used as a means for highlighting the major cybernetic 
features which underlie the dynamics of stability (or instabi- 
lity) in social systems. The model is, of course, a gross 
simplification of the intricate social reality and the com- 
plexity inherent to the social fabric. As such, it is likely 
to be accused of major omissions. It is therefore important 
to stress that it is not intended for representing a detailed 
model of a social system. Rather, its utility is in providing 
a simple representation, which as a conceptual construct, can 
assist the discussion of mechanisms underlying stability and 
change in social systems. It can also be useful for the pur- 
pose of identification, providing a bridge between some of the 
abstract ideas discussed earlier and more familiar aspects 
characterizing social processes. In particular, it can make 
a historical interpretation easier. 
The model is depicted by Figure 25 below, where the em- 
phasis is as a "homeostat" like organization. It is conceived 
on a low resolution level which glosses over the complex in- 
teractions within each major component and between them. Never- 
theless, it preserves the operational logic underlying the or- 
ganization of the processes involved. The complexity of such 
processes can be imaged by elaborate constructs of interacting 
TOTE like units with the important provisions discussed above. 
Much as the case of the brain (when it 
is studied from the cy- 
bernetician's viewpoint), the actual complexity characterizing 
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the working of society defies a detailed tracking. It must be 
kept in mind, however, as some global features are discussed. 
The view taken here is that the aggregate behavior of a 
soeiaý system (as it appears to an external observer) is con- 
ditioned by the dynamic interplay of a number of critical fac- 
4 tors which all together shape the broad characteristics of a 
social system at a given time. Problems of social stability 
can be interpreted with respect to the interaction of such fac- 
tors, and social evolution can be seen in the light of changes 
in their constitution, and in their continuous integration in- 
to a succession of stable and increasingly more complex systems. 
These, coincide with major historical transition which have 
marked the social evolution of mankind. 
The critical factors shaping the characteristics of a 
social system include the following: 
. the biological make-up of humans. 
. the characteristics of a particular geographical 
environment. 
. the available technology. 
. the symbolic representation of 
the world that is 
employed. 
. the value system shared 
by members of a social 
group. 
the institutional organization underlying a social 
order. 
In the model, these factors are grouped 
into four major domains 
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(24) which are defined as follows: 
1) The physical domain: represents the total local eco-system 
(as in the Tsembaga), including the biological make-up of 
humans and the man-made part of the environment (technology). 
The environmental component of the physical domain condi- 
tions the requirements for adaptation, in the general sense 
that the terrestrial environment favors particular organi- 
zations and in the more specific sense that particular geo- 
graphical characte isitcs determine specific adaptive 
needs. (2 5) 
2) The conceptual domain: represents the available model of 
the physical domain. It includes scientific models which 
are particularly effective for manipulative purposes, but 
also a host of other less rigorous (and even scientifically 
incorrect) concepts. All together, it constitutes a "-world- 
image" which is shared by members of a social group and is 
passed on by education. This image is embodied in proce- 
dures which guide social action. The actual effectiveness 
of such actions depends to a great extent, on the accuracy 
and refinement of the models employed. In this sense, the 
conceptual domain represents not only the realm of "what is 
known, " but ultimately also the boundaries of "what is po- 
tentially possible. " (E. g. for a successful journey to the 
moon, an effective model of celestial mechanics 
is impera- 
tive. ) 
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3) The ethical domain: represents the value system shared by 
members of a social group. It provides a normative frame- 
work defining both the "acceptable" and the "expected " 
The moral imperative and concepts of right or wrong which 
are inherent to a value system condition the choice as well 
as the priorities for action. They play a dominant role 
in the articulation of social goals and in specifying the 
-nature of relations among humans, and between them and 
their environment. (26) Like the world image, a value sys- 
tern is passed on by education as well as by less formal 
-means of social conditioning. (Values are implicit to 
-my-thologies, folklore, songs and stories to which children 
are expösed, etc. ) 
4) The -organizational domain: Social actions (in the broad- 
est sense) are carried out through an organizational frame- 
work wh-ich "s: pci-f=ied procedures for decisions and actions 
end _pröv-ide an är_gan- 1 -zed means for carrying these out. 
The ärgani'za; tiönäl f"rämework is embodied in the structure 
of =i=ns-t=it-Ut=ion's, = nc-Iuding "various forms of government, 
system"s of law, econömic systems and the like. These may 
üär_y greatly in respective rigidity, scope and other char- 
acteri. s"ti"cs, butt They all share (in principle) a common 
adaptive function - that of organizing actions for a common 
survival advantage. 
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The sharp distinction between the four domains is arbi- 
trary. In reality, they overlap to the extent that an abso- 
lute and clear separation is quite impossible. In a similar 
vein, their mutual interaction does not occur through single 
channels (as indicated by the two directional arrows in the 
diagrams), but through a web-like structure tying together 
I 
the many processes involved. The whole constitutes a complex 
fabric of loci of events (control) and "threads" of informa- 
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Figure 25. The Dynamics of Social Stability - 
Major Domains 
of Interaction. 
oI 
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tional coupling. The definitions of domains as separate enti-- 
ties is employed for a descriptive convenience and the arrows 
are used in order to symbolize mutual dependencies. 
The diagram represents a dynamic structure reducible to 
processes involving complex mutual interactions that are circu- 
i 
lar and non-serial in nature. Each domain is affected by the 
state of every other, while the state of each, and the inter- 
action of all, represent the constraints (or potentials, de- 
pending on the point of view) which are ultimately manifest in 
the global condition of a social system. The whole can best 
be interpreted with respect to an iterative sequence of "chal- 
lenges and responses" in Toynbee's sen. se. (27) This sequence 
is characterized by steps of related cumulative changes, where- 
by modification of states in one domain affect a corresponding 
change in the others. Such changes are regulated by a match- 
ing process (28) through which their effects are being contin-- 
uously synchronized. 
From a historical _pe-rsIpective this translates into a view 
which sees the challenges ö=f a particular environment met by 
an integrated set of adaptive responses embodied in a specific 
technology, a specific mode of social organization, a communally 
shared symbolic representation of the facts of experience and 
a system of values. These factors have always been intimately 
related and the particular characteristics of each has affected 
and has been reflected in the characteristics of the others. 
Their interaction has involved the application of mutual con- 
-178--- 
straints inhibiting particular developments at one time while 
reinforcing and accelerating other developments at another. (29) 
In a stable social system these aspects are compatible, 
their interactions are synchronized and their respective mani- 
festations consistent. This condition of stability is inter- 
pretable as a match of varieties in the sense of the theory of 
6 
regulation and it is displayed by well adapted societies, such 
as the Tsembaga (see Chapt. 1). An unstable situation, on the 
other hand, would result from internal inconsistencies, mis- 
matching situations and conflicts between states of the four 
domains. Such instabilities may cause ultimate disintegration, 
but under certain circumstances they may also stimulate evolu-- 
tion, which through a meta-process of conflict resolution could 
bring about a new level of sytemic integration. (30) 
The steady state which characterizes the Tsembaga as a 
viable system represents a special case of stability which is 
the exception rather than the rule. Most societies in history, 
if they did not perish, were forced to continuously readapt and 
evolve. In the related process of social change two major 
sources of variety have played an important role. One is a 
source of potential variety inherent to the complexity of the 
system itself. (Represented in the diagram by circular arrows 
originating and returning to each domain. ) This "internal" 
source of variety could generate a spontaneous activity which 
would spread through the whole system as 
it searches for a new 
equilibrium. 
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More significant to social evolution have been external 
sources of variety. These are implicit to the idea that spe- 
cific societies and their ecologies constitute a part of a 
larger "external" environment (broken circle encompassing the 
four domains in the diagram), in which other conditions prevail 
and other societies exist. Throughout history, exposure to 
such external sources of variety have involved territorial ex- 
pansions (a change of environment) as well as contacts between 
social groups and whole civilizations, with a resulting exchange 
of knowledge, transfer of technology, adoption of new values 
and a diffusion of forms of institutional organization. 
Such occasions require a process of adaptation and a 
synchronization of the new situations, affected in the manner 
already discussed above. A typical example is offered by the 
Cargo Cultures studied by Ted-Schwartz in New-Guinea. (31) 
These have emerged as a result of an encounter between a stable 
local society and Western Civilization. The rise of masseianic 
movements which have followed this encounter, and the associated 
violent "internal" upheaval, can be regarded as a pathology. 
But it can also be interpreted as a process by which such a 
local society, drawing upon the resources of its internal vari- 
ety, generates a sudden and dynamic activity as it seeks for a 
new stability and a new level of integration. A new stable 
equilibrium is not always assured. If the inherent potential 
for variability proves insufficient, the conflicting circum- 
stances may not be resolved. At times, it can lead to a genuine 
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impasse and a "Double Bind" situation in Bateson's sense. (32) 
A viable social system is an ultrastable system. But 
unlike Ashby's mechanical "Homeostat, " its environment does 
not represent only a source of disturbances. It also provides 
a source of potential linkages which are formed when the system 
"expands" as it gains control over its environment. This ex- 
pansive quality has been a dominant characteristic of the dy- 
namic process of interaction between man and his environment 
and the emergence and evolution of civilization. It followed 
"spiralling" pattern of self-reinforcing events in which a 
new technology, developed in response to a perceived challenge, 
has invariably lead to a growing awareness of a larger and more 
inclusive environment, which by presenting new problems forced 
the development of further technology, which in turn has fur- 
ther increased the scope of man's world, and so on. Each such 
step was followed by an increase in knowledge (thus anticipat- 
ing the next step), and each has involved changes in organiza- 
tional requirements as well as in the accepted notions of right 
and wrong. Signalling the major historical transitions which 
have characterized the evolution of human society, such changes 
have been accumulating continuously until, repeatedly, a cri- 
tical stage had been reached where their integration has brought 
about a significant qualitative transformation and a new phase 
in human affairs. 
In particular such qualitative transitions have been ty- 
pical to the Neolitic, the Urban and the Industrial 
"revolu- 
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tions. "(33) Each such transition has been characterized by 
specific environmental circumstances, (34) a particular tech- 
nology, a "level" of knowledge of the world, a typical form 
of organization and a system of values. (35) In each case 
these aspects constitute a coherent whole which makes the his- 
torical distinction possible. If one subscribes to an opti- 
mistic view of history and the idea of "progress, " such 
transitions describe a trajectory of an ever-increasing human 
advantage,. manifest, for example (and in spite of many 
temporary setbacks), in a continuous increase in longevity, 
a consistent expansion of degrees of freedom and a persistent 
pursuit of individual liberty. But each such historical 
transition has brought with it many new problems without 
guaranteeing the promise of continuous "success. " 
4.3 Reflections on Some Implications 
"The cities are narrow and so are men's 
minds. Superstition and plague. But 
now we say: because it is so,. it will 
not remain so. For everything moves, my 
boy. " 
Bertolt Brecht 
The Life of Galileo 
Following the industrial revolution an unprecedented 
acceleration in the development of science and 
technology has 
brought about swift and far-reaching changes 
in man's relation 
to nature. Such changes are manifest 
in new and overwhelming 
problems which make the possibility of 
a total self-destruc- 
tion a real threat, but they also suggest 
the feasibility of 
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a new phase in human existence, whereby in a world free from 
material want, the creative potential inherent to societies 
and individual humans could be realized on a scale never 
known beio, -e. 
The most critical aspects of the recent change in circum- 
'stances underlying mankind's existence, relate to the magni- 
tude of potential impacts of human activities on the total 
biosphere and to the rate of change itself. The impact of 
human activities, which had previously been locally contain- 
able, is now global in nature affecting almost every part of 
the terrestrial environment.. The rate of change has accele- 
rated within the last century to a point which makes the 
cumulative changes in all previous history look painfully 
slow. (36) Both the magnitude and the rate of change have far 
exceeded the adaptive capacity of existing organizations as 
well as their ability to manage human affairs in a stable 
manner. 
The results are all around us. They are manifest in 
economic, political, social and ecological instabilities 
which haunt our technological civilization and threaten the 
likelihood of its continuous existence. From the viewpoint 
of the discussion in section 4.2 above, such instabilities 
are interpretable as being symptoms of maladaptation between 
conditions characterizing the states of the four interacting 
domains. They result from internal inconsistencies, mismatch- 
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ing situations and conflicts between new perceptions, knowl- 
edge, problems and possibilities, and archaic ethics, out- 
moded concepts of organization and outdated institutions. 
The point is this, systems of values and forms of organi- 
zations employed at present have evolved in the past where 
adaptive changes could be slow and spread over millenia. 
t They are entirely inadequate for the high rate of change which 
characterizes the human environment at present, requiring a 
great deal of "flexibility, " fluidity in structure and rapid 
adaptation. Furthermore, as mechanisms which are ultimately 
responsible for regulating the social stability, they have 
emerged in a past where relative isolation of human groups, 
scarcity and fierce competition for meager resources were 
the most fundamental condition. They are therefore entirely 
unsuitable for a potential economy of abundance in a world 
that has shrunk so fast as to make all significant human 
activities interdependent, rendering the concept of isolated 
and antagonistic nation states utterly obsolete. 
These are but some of the factors which will require 
transformations in concepts, ethics and organizational s4ruc- 
tures as essential and profound as those which have accompa- 
nied, for example, the transition from a hunter's to an 
agrarian way of life. But such transformations will 
have to 
be accomplished in a much shorter span of time 
than was avail- 
able in earlier periods, and they will 
have to be accomplished 
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with the conscious, well-informed and active participation 
of all humans who inhabit the earth. Szent-Gyorgyi has 
expressed the need for such a major adaptation succinctly: 
"Here we stand now, on our tragically 
shrunken globe, with our ruined economy, 
with these terrific weapons in our hand, 
fear and distrust in our hearts. 
We either adapt to the new situation, 
revamp our thinking and human relations, 
exchange our outdated ideas of glory, 
force, domination and exploitation for 
mutual understanding, respect, help and 
collaboration, or else perish. "(37) 
Mankind is at a turning point. (38) An "undecidable" 
situation which not unlike the evolutionary dilemmas paro- 
died by the activities of simple automata in Eve-l, will 
require a major adaptive restructuring and a new integration 
of human affairs on a vast and more comprehensive scope. The 
inexorable condition for such a new integration demands the 
unification of human activities on a global scale, this, 
not only with respect to technological, economic and ecologi- 
cal considerations but almost in every facet of life, extend- 
ing man's internal organization to include his technology, 
his institutions and total ecology into a single stable self- 
organizing system, conducive to evolution and the pursuit of 
excellence. 
The problems involved in such an integration are all but 
simple. The uncertainties that are inherent to the evolu- 
tionary process make planning it (in the strict sense) quite 
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impractical. Nevertheless, the system can be encouraged to 
evolve. In this, cybernetics can offer some profound insights 
since it provides important notions as to how evolutionary 
behavior may be catalyzed. Two concepts in particular are 
crucial. Firstly, that any behavior depends on an underlying 
mechanism and it is therefore constrained by a particular 
organization and its specific structure. For an expansion 
in behavioral possibilities to occur, related expansions in 
underlying organizations must be made possible. Secondly, 
that a potential variability, and a redundancy of mechanisms 
with-the associated decentralized/distributed control, are 
essential to the innate dynamics of mutualism which promotes 
evolution. For society, this means a need for a complete 
revision of the concept of power so that a vast potential of 
creativity can be tapped with the true "human use of human 
beings. " 
The requirement for variability and the notion of dis- 
tributed control imply an "untidiness" which characterizes 
the fluidity of life and its persistent imperfections. These 
may offend a simple-minded concept of order, authority and 
permanence but they are essential for sustaining evolution. 
As planners, philosophers, educators, managers and others 
approach the problem of planning 
for change and for social as 
well as individual self-realization, 
these requirements must 
be taken into account; (39) recalling with 
humor, if not with 
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awe, that ultimately, there are more things in heaven and 
earth than are dreamt of in Horatio's (40) philosophy... 
I 
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NOTES 
1. HOMEOSTASIS AND STEADY STATE REGULATION 
IN A WELL ADAPTED SOCIETY 
1. For a state determined behavior, where a succession of 
states can be described by a trajectory in a phase space, a 
` condition of equilibrium is manifest by lines converging into 
a point or entering a closed loop showing evidence of a cycli- 
cal activity. A condition of multiple equilibria is repre- 
sented by a stable region in the phase space, and a behavior 
will be equilibrial as long as its representative points 
(trajectories) are not carried outside the stable region. 
(See Ashby, Ref. 2 below. ) 
2. For a detailed discussion on stability and equilibrium, 
see Ashby, W. R., An Introduction to Cybernetics, as well as 
Design for a Brain. 
3. See von Foerster, H., "Basic Concepts of Homeostasis. " 
BCL publication No. 5 reproduced from Homeostatic Mechanisms, 
Brookhaven Symposia in Biology: No. 10 (1957); pp. 216-242. 
4. Ibid., p. 237, but see the rest for a detailed argument. 
5. Cannon, W. B. , The Wisdom of the Body 
(first published in 
1937) . 
6. See McCulloch, W., "Finality and. Form in Nervous Activity's 
in McCulloch, Embodiments of Mind, pp. 256-275. 
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7. Quoted by Cannon, The Wisdom of the Body, p. 38. 
8. Ibid., p. 24. In Cannon's own words: "The coordinated 
physiological processes which maintain most of the steady 
states in the organism are so complex and so peculiar to liv- 
ing beings--involving, as they may, the brain and nerves, the 
heart, lungs, kidneys and spleen, all working cooperatively-- 
that I have suggested a special designation for these states, 
homeostasis. " 
9. See von Foerster, H., "Basic Concepts of Homeostasis, " 
BCL publication No. 5. 
10. See Cannon, W. B., The Wisdom of the Body. 
11. Some such physiological mechanisms operate by lowering 
or increasing the speed of continuous processes and others 
function by causing the storage or release of specific chem- 
ical substances. Some involve direct physico-chemical regu- 
lation only, others are controlled by the autonomic systems 
and yet others by the central nervous system. In addition to 
Cannon, see Klir, J., and Valach, M., Cybernetic Modelling, 
p. 221. 
12. Cannon, W. B., The Wisdom of the Body, p. 303. 
13. Goldman, S., "Further Considerations of Cybernetic Aspects 
of Homeostasis" in Self-Organizing 
Systems, Yovits & Cameron, 
eds., pp. 108-120. 
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14. Cannon, too, emphasized the fact that many bodily struc- 
tures compromise economy for the sake of redundancy in order 
to ensure an adequate margin of safety. In this context it 
should be mentioned that the concept of redundancy has re- 
ceived a rigorous treatment by information theory. For the 
general treatment, see Shannon, C., and Weaver, W., The 
Mathematica' Theory of Communication. For the treatment of 
the subject with respect to reliability (in the context of 
computation), see Von Neuman, J., "Probablistic Logic and the 
Synthesis of Reliable Organisms from Unreliable Components, " 
Automata Studies, Princeton University Press (1956). 
15. Ashby combined ideas similar to those proposed by Som- 
merhoff with set-theoretic methods developed by the Bourbaki 
school to produce a general definition of homeostatic regula- 
tion. See Ashby, R. W., "The Set Theory of Mechanism and 
Homeostasis, " Tech. Report No. 9, Electrical Engineering Re- 
search Laboratory, University of Illinois, Urbana (1962) 
16. The set theoretic formulation relates a set D of dis- 
turbances (d) to a set E of environmental states (e) and a 
set F of states (f) assumed by a regulator. The relation 
D-E is specified by a mapping ý of D into E, and the relation 
D-F is specified by a mapping p of D into F. The relation 
E-F of states (e) assumed by the environment and states (f) 
assumed by the regulator define uniquely a set of outcomes Z. 
This relation is given as a mapping 
1P of ExF into Z. The 
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crucial idea is that Z, the set of all possible outcomes, 
contains a subset G of those particular outcomes which cor- 
respond to the value of a system's essential variables. 
Homeostasis is achieved when regulation is exercised such 
"that p is so matched to ý and j that goal G is arrived at 
even after displacement from it. " See ref. 15, pp. 30-33 and 
p. 42. 
This formulation is general in that the relations 
specified are entirely independent of a system's specific 
fabric. Depending on special cases, the set G. corresponding 
to the values of the essential variables, will be of a physio- 
logical, socio-economic, or any other nature. 
17. Ashby, W. R., Design for a Brain, especially Chapter 5. 
18. Ibid., p. 64. 
19. Ibid., p. 84. What would otherwise be a random process 
of trial and error is in fact conditioned by previous history 
of successes and failures. 
20. Beer, S., Brain of the Firm, p. 38. 
21. See Pask, G., in An Approach to Cybernetics. 
22. See Ashby, Design for a Brain, especially Chapters 6-9. 
The principles involved are embodied in a mechanical device, 
the "Homeostat, " which exhibits ultrastable behavior. 
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23. Typical material can be found in references 80,86,88, 
93 and 94 of Appendix C. 
24. Lerner, I. M., Genetic Homeostasis. But see in this con- 
nection also Penrose, L. S., "The Supposed Threat of Declining 
Intelligence, " Ain. J. Mental Deficiency, 53, (1948) ; pp. 114- 
118. 
25. Jung, C. G., Modern Man 4 n Search of Soul, p. 17. But 
also Craik, K., The Nature of Psychology edited by Sherwood, 
S., for a view which stresses the regulatory features of 
human psychology. 
26. Wiener, N., Cybernetics, see pp. 160-161. 
27. See for example Bateson, G., "Epilogue 1958, " in Naven. 
Also various discussions and Prologue in Bateson, C., Our 
Own Metaphor. 
28. Wilkins, L., Social Deviance. 
29. Rappaport, R., Pigs for the Ancestors. 
30. See Beer, S., "Towards a Cybernetic Factory" in Princi- 
pies of Self-Organization, Ton Foerster and Zope (eds. ), 
pp. 25-80. Also Brain of the Firm, and other writings. 
31. Wynne-Edwards, W, C., Animal Dispersion in Relation to 
Social Behavior. 
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32. Slobodkin, L. B., "Anim. al Populations and Ecologies, " 
in Positive Feedback, J. H. Milsum, ed., pp. 149-163. 
33. In the following sections, Rappaport's study of the 
Tsembaga will be used to illustrate the condition of homeo- 
static stability in a well-adapted society. The account is 
based entirely on Rappaport's work, his material, data, and 
interpretation of the regulatory function of rituals. It is 
hoped that no violation is done in the short presentation 
that follows to his excellent work. 
34. The following is intended only to give a flavor of some 
major features which characterize the Tsembaga and their en- 
vironment. The sources are Chapters 1-4 in Rappaport's Pigs 
for the Ancestors and the original material should be con- 
suited for further details. 
35. Ibid., p. 59. 
36. Rappaport snakes a distinction between the local ecosystem 
and tr<<: regional system. The former is defined essentially as 
a system of localized trophic exchanges while the latter pro- 
vides the contest in which distinct human populations interact 
through the exchange of goods, personnel, and genetic material. 
A local population such as the Tsembaga participates in both 
systems. 
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37. The Australian government has acted to pacify the region 
and the diagram is written to express conditions as they ex- 
isted at earlier times. 
38. For the purpose of his study, Rappaport made use of the 
following formula for computing the carrying capacity: 
P= 
"Where: 
T 
(+v} XY 
A 
P= the population that can be supported 
T= total arable land 
R= length of fallow in years 
Y= length of cropping period in years 
A= the area of cultivated land required to provide an 
'average individual' with the amount of food that he 
ordinarily derives from cultivated plants per year. " 
See Pigs for Ancestors, pp. 92-96. 
39. As Rappaport points out, a similar effect is achieved by 
the Kaiko during which trade activity is facilitated to a 
great extent. See pp. 190-191. 
40. In this respect see also Goldman, S., "Further Consider- 
ation of Cybernetic Aspects of Homeostasis, " especially p. 116. 
41. See Appendix D. especially sections D-3, D-5 and D-6. 
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42. See for example p. 240 in Rappaport's Pigs for the 
Ancestors. 
43. Pask refers to such a program that was written to repre- 
sent the ritual cycle. See p. 98 in Pask, G., The Cybernetics 
of Human Learning and Performance. The actual reference is 
given as Cartledge, J. W., and Rejac, G. L. (1970), "Simula- 
tion of the Tsembaga Ritual Cycle, " Term Thesis I. C. 5626, 
School of Information Sciences, Georgia Institute of Technology. 
44. On this problem of the integrative function of regulation 
see Claude Levi-Strauss Totemism, for an example see p. '70. 
45. Bronowski, J., The Ascent of Man, see p. 131. 
46. This condition is quite typical to traditional societies 
for which Margaret Mead has coined the expression "postfigura- 
tive cultures. " See Mead, M., Culture and Commitment. 
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2. AMPLIFYING REGULATION AND VARIETY 
INCREASE IN EVOLVING SYSTEMS 
1. The notion of an essential interplay between constancy 
and change can be approached from different viewpoints. Thus, 
Ashby, for example, points out that change in some variables 
of a system is essential for maintaining the constancy of 
others. See Ashby, W. R., Design for a Brain. 
On another level, Bronowski has stressed the significance of 
error in molecular reproduction for the process of evoýution. 
Here in particular, an appropriate balance between constancy 
and change must be maintained since both extremes, of excessive 
modification or a rigid constancy, can lead to a system's 
breakdown. See Bronowski, J., "New Concepts in the-Evolution 
of Complexity: Stratified Stability and Unbounded Plans, " in 
Zygon, Vol. 5 (1), (1970) ; pp. 18-35. 
2. Maturana, for example, coined the term "Autopoiesis' to 
describe a particular kind of dynamic constancy that : is -typi- 
cal to living organizations. The "autopoietic" organ. i. za i. on 
is defined as a unity by a network of processes of production 
of components, characterized by a fundamental circularity, 
whereby the product of the network's operations is that net- 
work itself. 
Autopoiesis is thus a special case of homeostasis in which 
the essential variable that 
is maintained constant is a 
system's own organization. 
The concept implies a . self--realiz- 
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ing unity by which the autonomy of the system is defined. 
The establishment of such a unity and its constancy, Maturana 
points out, is a logical and operational prerequisite for 
reproduction and evolution. 
See Maturana, H. R., "Neurophysiology of Cognition, " in 
Cognition: A Multiple View, Garvin, P., ed., pp. 3---. 23. Also 
Varela, F. G., Maturana, H. R., and Uribe, R., "Autopoiesis: 
The Organization of Living Systems, its Characterization and 
a Model, " in Biosystems, 5, (1974) ; pp. : 187--196. 
3. See Slobodkin, L. B., "Animal Populations and Ecologies, " 
in Positive Feedback, Milsum, J. =H. , ed., pp. 1-49--163. 
4. Beer, S., Decision and Control. 
5. Pask, G., ". A Cybernetic Model for Some Types of Learning 
and Mentat. ion, " in Cybernetic Problems in Bionics, Oestereicher, 
M. C... and Moore, D. R.,, -eds.,, pp. 531-585. 
6ý The formulation relatees to the idea of a selfmreproduc ng 
machine that Is not limited to making p: rec: ise xep-l-icas arily., 
For the basic argument see Von Neumann, J.., Theory of Self- 
Reproducing Automata, Burks, A., ed. But also: 
Von Foerster, H., "Molecular- Ethology, " in Molecular Mecha- 
nisms of Memory and Learning, Ungar, C., ed.; 
Loefgren, L., "Relative Explanation of Systems, " in Trends in 
General stems Theory, K1ir, G.,, ed. Myhi. l_l, J., "The Abstract 
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Theory of Self-Reproduction, " in Essays on Cellular Automata, 
Burks, A. W., ed., pp. 206-218. 
7. For a full discussion see Pask, G., An Approach to Cyber- 
netics, also Pask, "The Cybernetics of Evolutionary Processes 
and Self-Organizing Systems, " Proc. 3rd Cong. Int. Assoc. of 
Cybernetics, Namur. Gauthier Villars ed., (1965); pp. 27-75. 
8. Pask, G., "The Cybernetics of Evolutionary Processes and 
Self-Organizing Systems, " p. 39. 
9See, for example, Teilhard de Chardin, P., The Phenome- 
non of Man, also by the same author, The Future of Man. 
10. For example, Glansdorf, P., and Prigogine, I., Thermo- 
dynamic Theory of Structure, Stability and Fluctuations. For 
additional references see notes No. 64 & 65 to Appendix C. 
11. See chapter 15 in reference No. 10 above. For additional 
examples see also: 
Prigogine, I., "Structure, Dissipation and Life, " in Theore- 
tical Physics and Biology: Proceedings, Marois, M., ed., (1969) 
pp. 23-52. 
Katchalsky, A., and Kedem, 0., "Thermodynamics of Flow Processes 
in Biological Systems, " in Biophysical Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, 
(1962); pp. 53-78. as well as: 
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Katchalsky, A., "'thermodynamics of Flow and Biological Organi- 
zations, " in Zygon, Vol. 6, (2), (1971); pp. 99-125. 
12. See concluding remarks in Katchalsky, A., "Thermodynamics 
of Flow and Biological Organization. " But especially see 
Jantsch, E., Design for Evolution. 
13. The formulation offered by non-equilibrium thermodynamics 
removes earlier difficulties concerning the seeming conflict 
of the idea of evolution in biology and the second law of 
thermodynamics. Prigogine has resolved these difficulties by 
showing that the seemingly contrasting concepts, relate to 
different thermodynamic situations - near and far from equi-. 
librium - both of which are subject to one physical law. For 
example: "Broadly speaking destruction of structure is the 
situation which occurs in the neighborhood of thermodynamic 
equilibrium. On the contrary, creation of structure may 
occur, with specific non linear kinetic laws beyond the sta- 
bility limit of the thermodynamic branch... " Glansdorf, P., 
and Prigogine, I., Thermodynamic Theory of Structure, Stabi- 
lity and Fluctuations, p. 288. 
A particularly significant contribution. to the unification 
of concepts of evolution, going beyond the scope of present 
irreversible thermodynamics, is offered by Eigen who intro- 
duced information theoretic concepts to a treatment of the 
problem of evolution. Eigen 
has emphasized the idea that the 
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use of information associated with a high "selective value, " 
rather than an economiza. tion in the consumption of free energy, 
is the crucial factor in evolution. See Eigen, M., "Self 
Organization of Matter and the Evolution of Biological Macro- 
molecules, " in Die Naturwissenschaften, 58, (1971); pp, 465- 
523. 
14. See Bronowski, J., "New Concepts in the Evolution of 
Complexity: Stratified Stability and Unbounded Plans. " 
15. See Sommerhoff, G., Analytical Biology, and Ashby, R. W., 
Introduction to Cybernetics. 
16. See Conant, R. C., and Ashby, R. W., "Every Good Regula-- 
tor of a System Must be a Model of that System, " Int. J. 
Systems Sci. Vol. 1, No. 2, (1970); pp. 89-97. For the develop- 
ment of the set theoretic formulation see Ashby, R. W., "The 
Set Theory of Mechanisms and Homeostasis, " Tech. Report No. 9. 
Elect. Engin. Research Lab. Univ. of Ill., Urbana, (1962). 
17. Ashby, R. W., "Requisite Variety and its Applications for 
the Control of Complex Systems, " in Cybernetica, Vol. 1, No. 2, 
(1958) ; pp. 53-99. 
18. Ashby, R. W., Introduction to Cybernetics. 
19. See Conant, R. C., "Information Transfer in Complex 
Systems, with Application to Regulation. " Tech. Report No. 
13. Biological Computer Laboratory, Univ. of Ill., Urbana, (1968). 
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20. For a discussion of such various schemes and their sym- 
bolic representation see Ashby, R. W., Introduction to Cyher- 
netics. For a quantitative discussion see Conant, R. C., 
"Information Transfer in Complex Systems, with Application to 
Regulation. " Also Conant, R. C., "The Information Transfer 
Required in Regulatory Processes, " in IEEE Trans. Systems 
Sci. and Cybernetics, Vol. 5, No. 4, (1969); pp. 334-338. 
21. The law of requisite variety can be deduced from the 
game theoretic formulation in which a set D of disturbances 
di is countered by a set R of responses rj producing a table 
with values zig of the outcomes Z at the intersections. By 
selecting a move di, D selects a particular row in the table. 
Following D's move, R selects a value r3 . and thus a particular 
COiumn . 
In a table of this kind, with r rows and c columns, where 
no element in a column is repeated, and where R acts to re- 
duce the variety in the outcomes Z, there is a quantitative 
relation between the varieties of D. R and Z. As Ashby has 
(shown, the variety in the outcome cannot be less than the 
value of r/c. Consequently, for a given variety of D. Z's 
variety can be reduced only by a corresponding increase in 
the variety of R. 
See Ashby, W. R., Introduction to Cybernetics. 
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22. Ibid, p. 211 
Ashby has shown that the concept of regulation as a process 
in which a stability is maintained in spite of a stream of 
disturbances is homologous with the information theoretic 
concept of correcting for noise in a transmission channel. 
The law of requisite variety relates closely, therefore, to 
Shannon's theorem (No. 10) which states that the quantity of 
noise which can be removed from a message is limited by the 
quantity of information which can be carried by a correction 
channel. 
23. For a discussion of the significance of constraints in 
the structure of an environment to the problem of regulation, 
see Ashby, R. W., An introduction to Cybernetics, also AsLb. by, 
"What is an Intelligent Machine, " BCL Publication No. 44, 
Univ. of Ill., Urbana, and Ashby, "Design for an Intelligence- 
Amplifier, " Automata Studies, Shannon C. E., & McCarthy J., 
eds., (1956); pp. 215-234. 
24. Ashby's concept of ultrastability, especially as it is 
embodied in his "Homeostat, " relies on the idea of a system 
containing .a sufficiently 
large internal variety, the latter 
allowing for new combinations and recombinations of internal 
states in a search for stability that is synchronized with 
unpredictable variations in pe. rtu bations. As 
it stands, the 
concept can not account for the 
increase in complexity that is 
typical to evolution. Here we must allow for 
incorporating 
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new variety from external sources (selected parts of the 
environment) in a process that is subject to the same general 
selection criteria for stable configurations. Selection is 
now applied to new entities in which systems, previously per- 
ceived as individuals, combine into super individual units 
yielding a specific "survival" advantage. 
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3. Eve-l: A Simulated Ecology With Some Characteristics 
of Evolutionary Processes 
1'. A comprehensive review of the relevant bulk of work must 
remain outside the scope of the present chapter. A list of 
representative references can be found in the appendix to 
Pask's "Cogni_ti-,, ve Systems, " (a paper prepared for a symposium 
on "Cognitive Studies and Artificial Intelligence Research, " 
The University of Chicago, March 1969)... Pask's list is greatly 
augmented by Minsky's bibliography in Computer and Thought, 
Feigenbaum, E. A., and Feldman, J., eds. 
2. See for example Pattee, H. H., "Physical Basis and Ori- 
gins of Control, " p. 102, in Hierarchy Theory, Pattee, H. H., 
ed., pp. 73-107. 
3. An excellent example of such a non-computerized model is 
offered by Pasr's "chemical computer, " a physical analogue, 
the behavior of which provides the basis for a broader inter- 
pretation. See Pask, G., "Physical Analogues to the Growth 
of a Concept" in Mechanization Of Thought Processes, 
A. Utley, 
ed., HMSO (1959); pp" 877-922. Also 
in Pask, G., An Approach 
to Cyberneticrs . 
4. Pask, G., "The Computer-Simulated Development of 
Popula- 
tions of Automata, " in Mathematical 
Biosciences, 4, (1969); 
pp. 101-127. 
-204- 
5. See Ashby, R., "The Self-Reproducing System, " in Aspects 
of the Theory of Artificial Intelligence, C. A. Muses, 'ed., 
pp. 9-16. 
6. Ibid., p. 15. The basic concept involved, is that a dy- 
namic process can be defined by a set S of states of a sys- 
tem and the mapping f of that set into itself where f is seen 
as the "dynamic drive" of the system. According to Ashby, 
"Reproduction is then one of the invariants that holds over 
the compound of this system and a set of disturbances that 
act locally. " 
7. Ashby, R., "Principles of Self-Organizing Systems, " in 
Principles of Self-Organization, Von Foerster, HI., and Zope, 
G. H., eds., pp. 255-278. 
8. Wilkins, L., Social Deviance. 
9. Burks, A. W., "Computation, Behavior and Structure in 
Fixed and Growing Automata, " in Self-Organizing Systems, 
Yovits, M. C., and Cameron, S., eds., pp. 282-309. 
10. Apter, M., Cybernetics and Development. 
11. Barricelli, N. A., "Numerical Testing of Evolution 
Theories, " Part 1, in Acta-Biotheoretica, Vol. XVI - I/II, 
(1962); pp. 69-98, as well as Part 2 in Acta-Biotheoretica, 
Vol. XVI-III/IV, (1963); pp. 100-126. 
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See also Reed, J., Toombs, R., and Barricelli, N. A., "Simu- 
lation of Biological Evolution and Machine Learning" in 
J. Theoret. Biol., 17, (1967); pp. 319-342. 
12. Fogel, L. J., Owens, A. J., and Walsh, M. J., "Artificial 
Intelligence Through a Simulation of Evolution, " in Biophysics 
and Cybernetic Systems, Maxfield, Callahan, and Fogel, eds., 
pp. 131-149. 
See also Fogel, et al,, Artificial Intelligence Through Simu- 
lated Evolution. 
13. Glushkov, V. M., Introduction to Cybernetics. The rele- 
vant discussion can be found in pages 273-278. 
14. Pask, G., "The Cybernetics of Evolutionary Processes and 
of Self-Organizing Systems, " Proc. 3rd Congr. Inter. Assoc. 
Cybernetics, Namur, 1961: Gauthier Villars (1965); pp. 27-74. 
Pask, G., "A Proposed Evolutionary Model, " in Principles of 
Self-Organization, Von Foerster, H. and Zope, G. H., eds., 
pp. 229-253. 
Pask, G., "The Computer-Simulated Development of Populations 
of Automata. " Also Pask, G., The Cybernetics of Human Learn- 
ing and Performance, Chapter 3. 
15. Barricelli, N. A., "Numerical Testing of Evolution Theories, " 
Part 1o 
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16. Barricelli, N. A., "Numerical Testing of Evolution 
Theories, " Part 2. 
17. Fogel, L. J., Owens, A. J., and Walsh, M. J., "Artifi- 
cial Intelligence Through a Simulation of Evolution. " 
, 
18. Pask, G., "The Cybernetics of Evolutionary Processes 
and of Self-Organizing Systems, " as well as Pask, G., "A 
Proposed Evolutionary Model. " 
19. Bonner, J. T., The Evolution of Development. 
20. See Pask, G., An Approach to Cybernetics, for example, 
p. 100. Much of the original work is due to Turing and Von 
Neuman. But see Loefgren, L., "An Axiomatic Explanation of 
Complete Self Reproduction, " in Bull. Math. Biophys., 30, 
(1968); pp. 415-424. Also Loefgren, L., "Recognition of 
Order and Evolutionary Systems, ", in Computer and Information 
Sciences II, Tou, J., ed., pp. 165-175. 
21. Pask, G., "Cognitive Systems. " 
22. Fogel, L. J., Owens, A. J., and Walsh, M. J., "Artif., icial 
Intelligence Through a Simulation of Evolution, " p. 49. 
23. See Barricelli, N. A., "Numerical Testing of Evolution 
Theories, " Part 1. And for a general review also Emerson, 
A. E., "The Impact of Darwin on Biology" 
in Acta-Biotheoretica, 
Vol. XV - IV (1962), pp. 
176-216. 
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24. Beer, S., Decision and Control. 
pages 361-369. 
25. Ibid., p. 365. 
See the discussion on 
26. Barricelli, N. A., "Numerical Testing of Evolution Theories, " 
Part 1. 
27. Ibid. p. 73. 
28. The reference is to the computer simulations discussed in 
previous sections (reference No. 11) in which Barricelli gene- 
rated an evolutionary process similar in many respects to bio- 
logical evolution by using self-reproducing entities that are 
constructed by symbiotic associations of other, more simple, 
self-reproducing entities, all represented by elements of a 
numerical nature. 
29. The relevant references suggested by Barriceili. -include: 
Kozo-Polansky, B., Outline of a Theory of Syrnbiogenesis, 
Se1khozgiz (1924). 
Sonneborn, T. M., "Beyond the Genes-Amer. Scient. XXXVII, 
pp. 33-59 (1949). 
Barricelli, N. A., "Symbiogenetic -Evolution Processes Realized 
by Artificial Methods, " Methodos IX, 35-36, (1957). 
30. See the account given by Emerson in "The Impact of Darwin 
on Biology. " 
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31, Typical representatives would be: 
Dewey, J., "Evolution and Ethics" reprinted (1954) in Sci. 
Mon. N. Y. LXXVIII, pp. 57-66. 
Kropotkin, P., Mutual Aid, A Factor in Evolution, McClure 
Phillips (1902). 
Allee, W. C., "Where Angels Fear to Tread: A Contribution 
From General Sociology to Human Ethics, " Science XCVII, (1943); 
pp. 514-525. 
Huxley, T. H., and Huxley, J. S.,, Touchstones for Ethics, 
13arper (1947) . 
Emerson, A. E., "Dynamic Homeostasis: A Unifying Principle 
in Organic, Social, and Ethical Evolution, " Sci. Mon. LXXVII, 
pp. 67-85 (1954). --(all quoted by Emerson) 
32. Von Foerster, H., "Communication Amongst Automata" in 
The American Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 118, No. 1.0, April 
(1962); pp. 865-871. 
33. Ibid., p. 866. 
34. Pask, G., "A Proposed Evolutionary Model. " 
35. Bonner, J. T., The Evolution of Development. See for 
example the discussion of developmental. processes in the slime 
mold, where phases of unicellular and aggregate existence are 
clearly differentiable. 
36. Ibid., p. 70. 
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37. Conrad, M. and Pattee, H. H., "Evolution Experiments With 
an Artificial Ecosystem" in J. Theor. Biol., 28, (1970); 
pp. 393-409. 
38. Kaufman, S. A., "Metabolic Stability and Epigenesis in 
Randomly Constructed Genetic Nets" in J. Theoret. Biol., 22, 
(1969) ; pp. 437-467. 
39. Pask, G., "The Natural History of Networks" in Self- 
Organizing Systems, Yovits, M. C., and Cameron, S., eds., 
pp. 232-260. 
Also Pask, G., "A Proposed Evolutionary Model. " 
40. Barricelli, N. A., see reference No. 11 above. 
41. Pask, G., see reference No. 14. above. 
42. Varela, F. G., Maturana, H. R., and Uribe, R., 
"Autopoiesis: The Organization of Living Systems, Its Charac- 
terization, and A Model, " Biosystems, 5, (1974); pp. 187-196. 
43. Pask, G., see reference No. 14 above. 
44. Conrad, M. and Pattee, H. H., see reference No. 37 above. 
45. Ibid. 
46. See Pask, G., An Approach to Cybernetics, p. 101. 
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2, SOCIETY AS A BRAIN 
1. See Bronowski, J., "New Concepts in the Evolution of 
Complexity: Stratified Stability and Unbounded Plans, " in 
Zygon, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1970), pp. 18-35. 
A summary of these views can also be found in Laszlo, E., 
"A General Systems View of Evolution and Invariance, " General 
Systems Year Book, Vol. 29 (1974), pp. 37-43. 
2. According to Bronowski, the concept of "stratified stabi- 
lity" explains the consistent direction of evolution in time. 
The overall direction is set by the sequential build-up of 
stable configurations, each upon the next lower one. Chance 
plays a dominant role in the process since: "the stable units 
that compose one layer are the raw material for random encoun- 
ters which will produce higher configurations, some of which 
will chance to be stable. " Ibid, p. 32. 
3. Ibid, p. 31. 
4. See Cipolla, C. M., The Economic History of World Popula- 
tion, for a view that emphasizes the role of technology, espe- 
cially the means of energy production for life support, in the 
major economic "revolutions" in history. 
5. See Eigen, M., "Self-Organization of Matter and the Evo- 
lution of Biological Macromolecules, 
" in Die Naturwissenschaften, 
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58 (1971), pp. 465-523. 
6. The emergence of novelty is inherent in the organization, 
or state, of matter and its surroundings and is not a result 
of the rise of any new property in principle. See Simpson, 
G. G., The Meaning of Evolution, for a discussion of the con- 
cept of "emergent evoluL. ion. " 
7. To the human observer, -these may appear as possessing 
special properties such as "intelligence, " "creativity, " 
"inventiveness" of "life. " 
8. See Ashby, W. R., Design for a Brain. 
9. A typical illustration can be found in the changes of the 
chemical composition of the atmosphere which followed specific 
evolutionary steps conditioning the possibilities for further 
evolution. Thus, for example, the evolution of plants and 
particularly of photosynthesis, released large quantities of 
oxygen into the air which had previously consisted almost 
entirely of nitrogen and carbon dioxide. This oxygen provided 
a protection from lethal radiation and made it generally pos- 
sible for living organisms to move out of the oceans and 
occupy the dry land. 
(See Luria, S. E., Life the Unfinished Experiment. 
10. The question of whether evolution has a direction, or 
whether it is an entirely random opportunistic process 
has 
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been a subject of a heated debate. 
The Meaning of Evolution. 
See Simpson, G. G., 
The view taken here is that the idea of a definite direc- 
tion can be inferred (and reinforced by a cybernetic interpre- 
tation) not in the sense of following a prescribed plan, but 
in the sense that the progression of evolutionary steps shows 
a consistent logic of favoring variability and selecting for 
"regulators" of increasingly more comprehensive capabilities. 
11. The idea that diversity in individual organisms is actively 
maintained by natural selection is argued by Bryan Clarke, for 
example, using data obtained from empirical studies of various 
snail populations. See Clarke, B., "The Cause of Biological 
Diversity" in Scientific American, Vol. 233, No. 2, August, 
(1975), pp. 50-60. 
The point made here, is that selection, more than just 
maintaining variety in a specific individual, selects for 
variability itself. This idea is consistent with the cyber- 
netic formulation of the concept of regulation and it explains 
the progressive increase of complexity which marks the evolu- 
tionary process. 
In so far as the process of evolution shows a consistent 
trend characterized by a progressive increase in the variety 
of adaptive possibilities and hence, of regulation potential, 
we can talk about the "evolution of evolution" much 
in the 
same sense of Bonner's discussion of the 
"evolution of development. 
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12. Ashby, W. R., Design for a Brain, p. 233. 
13. For a comprehensive account of the significance of increases 
in potential variety, -their relation to major evolutionary 
developments, and their associated survival advantage, see 
Bonner, J. T., The Evolution of Development. Most of the 
examples given in the text below have been cited by Bonner. 
14. On this point see in particular Ashby's discussion in 
Design for a Brain. 
15. The tremendous survival advantage gained with the emer- 
gence of social systems, culture and civilization has been 
emphasized by the notion of a clear breaking point in evolu- 
tion. The point often made is that cultural evolution has 
developed, "superimposed" on the realizations of biological 
evolution which had preceded it. For a full account see: 
Huxley, T. H., and Huxley, J. S., Touchstones for Ethics. 
As well as Waddington, C. H., "Human Ideals and Human Progress, " 
in World Review, August, (1946), pp. 29-36. Also Dobzhansky, 
T., Mankind Evolving, Luria, S. E., Life the Unfinished Experi- 
ment, and Simpson, G. G., The Meaning of Evolution. 
16. The adaptive advantage of language and the shared symbolic 
representation of objects and relationships is brought about 
by the provision (among other things) of an efficient method 
for modelling a complex environment and testing, abstractly, 
various hypothesis about 
its dynamics and structure. 
-214- 
Consider this point in relation to Conant, R. C. and Ashby, 
W. R., "Every Good Regulator of a System must be a Model of 
that System, " in Int. J. of Systems Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 2, 
(1970), pp. 89-97. 
17. Evolution is a "multi-dimensional" affair. Its products 
represent distinct steps in a continuous process but each such 
step may also evolve in itself. Thus, social systems represent 
an emergent step in the course of evolution, but as specific 
systems, societies evolve as well. 
18. See Pask, G., "Models for Social Systems and for their 
Languages, " Instructional Science, 1, (4), (1973), pp. 395-445. 
Also Pask, G. "Some Mechanical Concepts of Goals, Individuals, 
Consciousness and Symbolic Evolution. " Burg Wartenstein 
Symposium on "The Effects of Conscious Purpose on Human Adapta- 
tion, " July, (1908) . 
19. In the context of organizational theory, an "individual" 
is defined by a class of programs bearing a specific name. 
See Pask, G., Ref. No. 18 above. 
20. See Burks, A. W., "Computation, Behavior and Structure in 
Fixed and Growing Automata, " in Self-Organizing Systems, Yovits, 
M. C. and Cameron, S., eds., pp. 282-309. 
21. This correspondence has various significant philosophical 
implications bearing upon a view of man and society, the nature 
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of the relation between the two and the evolution of both. 
22. See Holt, A. W., "Information System Theory Project, " 
Technical Report No. R. ADC-TR-63-305, Rome Air Development 
Center, (1968) 
e 
23. See Petri, C. A., "Communication with Automata, " (Trans. 
by Greene, C. F. ), A Supplement to Technical Documentary Report 
1, Rome Development Center, (1965). 
24. The choice of number of domains and the names given to 
each is arbitrary in that other options are possible depending 
on a view point and the specific aspects one wishes to stress. 
In the context of the present discussion this choice is suffi- 
cient for conveying some essential concepts related to-the 
dynamics of stability in society, and particularly for a view 
of society as a cybernetic system. 
25. On the effects of the environment on human activity and 
on social organization see Huntington, E., Mainsprings of 
Civilization, For the biological aspects of this interaction 
see Lob2hansky, T., Mankind Evolving, also Dubos, R., So Human 
an Animal. 
In the discussion which follows the contribution of the 
biological element is suppressed. It is important nevertheless 
since, although man is largely a 
"product" of a culture, his 
biological make-up imposes definite limits on his actions. 
See Reynolds, V., The Biology of Human Action. 
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26. For the place of ethics in human evolution see (in addition 
to applicable references given earlier) Waddington, C., The 
Ethical Animal. Also a discussion in Ferkiss, V., Technolo- 
gical Civilizaý. ion. 
27. See Toynbee, A., A Study of History (Abridged edition. ) 
28. The dynamics of such matching processes involve "self 
vetoing" mechanisms typical to -an ultrastable system. See 
Ashby, W. R., Design for a Brain, but also Beer, S., Brain of 
the Firm for a detailed exposition. 
29. Examples for mutual constraints include a value system 
embodied in a dogmatic structure -inhibiting scientific develop- 
ment (e. g. Galileo and the church).. A rigid traditional social 
framework inhibiting technological development (India), and 
many more. Examples for self reinforcing processes, can be found 
in a technology which makes :a -ref-inement in scientific theory 
possible which in turn affects -further technological develop- 
frees humans for ment; an economy which by : cr_eatIng a surplus 
inventive pursuits which may . ad to scientific, organizational 
and technological improvement and ultimately to more surplus 
and so on. 
30. Such a process operates within domain as well as between 
them. A typical example is furnished by the evolution of con- 
cepts and in particular of scientific theories which 
is often 
characterized by a process 
in which new conceptual integration 
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follows conditions of "crisis. " (A mismatch between components 
of a theory or between theory and new observational facts. ) On 
this point see Kuhn, T. S., The Structure of Scientific Revo- 
lutions. 
31. See Bateson, C., Our Own Metaphor, chapters 4 and 5. The 
original reference is Schwartz, T., "The Paliau Movement in 
the Admiralty Islands, 1946-54, " Anthropological Papers of 
the American Museum of Natural History, Vol. 49, Pt. 2, (1962). 
32. Bateson, G., "Cultural Problems Posed by a Study of the 
Schizophrenic Process, " in Symposium on Schizophrenia, (Auer- 
bach, A., ed. ) 
33. The term revolution may be quite unfortunate in this 
context. It is nevertheless commonly applied to the transi- 
tion from a hunter's to an agrarian economy, the rise of city 
states and the great technological transformations of the 19th 
century. 
Population. 
See Cipolla, C. M., The Economic History of World 
Also Childe, G., Man Makes Himself. 
34. Childe's description of the -rise of civilization 
in 
Mesopotamia and Egypt is par-titularly vivid. See Ghilde, G., 
Man Makes Himself. But also Toynbee, A., A Study of History 
and Toynbee, Mankind and Mother Earth. 
35. A typical example can be found in the rise of the early 
civilizations of Mesopotamia and Egypt. 
The large scale 
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agricultural undertakings characterizing both cases, which 
involved the taming of the lower basins of the Tigris and 
Euphrates and of the Nile, could be only made possible by 
expanding the scale of technological operations. These, in 
turn, demanded an integration of large numbers of people, 
far exceeding the size of the earlier neolitic communities. 
To support such a requirement a new social order had to be 
brought about. It was embodied in a new organizational 
structure and the development of impersonal economic and 
political institutions. The alliance of individuals to 
these was assured by a system of values supportive of an 
all-mighty centralized authority, and institutionalized in 
an organized religion and a powerful priesthood. 
36. For an excellent illustration dramatizing the rate of 
change in science and technology, see Fuller, R. B., "Profile 
of the Industrial Revolution, " in W. D. S. D. document no. 3, 
Southern Illinois University, (1965); pp. 27-33. Also 
Fuller, R. B., Earth Inc. 
37. Szent-Gyorgyi, A., "Snakes Do It. So Must Man. " in the 
New York Times, Sat., March 29,1975. But see also Szent- 
Gyorgyi, A., The Crazy Ape. 
38. A book by that name illustrates the many trends which 
characterize this turning point. See Mesarovich, 
M., and 
Pestel, E., Mankind at the Turning Point. 
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39. Beer's "Liberty Machine" and the underlying concepts 
are especially significant in this respect. See Beer, S., 
Designing Freedom, as well as Platform for Change. 
40. Shakespeare, W., Hamlet, - I. V., pp. 191-192. The 
original lines read: 
"There are more things in heaven and 
earth, Horatio, 
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy. " 
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APPENDIX A 
EVE-l: SUMMARY OF TECHNICAL DETAILS 
A-i About the Hardware and Software 
Eve-1 was implemented in FORTRAN on the IBM 360/91 
computer of Columbia University. Data input and output was 
done via CRT terminals in the Department of Biological 
Sciences of Columbia University, and printouts were made on 
the computer center's line printer. With an environment 
consisting of 30 x 30 = 900 nodes, the program requires 
100,000 eight-bit bytes of computer memory. 
The program operation is controlled via a set of 
commands which essentially constitute a higher--order lan- 
guage. The program may be run interactively, in which case 
each command is executed by the program as soon as it is 
typed in by the operator; or it may be run in an off-line 
mode, in which case a sequence of commands is typed in 
prior to the execution of the program. All of the program 
parameters have internal default definitions in the program, 
so explicit commands are needed to define only those param- 
eters which are to deviate from the default values in a 
particular_ run. 
The following sequence of commands defines a 
specific simulation: 
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COMMAND EXPLANATION 
INITU "Initialize universe" given at the 
beginning of each simulation. 
NFOOD 10,20 Specifies that a maximum of 10 food 
particles are to be generated each 
time step in a maximum of 20 tries. 
FVAL 10,40 Specifies that the values of the food 
particles are to lie in the range 
between 10 and 40. 
CREATE 5,7 0,1 Creates an automaton at node 5,7; 
the automaton's genotype is 0,1. 
CREATE 13,28 1,0 Similarly, creates an automaton of 
genotype (1,0) at node 13,28. 
GO 400 Causes the simulation to start and 
proceed for 400 steps.. 
FVAL 5,10 Changes the food value range for food 
particles (the state of the universe, in- 
cluding food and automata, is unchanged). 
GO 200 Continues the simulation, using the new 
food values, for 200 more steps. 
EXIT Terminates program execution. 
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Other commands, not shown in the example above, 
allow for the modification of all other program parameters 
and for the specification of the type of output desired. 
With the use of this command language, it is not necessary 
to modify the program itself in order to produce different 
specific models or simulations; a single version of the 
program is used with different sets of such commands for 
that purpose. 
A-2 Model Specification: The Environment 
The environment in Eve-1 consists of the nodes of 
a rectangular grid; the two dimensions of the grid need not 
be equal. A node is represented by two index numbers (I, J). 
Each node may be specified as "inaccessible" in 
the beginning of a simulation. Inaccessible nodes are not 
visited by automata and food particles are not produced on 
them. In practice, therefore, the accessible environment 
may be any subset of the nodes of the rectangular grid, and 
may have a great variety of shapes. 
Each accessible node may contain at most one food 
particle and at most one automaton at any given time step. 
A food particle is dimensionless and has a "food 
value" which is assigned to it when it is created. The loca- 
tion (node) and food value of a given food particle do not 
change during the simulation until -the particle is eaten by 
an automaton. (The generation of food particles is described 
in Section A-5 of this Appendix. ) 
G2J° 
A-3 Model Specification: The Automata 
An automaton is dimensionless and occupies a 
single node of the environment in a given time step; it is 
able to sense ("see") food particles and other automata in 
its vicinity, and to move to neighboring nodes in subse- 
quent time steps. At most one automaton may occupy one 
node in a given time step. 
There are different species of automata, each 
characterized by a genotype and a phenotype; all automata 
of the same species have identical genotypes and phenotypes. 
The genotype of a species consists of two "genes" 
the "sensing gene" (gs) and the movement gene (gm). Each 
gene is an integer number whose value may range from 0 to 4. 
A genotype is represented by the ordered pair (gs, gm). 
Examples of specific genotypes are (0,3), (1,4), and (2,2). 
The genotype (0,0) is the "null" genotype and is not allowed 
to exist. The total number of different genotypes is 5x5 
-1 24. Each of the 24 possible genotypes may 
be repre- 
sented by a letter of the alphabet, as shown in Figure 8. 
page 108. 
The phenotype of a species consists of six numbers 
determining its behavioral and metabolic characteristics. 
The "primary characteristics" are: radius of sensing (RS) 
and radius of movement (RM). The "secondary characteristics" 
are: metabolic rate (RMETAB), initial food store 
(FSTORI), 
food store threshold for reproduction (REPROL), and food 
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store threshold for coalition formation (COMBL). Since the 
values of these numerical characteristics may be varied, a 
very large number of behaviorally different species may be 
defined--at most 24, however, may exist at the same time. 
A-4 Internal Data Structure in Eve-1 
The program maintains the following data areas: 
(a) For each node of the environment (I, J) : 
-A pointer to the automaton (if any) occupying the node 
in the current time step: IOCC (I, J, NEW) 
-A pointer to the automaton (if any) occupying the node 
in the previous time step: IOCC (I, J, OLD) 
- The value of the food particle (if any) contained by 
the node: FOOD (I, J) 
(b) For each automaton (K): 
- The automaton's gene values: GS (K) , GM (K) 
- The node currently occupied by the automaton: 
IGR (K, NEW) , JGR (K, NEW) 
- The node previously occupied by the automaton: 
IGR (K, OLD) , JGR (K, OLD) 
- The automaton's food store value: FSTOR(K) 
- The automaton's age: AGE(K) 
Note: K is actually used as an index not of all existing 
automata, but of all possible automata for which a "slot" 
exists in memory; by convention, if IGR(K) = 0, then the 
Kth automaton does not exist. 
-227-- 
(c) For each species characteristic: 
-A5x5 species matrix giving the numerical value of 
the characteristic for each of the 24 species. There 
are six such matrices. To find the characteristics 
of the Kth automaton, the program first looks up its 
gene values, S= GS(K) and M= GM(K). Its six char- 
acteristics are then RS (S, M) , RM(S, M), FSTORI (S, M) , 
RMETAB (S , M) , REPROL (S , M) and COMBL (S , M) . 
(d) Single parameter values: 
- Maximum number of food particles created each time 
step: NFOOD 
- Maximum number of trials in placing a food particle: 
NF TRY 
- Minimum and maximum food values: FVMIN, FVMAX 
- Minimum age required of an automaton before it can 
form a coalition: MCOAGE 
(e) Program statistics: 
The program maintains various types of statis- 
tical information such as population of each species, total 
number of automata created, etc. These values are used 
only for output and do not in any way affect the rules of 
the operation of the model. 
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A-5 Model Specification: Simulation of One Time Step 
As the rules of operation of the model have been 
discussed at length in Section II of chapter , this sec- 
tion of the Appendix consists primarily of flow charts 
describing these rules (Figures A. l through A. 5). These 
flow charts have been abbreviated in order to be made more 
readable; completely detailed flow charts would have been 
too elaborate to be comprehensible. (In all flow charts, 
MAXK stands for the maximum number of possible automata. ) 
The simulation of a time step proceeds as follows: 
(a) The "NEW" arrays are renamed to "OLD" and the previously 
"OLD" are renamed to "NEW. " 
(b) The "NEW" arrays are initialized. 
(c) New food particles are generated (Figure A. l). 
(d) Automata are aged and metabolized (Figure A. 2). 
(e) Automata sense their environment, move, and feed (Fig- 
ure A. 3) . 
(f) "Well-fed" automata reproduce (Figure A. 4). 
(g) "Hungry" automata form coalitions (Figure A. 5). 
The coalition formation event may be formally 
described with the use of the functions min and max, de- 
fined as follows: 
min(a, b) =a or b, whichever is smaller; 
max(a, b) =a or b, whichever is greater. 
Using these functions, we can say that two automata with 
genotypes (gsl, gmi) and (gs2, gm2) form a coalition accord- 
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ing to the following rule: 
(gS1, gml)+(gc2, gm2) -* (min (gsl+gs2 4), min(gm1+gm2,4)) 
+ (max (gs i+ gs 
2-4,0), 
max (gml + gm2 -4,0) ) 
where the second automaton produced may be the null automaton 
(0,0) in which case it is immediately removed from the sys- 
tem. 
The following flow chart diagrams describe a simu- 
lation of one time step and they should be read in a sequence 
where an exit of one diagram leads to the entry of the fol- 
lowing one. 
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I counts the trials) 
N=0 
I=1 
Select a 
node randomly 
ýls it 
accessible NO 
YES 
oes the 
ode Contain a YES 
Food Particle 
already 
NO 
Select a random food value in the 
range (FVMIN, FVMAX) 
1 
I= I-; -1 
I NF TRY 
9 
YES 
Place the new food particle on 
the node 
N=N+l 
NO = NFOOD 
? 
NO 
YES 
,,. _. -ý.. FIGURE A, 
2: Pass 1: Auto- 
FNTER mata are aged and metabolized 
in one time step. (I ;K is the 
maximum possible number of auto- 
mata, i. e. the number of acces- 
sible environment nodes). 
KI 
Does 
NO the Kth 
Automaton 
Exist 
YES 
Age the Kth automaton 
AGE (K) = AGE (K)+7_ 
Find its gene values: 
S=GS(K), M=GM(K) 
Metabolize the Kth automaton 
FSTOR(K)=FSTOR(K)-RMETAB(S, M 
YES 
Kth automaton 
dies of 
hunger 
FSTOR(K)/O 
9 
NO 
K=K+ý 
K> MAXK 
9 
YES 
-EXIT 
L. 
K=] 
Does the 
Kth automaton 
exist 
17 YES 
Find its node: 
I=IGR(K), J=JGR(K) 
Find its gene values: 
S=GS(K), M=GM(K) 
Find its radius of vision: 
IRS = RS (S , TI) 
is A. -ý. 
: >s 2W on:? 1 -ct', 
move dnd feed in one time sttp(k. 'hcn- 
ever a target node is occupi(ec. ' or 
further than the radius of movement , 
the nearest node to it into which a 
move is allowed is selected. 
Searching within the radius of vision, find the location 
of the nearest edible food particle, if any, and of the 
Was the 
food particle 
seen 
\7/ 
NO 
Was another 
automaton 
seen 
9 
YES 
FSTOR(K)< COMBL (S, M) 
and 
AGE(K) j MCOAGE 
9 
No 
Move to corner of movement region 
opposite the other automaton 
K=K+1 
NO K )MAXK 
9 
YES 
Move towards the 
food particle 
(eat it if it 
is reached) 
IN 0 Move randomly to 
one of the four 
corners of the 
movement region 
Move towards the 
other automaton 
EXIT 
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iýzure A. 4 Pass Auto- 
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ENTER Formations in one time step. (The 
requirement of minimum age for coa- 
lition assures that the same auto- 
FK mata do not recombine in the same or consecutive time steps). 
NO Does the 
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NO and 
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17 
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and 
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Was 
NO such an 
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found 
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A-6 The Program Written in Fortran 
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JOB (URXXXXX, 4,5000) , CVE 1, REG I ON= 160K, SC=S BIN=21 /*MA 111 S YSTE'r=SY I, FA I LUDE=CAUJCEL 
/*PROCESS MAIN 
/*PROCE. SS CRBEOUT 
/*Fc) R'. 'AT 1fT, DD; 1A '-ýE=S YS',, SG 
/*FOR'i. Ai RT, 1ý, 7i1A 
. '==SYS}ýiýI; IT /*FOR?, iAT RT, DDUUA', ir=FT06F00 
//JOBLIB DD DSN=;; YL. i3I . PIJ3. Lo AD, DISP=SHR //SHO EXEC PG?, i=Cc)'JSUL, p, 'ý(ý, 1- * *****ý: ********* STARTED 
// IIIIII1 EXEC F(OtRTGCLG 
//FORT. SYSIIJ DD * 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
C 
C EVEI 
C 
C- --------------------------------------------------------------- 
CALL P RUG 
RETURN 
END 
C 
C ------- --=----------------------------------------------------- 
C NOTE: THE ARRAYS I GS (: ) ,IG;; () Cc) RRESP() : TO THE CE E VALUES 
C (AS DESCRIBED III THE ', 'JRITEUP) PLUS ONE (I. E-.., IGS=GSM , IG, "M=GM+i ). C 
C LRS, LRM, I AGE CO RRESPU; ID TO RS, RM, AGE III THE IIR ITEUP 
C ---------------------------------------------------------------- 
C 
C 
SUBROUTINE PROG 
C C01', '1c) IS I t"1IT IAL I7_ D IN BLOCK DATA AND I NI TU ::::::::::: 
/IOCC(3! J, 3J, 2), F(iOD(30,30), ', 1; -ý, 'ýil, IU, I? 'I COI, iý{ONd/THI: -IGS/IGS(600), IG'M(600 ), IGR(600,2), JGR(600,2), 
*FSTOR(600), IAGE(60)), 4AXr: 
Cc);, {'-io l/ATFit /LAS(5,5), LR'; (5,5), R. {ETAS(5,5), REPROL(5,5), 
*COM{BL(5,5) , FSTORI (5,5) 
CU''. `O? J/PAS? '. {V/EPSIEN, IBA?:?, i IFTRY, NFOOD, FV; tI I, FVMAX, MCOAGE 
CO't; {Oiii/STAY/idT {, r1!, R, I? CU, UDTt i, I TYP (5,5) ,I P0P (5,5) ,I PBD, I PC, Fl. {X 
DATA IrIITF/0/, NPGr, )D, A)TAT i /1 ,1/, ijPLOT/O/ 
INTEGER C()!. 11'41UM 
LOGICAL DE3UG, L0G4 
C 
C COMMON/CONFIG/ IS REQUIRED BY CHAMAN 
C 
CO i, ', i )`I/CO'NF I G/DU?,: ': SY (4) , DEBUG, D IJMDU'h (20 ) 
C::::::::::::::::::::::: "- ::: :::::::::. "::::::::::::::::::: 
C:: TO ADD NE: '! CUM ANDS, SET Co %lt',; U, '. { Tc) THE TUT AL NUMBER :: 
C:: OF COMMA DS, DIMENSION CO'. UID ACCO DIi"IGLY, AND ENTER :: 
C :: THE COMMAND NAME IN TiiE DATA STATE? 'ýEi1T FOLLO'NI1IG. 
C== ALSO, ? SAKE SUR= TO '10DIFY THE COi,, PUTED "GOTO' (ST.!. iT 30) 
""""""". """"""""". "f""se"""""""""""""" 
DATA CO'ii1U: h/25/ 
REAL*3 PARA:. 4(50), CO`. ND(25), STR(20) 
DATA COMND/ 
*... J* ,.: * ', 'EXIT J# It 
*', ', IFUOD ', 'FVAL ', 'CREATE ', 'INITU ', 'PRSG f9 
*'PRPARM ', 'GO ', 'PTIME ', 'PBD ', 'PCOMB ', 
*'METRON / , 'REPRO ,; l ', 'CU', 
ttýc)r't ', 'FSTRO;, -i ", 'BARREN 
*1ý/ 
C 
C EXECUTION STARTS HERE- 
C 
CALL PTI, ME(TIIA) 
DEBUG=. FALSE. 
GO TO I 
r 
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ENTRY RLC()V 
1 CONTINUE 
10 CO: 1TIIUUE 
C ------ -------------- READ i'lEXT CU., ", `. SA'dD --------------------------- C 
CALL RYFY(STd) 
CALL GTPA; (ST1?, PARAý'. ) 
Di) 15 
IF (CO',. {; uuD (I) . EO . PAPA', I (1 )) GO TO 25 15 CONTINUE 
CALL 'N' TY('*** NO SUCH COMMAND k**', 22) 
GO TO 10 
C 
C. - 25 CONTINUE 
C "::: ::::::::::::::::: "". ": "::::::::... ": :: ":: ::::::.; . "e. )DI FY NEXT STATE'iE: IT : 'IHE1C N1 ADDING . 1E l'; Ct). 't, 4ANDS 
C a..............:.: "... ::::::. ... ":::. ""::.:: " ::... ...;.... ............. ..... .....: .... ......... .... 30 GO TO 
*10,10,100,200,300,400,500,600,650,700 
, 900,310,820 *, 900,910,920,930,940 
*), I 
C 
CALL ý'1TTY(' *** INAVALID CO M,. 4AND ****- , 27 ) GO TO 10 
C C ---. -- --- COMMAND SERVICING --------------------------- C. EXIT 
C 
100 CALL PTIME(TIM) 
STOP 
C 
e 14FOOD NFOOD NFTRY - 
C 
I 
IF ZEROS, OLD VALUES RETAINED 
200 N1=IIWTG4(PARAM(2)) 
N2=INTG4(PARA ? ßt(3) ) 
IF (NI . GT. 0) IFOOD='lI IF (N2. GT. U) ; \EFTR Y=N2 
GO TO 10 
-----z------------ 
f FVAL FV'aI? J FV, -1. AX - SET FOOD VALUE RANGE 
C 
300 R1-REAL9(PARAM(2)) 
IF(R1 . GT. EPSIL`J)FVMIN=R1 FVMAX=REAL9 (PAiRAM(3) ) 
IF (FV, 'JAX. LT. FV' I, J)FVMAX=FV? aIN 
GO Tt) 10 
C 
e 
400 I=INTG4(P. ARAM(2) ) 
J= `JTG4 (PAI3A'i(3) ) 
NA= I'4TG4k C PA: -A A, (4) ) 
N3=INTG4(PA( 5) ) 
IF(: -IINO(I, J, "'IA, 
NB). LT. 1)GO TO 10 
IF(I . GT.?:, 't)mac) TO 
10 
IF(J. GT.!. 4)(3Q TO 10 
I (, }. 1AX000A, 1J3). G .S )GO TO 10 
IF( IOCC( I, J, IN). U12.0)GO TO 10 
CALL CI11EATF(I, J, NA, NB) 
Go TO 10 
e. INITU - JUITIALIZE UNIVERSE FLIRR NEt'r SIMULATION 
C 
500 CALL INITU 
1 
F 
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INITF=I 
GO TO 10 
c --- --------------------- C Pi? SG , 7STAT I 'JG? i) <"PLOT> <FO)OD'.;. AX> - SETS PRRI'ITOUT PAf1A'/ TE.? S C iISTAT1=FýýECl1` CY OF P0PUL". T1c)I PRIUTOUT 
C" NG; ID =fý: ý`ý? Ü; _; JC Y OF SNIAPS; ioT PI `JTOUT 
C" [JPLOT =FREOUF; JCY OF PLOT LINE PiRI; JTOUT (IF NON ZERO, POPU- 
C" LATIO A`JD S; JAr':; i)T P: Ut)T; )UTS ARE SUPPRESSED) 
C" FOOD AX=USED TO SCA LE FREE; FOOD PLOT (ESTIMATE ;. AX F:? EE FOOD) C 
600 N1=I-NTG4(PARA', 1(2)) 
I42=INTG4(PA. A'. l( 3) ) 
U3=I NTG4 (rý A1? t, i. S (4) ) 
RI=REAL9() kR i. '(5)) 
IF(N1 . GT. 0)'JSTATI=141 Ir= (; J2. GT. D) `IPGPD=N 2 
IF (N3. Gf_. 0 ); -aPLOT=: I3 
IF(RI. GT. 0.5)FMX=PI 
GO TO 10 
C -- ----------------------- 
C. PRPARM - PRINT . ioD'--L EL SPE CIFICATIO ! PARAMETER VALUES C 
650 CALL : '1TTY( 
*'--------------------- 
CALL PRPAi;: A 
CALL IV{TTY( 
*. # --------------------- 
GO TO 10 
C ------------------------ 
C. GC) N-S I': MULATE N TIME 
MODEL PARAMETERS ----------------', 55) 
------------ ------------------- ', 55 ) 
STEPS 
C 
700 NGO=I'1TG4(PARA'S(2) ) 
IF(NG0. LT. 1. c)R.; JCO. GT. 900)GO TO 10 
IF (I :II Ti .:; `. 0) Gc) To 710 CALL IUITU 
INITF=1 
710 CALL STATI 
CALL PRGRI D 
IF (NPLOT. GT. 0) CALL I PPLOT 
DO 750 I =1 , 1, ]GO CALL TCYCLE 
IF(: "IPLOT. GT. 0) GO TO 745 
IF('MiOD('-IT'. I, NSTAT1 ). E0.0)CALL STATT 
IF(, MOD (UT -', '1PGRD) . E0.0 )CALL PRGR ID 
GO TO 750 
745 IF ( MOD(NT'1, , 4PLOT). E0.0) CALL PP LOT 
750 CO)iiTINUE 
C ***TE'JP -- CHECK. DATA STRUCTURE INTEGRITY 
UUMTH=0 
DC) 720 KK=1 0 MA XK 
IGG=IGR(:: I, 9I, I) 
IF(I G(, -,. EQ. O) GO TO 720 
JGG=JGR( , I1-I) 
NY'ATH=1JUT11+ 1 
IF(Ic)CC(IGG, JG(j',. INNl). E'). KK)GO TO 720 
C 
ViR ITE (6,71 5) KK, I GG, JGG, I OCC (I GG, JGG, IN) 
715 FORMAT(' BAD THING: K, IG, JG, I000=', 4I5) 
720 CONTINUE 
C 
Dc) 730 II =1 , ! rya 
IX) 730 JJ=1, *d1N 
IOCCI=IOCC( I I, JJ, IN) 
IF(IOCC1. LT. 1 )GO TO 730 
IF( IGI? ( IOCCI, I'J). EO. II SAND. JG? ( IOCCI, IN). E0. JJ)GO 
ll'IRITE(6,721 )IUIT', {, II, JJ, I()CC1 
TO 7 30 
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721 FORMAT(' BAD NODE: NT'r{, I, J, IOCC1-x, 415) 
730 CONTINUE 
C 
IPP=J 
IX) 740 1 15 
DO 740 JJ=1 ,5 I PP= I PP+ I P()P (I I, JJ ) 
740 Co )NT I'SUE 
IF(IPý. iE. `'JMT: f); '!: ýITE(6,741 )U; '. ý, IPP, 14T. iTH 
741 FU 7'. 1AT(-' 3AD CUUTS: 'IT?. 1, I PC)PS,! iU''. tTii=', 3I: ) 
C ***TE'. iP END 
CALL STATT 
CALL PRGRI D 
GO TO 10 
C ------------------------ 
C. PTI . SE - P; RIýIT iýEMAINLNG TI'-iE IN THIS RUtI 
C 
800 CALL PTIME(TI'S) 
GO TO 10 
C ------------------------ 
C. PSD T/F -- PRINT BIRTH, DEATH EVEi'ITS AS THEY FIAPPE14 
C 
810 IPBD=O 
IF(LcýG4(PARAM(2))) IPBD=1 
Go TO 10 
C ------------------------- 
c. PCOMB TIF -- PRINT COALITION 
C 
820 IP C=O 
IF(L0G4(PAR AM(2)))IPC=1 
GO TO 10 
C -- -------- -------------- 
C. MTRO', ') E JV1 V2 V3-V4 V5 
C 
900 CALL (ý Rc)r! t (R'. 4ETA3. PAl3A?. ý ) 
GO TO 10 
C -- -------- -------------- 
C. REPRO: 'l JV1 V2 V3 V4 V5 
C 
910 CALL R Ri, r1(REPROL, RARAM ) 
CC) TO 10 
C -- -------- ---------------- 
C. COMRO Vl JV1 V2 V3 V4 V5 
C 
920 CALL r?, Ro J(CU!. (3L, PARAM) 
Go Tc) 10 
C -- -------- -------------- 
c. FSTRO' JV1 V2 V3 V4 V5 
C 
930 CALL RRO'1(FSTQRI, PARAM) 
EVENTS AS THEY HAPPEN 
- READ JTH i? c) N. OF RMETAB (D', )T=N. O Cii-iAN3E ) 
- READ JTN REPROL RCW1 (DOT=NU CHANGE) 
- TREAD JTI-H COM3L ROW (DoT=1,10 CHANGE) 
ROAD JTN FSTOR I -RO N'N 
G() TO 10 
C -------------------------- 
C, BARREN IB&Rl? - , IUM`3ER OF COLUMNS (O? THE RIGHT) "NITH NO FOOD 
C 
940 IN1. =INTG4(PARAM(2) 
) 
IF(Ni. LT. O. ()ii.; 1I. GT.?, fit, {)G() TU 945 
IBARR=NI. 
GO Tc) 10 
945 CALL : JTTY(' **** BAD VALUE ****0,20) 
GO TO 10 
C 
C 
END 
C 
C 
1 
f 
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C 
C MAIN TIME CYCISIMULATION rZi}UTIi1E 
C 
C : k*ý: ** *k**; l-*; tr: ck*; ý*xE*'; 4l ký; *"k*kkk Jc: r*: ý*i*kr. ***k: *k ": * ; +-* *k** * 
SU 3 ROI. JT Ii1' TCY (, LE 
C INITIALIZED IN BLOCK DATA AND IIIITU :::::::::: 
Co i/Gi? ID/IOCC(30,30,2), FOUý(30,30), '{.. t, ? 'i, I0, IPd 
CU''; '. tON/THINGS/IGS(6G0), IG;. '(600), IGR(600,2), JGR(603,2), 
*FSTU;. (60J) ,I AGE ( 603) , ': SA; (K C(): ';;. 1(), ß/ATTR/Lrý3(5,5), Lr`ý'i(5,5), iý`,; ETAB(5,5',, REi ROL(5,5), 
*C()MBL(5,5), FSTQRJ (5,5) 
G)' AP'. W/EPS I L: 1, I3 A! ý ?, NNJFTIý?, Y, NNIFOUD, FVýiI `I, FV', MAX, ' . ýCO)AGE CO'4:. 1O't/S"1AT/; JT', `, ICR, I CITYP(5,5), 1P P(5,5), IP33, IPC, F. AX 
C. :::::::: ".:::. ":.:::::::.::: ":::::: "": 
LOGICAL T(}P Di! 
DATA TOPD'"1/. FALSE. / 
IT=IN 
Ire=IO 
IU=IT 
NT!. 1= NT J. +I 
C . '1RITE(6,1 i)NT', S, (( ITYP( I, J), IPOP( I, J), I=1 , 5), J=1 , 5) C 11 FO,,, R. AT(I4, ' >>> ', 25(A1, '=', I2)) 
C ------ GENERATE NEir FOOD - NFOOD PARTICLES OR NFTRY TRIES ------ 
NPLAC =0 
DU 230 I =1 , "JFTRY IT=IiRANI ('4M) 
JT=IRAINI("d`I) 
IF(IT. GT. '. 4't-IBARR)GO TO 230 
iF(IUCC(IT, JT, I; )). LT. O. OR. FOOD(IT, JT). GT. EPSILPI)GO TO 230 
C 
FOOD( IT, JT)=FV'. IINl+? AN(FVIAAX-FVznIII) 
NPLACE=NPLACE± 1 
IF (1--lP LAC ()()D) GO TO 260 
230 C01TIi'IU 
C 
C CLEAN UP NEE'D' ARRAYS - PRESERVE INACCESSIBLE NODES, IF ANY 
C 
260 DO 270 I=l , V', i 
DU 270 J=1, `JN 
I000(I, J, IN)=IOCC(I, J, I0) 
IF(I0CC(I, J, IN). GT. 3)I000( I, J, IN)=0 
270 CONTINUE 
C 
DO 280 K=1 , iMAXK 
IGR (' , I14)=0 
J'', R (K, I N)=0 
280 CONTINUE 
C 
PASS I: AGE, METABOLIZE THINGS ---------- 
C 
DO 305 K=1 , ,. IA XK 
IG=IG, 2(; K, I0) 
IF(IG. EQ. 0)G0 TO 305 
JG=JG; R (K, 10) 
C NA=IGS(K) 
N`. 3=IG'"t(t: ) 
If GE'(. K)=IA GE(K)+1 
FST0R (K) =FST, )R (K)-R, `ETA. B(NA, I13 ) 
IF (F STO ? (K) . C`ý-. 0) 
G() TU 305 
*C TiI I NG ! )I ES OF iU; `lGF_R 
IF( IP13D. NE ITE(6,304)1, IGi? (K, 10 JGf? K, I0), ITYPIGSK) 
*IGJ (K) ) 
304 FORMAT(' HUNGER DEATH: K=', 139" i1ODE=' , I2, ', ', I2, ' TYPE=' AI) 
CALL ; KILL (i(, IU) 
305 CO"ITI NUE 
e 
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C 
C ---------- PASS 21 irjQQVE, 
C 
C SCAN TOP/Do; -., '. l OO;? B OTTO '. t/UP 
TOPDU=.? IOT. TO)PD'I 
C 
D() 390 K&, =1 ti . ', A XK K=KK 
IF (TOP DU ):: ='SAXK-K<+I 
I0=I GR (K, I0) 
IF (I G. E0.3) G(; TO 390 
JG=JGR(K, I0) 
C 
F EFJ TIC I ;> ----------------------"--- 
1'4 A LTE RJATE TI . '.; 2 STEPS 
NA=IGS(K) 
III S=IG': ý(r: 
IRS=L:? S(NA, N" 
(NA, N3) 
CALL '1EAJRST( IG, JG,. RS, IITT, 
IF (IFF. E0.0)Gcý TO 340 
C HERE IF FOOD SEEN - GO TO IT 
CALL 'RNO''I (IG, JG, I R;. 1, I FF, JFF, I CODE) 
IF( ICODE.! IE.. 1 )G() TO 390 
C HERE IF REACHED FOOD - EAT IT 
FSTOrR(K)=r=STOýi: (;; ) -FoýoL(IFF, JFF) 
FOOD( IFF, JFF)=0. 
GO TO 390 
C 
C HERE IF FOOD NOT SEEý"I - CHECK IF A NEIGHBOR V1AS SEEN 
34Q IF( ITT. '4E., O)SO TO 350 
C HERE IF : `IO OJE I 3ä3OR {',. AS SEEM - MOVE: RANDO\ LY TO 1 OF 4 CORNERS 
CAT L 0Vti(IG, J0, I: R'. {) 
GO TO 390 
C HERE IFAEI G}iBý)R SEEI -CHECK IF }`ýE ARE HUNGRY 
350 IF(FST, ) (: ). GToCc)'t3L('IA,;! B))Gc) TO 360 
C HERE IF HUNGRY - GO TONARD NEIGH30, R SEEKIAG COALITION 
CALL MOVC)N (I G, JG, I R'. S, ITT, JTT, I CODE ) 
CO TO 390 
C HERE IF ', ()T HUNGRY - GO TO CORNER OPPOSITE TO i1E I GHBC)R 
360 IDEL=IG-ITT 
JDEL =JG-JTT 
IOPP=IG+ISIG"I(IR?: S, IDEL) 
JO PP=JG+ ISI ON (I J DEL ) 
C 
IF (I OPP. LT. 1) I O)PP= l 
IF(JUPP. LT. I )JOPP=1 
IF( IOPP. GT. '. i', i) IOPP =111'. 1 
4I)JOP? =NH IF(. Jt)PP. GT.. 
C 
CALL 3.0VUII (I Gg JG, IRM, I OPP, JOPP, I CODE ) 
C 
390 CONTINUE 
C 
C 
C --------- PASS 3: REPRODUCE ALL THINGS ------- 
C 
C FRCM No il ON ONLY O11 NEU! ARRAYS 
C 
400 DO 49x1 K= 1, iAXK 
IG=IGR(:, I `I 
IF(IG. EO. O)GO TO 490 
; A=IGS(K) 
N3=IG'. t(i: ) 
IF(FSTU; t('). LT. Iý P:? OL(`dA, US))GO TO 490 
C THIS THING 1? _r1DY TO REPRODUCE - LOOK FOR SPACE NEXT TU 
JC-JG2 (K, I ;I) 
; 13TART= I j? AUU 1 (8) 
IT 
.1 
r 
t 
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NE D='%I ST A;? T+7 
D; ) 405 
CALL GET: f: 3 (; IL= ,I ýJi3 , J; 13. ) I'1; 3=I: +I: 1i 
JN3=JG+JfUli3 
IFt Iitý,. LT. I.; )ý. II'! 3. GT. '. t'. S. c)i?. Ji1ß. LT. I . i)i?., 1. '1ý3. GT.! IU)G() TU 405 Ir(IO^C(I: 13, JUJ; IU). Eý. 0)30 To 410 
405 CO'ITI: 1UE 
C HERE IF 'IO FREE SPOTS - TOO C;? c): tDED TO REPRODUCE G() TO 490 
C HERE FOR THE ACTUAL REPRODUCTION 
410 CALL CREATE (I `7,3, J'"13, I ? J; 3 ) 
IF I23D. il E. -3). "h-UTE(6,41 1) ITYP(iJA, '13), I, 13, JI13, r-STOR(K) 
411 FOR'. tAT (' --- ýREPt oDIJCTI O 1: K=', 13, ' TYPE=' ,A1 ,' NODE _ý " *12, ', ', 12, ' FST()R=', F4.0) 
FSTOR(K)=F STO1? (K)-FSTc)RI(IA, N3 ) 
C 
490 CONTINUE 
C 
C 
C ------------ PASS 4: 
C 
500 
C THIS 
MAKE COALITIONS -------------- 
D: ) 5 90 1=1 , !. A XK (K l, I`I) 
IF(IGI . E'ý. J)G() TO 590 N AIIG SI 
NB1=IG'ý(l; l 
Iý C (ýSTUr2(:: I 3LGJA1 NBI 
THING 4I LL I NG TO COM3 I i"lE -- IS 
JG I=JGR(:: 1 , I; 1) NISTAýýT=I q. A: ]I (8) 
NE', ID='lSTART+7 
)). OR. CIAGE(i(1 ). LE. 'll G., E))GO Tt) 590 
THEE A : 'v'ILLING i, 'ýIGýi 3OiR? 
C 
Dt) 530 UE=: ISTART, 1El1D 
CALL GETýi: 3:? (iiiE, I; 13. JºJ3 ) 
IG2=IGI+I`1; 3 
JG2=JG I+Jil3 
IF(I C72. L"1. I. () .I G2. GT. '"ü ,. DR. JG2. LT. I OR. JG2. GT. 147,1) GO TO 530 
K2=100C( I0), JG2, III) 
IF(I: 2. LT. 1), 30 TO 530 
C HERE IF A; I I; ''IEDIATE iaEIG-BOR FOUND - IS IT ': 'TILLING? 
UA 2= I GS (K2 ) 
N132=IG;. I(K2) 
IF((FSTO (K2). LE. CW., 13L(UA2, NB2 )). A ND. (IAGE(K2). GE. MCOAGE))GOTO 
530 COYITIIJUE 
C HERE IF IIU ilILLINC : JEIGHBORS 
Gt) Tt) 590 
C : I-RE IF THE tE I0113OR IS ALSO }VILLIIJG - COMBINE THEM 
540 A 1='JAI -; IA2-i 
WlBI=UBI+N32-1 
ýl'1A21 
2=1 
IF(T AI . LF.. 5)Gt) TO 
542 
NUTA2= ILJA 1-4 
', IA I =5 
542 IF (` "1 Bi. LE . 5) Gt) TO 545 
- i'1; "132=11N31-4 P1h1B1=5 
C DI STRI 3IJTE CW, 'iB I ýJE1 FOOD STORE PROPORTIONALLY 
545 Tt)TI =: INA I+ 1, '131-2. 
TtT2='ýUA2+Trýq732-2. 
FSTO)T=FST; ).? (;: 1 )+FSTOI? "(K2 ) 
FSTO); R (K l) =FSTC)T-rTOT 1/( TOT 1 +TOT2 ) 
FSTOR (K2)=l- STO)T-FSTOR(K I 
C INITIALIZE 1: 1 AS A IlE: V THING 
IGS(KI )=; I; 1. A1 
540 
I 
f 
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IGM(KI )=; 1N a1 
IAGE' (K1)=3 
NCO=;: CO+ I 
IPOP(, `IAI ,; 131 )=i? O? CIA I , i13i)-I I Op(; IIIAI1i3I) =I,; 'OP AI, ', I)3I )+I 
IF( IPC . i1F0ITF*("'>, 'ý 35) I (,: I , Ii1), JCý(ý: 1, IN), *ITYP(`IAI, 3I ), ITYP(`! A2 A`32 I YP CI 'JA I ,: I;; 3I 546 Fo R. 'AAT(' * *** Cc)-1LIT1O. " I AT ', 12, E9 ', I2, " 
IF(: INNA2.: I. O. . tl: a[32. t! E. I )GO TO 550 
, til, '+', A1, '-->', Al ) 
C HERE IF SECOND Ti-I `JG NULL - 'ºE"1OVE IT 
CALL KILL( (2, IN) 
GO TO 590 
C HERE IF SECOND THING ` OT NULL - RE-INITIALIZE IT 550 IGS(.; 22 
I''S2)=N, `, 32 
LAGE: (, K2)=0 
IPOP('JA2, '132)=IPOP(NA2, U32)-1 
IPOP(it'J, -/2, `111132)=IP. OP(NNJ; JA2, 'l! JE32 )+I 
IF( IPC. ITE(6,557) IT YP(L1: 1; ý? _, 
'J Ii32) 
557 F0R'. tAT('+ +- AI) 
C 
590 CONTINUE 
C 
RETURN 
END 
C 
C* k**kýc** kkr; cam*icicx: tý k*k :k tkýc*ý ý +: ; F* xFx ;' *k h'c (-k* k 
C 
C INITIALIZATIO*11 AND I/O SUBROUTINES 
C 
C* *****ý; ýi k******i*kx * k*xkýc ý ý-kýck** ***k*JýýF*** k kkkýc 
C 
C ROUTINE THAT INITIALIZES THE DATA STRUCTU? E FOR NE: '1 SIMULATION 
C 
SUB ROUT I i1E I `1 I TU 
C :: ".::: - :: CO . i'ic)NS INITIALIZED 
PN 3LOCK DATA AID I . dITU " :: ":: :::: 
C, )'iý. iO'1/GRI 0/IO: CC (30,30,2) , FOOß) 
(30,30) 10, P4 
CU'; '. tO; 1/THI'I, S/IGS(500), IG i(600), IGR(6J0,2), JG:; (600,2), 
*FSTt): R (6 00) ,I AGE' ( 600) , "AXK C()j, t` ON/ATTý/LRs(5,5), LR:. i(5,5), R iETA3(5,5), ýEPROL(5,5), 
*CO'. ü3T (5,5), F ST! ); RI(5,5) 
MAr -, It=T;; Y,, iTF, )t)D, FV'. `I; 1, t=V' AX, "CO. ýGE 
CO ': 1, iOý 1DTi-I, I TYP (5 , 5) ,Ir: )P (5,5) ,IP, 3D, I PC, F;, ¶X 
..... . .:. : 
I=l, ' i'. 4 D: ) 10 
DO 10 J=1 , Itl 
IOCC(I, JS I )=0 
IOCC(I , J, 2)=0 
FOOD(I, J)=0. 
10 CONTINUE 
C 
DO 20 1: =1 ,: 1AXK 
IGR(iC, I)=0 
IGf? (K, 2)=0 
R (ý:, 1) =0 
J'GR('r) ,2) =0 
IGS(K)=0. 
IG'f(K)=0 
FSTOR(K)=-1. 
IAGL-: (K)=-1 
20 CONTINUE 
C 
DO 30 I=1,5 
DJ 30 J=1,5 
30 IPOP(I. J)=0 
C 
I 
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NCR=0 
N, r- ()=0 
? NN DTJ-i =0 
C 
IO= 1 
I14=2 
NT'. I=O 
RE TU R !J 
END 
C 
C -----"---------- OUTPUT GRID 
C OLD ARRAY ISU, 5'---D TO SET UP 
C 
CIA RACTE R , {AP 
S'JBROUTI: +: PE; GRID 
C :::::::::: CO"a"r S I: IITI ALIZFD IN BLOC': < DATA A,! D I '1ITU CO'`:; i); 1/GibIJ/IOCc(30,3J, 2), F 00)(33,3J),,,. 5, `; 'i, IU, IiJ 
CO'. 4 01J/ TIi1: 4,15/IGS(600), 101 6OJ IG600,2JGiý 60092 
*FSTO;? (600) ,1, V. ): ( 609) COO?; l', () I/AiI!? /LýýS(5,5)5,5), R; 4ETA3(5,5), R_ P(L(5,5), 
*CO'13L(5,5), F3TO? I (5,5) 
Cc)': S'!; )'r/Pfd ? 'S`/F PS IL.!, I ýA ?, NFT: ý Y, 1; Fo OD, FV; jI: 1, F V'. AX, ;.; Cc)AGE 
CO! {"O`J/ST T/;! C: R, i. CO, IDT f, IT. '? (5,5), IPOP(5,5), IP3D, IrýC, Fr. ii( 
C ". "":. ":.: "":. " ..::........::. ".:...:: " 
DATA IC'. iPTY, Ii'IACC/'. ', '; r'/, IFOOD/- *'/ 
C 
DO 100 I=I, MM 
D() 1 00 J=1 , JN 
K=IOCC(I, J, IN) 
IF(K)10,2.0,30 
C HERE IF PJACCES5I3LE NODE 
10 IUCC(I, J, IO)=Ii7ACC 
GO TO 100 
C HERE IF Er4PTY 
20 IOCC(I, J, I0)=IE'M. PTY 
IF (FOO D(I, J) . GT. EPS ILi1) IOCC(I, J, IO)=IFOOD GO TO 1 00 
C HERE IF THING 0'JT NOSE 
30 IOCC(I, J, IO)=ITYP (ICS(K), IG', i(K() ) 
100 CO JTINUE 
C OUTPUT ARRAY 
D0 2 00 JJ =1 , ^1; 1 J= I PI-JJ 
; IRITE(6,101) (IOC, -( I, J, I0), I=1 101 FOR'. MAT (' ', I OOA I 
200 COuTI: 1UE 
RETURN 
EN D 
C 
C 
C ----------- OUTPUT 3ASIC STATISTICS --------------- 
C 
SUBROUTINE: STATI 
C :::::::::: CO ; '.! t)'IS INITIALIZED IN BLOCK DATA , ß: 1F) IIIITU :::::::::: 
CQ. 'ý'. ic), 1/3, ýI )/IOCC(30,30,2), JC)D(30,33), 'i., i, 'I'J, I0, It1 
CO! "4'. iC)'J/THI`! GS/IGS(500), IG', `(o03 ), IGý(600,2), JG: 
R(500,2), 
*FSTUR(500), IAGE(6J0AXK 
CO'. ". Sc): 1/? ý. TTR/Li: S(5,5 ), LR'. it 5,5), rý;. icT, 'ý3(5,5), RFPi"? UL(7,5), 
*Cc)'t3 L 5,5) ,r STU,; I (5,5) 
CU.. t', 1c), 1/? A.? 'SV/FPS IL. `!, I BA ?:?, NFT? Y, ýIFOOD, FV I'T, FV, iAX, ;. cCOAGE 
Co, ', i'. 4U'1/ST; AT/: IT; t, ýlCý?,: ''Cý), ýJDTji, ITYP(5,5), IPc? P(5,5), IP30, IPC, FEIX 
C 
NG3, F))D C COU! T TH I 
NU'. ýMTH=O 
NU %iFD=0 
C 
f 
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DO 1 00 1=I, ? 4?, S 
DO 1 00 J=i 
IF(FOUD( I, J) . G; '. EPSiL I ); 1U FD=PJU'. ýFI? +l i; -IOCC(IIJ, II) 
If-(; (. LT. 1 )G0 TO (00 
100 COUTI. IUE 
C 
C OUTPUT OVEI? ALL ;, 1J'43E PS 
:; I, IT`E (6,2J 1 ): IT'{, ý. Uý iTH, 'JUi. {FD, iJCR, iIC(), NDTi-1 
201 FORMAT( 1 Xv 
*' STEP AUT(Yi F0')DP CdEATEI) CC)'-HI I ED DIED' , /, I X, * 14,3X, 15,3X, 14,3X, 15,4X, I5,5X, I4, ' %' 
C PRINT POPiJL1TIO; IS ß3Y TYPE 
CALL IPATTI (IP0P, 'SPECIES POPULATI'ONS', 19) 
R`TURN 
C 
END 
C 
C ------------- IUITI AL I ZE PLOT, PRINT A PLOT LINE -------------- C 
SUBROUTINE I PP LC)T 
C:::::::::: CO'{'-M'IS I; IITI AL I7_E'ßIN BLOCK DATA A'ID IiII TU ::::::::: : 
CU', 4MOv/G; RID/I0 C(30,30,2), FOO; ý(30,30), '. ""`, '1; I, IO, IN 
'`: ', {C)'T I1: 5/IGCC) I S(6,00), I-C; {(600), IGq(600,2JGýR(603,2), 
*FSTOR(60Q3) ,I AGE (600) , '"'AXz\ CU'{', S()U/ATT! R/L RS(5,5)RMETA3(5,5 ), REPROL(5,5), 
*C0 'r13L(5,5) vFSTORI (5,5) CC)"{`4ON/PAR'{V/EPSIL'd, I3AR:?, 11FTRY, IF OOD, FV'! I'I, FVI, {AX, MCOAGE 
CO'i"O: 'I/ST; T/ IT cNCP, PICO, IDT: i, ITYP(5,5), I? t) (5,5), IPBD, IPC, F'"{X 
C ... . ....... :. 
R/10/ DATA IPE 
LOGICALYI IIRATS 
LOGICAL*1 I; ýATS2(31 ), FC1-iAR 
L() )ICAL LT! ': S 
REAL*R ;'11 (21 ISP2(21), I'll , f1 (8), '. IIR2(8) 
E)UIVALEJC(ISP I(1ISP l(1)), (I5P2(I: 'JISP? 
_(1)), *(IRATSI(1: 1ER1(1)), (IRAT S2(I: dIR 2(1 )) 
E-0UIVALENCE(LTE'"{, ITEM) 
L(}; ICAL' 1 LlE`11 (4) 
EOUIV. ALENCE(LTTh, LTEM1 (1 )) 
DATA FCHAR=; /' *'/ 
DATA i'IISPI/'! ", ' ! J, / ", # ! ', - " 
*'I itI.. .. iiii iIi/ 
DATA UI SP 2 /' --- ------ ,' -- ----- ,' ---- ---' ,' ------- -' ,' -------- " 
etc' ! -------- 91 --1 ----- 10 ,' ---- ! ---' ,' ------ 1-t ,' --------- '!. / 
DATA NIRI/'! ý, " ! ", " ! ", " ! ý/ 
DATA PI IR 2/' -_-____. ' __ i _____ i ____ s ___i __-- __ t"/ 
C 
C 
I PT!. M=0 
tICR0=0 
NCUU=O 
NDTH0=0 
Vh ITE(6,11 )F , 1X 
11 Fo R. -,!. AT(' I', 'TII X, 31 X, 'SPECIES POPULATI31 X, I X, 'TI'', E', 
*IX, 2X, ' U''1CAF'TU; rED FOOD ', /, 
*6X, '0', F3X, '10', 9X, '20', 9X, '30', 9X, '40' "9X, "5Q 'F3X, '60'"5X, '70", 
*9X, '. 90, ,5 , '0', 
3X, ' ', 9x, I ', 3X, F9.0, /, 
*1 X93 A 1' 0' 1 X, ' ------------------------------------------' 
-ft --------------------- --------- ------------ 
I, 1X, 3;; , 10' ,1X, 
-----------------------------------' 
) 
RETURN 
C 
C 
ENTRY PPLOT 
F 
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IP Tý, i=IPT'. i+l 
IF (': `O (1 S'T'S, IP iý) . E0.0) GO TO 60 C HERE '! ")ST Or TiiE TIME 
?; ) 30 
ISP(I)=ISP1(I) 
30 C()ýITI i, UE 
DX) 40 I=1,31 
40 I'? ATS( I )=I; iATS1 (I ) 
G; ) TO 1r)0 
C HERE FOR GRADATION 
60 D: ) 65 I =1 , , 31 65 ISP(I)=ISP2(I) 
DO 70 1=1,31 
70 IRATS( I)=I:; ATS2(I ) 
C SPECIES POPULýTIo DISPLAY 
100 D: ) 200 1=1,5 
DO 2 00 J=1 ,5 IP=. iIN0( IPoP( I, J) 9.90) IF(I?. ED. 3)GO TO '200 
I TE''= I TYP (I ,J) ISP(IP+I )=T TE'. il (1 ) 
200 CONTINUE 
C PLOT FREE FOOD VALUE 
FTOT=O. 
DO 220 I=1 
DO 220 J=1 
220 FTOT=FTOTTFOOD (I, J) 
I F=30. *FTOT: FMX 
230 IF ='JAX0( IF, 0) 
IF='iI: 'N10( IF, 30) 
IRATS (IF+i)=FCHAR 
C 
250 IF('. i()D(IPT,. , IP_R). 1 .0 )G, ) TO 400 1'IRITE(6,301 )`)T' ISP(I ), I=1,81 (IRATS(I), I=1,31 ) 
301 rO; )iR; IAT(IX, I4,1X, 81A1,1X, I4,1X, 31A1) 
RETURN 
400 S'IRITE(5,401)CISP(I), I=1,81 ), (IRATS(I), I=1,31) 
401 F()tý'. iAT(I X, 4X, 1X, f31Al, 1X, 4X, 1X, 31A1 ) 
RETUR. I 
END 
C 
C 
C ------- -------------- PRINT MODEL PARAMETER S 
C 
SU3R0', JTI , 1E PIRPA; RM 
C Cc)'. S'"{()'. IS INITIALIZED IN BLOCK DATA AND INITU ::::::::: : 
CO. '. t'. {O: J/GibI'J/IO': C(30,3J, 2), FOOD(30,37 `I'1,10, IN 
CO'{'. i0'1/T; -II': GS/IGS(600), IG"(600), IGR(670,2), JýR(600,2), 
- *FSTO ß(6G0) , IAGB(600)., '. iAXi 
CU'{'iO l/ATT; ý/L,: S(5,5LR:. {(5,5), R'. SETA3. (5,5REPROL(5,5) 
*C()'! ýL(5,5 ), i=STc), ýI (5,5) 
CO't. iON/PAR'SV/EPSIL 1, I3AlýR, 'IFT ? Y,? IFOOD, FV!. 'I'I, rV'-{AX, '. SCO)AGE 
CO'. S': SO. 1/STAT/iIT t, ': C ý, ýlCO, ý1DTi, ITYP(5,5), IP! )P(5,5), IP3D, IPC, FMX 
C .:..:...::.:::..:. ".::: .... . ..... 
CULL IPA TT(L: ý'S, 'HOVE RADIUS', 11) 
CALL IP", TT (L:; S, 'SrE 1? ADI U3' , 10 ) 
CALL PA TT(FSTW): 'I, 'I: 1ITI, 1L FOOD STORE', 18) 
CALL PATT('{E T A13 ,TA, 501- I S. -', RATE' ,15) 
CALL PATT(R P )L, ' ýEP; ý: ). `)UCTI()`I TiiP, ýSi-1 )LD ('. SIN )', 2S) 
CALL PATT( C0, '3L, 'C()ALITI()'l THP. ESF-10L7 (MAX)--, 25) 
CALL : 'JTTY ( 
*'`IF()0D 'IFTRY 'SCOAGE FVMI11 FVMAX 
! 'IRIT'_(6,10 1 ): 11 OOD,; 1FT(ýY, ý, `COýýv , t=V' I. 1, FVý. {AX, S?, {,: IN, `, {AX 
101 FOR '. {AT( 1X, I4, I5, I6,2F7. O, I7, I3, I5) 
; ';:? ITE (6, I02) IUARR 
102 F()izi. SAT( i X, /, ' I: 3At? RR=', 12) 
f 
_24.7_ 
RETURN 
E"ID 
C 
C ---------- )'JTI1r5 Tc) PRI UT AN ATTAR IEUTE 'S ATzIY, 
C 
SUB: ROUTI, IE PATr(Ä'SAT, 'ýiESS, I) 
REAL AMAT(5,5) 
I'ITEG: E1? 'AAT(5,5 ) 
LOGICAL*] 'iFSS (I) 
C CO'i', `iYIS INITIALIZED IN BLOCK DATA AND Ic1IT'J ::::::::::: 
CC)ON/GR ID/I000C 37,30,2FOOD(30,3J), 10, IN 
CO '. S': SO'WT1FýC_)/IS(600), I'S(600), I00.,? W^' 2), J'-. x(600,2), 
*FSTQ (600) ,I ^ý'c (60)0) , '. i. AXý: C; )'S, `. iO:, t/ATTP/U? S(5,5), R'' TA3(5,5), REPROL(5,5), 
*CO'4ßL(5,5), FSTO: lI(5,5) 
IBAIý.?, 'ýr'I't? Y,: dFi)UD, FV'ýI JJ FVlAX, '. 'COAGE 
COtt. '; i) 1/STAT/ IP(5,5), I POP(5,5) , 1P3D, IPC, F"X 
'hRITE(6,9) (', i'ESS(I ), I=l , N) 9 F()R?. iAT (1 X, ' ----------------------------------' ,1 C0A I) C_ 
: '1RITE(6,11)((ITYP(I, J), A'. iAT(I, J), I=1,5), J=1,5) 
II FOR. T( I X, /, (5(SX, A1 , '=', F4.0)) ) 
RETURN 
C 
C 
ENTRY IPATT('. SATSS, N) 
iRITE(6,9) SS (f 
C 
IT'=(6,12) (( ITYP( I, J), 'aAT( I, J I=1 , 5J=I , 5) 
12 F0R, SAT(IX, /, (5(3X, A1, '=', I4))) 
REE TUi; U 
C 
C 
E NT. R YI PATT I (ý{AT, ! ME SS, N) 
IF (N . EO. 0) GO TO 15 IRITE(6,9) (', SESS( I), I=1, Ill) 
C 
15 TE (6,17)(J, (%iAT(I, JI=1,5)ITYP(I, J), I=1 , 5), J=1,5) 
17 FO qS= 1 RS=2 RS=3 ;? S=4 R5=5', /, 
*5(' R1; 1=', I1 , 5I5,12X, 5(AI , 4X), / )) RETURt' 
END 
C ------------------- ROUTINE TO READ A ROY! OF AN ATTRIBUTE MATRIX --- 
C 
SUI3ROUTI IIIE RR():; (A' AT, PARA'S ) 
C CO'"y40'; S INITIALIZED IN BLOCK' DATA AND IIUI TU ::::::::::: 
CcYY. 1ON/GRI0/iOCC(30,30,2), t=UOD(30,30), 't ;, NN., IO, IN 
CO'S; )N/T; -iI: 1331IGS(600), IG'S(60'J), IG: t(60O, 2), Jýý, ý(600,2), 
*FSTOý; (60D) ,IA GE ( 600) , '. SARK 
C()'i. '. ýU'I/. ýTI'; ý/LýýS(5,5), Lr2''(5,5), R"`SE'I'A3(5, h), REPAROL(5,5), 
*CO'"13L(5,5), f7STO ; I(5,5) 
COS'. ii):; /PAý": ''J1ý SILNI, I3ARýR", Ii TRY, NF000, z=V'"`, IN1 FV". AX, O, 1GE 
CO ýI/STA T/: ": T:., NSR, NCO) It; T1i, I TYP (5,5) I 
?t )P (5,5) ,I PBD, I PC, F USX 
Cz. s.:: ::::::.::::::::: ::::::.:..:: 
R=AL A'. SAT(5,5) 
REAL*R PARA A(1 ), DO)T/'. TEA 
C 
J= INTG4(PARA? c(2) ) 
IF(J. GEI AND. J. LL. S)CO TU 5 
CALL , Tfy(' *: * BAD 1 col 15 ) 
G; ) TO 10 
5 , rO) 10 
1=1,5 
TE!, =PARAM( I+2 ) 
IF(TEý. f. fE. DOT) AMAT( I. J )=fV-AL9(TEM) 
10 CO; NTIIJUE 
F 
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RETUIN 
END 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
k**k*kkk*+ k**kkkk**kk*kk k**kk**xkk*irkkkkkk*kkkk**kk*kkkkkkk*kk* 
TOP LEVEL PRO^`SSING i'oUTINES - BE 130R'"I, STE, MOVE, DIE 
*********k****** ****Jc**********'c**k**k*keck: 4*****************k*** 
ROUTINE THAT FIS CLOSEST THINGS, FOOD PARTICLE TO A T; II:, G. 
IF; )UD, ITHI !G ARE AS ZEROS IF Cc L ESPU IDI. G EiITI T IES 
ARE NOT SEEI '1ITIIIU LRS OF f; iIlIG. 
SU3 ; c)UTI I_ °1=AI? ST(I G, JG, I:, IFOOD, JF: )()j, IT; iIG, JT`ýi ^! G) 
:::::: "":: CO ``. 'SC)!! S I? ITI AL I ZED I: I BLOCK DA T. ý. Ill: ID INI TU """:::::: : 
CO 
. '. O 
T/GRID/IOCC(3C, 3J, 2), F; )C)J(30,3D), IC), I: J 
CO '. s'. ý )'ý/Tili:: ýS/I3S(hOD), I: ý'ý(hOD), IG: q(6,03,2JGi? (6JJ, 2), 
*FSTO R( 603), IAG _ (6 JJ) , '`AXK C()'ý, ATTf VL2S (5,5) LP: lý'iEi A3 (5,5) F. r-P2OL (5,5) 9 
*CO' MBL (5 , 5) , FSTU; ý I (5,5) CO ., {'. `: U'7/PAý. fV/ BSIL '1, I3AR2, ? rT:? Y, 'ýF 00 D, FV? iI; V? FA X, '. SCC)AGE 
Cc) a `O'1/STAY/UT _S, ýC', vCO,: dýýT: I, ITYP(5,5 ), IPOP (5,5), 
IP33, IPC, Fr'. 1X 
::...:....:..:..::::: :.::...:..::.:::::.. 
K=IOCC(IG, JG, IC)) 
NA= 1 GS (i"%) 
NB= I GM (K) 
r"t'ý[FT= '. icT; 1'3 (NA, MB) 
IFQOD=O 
ITH I NG=O 
IFD=IHR+I 
ITD=IFD 
I'4I11='-IAXO( I, IG-IR) 
IMAX='. I; 10( IG+IR) 
J': fI'J='IAXO( I , JG-IR) JA X='-f 1 40 ('1'd, J G+ IR ) 
DO 1 00 I=I"I`1, I, 4AX 
"D0 101D J=J ! 1I I1, J, ': [AX 
IF(Fc3; )D(I. J). LT. F SIL`! )Gý) TO 20 
C IF PARTICLE S'Y LL= ? TH JI R, `ETA3, NOT VISIBLE 
IF(FOOD(I, J). LT.! 3 t_T)Gc) TO 20 
C HERE IF FOOD O'I THIS 'TODE 
ID='"MAXO(IA3S(Iýý3-I), IA3S(JC J)) 
IF(ID. GT. IFD)GC) TO 20 
IF (I 9. Li. IF D) üO TO 10 
C HERE IF THIS PARTICLE AT SAiE )IST AS A Pi'. =t' IOUS 
C THIS IS ýý; 3I'IýýUL ONLY "HE: ' FOOD IS EVERY, iE? r 
Il ( I:? 
1i'J1 
(3 ). Ui 
.I 
)'J. ) ILJ 
-fu 
C HERE T() TITS FOOD PARTICLE 
10 IFD=ID 
IFOOD=I 
JFOOD=J 
C UO ! LOOK. FO T& -S 
20 IF (IoCC(I, J, IO). LT. 1)GO TO 100 
C HrRE IFA TILG ON THIS NODE - BUT IGNORE 
Ii= (I G. EG. I. AN D. JG. En. J )G0 TO 1 00 
ID=MA 0( IA3S( IG- I), IA3S(JG-J) ) 
IF (ID. GE. IT1))G) Tc) 100 
C HERE IF THIS IS CLOSEST THING S, EN SO FAR 
ITD=ID 
ITHi I NG= I 
JT: 1 I NG=J 
1 00 CU NTI IN U L= 
RETURN 
Oi1 
{3 NEAREST CALLS) 
IF IT IS US 
- REMEMBER IT 
1 
9 
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EU I) 
C 
C ------------- '4OVE TO, '+qqDS TAIR ), _T ------------------ C MOVES TUIIMG TO rj; )DE To) TAR'3ET THAI IS F,; ý! E AND 
CY 1ITii I l1 Lt? '"1 O; = TH IfG (THAT J1, 
')0;: 
AY ESE Ty,? GFT ITSELF) 
CIF WI TAtzG3ET, 1 15 ; RETU: 3; 1ý=D I. J I COJL - ELSE C. C AVAI LAS I LI TY OF `; UDC ISC JEO ED I:! I31, Mi OLD, IIE. "; ARRAYS. 
CA SSW'"t, _ S TdE TA;? G'ET IS ; '1 I TH I1 BOUNDS OF GRID. 
C UPDATES () SLY AR; aAY. 
C 
SU3ROUTINE {c)VC): ý(IG, JGG I ý, ITAý, JT^. ý, ICc)ýE) 
C :::::::::: Cc) i, 10-:. 'S INITIALIZED I: BLOCK DATA A- 'ID I:; I T(J 
CO! '. `ON/'; ID/I000(30,30,2), F000(30,30), `"i, '1! 1, IU, I: 1 
CO': ý. ýý)'ý/Ti-II i3S/I: S(500), IG.. (6OJ), IGr? (5'ý: ý, 2), JG:; (670,2), 
*FSTU; ý (600) 
CO)'. ii. i(; l/ATT'R/Lr? s( 5,5) , LR(5,5 ), R°4ETA3(59 5), KEPI? c)L(5,5), *C: )'.; 3)L( 5,5) ,; =S O;? I (5,5) CO'iMO'l/-AR'S`J/EPSI_L 1, IGA? i?, 'IFTRY, : FOO! ), FVt! IýJ, FV"AX; 1. iCOAGE 
IT'. ý 'C, ý, I)CO, : 1. -)Ti, I TYP (5 , 5) ,i Pi)P (5 , 5) ,I P3, -), 
I PC, F;, iX 
DATA Ii1SVO: d101 
1.1sl. iv0 `1=`d', ýv01ý +1 
IF (IG. `, E. ITAR. i)iý. JG. i1E. JTA ý)CO TO 20 
C HERE IF SITTING O; 1 TARGET ALREADY - JUST UPDATE NEu`! ARRAY 
I CO)1L= 
IT=IG 
JT=JG 
C ''1)ITE(6,91 )IG, JG 
C91 FORMAT(' SITTING ON TARGET: ', 2I4) 
GO TO 150 
C 
20 DELI=ITAR- IG 
DE L J= JT A R- . JG A1)ELI=A3S(D`LI ) 
ADELJ=ABS(DELJ) 
DISf=A; '_AX1 (A DELI, ADELJ) 
ID ST=D I ST+0. I 
I CODE= 1 
IF(IDIST. Lý. IR)GO TO 1 00 
C HERE IF I NT'ER', i -DIAT'E MOVE NEEDED (TARGET Too FAR) 
ICODE=O 
SFAC=I R/DI ST 
DELI=SFAC*DELI 
DELJ=SFAC -D: LJ 
C MOVE THI'JG BY DELI , D)'ELJ UNLESS THAT PT TAKEN 
100 I? `L =DELI+SI3;! (0.1 , DELI ) 
JD_L=tDELJ+SIGii (0.1 , DELJ) 
IT=I G+ I DEL 
JT=JG+JDEL 
C TEST FO NODE AVAILABILITY IN BOTH ARRAYS 
It'(I000(IT, JT, IO). E. 0 )G0 TO 200 
I1 (IOCC( IT, JT, I'i ). U .0 )G0 TO 200 
C HERE IF DESIRED : JODS AVAILAi3LE - TAKE IT. 
150 It (IT. GE. 1 . Ai1 ). JT. 
GE. I .. ý Iii, IT. LE. 1i'r. A: 
lD. JT. LE. NN )GU TO 152 
VJ. RITE(6,1-1)`1;. iVOi1, IG, JG, Ii?, 1T. AJTAt?, IT, JT 
151 FOit', AT(/ t1': {Vo)'N1, IG, JG, I:?, ITAR , JTAi?, IT, JT=', 8I4) 
CALL EVE P (''`0VO1! 1 ') 
152 K= I O(: C (I G, J3, IU) 
IOCC(IT, JT, I ! )=K 
IG, R(K, Iii)=IT 
JGi? (i(, I N)=JT 
C* C 
C* IF(, yT'"GT"42); JRIT: k_ (76 t 171 )t:, IG, JG, IT, 
JT, ITYP(IGSM, IW(I: )) 
C*171 F0)j? 'ýIAT(' !. 1OVc), 1 K, -1,139-1 Fi-? )M 
TO 
C* *' TYPE=', Al) 
RETURN 
0 
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C HERE IF DESI iýr0 UO E rA;; E:! - SEARCH BRUTE-FO RC` FOR CLOSEST NODE 200 I CODE=0 
I' 'I: 1='.! AXO( I, IG-IR) 
I' AX-'1I: 10('x' , I:; +Ia) 
?I ßi1 DST=() 999 
C 
C HERE 
3 00 
C HERE 
C 
D; ) '300 I=I'. SI1I, I'. TAX 
D: ) 300 J=J'f I `!, J'. AX 
IAD=L=IABS(I-ITAR) 
J. \DEL=I A3S (J--JTAR ) 
IDTST=!.; -. X: 3( Ii%D=L, JADEL) 
IF(IDIST. G=..! P1JST)GU TO 300 
IF(IOCC(I, J, IO).,; . 0)_; U TO 303 IF(I0CC(I, J, IN).;, IE. 0) O TO 303 
IF THIS 19 BEST FjýEE ; -JUDE SEEI I NDST=I DI ST 
IT=I 
JT=J 
CONTINUE 
IF(MII'll D 5T.: `IE. 9999)SO TO 150 
SO FAR - RE'. t_r- MBER IT 
IF NO BETTE-ý UODE SEEN - ? -. tc) MOVE... 
IT=IG 
JT=JG 
GO TO 1 50 
END 
C 
C 
C ------- -- ---- ---- MOVE R AI, T DO MLY --------- 
C ONE Or THE F'. )'JP CORNERS OF THE LR .M REGIaJ (CLIPPED, IF 
C NECESSA)LY, 3Y THE GRID BOUMDARY) IS S`IEL=CTED i? A; 'IDO;, 'LY, AND 
C THE THI ;G IS FJOVED To IT OR (Ir= OCCUPIED) TO THE CLOSEST 
C FREE NODE. 
C 
SU3Rt)UTI; iF '-ic)VR(IG, JG, IR) 
C :::::::::: Cc)'º . it) ýS I11ITI ALI Z_D Iý BLOCK 
DATA A, ID I ! IITU ::::::::: : 
Ci)'aý. it): I/GRID/ I0'-C(30,30,2) , FOOD (30,30) , '. f'a, ')i10, IN 
CO i: '. ý'f -S/IGS(500), IGM(600), IGr? (6'JD, 2), J R(600,2), 
: ': FSTQT (6 00) ,I AGE (600) , MA XK 
CW''i() 1/n'TT /LdS(5,5)LR 4(5,5), rRJE7A3(5,5), R'r)Rt)L(5,5), 
*CC)'. 3L(5,5), FSTt)iI (5,5) 
CO: '. i'"tt N/PAR-WV/EPSIL'J, 13ARJ, UFTisY, NFOOD), FV'II N, FV'. iAX, MCOAGE 
CU, '; '. «)N/STATI, IT'S, I1CR, iICt), '1DT: i, ITYP(5,5), IP0P(5,5), IPSD, IPC , FMX 
C ..................... 
CALL RA 14 (I T, JT ) 
IT=IT*I? +IG 
JT=JT*IR+JG 
IF( IT. LT. I )IT=1 
IF(JT. LT. I )JT=1 
IF ( IT. GT. IT='RM 
IF (JT. GT. WI: '1)JT-1NN1 
CALL iOVO I (I G, JG, I R, IT, JT, I CODE) 
RETURN 
END 
C ----------------- ---- CREATE 
A THING ---------------------- 
C THIS ROUTI', E SH-IOULD , JOT BE CALLED DUR I : 1G TUE '', SOVE, FEED' LOOP 
C OF TAE TCYCL: _ qOUTI'IE. 
C THIS Rc)UTI: 1r ASSUkES THAT T-IE NUDE IS FREE. 
C 
SUBROUTI: di_ C: ýE. ATE(IG, JG,! IA, "1B) 
C:::::::::: C0,1"; O, IS ISII T IAL I? ED Ij'! BLOCK DATA AýJD 
INITU 
CO'A;. 5ON/Gi? I J/ I00C( 30,30,2 ). FO; )-'-) ( 30,3J ), '""(, ý1; I, IO, JN 
C0'VON/1HLI3S/IGS(600) v IG". (603), 1 G. q (600,2), 
JGR (600,2), 
r 
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*FSTO kl(6. J0), IAGE (600),! 'AXK 
CC)'"'. f; )i1/ATTIC/US( 515) , LAM( 5, D) , fR'META 3 (5,5 ), REP)ý? ()L(5,5 ), *CO. 3L(5,5) , =STORI (5,5) E PSIL: I, I: 3A;?, 'IFTýiY, i1Ft). )n, FV"iI; "., F'J'AX, 'ýCi)AGi! 
ITYP(5,5) I IP0P(5,5), 1'3D, IPC, F, fX C ": ":. ".. ......... IF (IO C( I G, JG, I'I) NE .3 )CALL EVE: RR(' CNATE 1' ) IF (`"ZA . LT. 1 . t); ý. `1ý3 .LT. 1. Oý. ^ýl,. GT. S. c): ý. iJi3. GT. 5 )CALL EVE,? R ('CREATE 2") C FIND A FP "7: E C: ):? - i3L(j'C, ': FO: -? NEa THI NC EX) 10 K=1 , 'fAXK IF(IGR(K, IN1). E0.0)Gc) TO 20 
10 CO'IT I tI UE 
CALL E VE Riý(' lO SPACE-) 
C HERE i'1I TiI NF-i'1 K 
20 I0CC(IG, JG, I, "1)=K 
IGR(K, Iil)=IG 
JGR(K, Ii1)=J3 
IGS(K)=NA 
IG'f(K)="lß 
FSTOIR(K)=FSTo)RI (NA, NB) 
IAGE(K=0 
VCR=UCR+ 1 
TROP(N A, N3)=IPc)P(ANA, N 3)+1 
C* IF(UT; "+. GT. 42)il RITE(6,31 )K, IG, JG C*31 FORS-'AT (' Ci-? EAT I NG: K=' ,I3, ' f1ODE=', 12 , I2 ) RETURIT 
END 
C 
C ----------------- KILL A THING ----------------------- 
C 
C ION SHOULD BE I() OR III - THING SHOULD ALREADY EXIST IN THAT ARRAY 
C 
SUSR0UTIN! CILL(K, ION) 
C =:::::::: " CO', 1'sOIIIS INITIALIZED IN BLOCK DATA AND INITU :::::::: : 
CU'i`; ON/GiýID/iOCC(30,30,2 ), FOOD(30,300), 'Fý,,, 'IIO, IN 
COPISS/ ISS/IGS(600), IG (600), IG) (6D0,2), JGR(600,2), 
*FSTOP(600), IAGE(630), 'JAXK` 
CC)S'jO`I/ATTR/L? S(5,5), Lid; i(5,5 ), R'. fET! l3(5,5), REPROL(5,5) 
*CO'`; BL(5,5), FSTi)RI(5,5) 
CO: 'a, '4OIT/PA R'1V/EPSIL: N1, I3ARR, 'JFTq Y,, N1FOOD, FV ', I'd, FV?. 'AX, MCOAGE 
CO'"UOiI/STAT/ lT'S, NCRO, IDTi-l, ITYP(5,5), IPOP(5,5), IPBD, IPC, FMX 
IF (IOCC(IGR(K, I011), JGt? (I:, ION), TON) . NE. K)CALL EVEiRR('KILL 1 
NA=IGS(K) 
N3= I Gý. M (K ) 
JOCC(IGR(: `, I0: J), JGR(K, ION), ION)=0 
IGR (K, ION)=0 
JGR(K, ION )=0 
IGS(K)=0 
IG'd(K)=0 
FSTOR(K)=-1. 
IAGECK)=-1 
NDTH= IDTH+ I 
IPOP (: JA,, 'I'3)=IPOP(NA, NB)-1 
RETURN 
END 
C 
C is kýhk*** *ýk-***ýc. cý: t* k*k k; ', /*k** ** ************ý(*k*** 
C 
C L(): ý LEVEL SU3Rý)UT I rýES, I IDEPE'lI)E. JT OF TH DATA ST RUCT'J E 
C 
**? c**; +; ****hk*ký: t***k 
***** ** *****k****k*ýc*: ': *k****** C 
C ýý(_ ýý i1 
C GIVEN H, RETU:? N NTH IMMEDIATE NEIGHBOR (AS DEFINED BY II, JJ VECTORRS) 
C 
SUBROUTINE GETNBR(N, I, J) 
f 
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DIý, MEýJSI0N II (R), JJ(8) 
DATA 11/ 1,1, -1,0,0/ DATA JJ/ 11-1,1, -1,0,0,1, -1/ h11= , ODC118)+l 
10 I=II (141 ) 
J=JJ(`11 
RETURN 
C 
C ---------------- 
C RF- TURN A PAIR RAUD: )'ALY FROM II , JJ VECTORS C 
ENTRY RAUS (I , J) NN1-ItRANI(F ) 
GO TO 10 
C 
C ---------------- 
C RETURN A PAIR RANDo; LY FROM FIRST 4 ITEMS OF II, JJ 
C 
ENTRY RA I, %4 (I ,J) N1=IRANI(4) 
GO TO '10 
EM D 
C 
C ----- GET A RANDOM REAL BETEN 0 AND A ------ C 
FUUCTIO'1 RAN(A) 
DATA IFI ; RST/0/ 
IF(IFIRST.: i'E. 0)GCS TO 10 
CALL RANDU(65539, IY, Q) 
IF IRST=1 
10 IX=IY 
CALL RAr1DU(IX9IY, Q) 
RAN=Q*A 
RETURN 
END 
C 
C 
C 
C --------------- GET A RANDOM INTEGER BETº'1EEN 1 AND L ---------- C 
INTEGER i U'ICTION IRANI (L) 
IRAU. I=R"J1(FLOAT(L) ) 
IRAIN I=IJA'JI+I 
IRA QI='INO (L, IRANI ) 
IRANI=1, 'AX, Q( I, MRANI ) 
RETURN 
END 
C 
C -------------------- NON-RECOVERABLE ERi? OR ROUTINE --------_- 
C 
SUBROUTINE- EVERR(MESS) 
LOG I CA L* 1 : 1, E SS (8 ) 
"1RRITE(6,1 )C 1 SS( II=1,8) 
1 FORMAT (' ** ERROR "; ** ', 8A I) 
STOP 
DID 
C 
C ***********ýr***********ý****ký, -****ý'c*** ýkkýE"ýr7: Jl-ýckýc: ýCk*********, ck 
C 
C DATA INITIALIZATION FOR VAi? IA3LES IN CO'-VION 
C- 
C *****k** '*****1c** cý; *k** k****; l-!; ; F3****k"kkk*: *****; ý*ý'r****: f; **** * 
C 
BLOCK DATA 
CoM. 1!. «)'I/GtýI; )/IOCC(30,30,2), F(x)D(30,30), M. i. '. 5, ", "J, IO, IU 
COiý. OU/TLiI; IGS/IGS( 600) , IG ýf (60J ), IGº'R(G00,2) , JC? (600,2 ), 
p 
r 
I 
-253- 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
*FSTUR(600), IAGE(600), '"'AXK 
CO'., 'fc) 5)R'. 1ETA3(5,5), REPi: OL(5,5), *CU',; 3L ( 5,5) I (5,5) 
CO, '. f': fO'l/; ýAý'"fV/r231121, IBAIME2, 'IFT: '? Y, -`JF O(): ), FV'lIN, FV"AX, '! CUAG: - CO'. ' , f; )r1: STET/ JT'. f ,;; C 2, UCO , :J [)Ti 1, I TYP ( 5,5) ,I POP ( 5,5) ,I P3 _), I PC, F', f X 
DATA J/30/, I0/l /, Ij! /2/, i. 1. AXK/600/ 
DATA '1FOO )/1 0/,: JFTrtY/20/, '. SC: ); 10E/5/ DATA EPSIL'J/J. 031 /, IBkP /3/, FV'vfI; 'J/50. /, FV". IAX/50. / DATA I PBD/0/, I? C/0/, F., dX/2000. / 
I NTEG` R Lid `ý[/ 
*2,2,2,2,2, 
*3,3,3,3,3, 
*4t4,494,49 
*5,5,5,5,5/ 
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APPENDIX B 
CYBERNETICS -- AN INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW 
B-l General System Theory and Cybernetics 
Present conceptual tools used in the discussion of 
viable systems that range from the physiological and biolog- 
ical to the psychological, social and certain man-made 
assemblies, owe a tremendous intellectual debt to two re- 
lated scientific developments, both of which achieved a 
sufficient level of rigor and conceptual coherence to emerge 
as acknowledged major disciplines by the late 1940's. 
One such, development is associated with Ludwig von 
Berta-lauf fy and general -system -theory , and the other with 
Norbert Wiener-and cybernetics. 
A =common root for both was the generally spread 
realization that the classical mechanistic approach of 
science -inherited =from -the -19th century failed to 
deal in 
a sati=s-factory way with complex and at times elusive enti- 
ties =such as 1=i-fe, -thought, =mind, -value, purpose or society. 
This -led to the appre-c-i-at =on of 
the -fact that the reduction- 
ist s-t 'ategy locf s=cienti=fic =investigation which studies 
various phenomena by ar lyz ng their.: isolated components 
was inherently inapplicable to the comprehensive treatment 
of viable systems. 
Living organisms, for example, show essential 
qualities which add up to more than 
the simple sum of their 
isolated parts and which depend on the integrity of the 
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organism preserved as a whole. Hence the need, it was felt, 
for a new emphasis on a "systemic"-"wholisti. c" approach in 
the appropriate fields of scientific research. As Ludwig 
von Bertalanffy expressed it: "In one way or another, we 
are forced to deal with complexities, with "wholes" or 
"systems" in all fields of knowledge. This implies a basic 
reorientation in scientific thinking. "(i) 
The notion of "systemic wholeness" led to a grow- 
ing preoccupation with concepts of organization and. had an 
immediate impact on biology, the behavioral sciences and 
other fields where the reality of an organized complexity 
was paramount. Biologists in particular had been early to 
recognize the critical importance of the concept of organi- 
zation for the understanding of the living organisms as an 
integrated, complex whole. (2) The idea gained momentum, and 
was used to replace earlier notions of "vital forces. " 
These, previously, had seemed essential in order to account 
for overall qualities in the behavior of organisms which 
were inexplicable by the simple study of their isolated 
parts. 
The emphasis on the significance of the "systemic- 
wholistic" approach and the recognition of the underlying 
importance of the concept of organization became central to 
both general system theory and cybernetics. Bertala. nffy, 
for instance, "advocated an organic conception in biology 
which emphasizes consideration of the organism as a whole 
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system, and sees the main objective of biological sciences 
in the discovery of the principle of organization at its 
various levels. "(3) A similar emphasis on organization, 
and the general relation between the structure of systems 
and their behavior, later received a rigorous treatment by 
Wiener, (4) as cybernetics -integrated the concepts of or- 
ganization, information, communication and control into a 
coherent system of thought. 
Bertalanffy expressed the view that the concept 
of organization could provide a general unifying princi- 
ple. (5) Organization appeared to be the crux of various 
supposedly unrelated phenomena and seemed to bridge dif- 
ferent levels of reality. Tn this particular sense, the 
idea obtained a special significance =for general system 
theory in its broad search for unifying principles which 
could relate different systems. This search for unifying 
systems principles became the major preoccupation of the 
theory, and Bertalanffy set the goals o. f the =new discipline 
on the "formulation and derivation of -those prri.. nciples 
which are valid for systems : in genes=al.. " (6) 
The basic idea was 'not of =stress, ing. simple 
analogies or claiming superficially the fundamental "same- 
ness" of diverse phenomena. Rather, it was-predicated on 
the proposition that there are structural similarities and 
underlying isomorphisms in different aspects of reality, 
which are reflected in different fields of study, and which, 
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applied on an appropriate level of abstraction, could enrich 
the available repertoire of scientific models. Such models 
could be used, in -turn, across the conventional boundaries 
of established scientific disciplines and help gain a better 
understanding of the general principles which underlie var- 
ious observable phenomena. The general approach, it was 
pointed out, could thus provide a possible base, general 
enough for the unification of science, (7) 
While the concept of organization provides a key 
to the understanding of complexity, the crux of organization 
is the mechanism which maintains it invariant. And as gen- 
eral system theory was developing in the direction of explor- 
ing for general systems' laws, cybernetics, more specifically, 
was concentrating on the identification and study of those 
particular mechanisms which maintain dynamic organizations 
stable. 
Cybernetics focused its attention on the organiza- 
tion of a variety of complex systems, manmade and organic 
in an attempt to gain an 1-n-sig-ht into the connection between 
their structure and per=formance. it emphasized the view 
that "the structure of -the machine or -the organism is an 
index of the performance that may be expected from it r" (8 ) 
and went on to reveal the dynamics and the specific nature 
of the relation between the structure of such systems and 
their behavior. 
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It had succeeded in doing so by utilizing new con- 
cepts of information and communication and associating these 
with factors that control behavior. Ultimately, it led to 
the integration of the notion of information and the idea of 
purpose through the identification and study of feed-back 
mechanisms. Cybernetics showed that "mechanisms of feed- 
back nature are the base of teleological or purposeful be- 
havior in man-made machines as well as in living organisms 
and in social systems. °'(9) It thus opened the way for the 
unambiguous discussion of purposeful systems in functional- 
organizational terms which related the behavior of "teleo- 
logical" mechanisms, the logic and form of their goal 
structure and their environment. 
Such terms were universal enough to transcend the 
unique fabric of a specific system under view. Thus, 
cybernetics provided a particularly powerful paradigm for 
the early claims of general system theory, (10) but it went 
on to develop as a new scientific discipline on its own 
right. 
B--2 The Emergence of Cybernetics 
The emergence of cybernetics and its consolida- 
tion into a coherent discipline followed the gain of new 
insights into the general applicability of principles 
fundamental to problems of regulation. In this respect, 
the working of control mechanisms already known to servo- 
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engineers, as well as mathematically well-defined concepts 
developed by information theory and used in the context of 
communication technology, were found relevant to a broad 
range of phenomena extending beyond the specialized fields 
within which they were originally conceived. In this con- 
text, "The lead was taken by Norbert Wiener who, with 
Rosenblueth, called attention to the great generality of 
the concept of feedback ... and emphasized that this 
concept provided a useful relationship between biological 
and the physical sciences. "(11) 
A typical example for this generality relates to 
problems encountered with stabilizing servo-mechanisms, in 
which violent oscillations can be induced under certain con- 
ditions of delay in the error-correcting feedback loops. 
Such unstable conditions were shown by Wiener and his col- 
leagues to be similar to a neural pathology known as 
"purpose tremor, " which is associated with injuries to the 
cerebellum and in which muscular control is effected. In a 
typical case of this sort, "a patient, in trying to perform 
some voluntary act, like picking up a pencil, overshoots 
the mark and goes into an uncontrollable oscillation. "(l2) 
It was the disclosure of such analogies and their 
persistent appearance in systems of different kinds, that 
brought to light the existence of fundamental organiza- 
tional similarities in the structure of control mechanisms. 
When this realization was combined with a new theoretical 
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apparatus, by which concepts of entropy, order, information 
organization and control were related, it became possible 
to approach problems of regulation in a general way. 
Thus, a chain, or rather, a network of related 
ideas was developing, which provided important links between 
the discussion of man-made control systems such as Watt's 
governor, the thermostat, and the new generation of complex 
self-regulating machines on the one hand, and the study of 
the brain, the working of the nervous system, and various 
problems related to physiology and biology on the other. 
Wiener has expressed this point very clearly when he wrote: 
"It is my thesis that the physical functioning of the living 
individual and the operation of some of the newer communica- 
tion machines are precisely parallel in their analogous 
attempt to control entropy through feedback. "(13) 
The link, to emphasize again, which provided the 
common ground in the discussion of such different systems-- 
mechanical, biological or electronic, was in "the idea of 
communication of information and the setting up of self- 
stabilizing control action. "(14) It is this very same 
idea which established the conceptual foundation underlying 
the emergence of cybernetics. It emphasizes two central 
issues: namely, that there exists an organizational iso- 
morphism on the level of mechanisms of regulation, and that 
with regard to such mechanisms, and consequently the dy- 
namics of systems in general, informational content and the 
structure of information flow play an essential role. 
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B-3 Cybernetics -- Sources and General Background 
The historical background against which the early 
ideas of cybernetics have been developed, though relatively 
recent, is well documented(15) and only a brief description 
will be given below. In retrospect, the birth of the new 
discipline preceded a period of intense activity in science 
and technology. Theoretical breakthrough, particularly in 
the physical sciences, as well as revolutionary innovations 
in applied technology were strongly effecting the character 
of the first decades of the 20th century. The accelerating 
rate of their proliferation was significant enough to be 
referred to by many contemporary writers as explosive. (16) 
It produced, not unlike other typical periods in the history 
of science, the kind of environment in which the formation 
of new theories and the integration of new concepts seem to 
thrive. (17) The need for such a conceptual integration, 
with specific regard to problems associated with communica- 
tion and regulation, was fulfilled by the advent of cyber- 
netics. 
This conceptual integration was brought about by 
separate efforts, in a variety of fields, at first isolated, 
but which were ultimately joined by a common language. In 
the center of activities was work done in an answer to the 
growing complexity of technology and the associated need to 
replace human operators with more effective automatic con- 
trol mechanisms. This need became pressing 
during World 
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War II, when the speed of the newly introduced jetplanes 
was approaching the speed of anti-aircraft missiles signif- 
icantly enough to "render obsolete all classical methods of 
the direction of fire. "(18) New means had to be developed 
for scanning, range and location finding, and fire control, 
with anticipatory as well as error-correcting capabilities. 
Wiener. and Bigelow collaborated on solving these problems, 
which involved the investigation of the theory of predic- 
tion and the construction of apparatus to embody these 
theories. " (L9) 
Circumstances required sensitive controls, quick 
to react, yet stable, which could anticipate the most 
likely future position of moving targets and which could 
effectively correct deviations in following the complicated 
patterns of flight. It is in this context that the im- 
portance of feedback to guidance became apparent. It was 
also in this connection that the role of information in 
controlling behavior was brought to light and it became 
clear that "the problems of control engineering and of com- 
munication engineering were inseparable. "(20) Both cen- 
tered essentially around the notion of information by 
whichever means it was transmitted and in whatever medium 
it was conveyed. 
In specific regard to human performance, similar 
notions were anticipated by Kenneth Craik(21) who emphasized 
the regulatory characteristics of mechanisms involved with 
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skill acquisition and memory. His work, incidentally, in- 
spired. a group of British scientists, some of whom, notably 
Ross Ashby, Grey Walter and Albert Uttley, subsequently 
made important contributions to cybernetics in their own 
right. But returning to the control engineering problems 
discussed above, the then newly developed information 
theory, with its roots in notions central to Gibbs statis- 
tical mechanics, became critical to the design problem on 
which Wiener and Bigelow were working. The final result 
took the form of a new kind of machine which integrated 
scanning capabilities with computing functions and 
sophisticated error-correcting control techniques. 
This work signaled a new development in science 
with a shift of emphasis from power to communication engi- 
neering. Problems associated with transmission and accurate 
reproduction of information rather than those related to 
energy conversion became central, finding their technological 
realization in the development of computing machines and 
systems of servo-control. Reviewing this development in its 
historical context, Wiener has expressed its significance as 
follows: "If the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries 
are the age of the clocks and the later eighteenth and nine- 
teenth centuries constitute the age of steam engines, the 
present time is the age of communications and control. "(22) 
Unlike earlier machines, such as the simple clocks 
or the typical heat engines, the new automata embodied in 
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adaptive--servo-systems were coupled to their environment by 
complex circuits of performance of actions and information 
exchange. In their internal organizations and their mode 
of interaction with the external world, they showed features 
previously assumed to exclusively characterize life. They 
became "elaborate enough to exhibit the troublesome kinds of 
purposiveness already familiar in biology, "(23) and even the 
functioning of their basic components resembled those of 
living organisms, in that "they contained sense organs, ef- 
fectors, and the equivalent of a nervous system to integrate 
the transfer of information from one to the other_. '' (24) 
By the early 40's the connections between the be- 
havior of these man-made control systems and problems en- 
countered in'physiology and neurology were becoming clear, 
and the theoretic framework for their discussion was being 
established. It received a clear expression in 1943 when 
Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bigelow published their classical 
paper "Behavior Purpose and Teleology. " In it they dis- 
cussed the nature of purposive behavior, tied its essence 
to organizational principles and to the inner informational 
structure of systems, removed all notions of vitalism and 
stated that from a scientific standpoint the "behavioristic 
analysis of machines and living organisms is largely uni- 
form. "(25) 
These notions became major topics in a wide rang- 
ing discussion, centered around Wiener and his colleagues, 
f 
-266- 
in which scientists from various fields became involved, 
There were control engineers and mathematicians, physiolo- 
gists, neurophysiologists, information theorists, logicians 
and early computer scientists. (26) It was soon apparent 
"that there was a substantial common basis of ideas between 
the workers in the different fields, [and] that people in 
each group could already use notions which had been better 
developed by the others. "(27) By 1946, the group expanded 
to include psychologists, sociologists and anthropologists, 
as all these various sources were combining to produce what 
amounted to a new vocabulary and a new system of thought. 
It was to the credit of Wiener and his close colleagues 
that they articulated the significance of the newly emerg- 
ing viewpoint and realized that notions of control and com- 
munication were at its core. In 1948 Wiener' s Cybernetics 
was published. The book, which " gave a name to an ongoing 
way of thinking, and added mathematical stamina to a body 
of embryonic concepts, " (28) had a powerful impact. The 
foundations for a new science had been laid. 
B-4 Definition of Cybernetics 
Chosen as a name for the new discipline, the term 
cybernetics denotes in itself the central role of feedback 
mechanisms in control. It is derived from the Greek 
kybernetes, meaning steerman, to which the English governor 
relates through the Latin gubernator. (29) As Wiener 
-267- 
pointed out, the word governor had already been applied to 
a typical feedback mechanism in the case of Watt's steam 
governor, and in this specific sense it was also used by 
Clark Maxwell in his mathematical analysis of feedback con- 
trol which was published in 1868. (30) Hence: "the basic 
concept which both Maxwell and the investigators of cyber- 
netics mean to describe by the choice of this term is that 
of a feedback mechanism, which is especially well represented 
by the steering engine of a ship. "(31) 
In his original text, Wiener defined cybernetics 
as "the science of control and communication in the animal 
and the machine. " In another source, he described the field 
and its goals as follows: "Cybernetics attempts to find the 
common element in the functioning of automatic machines and 
of the human nervous system, and to develop a theory which 
will cover the entire field of control and communication in 
machines and in living organisms. "(32) 
While the name, as we have seen, implies the role 
of feedback mechanisms in the regulation of systems, the 
definition emphasizes two key notions. Firstly, it classi- 
fies control and communication together, indicating the 
central function of information in processes of control. 
From this point of view, control is achieved through infor- 
mation exchange in the sense, for example, that "the commands 
through which we exercise our control over our environment 
are the kind of information which we impart to it. "(33) In 
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other words, systems affect and modify, hence exercise con- 
trol on one another, through the process of informational 
interaction. 
Secondly, the definition emphasizes the univer- 
sality of laws of regulation and the fact that, in its 
essence, the functioning of regulating mechanisms is quite 
independent of the special-case system which is being con- 
trolled. Such a system can be embodied in the flesh or in 
metal. Thus, from the point of view of regulation, the 
classical duality of the organic and the inorganic van- 
ishes, and "as subjects of scientific inquiry, humans do 
not differ from machines. '' (34) 
It is perhaps a healthy attribute of a develop- 
ing science, that since Wiener's original definition was 
proposed, quite a few other alternatives have been dis- 
cussed. These vary in their inherent degree of generality 
and comprehensiveness as well as in giving emphasis to 
different aspects of the discipline. 
Klir and Valach, for example, have criticized 
Wiener's definition as being unnecessarily restricting, (35) 
and have reviewed a broad spectrum of other proposals in- 
cluding one of their own. These range from the very spe- 
cific: 
"Cybernetics is the science of the 
quantitative and structural laws 
governing control systems"(36) 
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to such definitions as: 
"Cybernetics is the science of control in 
machines, living organisms and societies and 
of transmission of signals within them. "(37) 
and 
"Cybernetics deals with the study of systems 
of arbitrary character, capable of receiving, 
storing and processing information and utilize 
ing it for purposes of control and regula- 
tion. " (38) 
or their own definition: 
"Cybernetics is a science dealing, on the 
one hand, with the study of relatively 
closed systems from the viewpoint of their 
interchange of information with their en- 
vironment, on the other hand with the study 
of the structures of these systems from the 
viewpoint of the information interchange 
between their elements. "(39) 
And finally to the most general views which regard cyber- 
netics as: 
"The science of the optimization of 
activity. " (4 0) 
or similarly: 
"The art of ensuring the effectiveness 
of action. " (4l) 
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On a closer examination, however, none of these 
definitions seem to go significantly beyond Wiener's orig- 
inal. Especially if one is willing to view the words 
"control and communication" in the broad sense of regula- 
tion, and the expression "animal and the machine" to sig- 
nify the universal applicability of the concept to general 
systems (in the sense of Bertalanffy). In such a case, 
Wiener's definition would read in effect: "The science of 
regulation in general systems, " or better still, "the 
science of effective regulation in general systems. " 
In connection with the problem of definition, Beer 
has pointed out the important relation between control and 
organization, in stressing that organization: ''is the 
medium through which control is exercised. "(42) According- 
ly, he joins some Russian workers in proposing to define 
cybernetics as "the science of effective organization. "(43) 
This definition does not violate Wiener's original dictum. 
It has the advantage of being short and comprehensive, and 
may thus be preferred. 
B-5 Scope and Multidisciplinary Characteristics 
While its fundamental premises are specific and 
well defined, the scope of cybernetic inquiry is vast. It 
is characterized by an approach which articulates the gen- 
eral laws of regulation and goes on to apply them in the 
context of various specific assemblies. Thus, its investi- 
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gations into phenomena of considerable diversity gives it a 
strong multidisciplinary flavor. 
The problems it examines are concerned, on one 
way or another, with organization. "Organization in its 
widest sense, its evolution within the system, transfer 
between elements of the system and between the system and 
its envi_ronment»"(44) Insofar as it relates the dynamics 
of organization to informational processes, cybernetics is 
quite oblivious to considerations of energy metabolism and 
energy exchange as these may occur within or between sys- 
tems. It takes such energetic processes for granted and 
focusses its attention on the informational dynamics of 
systems. In this respect, its approach differs fundament- 
ally from the approach taken by the natural sciences, where 
energetic considerations are vital. (45) Thus, cybernetics 
studies ways of behavior and their relation to manifesta- 
tions of control in the specific-domain of "systems that 
are open to energy but closed to information and control-- 
systems that are information-tight. "(46) 
Within this domain, a typical object of cybernetic 
study is a system--"either constructed, or so abstracted 
from a physical assembly, that it exhibits interaction 
between the parts whereby one controls another. "(47) In 
other words, the overall behavior of such a system is inter- 
preted in relation to controlling factors. Its interaction 
with the world and the dynamic relations between its internal 
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elements are always described in terms of informational 
processes. The information content and its flow--the trans- 
fer of signals between elements--determines the outcome of 
regulation and in general the total complex of signal path's, 
the elements they connect and their respective transforma- 
tion functions, constitute the essence of a cybernetic 
model. 
The power of the cybernetic approach is precisely 
in the general validity of its models to the discussion of 
organization and processes of control. In this respect it 
"offers a single vocabulary and a single set of concepts 
suitable for representing the most diverse type of sys- 
tems. "(48) For example, if one imagines a system A de-- 
scribed by a language a and another system B described by a 
language b, the essence of the cybernetic approach is in 
abstracting the principles of regulation and describing 
these in a language c which is then valid for both systems 
A and B while remaining independent of the details of their 
particular characteristics. 
The notion of abstracting principles of regula- 
tion to a level of comprehensive validity was carried even 
further by Ashby who had contributed significantly to ex- 
tending the conceptual vocabulary of cybernetics by insist- 
ing on generalizing its methods to all possible behaviors 
in controllable systems. Ashby took the view that "cyber- 
netics stands to the real machine--electronic, mechanical, 
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neural, or economic--much as geometry stands to a real ob- 
ject in our terrestrial space. "(49) In other words, it 
should provide a general framework "on which all individ- 
ual machines may be ordered, related and understood. "(50) 
Accordingly, cybernetics should develop by considering "the 
set of all conceivable systems"(51) to which observable 
phenomena could then be related. This method, Ashby had 
emphasized, of working from the abstract and general and 
only then relating its findings to the particular and em- 
pirical--"may help to provide us with what is urgently 
needed in our studies of such complex systems as the brain 
and society. Namely, a logic of mechanism. " (52 ) 
Complexity is the most outstanding characteristic 
of systems investigated by cybernetics. It is manifest in 
the fact that such systems are dynamic, usually large and 
highly interconnected. As a rule, they defy decomposability 
into simple isolated elements and are in fact never com- 
pletely accessible. Observation of their details is in- 
herently incomplete. Developing methods suitable for the 
study of systems which are intrinsically complex has thus 
become a central feature of cybernetics and typically "the 
processes that it studies are to be found among brains, 
colonies of animals, and economic, social and managerial 
systems too. " (5 3) 
Cybernetics regards each such system essentially 
as an organization and is chiefly concerned with the means 
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by which it maintains its integrity, stability and viability. 
In each case such a system is treated as an organic whole, 
and from the point of view of "effective" survival, its 
viable behavior is described by the general laws of organiza- 
tion and control. These "constitute the 'management princi- 
ple' by which systems grow and are stable, learn and adjust, 
adapt and evolve. "(54) With regard to such terms, and spe- 
cifically from the viewpoint of how they regulate themselves, 
how they "self-organize, " all such systems exhibit typical 
"brain-like" features and on this level of abstraction cyber- 
netics yields its uniquely powerful insights. 
Taking a broad overview, and the risk of oversim- 
plification, it seems possible to identify three major levels 
in relation to which the development of cybernetics has been 
taking place. These overlap to a great extent but are suf- 
ficiently different to merit distinction. 
Firstly, there is the level on which the general 
theory of cybernetics has been developing. By general 
theory is meant the logic of mechanisms in the sense of Ash- 
by. The theory articulates the laws of regulation and 
identifies the embodiment of such laws in control mechanisms 
upon which the stability of complex organizations depends 
and by which behavioral patterns conducive to survival are 
mediated. 
In addition to Wiener's early contribution and to 
Shannon's Theory of Communication, (55) most of Ashby's work 
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on brain-like mechanisms and adaptive behavior (56) belongs 
to this level. So does McCulloch's work on the logic of 
neural networks(57) as well as von Foerster (5 8) and Pask 's 
(59) theory of self-organizing systems. The lists by no 
means exclusive and is only meant for stressing the under- 
lying common feature of starting from first principles in 
the search for rigorous and. general concepts. 
The second level of cybernetics research encom- 
passes work in which aspects of the general theory are 
brought to bear on experimental situations. The theory of 
control and the theory of automata, for instance, provide 
the foundation for experimentation and study of various 
machines, embodied in actual hardware or simulated. The 
basic notion is that of the constructability, in principle, 
of mechanisms which display animal-like behavior. Accord- 
ingly, the general interest is in "drawing parallels between 
organisms and machines and in methods of designing machines 
which have some of the attributes of organisms. "(60) 
Existing machines of this kind range from those 
which display a simple demonstration of purposive behavior 
to machines which attempt to capture the essence of nervous 
activities and others which deal with various manifestations 
of cognition and learning. 
Thus, for example, there is Grey Walter's "tor- 
tose, "(61) a goal seeking device designed to steer towards 
a source of light and capable of going around obstacles 
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placed in its way. There is Ashby 's homeostat(62) featur- 
ing brain-like "ultrastability. " In relation to neuro- 
physiologicalL organization, there is a whole class of finite 
automata which owe their origin to McCulloch and Pitts. 
. They are associated, for instance, with the work of George(63) 
and Uttley(64) and include logical nets as well as condi- 
tional probability machines exhibiting various) aspects of 
pattern recognition and learning. There are various models 
of thinking processes and artificial intelligence, associated 
with Amosov(65), Newell, Shaw and Simon(66) as well as 
Minsky. (67) And there are adaptive teaching machines, of 
particular significance Pask's "Eucrates, "(68) which demon- 
strate the interaction between a "teaching" and a "learning" 
system. Once again the list is by no means exclusive but 
points to the common effort attempting to embody in man-made 
machines manifestations of the higher behavior of animals. 
The third and rather broad area includes cases in 
which aspects of cybernetic theory are applied in the con- 
text of other fields. On the one hand there are comprehen- 
sive cybernetic theories, especially devised by cyber- 
neticians, to yield a new approach in an otherwise estab- 
lished area. Beer's utilization of cybernetic theory of 
control in the context of management in industry, business 
and government, (69) as well as Pask's theory of learning(70) 
and its embodiment in an adaptive learning--teaching environ- 
ment, are typical examples. 
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Similarly, but perhaps on a somewhat more limited 
scale, there are numerous cases in which various cybernetic 
notions are incorporated into research done in other fields. 
Thus, there are economists like Oscar Lang, (71) social an- 
thropologists like Bateson(72) and Rappaport, (73) cognitive 
psychologists like Miller, Galanter and Pribram; (74) there 
are biologists, linguists, embryologists and many others who 
find the interplay with cybernetics useful. 
It is especially with respect to this bulk of work 
that the multidisciplinary character of cybernetics is 
clearly visible. It is manifest in the recent emergence of 
new titles which emphasize the overlap of cybernetics with 
other sciences. These include: biocybernetics, neurocyber- 
netics, psychocybernetics, sociocybernetics, medical cyber- 
netics, engineering cybernetics and so forth. While such 
distinctions may be useful in describing special branches, 
they should not, as Beer has warned, be taken as "undermin- 
ing the transdisciplinary unity of cybernetics itself. "(75) 
B-6 The Cybernetics of Social Systems -- Early 
Constraints and Current Approach 
The concept of information, which has been central 
to the development of cybernetics, appeared to be both at- 
tractive in the intuitive realization of its wide applicabil- 
ity and limiting, in that its basic notions were developed 
within the context of a specialized technical field. 
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As Collin Cherry pointed out, "The concept of com-- 
munication certainly arises in a number of disciplines; in 
sociology, linguistics, psychology, economics; in physiology 
of the nervous system, in the theory of signs, in communica- 
tion engineering. "(76) Commenting specifically on the 
mathematical theory of communication he added, however, that 
"attempts to extend it outside the technical field in which 
it first arose will be fraught with pitfalls. " (77) Wiener, 
too, while acknowledging that "it is certainly true that the 
social system is an organization like the individual, that 
it is bound together by a system of communication, and that 
it has a dynamic in which circular processes of feedback 
nature play an important part, "(78) warned against similar 
difficulties. 
It seems accurate to say, therefore, that in early 
years cybernetics developed rather specialized concepts 
which were immediately useful in dealing with various phe- 
nomena observed in physiology and neurology and those which 
emerged in the context of the new man-made automatic machine 
complexes. There was a wide-spread feeling that insights 
provided by cybernetics could be helpful beyond the bound- 
aries of the fields mentioned above, particularly that it 
could provide new tools for the social. sciences. But in the 
40's this was regarded only as a hope, and Rosenbleuth, com- 
menting on Wiener's Cybernetics, was rather cautious too, 
when he wrote that it "suggests a program of 
inquiry that 
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could extend the use of concepts and techniques of proven 
value in the physical sciences and technologies to the life 
sciences and eventually to the study of society. "(79) 
The difficulty had to do with the situation that 
the very essence of information theory and the rigour by 
which it was expressed were not quite suitable for a compre- 
hensive treatment of the social reality. Information theory 
is basically statistical in character in that the transmis- 
sion of information is expressed in terms of the probabili- 
ties of transmitted alternatives. Communication engineering, 
Wiener has emphasized, deals typically with a machine which 
has a multiple and varied input. "To function adequately, 
it must give a satisfactory performance for the class of 
inputs which it is statistically expected to receive. "(80) 
While there certainly are many specific issues related to 
social systems which can be dealt with by statistical notions, 
the broader and more significant events of the social phe- 
nomena cannot be expected to yield sufficiently long statis- 
tical runs simply because the conditions underlying social 
systems continuously change. "Thus, the human sciences are 
very poor test ing--ground for a new mathematical technique 
as poor as the statistical mechanics of a gas would be to a 
being of the order of size of a molecule. "(81) 
In addition there is the significant fact that 
the mathematical theory of communication was especially 
tailored to practical engineering problems. It gave a 
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precise definition to the concept of amount of information 
and developed analytical tools for specifying the relation- 
ships between transmitters, receivers and transmission 
channels and for commenting on their effective organization 
with regard to performance. Thus the concept of informa- 
tion "has a slightly limited usage which is characteristic 
of any term that has been given a precise meaning. "(82) 
The effectiveness of the theory and its rigour were achieved 
by concentrating on a quantitative analysis of information 
processes which excludes problems associated with the mean- 
ing of messages and how they are interpreted. This in 
itself would have made the discussion of social systems by 
strict information theoretic terms, at best trivial. 
Subsequent developments, however, have extended 
the conceptual repertoire of cybernetics beyond the applica- 
tion of such restricting specialized techniques. Indeed, 
some of the methods referred to earlier made it possible and 
legitimate to include in the cybernetic discussion questions 
of meaning and cognition which are crucial to approaching 
systemic processes typical to social interactions. In this 
respect, von Foerster has recently introduced an important 
distinction between ''first'and "second order" cybernetics. (83) 
The distinction refers to the cybernetics of "observed" and 
'observing'' systems respectively, and stresses what amounts 
to a significant qualitative difference between the two. 
Thus, von Foerster has observed, "while cybernetics began by 
-281-- 
developing the epistemology for comprehending and simulating 
first order regulatory processes in the animal and the 
machine, cybernetics today provides a conceptual framework 
with sufficient richness to attack successfully second order 
processes (e. g., cognition, dialogue, socio-cultural inter- 
action, etc. ) ." (84) 
Typical to the general cybernetic method outlined 
earlier, the current approach to the cybernetics of society, 
and social-like processes in the broadest sense, starts by 
viewing information as constituting the principle upon which 
maintaining the integrity of systems depends. The basic no- 
tion is that "any organism is held together ... by the 
possession of means for the acquisition, use, retention and 
transmission of information. "(85) Information channels 
constitute the structure by which an organization is recog- 
nizable as an entity, and the flow of information provides 
the means by which the system is, controlling itself. 
Furthermore, it is such an information structure which 
actually defines the boundary of a typical social system in 
that "properly speaking, the community extends only so far as 
there extends an effectual transmission of information. "(86) 
The key to the effective extension of cybernetic 
methodology, however, is in the development of what Pask has 
called "the organizational model. "(87) The main point is in 
regarding social-like systems as language-oriented in the 
sense that the organizational model is: "chiefly concerned 
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with the meaning of statements to the participants and in 
particular, with the interpretation placed upon statements 
and how this interpretation occurs. " (8 8) By participants 
is meant individual systems in interaction or the inter- 
acting sub-systems in a complex conceived as a whole. 
These are regarded as goal-directed basic "building blocks" 
and the interest is chiefly with the content of information 
exchange between them and with the rules mediating their 
interaction. 
The approach regards the systems that are selected 
for study essentially as constituting a media in which com- 
putations occur. At the same time, it emphasizes a distinc- 
tion between the information processes themselves and the 
media from which they are abstracted. The concern is, thus, 
with procedures, or programs in the sense of Pask, i. e., 
formulas for achieving goals, and the critical questions 
relate to their monitoring, execution, reporduction and 
evolution as well as to how they are coupled in "conversa- 
tions. " 
Typically, a view is taken of social systems "as 
a system for processing information. "(89) This is meant 
in a non-trivial sense which emphasizes the idea that 
"biological computing mechanisms, ... rely upon programs 
for their survival; they rely, at the individual level, 
upon programs satisfying vital needs--the basic goals of 
L 
the organism. They rely, at the social level, upon pro- 
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grams for regulating population density and for achieving 
societal goals. " (90) In this an analocry is made with the 
working of computing machines and brains in general. Taken 
on the properly intended level of abstraction, such an 
analogy yields a useful model and provides the link needed 
"in order to pass from control techniques to the social 
issues dealt with in "The Human Use of Human Beings". "(91) 
B-7 Summary 
In summary, the general impact of cybernetics can 
be seen in related to the following points: 
-- It replaced simple reductionism by an organizational 
approach to whole systems, the concept of organization 
being the key to the understanding of complexity. 
-- By emphasizing the concept of organization it called 
attention to the relation between the structure of 
systems and their behavior. 
-- The structure of a system was related to informational 
processes and their specific form within the system. 
-- This form, especially as manifest in feedback mechan- 
isms, was identified with the notion of stability and 
purpose. The connection between goal-directedness and 
feedback mechanisms thus made it possible to remove 
earlier notions of vitalism. 
-- Feedback mechanisms were associated with 
the structure 
of information flow. Thus, the place of information 
-284- 
in setting up self-stabilizing control actions by which 
systemic processes are mediated was brought to light. 
-- The concepts of organization, control and communica- 
tion were centered around the concept of information. 
They were developed to cover evolutionary and growth 
processes as well. 
-- In this regard the universality of mechanisms of 
regulation was emphasized abolishing the duality of 
the organic and inorganic in relation to processes of 
control. The principle of organization was shown to 
transcend the specific fabric of a system under con- 
trol. 
-- The discovery of the central role of information, its 
content and flow, to the behavioral dynamics of sys- 
tems and particularly to the notion of regulation has 
stressed the cybernetic viewpoint of studying systems 
which are open to energy and closed to information. 
Information has obtained a similar importance for 
cybernetics as energy has in the realm of the physical 
sciences. 
-- As a result oft' extending earlier cybernetic concepts 
to deal with problems of cognition, socio-cultural 
interaction and so forth, cybernetics achieved a 
status of a general science of effective organization. 
Its broad applicability is manifest by the fruitful 
interplay with many other disciplines. 
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To conclude, it seems appropriate to quote Ashby, 
once more, who emphasized that cybernetics "offers the hope 
for providing the essential methods by which to attack the 
ills--psychological, social, economic--which at present are 
defeating us by their intrinsic complexity. "(92) In this 
may still lie its most important contribution. 
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APPENDIX C 
SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATION 
C-1 The Systems Concept in Science 
The term "system" is being used at present so 
widely and freely that it may be useful to briefly examine 
its content and define its meaning for the purpose of 
clarity. 
On a superficial level, the term is used to denote 
any complex--meaning an assembly containing more than two 
distinguishable interdependent parts--the totality of which 
is identified by virtue of some "logical" consistency. In 
this sense, we speak about a system of law, a production sys- 
tem, a specific engineering system, an educational or health. 
delivery system, a communication system, a political system, 
a system of concepts, a mechanical system, a biological sys- 
tem, and so forth. 
The loose daily usage does not place rigorous con- 
straints on the term which serves, in -act, as a symbolic 
shorthand for emphasizing the notion of a totality. The 
later is grasped intuitively and is not defined with any 
precision. The concept has a deeper significance, however, 
which is rooted in fundamental issues concerning man's view 
of the world and bears upon the very essence of the scien- 
tific method. 
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In the broadest sense, science, as many writers 
have emphasized, has always dealt with "systems. " It is 
only recently, however, that the term has obtained a meaning 
new to the mainstream of the western scientific tradition, 
and that it became possible to speak about "the emergence 
of the 'system' as a key concept in scientific research. "(1) 
The main issue was referred to earlier, in the introductory 
discussion of general system theory and cybernetics. It re- 
lates to the dichotomy between reductionism and the need 
for a wholistic perception of complex phenomena which defy 
treatment by simple decomposition. It is manifest in the 
relatively recent orientation in science which has been 
variously called the "systems view, " "systems thinking, " or 
the "systems approach. "(2) 
As Bertalanffy, who pioneered the approach, has 
emphasized, "the system problem is essentially the problem 
of the limitation of analytical procedures in science. `=(3) 
Until very recently, the development of western scientific 
thought was predicated upon the analytical method which 
since the time of the early Greek philosophers was predom- 
inantly atomistic in character. The world was seen essen- 
tially as a complex, resolvable into its partial and simpler 
components. Various entities were investigaged by breaking 
them down into "handleable" parts with the basic assumption 
that the understanding of these parts could he then linked 
by simple causal connections to explain the behavior of the 
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whole. The method was successful enough to provide the 
foundation for the tremendous development of classical 
science since Galileo. In fact, sc dramatic was this suc- 
cess that its dependence, in the first place, on dealing 
only with simple aspects of reality could be easily over- 
looked, and science presented a model which, culminating in 
Newtonian mechanics, "looked upon the physical universe as 
an exquisitely designed giant mechanism, obeying elegant 
deterministic laws of motion. "(4) 
The successful application of the analytical pro- 
cedure, Bertalanffy has pointed out, depends on two basic 
conditions; firstly, parts must be independent to a degree 
that they can be analyzed separately without having the 
effect of trivializing the entity which is being investi- 
gated. In other words, "interaction between 'parts' [should] 
be non-existent or weak enough to be neglected. "(5) Sec- 
ondly, it must be possible to simply add up description of 
partial processes in order to construct a picture of the 
whole. In a mathematical sense this condition demands that 
"the relations describing the behavior of parts be linear. "(6) 
That these conditions are not fulfilled by complex 
assemblies which are richly connected, that the world is 
made up, to a great extent, precisely of such complexity and 
that it is not an additive construct of simple entities has 
been a major revelation to contemporary science. It lead 
ultimately to the "synthetic" model of thought associated 
-301- 
with the notion of systems. The essential novelty of the 
approach was emphasized by Beer when he wrote: "As far as 
I can tell, the Greeks, even that greatest of Greeks, 
Aristotle, had not the faintest glimmer of understanding 
here, ... there is no recognition (that I can find) of 
the potency of system in western thought until we turn into 
the nineteenth century--when it came with Hegel. After that 
the notion all but vanished again. "(7) 
By the 20th century, however, the classical model 
was running into difficulties even in the realm of the 
physical sciences where it had been most successful. It 
proved particularly limiting in biology, for example, where, 
by the early 1940's, the traditional analytic procedures were 
being replaced by an organismic view stressing the notions 
of "whole" complexities, the interdependence of their parts 
and the underlying logic of their structures. These no- 
tions, together with the emphasis on the idea that the be- 
havior of integrated complex organizations is essentially 
synergetic, -namely that -it adds up to more than the sum of 
the parts and -that it is unpredictable by the behavior of 
any of these parts, (8) became the major features of the 
systems approach, which "has since played an increasingly 
larger role in organizing both our lay and scientific view 
of the world. " (9) 
The systemic notion of integrative qualities and 
especially of the importance of relational propositions 
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and the interdependence of elements imply, according to 
Ackoff, (10) three basic properties which are common to com- 
plex systemic organizations. One relates to the fact that 
in a system, each single element has an effect on the be- 
havior of the whole. The second points out that each ele- 
ment in a system is affected by at least one other element 
and that none have an independent effect on the whole. The 
third stresses the idea that, in a system, no subgrouping 
of elements is possible into totally independent subsystems. 
Together these three properties account for the essentially 
synergetic behavior of integrated complexity. 
The emergence of the system concept has thus sup- 
plemented the classical method with another approach to 
viewing the world. We are faced here with two basically 
different models. The one reductionist, emphasizing atom- 
istic aspects of phenomena and tending towards ever-greater 
specialization, the other wholistic, emphasizing related- 
ness and the integrative aspects of the world, and tending 
towards comprehensiveness. The significance of the differ- 
ence between the two cannot be over-emphasized. It is quite 
fundamental not only on the technical level of scientific 
methodology, but maybe more importantly, in the philosophical 
sense of providing a general guiding concept. It thus 
reaches to the very core of ethics and bears upon man's 
concept of his identity and the way he relates to the world. 
Though different, the two models are not mutually exclu- 
-303- 
sive. (11) Both are useful and can best be developed to com- 
plement one another. 
In this respect it is worth noting that while 
systemic notions of wholeness and the interdependence of 
natural phenomena may be relatively novel to the western 
scientific tradition, they have been central to various 
ancient eastern philosophies. While not using explicitly 
the same systemic terms, such notions have found clear ex- 
pression in various aspects of Hinduism, Buddhism and 
Taoism and they are especially well-articulated in the 
doctrines of Zen and Tao. The point was not lost on writers 
who, being aware of the limitations of classical science, 
called for a conceptual integration of east and west.. (12) 
The rise of the system sciences may well provide a basis for 
such an integration. 
C-2 Definition of System 
The intuitively obvious approach to defining a 
system stresses the property of a totality consisting of 
parts which are dependent on one another. Thus we have 
definitions of a system as "a complex of elements in mutual 
Ct4 conceptual or intera on, "(13) or similarly, "an en-IL-ityF 
physical, which consists of interdependent parts. "(14) If 
one wishes to stress the dynamic aspect of systems behavior, 
it is quite legitimate to substitute "events" for "elements" 
or "parts" and accordingly a system can be defined as "a set 
of mutua. -J-1y constrained events. "(15) Definitions such as 
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those cited above are generall accepted and their meaning, y A. 
at least intuitively, is quite clear. It is only when one 
proceeds with a search for a more rigorous def-Linition of the 
concept that some difficulties appear. The difficulty in 
providing a definition which is precise and general at the 
same time stems, on the one hand, from the fact that with 
regard to the concept of system, different conceptualiza- 
tions may appear convenient for different purposes. More 
significantly, however, it seems that the problem of defi- 
nition of a system is quite inseparable from problems asso- 
ciated with the nature of knowledge and thus it bears, in 
one way or another, upon problems of semionics, linguistics 
and the concept of cognL , -1: ition itself. Diff'erent de: L-: initions 
may thus be expected to reflect different attitudes to such 
problems which to some extent still carry the prints of the 
age-old dichotomy between mentalism and reality. (16) 
With this in mind, it'seems that definitions can 
be related to a few different categories stressing notions 
that are percepll--ibly distinct. The first category tends to 
stress the independent, "objective" existence of ca system 
in the real world. The second emphasizes the part played 
by cognition, namely by an observer, in defining the coher- 
ence we call a system. The third is a formal. and rigorous 
definition which stýresses the funct-J. -on of a system as a con- 
ceptual construct, regarded essentially as a model--an 
abstract representation of the real world. Finally, there 
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is the fourth attitude,, probably the r-nost comprehensive, 
which places the definition of that which constitutes the 
boundaries of "a system" on the process of interaction 
between an observer and a relevant part of the world. This 
view stresses the relatJL-vity inherent in such an interac- 
tion,, and the fact that under certain circumstances such an 
interaction may be significant enough to be regarded as an 
actual "conversation. " 
A selection of a few typical examples will serve 
to illustrate the distinctions. The first category is 
represented by a definition such as Forres-41-er's who defines 
a system as "a grouping of parts that operate together for 
a coirmion, purpose. "(17) The definition is pragmatic and 
rather limited. It implies that an observer is typically 
faced with coherent entities which are defined by the logic 
of their own purpose. It is this purpose which sets a given 
system apart from other systems in the real world. For a 
typical example, Forrester uses an automobile which is de. - 
fined by its function of "providing transportation. " As a 
concrete system in the real world it has a cohezence, seem- 
ingly "objective, " and independent from the viewpoint of a 
particular observer. (Unless, of course, he is the designer, 
for example. ) The approach stresses a view of a system as 
a functional entity identified by a purpose "in it" but it 
neglects to comment on the role of the observer in defining 
that purpose. 
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In contradistinction, the second category stresses 
the role of a mental act in defining the boundaries of a 
system. It implies that it is really the observer who de- 
cides what will be viewed as a system and that it Is he who 
provides the criteria for such a selection. This is a more 
general approach which in fact contains the first. A typi- 
cal example is furnished by Fuller's definition of a system 
as "the first subdivision of universe into a conceivable 
entity. "(18) It is an observer who is "subdividing" the 
universe, by isolating the entity he defines as a system 
from both the macroscopic and microscopic events which are 
irrelevant for the resolution level of the definition it- 
self. In other words, this act of "subdivision, " which can 
be quite arbitrary, separates the pattern conceived as "the 
system" from those processes which are external to it, 
namely its environment, and those which are internal to it 
and require a finer resolution. Such a subdivision, how- 
ever, is essentially an act of mental recognition and 
accordingly, as Beer points out: "A system is not something 
given in nature but something defined by intelligence. "(19) 
Whether a SN7Stem is something that exists as a i 
Lty in the real world, or whether its coherence coherent ent4 
depends on an observer's imposition of a conceptual frame- 
work which demarcates it from its otherwise fuzzy background, 
it is clear thatto a great extent,, reality is commonly dealt 
with through the use of models. These are conceptual con- 
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structs or abstract mental representations which depend on 
a mapping that establishes a correspondence between a spe- 
cific part of the world and its description. The next 
class of definitions is -)trongly related to this partic- 
ular notion and it implies a view of a system as such a 
model. 
Even if not apparent at first glance, Hall and 
Fagen's definition belongs here. It states that "a system 
is a set of objects together with relationships between 
the objects and between their attributes. "(20) Objects are 
defined as components, physical or conceptual, attributes 
are properties of such objects and relationships are "those 
which tie the system together. "(21) Other typical repre- 
sentatives are provided by similar but more rigorous defi- 
nitions which utilize set theoretic terms. Klir and Valach's 
is a good example. (22) Their definition of a sys-tem S, con- 
taining elements a,, a 2r an, the environment of wh. -ch 
is defined by ao, depends on the following argument: There 
is a set A= fal, a 21 anI and a set B= 
lao, a,,. 
anJ such that B includes the elements of A and their environ- 
ment ao. For every element in B there is a set of input and 
output quantities. The way by which J. -nput quantities of 
element aj depend on output quantities of element a1 is de- 
noted by ri j and the set of all rij (i ri= Or 1r...., n) 
is 
symbolized by R. Accordingly: "every set S= {A, R} con- 
stitutes a system. ''(23) 
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Finally the-re is the approach, dealt with here as 
a separate category not because of a fundamental difference 
but because of its particular usefulness. Set in informa- 
tion theoretic terms, which describe the relations between 
transmitters and receivers in general, it is especially 
well-equipped to deal with the relations between observers 
and systems, in this case regarded as "black boxes. " A 
typical illustration of this approach is offered by Pask 
who suggests that "the paradigm of a system in Ashby's con- 
cept of a black box. "(24) The implication is that a sYstem 
can be defined as "a source of information, " and while this 
is a broad definition indeed, which at first glance may seem 
much too general, it is in fact quite potent. 
The crucial point is that, while a black box may 
represent anything at all, its contents and boundaries are 
defined by an informational closure which depends on the ob- 
server's choice of a set of relevant attributes. These 
attributes are the few selected from the many that are 
possible and their choice may, of course, be quite arbitrary. 
This arbitrariness, however, can be removed by adoption of 
the usual scientific procedures of prediction and verifica- 
tion by experiment. 
The choice of attributes, which represents the 
choice of the relevant constraints by which the system is 
defined, determines the state description of the black box 
at any given time. Their value is typically conveyed by 
-309- 
measuring instrurvents, organ4A-c or especially manufactured 
for the purpose, the readings of which provide the evidence 
that constitutes the abstracted representation of chosen 
properties of the real world. They present -the values that 
variables of the system, or better, variables with which 
the system is identified, assume at a given time. Hencer 
inci entally, Ashby's definition of a systein as "a list of 
variables. "(25) 
By convention, as Pask points out, "the totality 
t4 Jables and their of the possible asser I_ons about the var- 
-relations to one another 
is called a universe of dis- 
cou-rse. "(26) And in this connection, a distinction is made 
between an observat-'Lonal language used to discuss events 
which occur within the universe of discourse and another, 
higher order language used to discuss the system as a whole 
and its relation to its environment. The general approach 
thus provides a consistent vocabulary which lielps remove 
many of the logical ambiguities that otherwise beset the 
definitions and the discussion of systems.. This is signif- 
icant, particularly in cases where there exists a danger of 
mixing different levels of description. 
Before leaving the -Lopic of systems definition, a 
few words may be approp-LiC-2. te with regard to the problem of 
the classification of systems. Various attempts at such a 
I- as Klir and Valach class-ýficati-ort have been made, (27) but 
ification of systems has been note, "no satisfactory classL 
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elaborated so far. "(28) The difficulty seems to relate to 
the fact that the relevant material is diverse and rather 
extensive and that different approaches are applicable, 
stressing different aims, different viewpoints and di. *I': -fer- 
ent operational criteria. 
From the viewpoint of cybernetics, the problem of 
classification is that of identifying the special class of 
systems which, of all systems, is relevant and significant 
for a cybernetic study. We have already discussed the sig- 
nificance of information processes and particularly the no- 
tion of informational closure to the cybernetic approach. 
With these characteristics in mind, Klir and Valach offer a 
specific definition off' a "cybernetic system. " It is ccnsiste-nt 
with their definition of a system in general and defines a 
cybernetic system by stressing its special characteristics 
as these relate to inforinational dynamics and information 
content. The definition reads as follows: 
"A set {A,, R) where R is the set of informational 
or signal relationships rij (i, j = 0,1, n) asserting 
themselves between the elements of a set A= fal, a2,.,.,, 
I anj on the one hand and between these elements and the 
element ao (the environment) on the other hand, in a cyber- 
netic system. " (29) 
A different approach is taken by Beer(30) who of- 
fers a classification that is particularly useful in helping 
put the objects of cybernetic inquiry in foc-us. Briefly, 
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this classification is developed by adopting two major cri- 
teria. The first, relating to the concept of complexity, is 
a three-fold scheme that describes sYstems as simple, com- 
plex, or exceedingly complex. The other is a two-fold 
scheme having to do with behavior which is defined as being 
either deterministic or probabilistic. The outcome of re- 
4 lating these two schemes produces six categories by wh. _ch 
various systems are identified. Of particular interest are 
the last two categories, namely, of systems which are "com- 
plex and probabilistic'' and those which are ''exceedingly 
complex and probabilistic. " Examples given are conditional 
ref-lexes and industrial profitability for the former and 
the economy or the brain for the latter. As Beer points 
out, "the first of these is, in round terms, the province 
of ope-rational research; the second is the province of cyber- 
netics. " (31) 
The interest then is in dynamic systems that 
register a complex behavior, and with control mechanisms 
which --regulate such 
behavior. From the cybernetician's 
point of view, more often than not, such systems will be 
of exceedingly high complexity, and this complexity will be 
manifest in a system's high internal variety as well as in 
the richness of its mode o. -L' interaction with the world. On 
both depends its viability, homeostatic or evolutionary, 
which is othe-, t--wise characterized by irreducibility and 
by 
various degrees of self-regulation and self-organization. 
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C-3 Observation, Behavior and Uncertainty 
At the previous section the st. -atement was made 
that the view of a system as a black box offers a particu- 
larly useful paradigm for discussing the problem of observ- 
ers and the systems with which they interact. Before we 
proceed to examine this paradigm in relation to the notions 
of observation, behavior and uncertainty, a brief review of 
the concept of the black box itself is appropriate. 
The concept has originated in the field of elec- 
trical engineering, but was shown by Ashby(32) to have a 
more general validity and a far wider range of application. 
In its original form associated with electrical systems, 
the concept was related -to the need of deducing the content 
of a complex p-Lece oj_ equipment by manipulating -the input 
terminals and observing the effect of such a manipulation 
on the outputs. A need of this kind would arise, for ex- 
ample, when a cause for-malfunctIoning had tobe located 
but for some reason the equipment itself was -to be 'left In- 
tact and could not be dismant'Led foýr In-vestigation. 
As Ashby has pointed out, this problem is quite 
general in that "in our daily lives we are confronted at 
every turn with systems whose in-ternal mechanisms are not 
fully open to inspection, and which must be treated by the 
methods appropriate to the black box. "(33) The concept 
thus offers a par-Iticularly useful strategy for approaching 
systems, the structure of which, as a rule, is not access- 
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ible to direct investigation, and where conclusions about 
the functioning of internal mechanisms can only be reached 
by observing externall manifestations of behavior. Typical 
systems of this kind are encountered in biology, physiology, 
and psychology and are also related to variou. c - economic and 
social problems. The range is broad, "perhaps as great as 
science itself. "(34) 
An observer who is face Id with a black box has the 
facility to manipulate the inputs to the box in various ways, 
and he can observe the related outputs. The observer and 
the box are coupled by information channels as shown in Fig- 
tire C-1, and the outcome of the interaction is summarized in 
a protocol which "can be regarded as a message that contains 
information about the box's nature. "(35) Facts about the 
principles underlying the behavior of the black box can then 
be deduced, by identifying regularities which may govern the 
observed activity and by giving these an appropriate inter- 
pretation. 
Figure C. I. An Observer and his Black Box 
Information 
Channels 
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The constraints placed upon the interaction of an 
observer and a black box are subject to laws of communication 
which specify the mode of interaction between any two systems 
where informational closure is assumed. This is the basic 
reason behind the general validity of the model and the par- 
ticular usefulness of the terms it employs. These terms will 
be examined below following, essentially, a discussion of- 
fered by Pask. (36) 
An observer interacts with a "black box" with a 
particular purpose in mind. Normally, his purpose would be 
to reduce his uncertainty about the system, possibly with the 
intent of eventually being able to make accurate predictions 
- its behavicr. Within the reference frame of our dis- aboul 
cussion, the concern is specifically with dynamic systems, 
namely, systems which display activity. The activity itself 
is a result of an available energy supply which the system 
consw-nes as it changes states. From the cybernetic vieW7 
point, however, energetic considerations are neglected and 
the interest is wholly with manifestations of behavior and 
with their description. As the system changes states, it 
produces a stream of information which is interpreted as 
4 
evidence about its behavior. This evidence s registered in 
the observer's kieasuring devices and is dependent upon the 
choice of attributes by which his system is identified. 
Such registered activity, i. e., the behavior itself, "de- 
lineates those events that actually do occur ... from 
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those that are log4czlly possil)le. "(37) 
Recalling the black box paradigm of Figure C-1, 
tho observer can be regardud as a typical receivei-. coupled 
L to a transi, iitter, or an ini-ormation source. The Seouence of 
messages recolved constitutes the bohDvioral cv-idence, whic 
in turi) is a consequence of changes registered in the oul-- 
puts of the black box. There are, however, b, -isic limdt, i- 
tions placeJ on the interaction Which can be. ji-Iterpret('d 
fundamental sources of uncertainty. These mL)y be. duc, to 
limitations inherent in the observer or his 
strumenLs, they may be duo to an inherent ConjPj_C>-- 
black box i. 11--self, or thoy may result from a source of 
acting on the information channels. As Pask points OuL, thcll 
model as a whole "is not a picture of things aý: seen by the 
observer hirilsc-ýIf, but a picture as seen by sont, -ore ýo(,, IYJ])gT 
on from outside, at the process of ohscrvation. "(3(')') 
As he inLeracts with a blach box, the observer 
tains the values assumed by inputs ancl the correspon, 'Lin(, ) 
values of outputis. For exawple, he may read ý'j and X2 fý)'- 
his input and X3 for his output values. In gencral, the be- 
havior of the, sysýem can Lc,, as the trans-Form,,. t7-ion 
T of the iriputs X, and X2 'ntO tll(' Y3, ''I F i. qllro 
bc, I ow .Co rruyi 
oiiIy, t, h c, eYp re ssi (-)ý iL-t I- c, ý', Ihc, 
f() 1- 111 () f- 
xi 
Fi girre C. A 'Blaclý BOX With Implits X1, '11A 
X21 X3 ""'I "' transform,, it-ion i-'unctýnij 
-316- 
X3 = f(Xl? X2) where f is the transfer function which speci- 
fies the transition rule. The observer can manipulate the 
inputs, thus modifying the parameters of the system, and ob- 
serve the corresponding changes in output values as he at- 
tempts to deduce the transfer function itself. 
In general, the values obtained by a sequence of 
measurements, conveying information about the system's be- 
havior as it changes states with time, can be summarized in 
various ways, according to need and convenience. By conven- 
tion, the behavioral protocol can take the form of a simple 
table of transition states. Otherwise it may be represented 
by a trajectory in a phase space of n dimensl-ons, where n 
represents the number of initially unrelated outputs. In 
yet another typical representation, behavior is descri. bed by 
a state transition graph in which nodes correspond to indi- 
vidual states of the system and the lines connecting them 
bear the input and output values. 
As far as the observer is concerned, dealing with 
a system entails identifying a universe of discourse U, which 
can be regarded as an essential constraint that "specifies 
the logical possibilities an observer can talk about. "(39) 
It also entails a language L by which entities U are identi- 
fied and their relationships are described. Together, U and 
L constitute a "reference frame" which is typically chosen 
by an observer. It is conditioned by his previous experi- 
ence, by social conventions and so for-t-h. Typically, science 
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makes available a variety of such reference frames which, as 
Pask points out, are "stereotyped ways of looking at the 
world. "(40) Their usefulness is in providing a common struc- 
ture through which all individual observations can be coor- 
dinated. They facilitate communication, comparison and eval- 
uation of special case experiences, thus contributing to the 
continuous refinement of specific models and ultimately of 
science itself. 
By setting up the reference frame of U and L, the 
observer sets the boundaries and the logic by which his in- 
teraction with a system is defined. Thus, using L, he may 
try to predict events in U. In this sense, the "black box" 
meta-view of observation can describe the hypothetico-deduc- 
tive method of science whereby observation is followed by 
the co. -Listruction of an hypothesis which is then subject to 
empirical conformation. As he interacts with the system in 
this fashion, the observer may introduce changes in U, in L 
or in both. At times, however, he may be compelled to sub- 
stitute the entire frame of reference U; L for another, a 
procedure which, as Pask observes, would be associated with 
a creative act of conceptual innovation. 
As an observer learns about a system, he reduces 
his uncertainty about it but as a general principle uncer- 
tainty cannot be entirely removed. There are, for instance, 
objective limits to the exactness of evidence that can be 
obtained, in that there are limits to the accuracy achiev- 
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able in measurements. (41) Notwithstanding cases in which 
the observer's objectives are unclear to begin with, his 
interaction with a black box, about which he is trying to 
learn, is subject to two basic types of uncertainty; 
metrical and logical. (42) The first relates to uncertainty 
which is inherent in the values an observer obtains from 
his measurements, whereas the second is typical to cases 
where he is uncertain about the structure of the system he 
is dea-'Ling with and about what kind of measurement would 
be appropriate to begin with. 
In principle, some structure in the phenomena 
observed must be assumed which restricts the logical poss-i- 
bilities of observation. Otherwise there will be no limit 
to experimentation and no stable conclusion which could be 
communicated. In order for behavior not to appear chaotic 
and unintelligible, some regularity must be detected in the 
protocol. Especially if the observer is to make successful 
prediction, the system must behave in a "machine"-like 
fashion. Machine-like in the sense of Ashby, where "knowl- 
edge of its present state (as shown at the output) and the 
conditions within which it is working (that is, the state of 
its input) is sufficient to dete=ine what it will do 
I be state deter- nex-tl--. "(43) In other words, the system mus, - 
mined, and in fact, a great deal of the observer's activity 
will be vested in trying out various procedures, changing U 
and L., for example, and testing repeatedly for a state 
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determined behavior. If his attempts are unsuccessful, he 
may choose to try out statistical observations in an effort 
to establish a statistical determinacy. 
We have arrived here at a basic distinction be- 
tween strictly determinate and statistically determinate 
behavior. In the first case, the state of the system at 
time (t+l) depends uniquely on its state at time (t) and 
upon a fixed transformation function. In other words, when 
the state of the system at (t) and its transformation func- 
tion are known, it is always possible to compute its state 
at (t+l). In the other case (commonly associated with 
"Markovian" systems), prediction is subject to limitations 
14 St4 C of probabi L _L constraints and the behavior can be de-- 
scribed only statistically. Thus, the probability that the 
system will assume any one of its possible states at time 
(t+l) depends upon its state at (t) and upon a probabilistic 
transformatilon function which is contingent on unvarying 
transition probabilities. In a general sense, however, it 
is possible to regard all systems as statistical and maintain 
that "'Determinate' is the name we give to a system with par- 
ticularly consistent statistics. "(44) 
In this con-text it should be noted that the philo- 
-lie theoretical distinction sophical meaning underlying 4. 
between deterministic and iDrobabilistic behavior has been --*Ln 
the center of a b. ea-'L--ed scientific controversy associated par- 
ticularly with modern physics. The problem reaches beyond 
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questions about predictability of specific events and it 
bears upon fundamental N7iews concerning the nature of phys- 
ica. phenomena and of order in the universe. (45) We may, 
however, conclude at this point with Beer, who suggests 
that from the viewpoint of empirical considerations ''we 
accept as a matter of experimental fact that whereas we are 
able to describe some systems as if they were deterministic, 
we are able to describe others only as if they were proba- 
bilistic. "(46) 
C-4 Measuring Complexity -- The Concept of Variety 
Systems of high complexity are of particular inter- 
est to cybernetics and, as we have seen, high complexity is 
an essential property of viable systems. Complexity itself 
does not relate necessarily to the size of systems, when size 
is taken in the simple sense of adding together elements of a 
similar kind, in larger and larger quantities. When we add 
more and more particles to a growing heap of sand, for ex- 
ample, the heap may grow to become very large indeed, but it 
will remain an essentially simple entity. Complexity, by 
contrast, is the direct outcome not only of the number of 
different elements in a system but especially of the fact 
that these are in a strong and active interaction. It will 
thus be manifest by the number of different states a system 
can assume as a result of the dynamic interaction between 
its elements. 
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Biological, organisms, for example, are commonly 
referred to as complex systems. Their complexity is due to 
the fact that the state of the organism at any given time 
depends on the large number of its physical and chemical 
processes, all of which interact in an enormously compli- 
cated manner. The fact that as a system the organism is 
also characterized by a significant interaction with the 
environment only adds a further dimension to the complexity 
of its internal processes and it is in this sense that "an 
amoeba is a more complicated system than all systems of the 
inanimate world. "(47) By the time we reach the level of 
higher organisms or of the hurnan brain with its 10 
10 
neurons 
forming a network that is very rich in interconnections, the 
complexity is very substantial indeed. 
Biological organisms in general, and brains in par- 
ticular, have become synonymous with the concept of complex- 
ity in the sense of being associated with a high degree of 
interaction of dynamic elements and with the related charac- 
teristics of non-reducibility and synergetic behavior. In 
principle, a similar order of magnitude of complexity, as 
well as fundamentally similar related properties, are also 
encoun-'t--ered in the context of many other systems upon which 
man depends and with which he interacts daily. These range 
log4 from, the eco Lcal to the social and economic contexts in 
their broadest sense. Complexity, in fact, is a primary 
qualitative characteristic of most non-trivial situations 
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encountered in the domain of human affairs. It is in this 
sense that Beer, for example, can talk about business or in- 
dustry as being viable systems as he emphasizes the signif- 
icance of complexity in the context of management in gen- 
eral. (4 8) 
Intrinsically high complexity must be accepted, 
then, c-; Ls an essential and un-ignorable property of viable 
systems. (49) In principle it cannot be avoided and therefore 
techniques for approaching and dealing with complexity are 
vital. We have already examined in this regard the idea of 
the black box which offers a method of studying complex 
systems. An additional and equally important notion has to 
4 -- fe - do with the concept of varielty whL_ch ol, "-. L- Ls a means for 
measuring the actual complexity of a system. 
Simply defined, the concept of variety refers to 
the "total number of possible states of a system. "(50) Tn 
other words, it has to do with the total number of distin- 
guishable states the elements of a given set can assume. 
The notion of complexity is closely related to the idea of 
uncertainty, in that the total number of distinguishable 
states in a typical universe represent, in fact, the uncer- 
tainty of an observer facing that universe. The observer 
is uncertain about which of the many possible states will 
be actually assumed next. Thus, for a finite well-defined 
set of elements, the quantity of variety offers a measure 
of the uncertainty involved as well. 
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Uncertainty itself relates to the quantity of 
entropy associated with a given universe, and because the 
appearance of any one state of possible total n states, re- 
moves some uncertainty about the universe by conveying an 
amount of information, uncertainty and information assume 
a similar mathematical expression but have opposite signs. 
Expressed in logarithmic form, their absolute relation is 
such that: 
(Uncertainty) = -(Information) 
As Pask notes., "Because of this, observation can either be 
thought of as removing uncertainty about a set of possi- 
bilities, or selection from a set of possibilities can be 
thought of as a source of information. "(51) 
The problem of variety and uncertainty has been 
given a rigorous treatment by von Foerster and his co- 
workers, (52) who have shown that there exists a formal con- 
nection between the two. In general, for any given universe, 
a specific magnitude of uncertainty corresponds to a partic- 
ular value of variety. For example, when uncertainty is at 
maximum, which happens when all events in a universe may 
occur with equal probability, the variety is naught. Other- 
wise put, when H and H stand for variety and uncertainty re- 
spectively, "if one is ignorant of any regularity in a 
universe (Variety H= 0), one is faced with a universe of 
maximum uncertainty (H =H max). "(53) 
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i VarLety can be expressed in "absolute units of 
var-Lety" representing directly the number of possible states 
a given set of elements can assume. For exampl, --, in a set 
of n elements each of which can acquire X di L fferent states, 
the total variety is given by Xn. Thus, in the case of n 
elements, all with a binary property of being in a certain 
n state or not, the total variety will be 2. 
As Beer has shown, (54) because of the multiplica- 
tive characteristics of the process involved with measuring 
variety, the values obtained, even for relatively simple 
cases, tend to be rather large. Typically, such values may 
be expected to be on the order of magnitude of astronomical 
figures, a fact which Beer goes on to demonstrate by comput- 
ing the variety inherent in a relatively simple dyanmic 
system. According to his example, in such a system, "having 
only seven components, only one obtrusive relationship 
between the components, only two modalities of that relation- 
ship, and only two conditions of each modality that alternate 
through time. The variety ... is 2 
42 
, or something greater 
than 1,000,000fOOO, 000. "(55) 
In complex systems, variety can thus proliferate 
very rapidly, but in reality various constraints will be 
operative in any given Situation, limiting the actual number 
of different states elements in a system can assume, thus 
reducing variety from its total theoretically possible vIalue. 
The e-,,. istence of such constraints which act on the total 
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possible variety is of fundamental significance, in that such 
constraints underlie the order we perceive in the universe. 
If elements) that constitute the complexity of which the world 
is composed could assume any arbitrary state at all, predic- 
tion would be impossible in principle, and the regularities 
we call natural laws would have no meaning. 
Because of the large numbers usually associated 
with values of variety and because of the multiplicative 
characteristics involved with its proliferation, it is a 
common practice to express variety logarithmically. The 
binary characteristics of dec-l-sion in removJ. -ng uncertainty 
i 
make it convenient to choose the base two and, accordingly, 
the variety of a set of n elements takes the form cf 1092n. 
Measuring variety in binary terms has a particular practical 
significance as it underlines a strategy which simplifies 
the problem of removing uncertainty in high variety situa- 
tions. Thus, for example, using Beer's demonstrated case 
of the system with variety of 2 
42 
, and viewing the problem 
of removing uncertainty essentially in terms of making 
binary decisions, the total variety of the process of selec- 
tion involved is reduced from 1 in over 1,000,000,000,000 to 
1 in 42. 
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that a large 
class of problems that are associated with perception, cog- 
nition, learning, decision making, prediction and control, can 
be viewed in principle in terms of problems of regulating 
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uncertainty. This fact gives the concept of variety a par- 
ticularly important validity as it offers a powerful tool 
for approaching issues that range from aspects of biological 
adaptation to problems of management and of effective regu- 
lation in general. (56) 
C-5 Open and Closed Systems 
The distinction between open and closed systems(57) 
is the distinction between viable systems that maintain a 
coherent integrity by interacting with an environment through 
an active exchange of material components, and inert matter, 
which inherently tends to become uniform with its surround- 
ings. The distinction emerged in biology in the face of what 
had seemed to be an essential contradiction between phenomena 
observed in the life sciences and the laws of thermodynamics 
formulated in physics. The issue was that of reconciling the 
eVolUt4 characteristics of biological organisms and Ionary 
processes with the second law of thermodynamics and the con- 
cept of entropic equilibrium. 
Living organisms are associated with a condition 
of matter in which order and structure are maintained in a 
4 "steady process of dynamLc equilibrium by which a specific 
state" is preserved. Furthermore, phenomena of growth and 
evolution manifest the fact that such orderly processes are 
not only capable of continuously maintaining themselves, 
but are also capable of a transition toward a progressive 
increase in order and comple-Kity of organization. In fact, 
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theories of evolution since Darwin and Spencer implied a view 
of the world in which matter was seen to evolve from less 
towards more organized forms. There were moral and philo- 
sophical interpretations involved as, in general, this view 
"placed %--mphasis on plogressive evolution, with complexity 
and differentiation generally associalted with goodness and 
value. "(58) 
Biological-evolutionary thinking seemed to clash 
with developments in physics, in particular with the second 
law of thermodynamics, which maintained that for physical 
systems a quantity called entropy will always increase lead- 
ing to a time-independent SIC-ate of entropic equilibrium. In 
such a state, all activity would cease to exist and all en-- 
ergy differentiation would level out. In terms of statis- 
tical mechanics, the increase in entropy was seen as proceed- 
ing in a direction in which eventually all statess of matter 
would become equiprobable, -t-hus "the tendency -towards maxim-um 
entropy or the most probable distribution is the tendency to 
maximum disorder. "(50-1) According to the second law of thermo- 
dynamics, therefore, the general trend in physical universe 
is towards dissipation and irreversible degradation of energy, 
tending towards an ultimate state of thermodynamic equilibrium 
characterized by an even distribution of low temperature, a 
condition in which all processes would come to an end that 
w, --is actually called a "heat death. " By implication the for- 
mation of complex order and increase in organization seemed 
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paradoxical in a universe that was regarded as essentially 
running down. 
The contrast with the coherence and evolutionary 
characteristics of the biological world was sharp, and while 
the second law of thermodynamics-had been established on 
firm ground, the fact remained that life processes did show 
the properties of building up order and an ever higher dif- 
ferentiation of complexity and organization. Such properties 
seemed so striking, in fact, that from "the earliest time in 
human thought some special non-phys-ical or supernatural force 
(vis-a-vis entelechy) was claimed to be operative in the or- 
ganism. "(60) This very same attitude was taken still quite 
recently by Driesch, for example, in his attempt to remove 
the difficulties mentioned above. Driesch was arguing that 
biological growth processes, and specifically the proper-ICY 
of equi-finality-which seemed to contradict the laws of physics, 
could be only explained by assuming the operation of vita 1- 
istic forces in governing biological activity. (61) 
Bertalanffy, however, was able to clarify -the -seem- 
ing paradox by observing that the laws of thermodynamics had 
been formulated with regard to closed systems which are 
energetically isolated from the world. Theyc-re thus inap- 
plicable to the case of living organisms which are, in prin- 
ciple, open systems maintaining a continuous exchange of 
matter with their surroundings. The living organism, as 
Schr6dinger has pointed out, (62) feeds in effect on "negative 
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entropy. " It is continuously importing co, -,. Tiplex organic sub- 
stances and freeing itself from its own, unavoidable, en- 
tropic products. This essential property of "openess" re- 
lating to the continuous metabolic exchange of materials 
ýaith the environment could thus explain the cap(-:: ýbility of 
maintaining an orderly and complex structure,, and the fact 
that "living systems, maintaining themselves in a steady 
state,, can avoid the increase of entropy, and may even de- 
velop towards states of increased order and organization. "(63) 
The articulation of the principle of oPen systems 
removed the apparent paradox that seemed to exist between 
physics arid biology in that it showed that the laws of 
thermodynamics were relevant to a domain of systems differ- 
ent in k--*Lnd from those encountered in biology. At the same 
time, it was made clear that an extensLon and generalization 
of thes2e laws were needed so that they would eventually 
cover the case of open systems as well. Such a generaliza- 
tion was actually achieved and is associated with Prigogine 
and his colleagues, (64) who introduced the effecit of meta- 
f entropic equilibrium, bolic exchange into the equations ol 
thus extending the second law into a version applicable to 
both closed and open systems. 
According to Prigogine, (65) the entropy variation 
cLS during time dt for an open system that exchanges energy 
and matter with its surroundings can be written as: 
dS = deS + diS 
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where deS stands for the entropy flow from the environment 
and diS denotes the production of entropy due to irrevers- 
ible processes internal to the system. The second law 
states that d1S can never be negative (d i S>, O). In an iso- 
lated ssystein d eS =0 and we get the obvious result that for 
all physica-', '.. closed systems the entropy increases irre- 
versibly, namely: 
dS = S>,, O 
In an open system, however, Prigogine points out, while dis 
is always positive, deS may be either negative of positive 
with the result that "during evolution a sys-41--em may reach a 
state where entropy is smaller than at the start. "(66) Such 
a state can in fact be maintained as long as the general con- 
dition 
deS = -diS, <O 
appl4-es. In other words, "in principle, at least, if we 
supply a system with a sufficient amount of negative entropy 
flow, we can maintain the system in an ordered state. "(67) 
Prigogine's work is associated with the relatively 
new field of nonequilibrium thermodynamics which has been 
particularly significant in throwing new light on processes 
associated with open systems and particularly in extending 
the thermodynamic model to problems of evolution. This work 
removed earlier ambiguities resulting from the partial ap- 
plicability of the second law in its origina-1 form and has 
offered a coherent framework which integrates the dynamics 
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of entropic processes in closed systerns and in situations of 
"nonequilibrium" where orderly structures may appear that 
are able to progress to novel dynamic regimes of new and 
higher complexity. 
By implication one can speculate about a view of 
a fundamentally regenerative universe in which entropic 
processes tending to the state of maximum disorder are en- 
countered by tendencies towards situations in which order is 
created locally, and properties of coherence, structure and 
self-organization appear. In a sense, observable patterns 
of behavior in the universe at large may be regarded as the 
outcome of a balance created by these two opposites, and if 
this is the case, we are brought by contemporary arguments 
of modern physics face-to-face with some of the most ancient 
of human mythologies. 
C-6 Entropv, Information and Organization 
Facing the complex world around him, the notions 
of order and chaos have intrigued man since time immemorial. 
This fact found expression in various ancient mythologies, 
particularlY in those dealing with the problem of creation. 
Th,,.: -,, biblical story of 
Genesis, for example, offers a clear 
the illustration of the ancient concept of order and of t- 
direction that orderly proCesses were assumed to take. 
Order emerged by the differentiation of chaos, homogeneity 
and sameness, into variety, coherence arid structure. 
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Homogeneity is the one extreme and order is the other, an 
idea which is quite close to the notion of entropy and the 
direction of entropic processes, of which we had a glimpse 
in the previous section. Thus, in a sense, the concept of, 
entropy, and particularly its expression in statistical terms, 
has given a rigorous definition to that which has been held 
intuitively for long. The modern concept, however, provides 
a precise mathematical definition to the relative conditions 
of "order" and "disorder, " and it has an important formal 
link to the contemporary definition of information and sub- 
sequently it also bears on the definition of organization. 
These notions and how they relate will be reviewed below. 
The concept of entropy waS developed in relation 
to the observation that there is a general tendenc-,;, in .A 
physical systems for energy differentiations to even out. 
If two bodies of different temperatures are placed. in con- 
tact, the tendency is for heat to flow from the warmer to 
the cooler body in a process that will continue, if left 
undisturbed, until the temperatures are equalized. Around 
1850,, this observation was generalized by Clausius into what 
came to be )-.. nown as the second law of thermodynamics which 
stated, in principle, that heat cannot be transferred from 
a cold to a warmer bodv wi-thout the introduction of an out- 
side source of eliergy. (68) In this relation, Clausius in- 
troduced the term entropy to account for the energy disbal- 
ance which results in irreversible heat loss. This entropy, 
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he maintained, will always tend to increase. 
In classical physics, the quantity of entropy is 
measured in relation to the absolute zero point of tempera- 
ture (approximately -273'C), at which point the entropy of 
any substance is given as zero. As heat is introduced, the 
entropy increases and the rate of its increase is obtained 
by computing the ratio of all the small increments of heat 
which were supplied, by the absolute temperature at which 
each was supplied, and then integrating all these small 
ratios from the temperc-; L of absolute zero. The general 
expression takes the form: 
dQ 
T 
where S stands for entropy and dQ is a small increment of 
hea-'L-. supplied at temperature T. The unit of entropy S is 
thus given in cal/Cl. 
A further refinement in the development of the 
concept of entropy occurred when it was linked to statis- 
tical notions of order and disorder as developed by the 
work of Boltzmann and Gibbs. The basic notion had to do 
with the recognition that heat can be discussed in terms of 
the motions of atoms. Hence, as Boltzmann had pointed out, 
as energy is degraded the atoms assume a more random, or 
disorderly, state and, consequently, entropy can be regarded 
as a measure of disorder. This measure is given as: 
k log D 
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where S denotes entropy,. k is a constant of proportinality 
known as Boltzmann's constant, and D is a measure of the 
probability of the system being at a particular state of 
all the states that are possible. As Schr6dinger points 
out, D can in fact be regarded as a "quantitative measure 
of the atomistic disorder of the body in question. "(69) 
Entropy, then, is expressed as the logarithm of 
the probability of a particular state, and by the terms of 
the expression, this probability rises proportionately to 
the rise of entropy. In other words, the most probable 
state is the state of maximum entropy, or maximum disorder, 
and this is the state to which all isolated physical sys- 
tems tend. The increase in entropy is associated with the 
loss of distinctiveness, differentiation and order, or as 
Wiener had expressed it "in Gibbs' universe order is least 
probable, chaos most probable. "(70) This is precisely the 
source of the notion of the universe moving towards a "heat 
death" and the particular significance of the concept of open 
systems, vis living organisms, which as we have seen literal- 
ly feed on "negative entropy, " thus making it possible for 
organ'Lzation to increase at least locally and temporarily. 
The precise meaning of the conc. ept, of""'negative 
entropy can be obtained, as Schr6dinger had shown, directly 
from the equations for entropy. The essence of his argument 
is that if D is taken to express a measure cf disorder, its 
reciprocal l/D could be regarded as a. direct measure of 
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order. And since 
log l/D =- log D 
we could obtain for the equation of entropy: 
k log (1/D) 
or: 
-(entrcpy) =k log(l/D) 
The conclusion, in Schr6dinger's words: "entropy,, taken with 
the negative sign, is itself a measure of order. ''(71) 
As it turned out, a similar conclusion was reached 
with the development of the contemporary mathematical theory 
of communications. In its original form proposed by Hartle, ý,. 7, F 
a quantity of information was defined in terms of a succes- 
sive selection of signs from a given list of possible 
signs. (72) According to Hartley, for a measure of N signs 
chosen from a repertoire of S signs, where the total number 
of possible combinations is Sn, a ''quantity of information'' 
H,, can be expressed as: 
log S 
As Wiener later pointed out, statistical notions are partic- 
ularly important in connection with the definition of infor- 
mation in that "the transmission of information is impossible 
save as the transmission of alternatives. "(73) Consequently-, 
the idea of entropy as defined in statistical mechanics pro- 
va-des a useful concept for the definition of information 
which in its current form was developed by Shannon. (74) 
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As is the case in Hartley's definition., an amount 
of information is expressed in relation to the choice of a 
particular message out of a given source of signs. It thus 
takes a similar form where information is measured by the 
logarithm of the number of available choices.. Tn the sta- 
tistical de-finition, however, these choices are expressed 
in terms of the probabilities which govern the selection of 
successive signs. Thus, for a set of n independent signs 
with probability of selection Pl, P2 ''* Pi - Pn an amount 
of information H is defined as: 
Pi og P 
where Pi is the probability of occurrence of a selection. i 
out of the possible n. As we have seen earlier with regard 
to the concept of variety, the use of logarithms is partic- 
ularly convenient because of the multiplicative character- 
istics of accumulating probabilities and the base 2 is 
chosen because it provides, directly, a standard unit as- 
sociated with binary selection. The quantity of information 
itself is given as an average. 
An expression similar to the one defining entropy 
can be used in the case of information because, essentially, 
the patterns of signs in a message can be regarded as a form 
of organization. Moreover, in the case of entropy, as we 
have seen, organ4l-zation deteriorates as the system moves 
towards a more probable state. Similarly, the amount of in- 
formation conveyed by a sign decreases as the probability of 
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its occurrence is incr%cased. This is the key to the rela- 
tion between. the two concepts and in general as a system 
gains in entropy it "loses" information in the sense that 
the more disorganized it is, the more homogenous, the less 
information it conveys. When the system reaches a state of 
maximum entropy, no information is conveyed by it at all. 
T is is the reason for regarding information as the negative 
of entropy. As Wiener summed it up: "Just as entropy is a 
measure of disorganization, the information carried by a set 
of messages is a measure of organization. In fact, it is 
possible to interpret the information carried by a message 
as essentially the negative of its entropy, and the negative 
logarithm of Ji. ts probability. That is, the more probable 
the message, the less information it gives. "(75) 
A particularly elegant means for expressing the 
notion of organization was offered by von Foerster(76) who 
suggested using Shannon's concept of redundancy which is 
gi-t., -en as: 
H 
R= l-Hmax 
I where 
1-, T 
expresses the actual variety of a source and H max 
is the maximum possible variety of the same source. As a 
result, von Foerster points out, the measure of order would 
conveniently assume values between zero and unity. Thus, 
when the system is in maximum disorder, the actual variety 
equals the maximum variety and R will be zero. In the other 
extreme, when the system is completely orderly, namely when 
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there is no uncertainty about it, the entropy is zero and R 
assumes the value of 1. 
As a final note it should be pointed out that be- 
yond the technicalities of their definitions the concepts 
of entropy, information and organization have contributed 
substantially to shaping the contemporary view of the 
world. In particular the notions of entropy and order, by 
defining two major opposite directions that natural pro- 
cesses can take, 1--owards an increase in randomness on the 
one hand and toward the evolution of order on the other, 
have provided an important conceptual guiding principle. 
They have an obvious effect on JIDasic notion of progress and 
their general philosophical and moral impact have been pro- 
found. For example, Fuller has suggested that "the mind of 
man seems to be the most advanced phase of antientropy 
witnessable in the universe, " (77) and that the "function" of 
humanity in the universe can be interpreted accordingly. 
A somewhat similar notion is also voiced by Wiener when he 
suggests that in the face of entropic forces and ultimate 
decay, "our main obligation is to establish arbitrary 
enclaves of order and system. "(78) 
C-7 Feedback and Self-Regulation 
As we have seen, a sign. ifica,, nt property of viable, 
or open systems, is manifest in the ability to resist an en-- 
tropic drift and maintain an orderly structure stable. Such 
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systems survive by virtue of a continuous intake of energy 
and/or physical material from which their fabric is being 
continuously synthesized. They interact with their en- 
vironment in a dynamic process of importing and exporting 
essential substances, at the same time maintaining con- 
stant the ratio of critical ingredients in their Clow of -1 
metabol'Lc exchange. In sp'Lte of environmental perturba- 
tions, they preserve their internal composition and resist 
critical deviations from the conditions by which their 
surivival is defined. (79) In this regard, we have also 
seen how the extension of thermodynamic theory to cover 
open systems made it possible to account for such prop- 
erties in terms of physics. 
Taking a global viewpoint, it is clear that what 
we perceive as the individuality of a system, an organism, 
for example, is not defined by the speci ic composition 
or particular properties of its material components. 
Rather, it is the result of a continui-lt--y of processes, the 
consistency of a dynamic pattern, or, what amounts to the 
same thing, a stability of an organization. In this sense, 
cybernetics points out, the stability of a viable organi- 
zation depends upon the operation and specific structure of 
information-related processes performing essentially a 
regulation function. Such regulatory mechanisms operate 
in all levels of the organism often in a highly complex and 
interdependent manner. 
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An archetypal regulating mechanism, long familiar 
to servo-engin. eers, but upon which cybernetics has cast a 
new light by drawing attention to its broad validity, is 
associated with feedback regulation. The related theoret-. 
ical foundation is quite solid and the mathematical apparatus 
available is well developed, especially in relation to 
servo-mechanisms and various other aspects of control 
theory. (80) The literature which bears upon the subject- 
matter, in one way or another, is extensive and, therefore, 
only a very brief account of some central issues will be 
given below. 
The basic notion is of regulating a process by the 
results of its actual performance. The mechani. sm depends on 
a structural arrangement by which output is being continu- 
ously monitored and a signal conveying a measure indicating 
its value is obtained. This signal is fed back to an ap- 
paratus designed to adjust an input signal -so that a desired 
output can be maintained or amplified, depending on a de- 
sired outcome. 
The essence of feedback regulation, then, is of 
informational coupling by virtue of which an actual output 
is compared with some given standard. Such a standard 
specifies the value for an operational criteria pertinent 
to the system's performance and it can generally be inter- 
preted as a system's goal. A goal of the system at large, 
or of any of its subcomponents, depending upon the level of 
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resolution at which the feedback loop, is identified. 
Realizat. ic. ri of the universal significance of feed- 
back me-chanisms to regulat-ion and the fact that such inech- 
anisms exist in a wide variety of systems in technology and 
-in the biolog-; -cal- world, characterized the early days of 
cvbernetics. In this respect an important step was taken by 
Wiener, Bigelow and Rosenblueth when they made a general dis- 
tinction between purposeful and non-purposeful types of be- 
havior showing that purposeful behavior could be clearly 
identified with mechanisms of feedback nature. (81) Wiener 
and his colleagues identified the standard by which an out- 
put is adjusted with a system's purpose, thus giving the 
notL-on of teleology a novel interpretation. The concept, 
which was previously used in a sense implying a "final 
cause, " has now obtained a new and more precise meaning re- 
stricted by an association with a specific mechanism, con- 
trolling behavior by adjusting the difference between an 
actual output and its intended value. "Teleological be- 
havior, " they concluded, "thus becomes synonymous with 
behavior controlled by negative feed-back. "(82) 
This development was particularly significant as 
by identifying purpose with. the effects of behavior, rather 
%.. han with a particular kind of system, the ground was laid -1, 
for stressing the essential similarity between purposeful 
behavior in animals and machines. This similarity exists on 
the specific level relating to the informational structure 
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of feedback mechanisms, but it is also manifest on the gen- 
eral functional level of a "loop of action" incorporating 
.L 
sensory capabilities with control apparatus as well as 
affectors suitable for the performance of specific tasks. (83) 
To be ''purposeful, '' the arrangement entails a goal 
(the "standard" referred to above), and as Pask points out, (84) 
an important distinction can be made between goals which are 
-in erent to a system and goals which are assumed with respect 
to a -system by an observer who watches its behavior. In the 
-first case., the goal is prescriptive in the sense that it is 
built into a system, some homing device, perhaps, by its de- 
signer. In the second case, on the other hand, the goal is 
-desc-ri--cj ive In tl-iat -it 
is projected by an observer as he 
'gives -an interpretation to the behavior of a complex system, 
a lJLving organism or a society, for example, the behavior of 
'which he may be trying to understand. 
Similarly, a goal. can be unambiguous, a well 
specified algorithm, as in the case of the simple thermostat, 
cLr i-t can be underspecified and open-ended as is typical in 
the case of evolutionary processes. This distinction is im- 
p-ortant because it allows an eX-L-ension of the use of the 
. basic IEýedback model 
to processes which, due to their com- 
-plexity, dynamics, or both, are inherently fuzzy. (85) 
Depending on the effect of a feedback coupling on 
the behavior of an output, a distinction is made between two 
classes of feedback systems. These are commonly referred -to 
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as negative and positive feedback respectively. Negative 
feedback is associated with the case in which a measurement 
of the actual output is compared with its desired value and 
the difference is used to modify the output in a way which. 
forces it to approach the desired value. In the case of a 
positive feedback, on the other hand, the output value is 
coupled back in a manner which amplL the original input 
s igna . 
A typical representation of a simple feedback loop 
is given in Figure C-3, where some active element.. which 
could stand for a rudder in a servo-mechanism, for example, 
is being regulated. 
Figure C. 3. A SiTnPle Feedback Loop 
A control signal x is derived from the input i which sets 
an operational standard. a represents the transfer function 
across the active elements so that the output y is a function 
Active 
Comparator Element 
(-I- n -r -) 
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of the control signal and the transfer function a. I. e., 
y= f(x; (x). Similarly, ý represents a transfer function by 
which the value of the output y is modified before it is 
compared with the original input. Focusing on the compar-. 
ator, we distinguish between two cases as shown 4n Figure 
C-4 below: 
+ 
(a) 
+ 
(b) 
Figure C. 4. Negative and Positive Feedback Loops 
The first, (a), represents a negative feedback in which the 
control signal x is obtained by the difference between-the 
In -the -case input 0, and the ou-1, put eo, namely x= 8i - eo* 
of a positive feedback, depicted by (b), the con-tro-l. signal 
is obtained by adding the output value e. to, the -input 0ir 
i. e., x= ei + eo# with the result that the origina-lInput 
value is being continuously amplified. (86) 
In general, negative feedback is inherently stabil-' 
izing as it seeks to correct for deviat-ions from a given 
-d. It is typically associated with goal seeking and standar -L 
4 homeostatic inechan, _SMS. The operation of such a negative 
feedback, as Wiener pointed out, "may be as simple as that 
of a common reflex, or it may be a higher order feedback, 
in which past experience is used to regulate not only spe- 
C4 
_LfiC movements but also whole policies of behavior. "(87) 
From a behavioral vJI-ewpoint it may thus relate to simple 
automatic actions, to the operation of conditioned reflexes 
and even to higher forms of learning. In contradistinction, 
positive feedback causes deviations and instabilities to 
amplify. It is usually associated with a self-reinforcing, 
accelerated departure from an initial condition in which 
case 'tan action builds a result that generates still greater 
action. "(88) It is typical to processes of growth or decay 
-such as are found in an unchec), ýed population inc. rease, the 
spread of an epidemic, certain cases of organic decomposition, 
and so forth. 
tive and positive feedback mechanisms may in- Negat 
teract mutually to produce complex patterns of beb4vior as 
is typical to cases in which a regenerative growth, caused 
by a positive feedback loop, is checked by being coupled to 
a negative oneý A simple illustration can be found in the 
cyclical interaction of prey and predator populations in 
which a significant increase of number of animals of a spe- 
cles preyed upon leads to an increase in number of their 
predator's population with the inevitable result that the 
number of prey animals is reduced and consequently there is 
a reduction in the rate of increase of predators as well. (89) 
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In the re-alm of economic affairs, to pick an addi- 
tional example, Forrester has shown that similar mechanisms 
underline the behavior of certain business cycles. He dem- 
onstrates the point in a typical case of an increased sales 
4 rate which produced hgher revenues, that lead to a higher 
sales budget and greater sales effort, followed by a further 
increase in sales. This regenerative cycle is reversed, 
however, when sales rate reaches a point at which it exceeds 
production capacity. An order backlog accumulates, result- 
ing in delayed deliveries which make the product less at- 
tractive to buyers. The sales rate goes down, and so 
on ... (9 0) 
Feedback mechanisms rarely exist as in the simple 
single loop of Figure C-3. A dynamic viable system of even 
a moderate complexity consists of a multitude of such loops, 
coupled together and interacting in a complex fashion. As 
a whole system, it reveals a web-like structure of multiple 
loops, alt- times following a scheme of a control hierarchy in 
which some such loops are subordinate to the purpose of 
higher level ones. Techniques for studying systems behavior 
by analyzing the underlying structure of their feedback 
mechanisms are well developed and are due in particular to 
Forrester's work. (91) 
Mechanisms of negative feedback have been studied 
regard to problems of control. extensively with specifik- 
In this context the notion of self-regulation has emerged 
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as all-imporit-ant. The idea relates to the fact that in 
mechanisms which operate by the negative feedback scheme, 
the act of going out of control, in itself, triggers the 
appropriate action which restores stability. In other words, 
deviations, as long as they are not fatal, are automatically 
compensated folL. - because they are coupled to a control mech- 
anisj-kn in a way which causes it to act immediately, automat- 
ically, and proportionately to the deviation from a norm. 
I 
This is quite different from reacting after the fact. Beer 
in particular has strongly emphasized this point, its fund4- 
mental dL-stinction from a simple-minded notion of control as 
a coercive - action, and its implication to the general field 
of management. (92) 
A classical example for sa, 11---regulation can be 
found in the operation of Watt's governor which regUlates 
the supply of steam in a steam engine. The device operates 
in such a way that an increase in the, speed of revolution of 
the engine causes a mechanical movement in the controller 
which results -in reducing the 
input of steam., thus causing 
the speed --I'--o come down. Deviations from a desired speed 
cause a direct compensation and the speed isý kept stable. . 0- 
The Watt's governor is a simple mechanical device 
but the same principle of self-regulation which it embodies 
can be found in more complex systems and in various levels 
of reality. Thus in addition to typical servo-controls, (93) 
the principle relates to physiological functions of various 
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kinds, (94) to certain behavioral aspects of organisms, simple 
or complex, (95) to industrial and managerial systems, (96) to 
various manifestations of social and economic behavior, (97) 
and to problems associated with ecological stability. (98) In 
linking the operations of various organizations, such mechan- 
isms offer a unifying principle, and in this sense it is 
possible to regard our total environment as a vast complex 
of semi-autonomous, mutually interacting and self-stabilizing 
feedback mechanisins. 
C-8 The Self-Organizing System 
The concept of an open system interacting with its 
environment, the concept of order in the sense of Section C-6, 
the concepts of negatiVe entropy and of the relativity in- 
herent in an observer's interpretation of a system's purpose.. 
all combine in. the idea of self-organization. An extensive 
discussion is due to Ashby, (99) Beer, (100) Pask, (101) and von 
Foerster. (1-02) 
The idea refers to a dynamic system which is non- 
y4 stationar Ln the sense of Pask. (103) Its dynamics is such 
-hes it over an interval that it compels an observer who watc 
of time Atr to conclude that it generates spontaneous organi- 
zation. In other words, the case in point is of a given 
univers-, a local region Of Which shows an activity that is 
accompanied by an observable change in organization. From 
the viewpoint of its entropy, von Foerster argues, (104) the 
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activity in such a region can be characterized by one of the 
following three conditions: its entropy can increase with 
time, in which case it behaves like a typical thermodynamic 
system; it can remain unchanged, in which case it acts like 
a mechanical system; or else its entropy can actually de- 
crease, implying an increase in organization, and the system 
will be called self-organizing. Thus, to be self-organizing, 
a system with entropy SS that changes over time t must satis- 
-C fy the condition 6ss 
6t. < 0. 
That this condition hoIds implies an activity and an increase 
in organization which, acccrding to Ashby, (105) may have the 
following meanilig. ' I-Firstly, it may mean a cL-ianqe from a dis- 
organized to an organized condition. For example, parts 
which were previously separated may be joined to form an 
integrated whole. Ashby uses as an illustration the develop- 
ment of connectivity in an embryo's nervous system, but the 
development of a roads network over a new territory, the ex- 
pansion of a communications system to connect previously 
isolated centers, and even certain types of political inte- 
gration may illustrate the point equally well. 
Secondly, Ashby points out, self-organization may 
be used to convey a qualitative meaning as when we talk 
about an organization the performance of which is improving. 
It is becoming a "better" organization. A typical example 
is a student who is learning a skill and is progressively 
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improving his proficiency in it. But on a more general level 
we may regard evolutt-ion, in the specific sense of an organism 
or a specie, as well as in the sense of a general trena, (106) 
essentially as being a process of this kind. All these ca. ses 
portray systems which are self-organizing, in that by and 
large they develop in the direction of becoming "better" or- 
ganizations. Problems associated with adaptation and evolu- 
tion. can thus be interpreted in terms of organizations which, 
over time, become more efficient or better fit for the task 
of survival in a particular environment. 
This last remark is particularly significant be- 
cause it bears upon the very essence of the qualitative 
nction of good or bad organization,. This notion was given a 
rigorous definition by Ashby(107) and Sommerhof. E. (108) The 
central issue of their argument is that an organization can 
be judged to be faulty or effective depending on how success- 
ful it is in maintaining conditions which are essential to a 
system's existence. The idea implies a goal, defining the 
"focal conditions" for the organization's successful survival. 
It also implies some environmental perturbations which threat- 
en this goal. Given such a set of disturbances and a goal 
which defines a stable condition, "an organization is good if 
it makes the system stable around an assigned equilibrium. "(109) 
There is a strong connotation of relativity involved as 
changing environmental circumstances may require a signifi- 
cant change in an organization if it is to remain effective. 
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With this in mind, self-organization may generally be re- 
garded as a process of "structural adjustment to a set of 
disturbances within the context of a set of overriding 
goals. " (110) 
The general concept of organization itself is de- 
fined with respect to a set of constraints acting on a given 
universe of possibilities. We say that a group of variables 
form an organization when there exists some specific rela- 
tions which define their interactions. Such relations act 
in e, ect as constraints which reduce the total number of 
possible configurations that the variables could assume if 
they were acting independently. Moreover, when we talk 
about an organization forming within a particular systemic 
boundary, we rely on a mental act of discovering a growing 
number of such fundamental relations operating between the 
system's variables. This view of organization as the actual 
restricted subset of a range of possible behavior has emerged 
d-',. rectly from the logic of information theory. It provides 
the core of von Foerster's argument for using the information 
theoretic concept of redundancy as a measure of organization. 
As we I-lave seen in Section C-6, von Foerster has 
shown that the redundancy of a system, taken as a measure of 
organization, can be computed by obtaining the ratio of the 
system's actual variety to its maximum variety and subtract- 
ing this ratio from unity. The resulting measure thus 
assumes a relative value that ranges between zero and one. 
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Using this specific concept of organization and noting that 
an a self-organizing system we would expect order and organi- 
zation to inc-rease with time, von Foerster has gone on to 
develop an elegant definition for a self-organizing system. (111) 
According to this definition, a system is a self-organizing 
ly 4f system if and on - the rate of change of 
its redundancy 
is positive. Nainely 
6R 
6t 
The immediate implications of such a condition are clear. 
From a behavioral point of view, the fact that the rate of 
change of a system's redundancy remains positive means a 
-richness of behavioral patterns that the system can continu- 
ously exploit. There is always room allowed for change and 
for new behavioral manifestations. New degrees of freedom 
remain open and therefore the behavior of such a system 
cannot be entirely and precisely pre-specified. From the 
more general viewpoint of a theory of equilibrium, this 
behavioral richness would mean that the system has many 
points of equilibrium.. at which it is stable. Unlike a simple 
pendulum or a marble in a concave vessel, for which equi- 
librium is specified by a single point, such a system is 
characterized by a large region within which it can be sta- 
ble. other words, a self-organizing system always occu- 
pies cnly a subset of the total number of stable states that 
are potentially open to it. It is ultrastable in the sense 
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of Ashby, (112) and as it seeks equilibrium it shows a dynamic 
and versatile behavior. In fact, moving towards equilibrium, 
it performs acts of selection in that it "rejects" those 
states which are not stable. It may thus appear to an ob- 
server who has the system's goal in mind as though it was 
making intelligent decisions in the process of seeking stabil- 
ity. 
The introduction of an observer is an essential 
feature of the discussion of organization, the reason being 
that the identification of an organization, in the first 
place, depends on an observer selecting a specific set of 
attributes that he deems relevant with respect to a partic- 
ular universe of discourse. The notion of organization is 
therefore a relative notion as it depends on a specific 
observer, his observational capabilities and purpose, and 
his relation to a specific part of the world. This relation, 
Pask has stressed, (113) obtains a special meaning with re- 
spect to a self-organizing system. The point is that when 
he is faced with a self-organizing system, an observer may 
find that in order to make sense of its behavior he will 
have to continuously change his frame of reference. This is 
another way of saying that because the system is typically 
involved in processes of development or evolution, the ob- 
server will have to change the original criteria of his 
observation if he is to "Keep Up" with the system's dynamic 
behavior. 
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There is a fundamental structural uncertainty in- 
volved which is typical to interaction with the "fuzzy" 
systems that are encountered in biology, psychology and the 
social sciences. Because of it, the observer may have to 
continuously change the boundaries of the universe of his 
observations in order to account for new stages in the sys- 
tem's develoPment. Similarly, he may have to increase the 
scope of his language, perhaps by stratifying it, in order 
to obtain a description that is rich enough to account for 
new manifestations of the processes under observation, as they 
unfold. A self-organizing system, Pask points out, cannot be 
approached with the assumption that conditions defining its 
existence will remain invariant for any length of time. No 
unique, pre-specified formula for controlling it can be ef- 
fective, and the process of interacting with a self-organiz- 
ing system must therefore be essentially conversational in 
nature. It is characterized by the fact than an observer 
t4 must con Lnuously adapt his procedures so that "as a result 
of the interaction some continuously changing descriptive 
model is built up. "(114) 
The concept of self-organization has brought about 
a signilicant reorientation in the scientific view of com- 
plex systems and particularly of the evolution of stable or- 
ganizations in complex environments. According to the cur- 
rent view, any system of significant complexity, given time 
and an unvariable set of environmental constraints, will show 
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a. typic cal self-organizing activity in the sense of settling 
to local stabilities which are particularly well adapted to 
those specific constraints. The implications to problems of 
the origin and evolution of life on earth, for example, are 
all impoftant. As Ashby suggests, if the system in view 
has been in existence as long, and is as complex as the 
terrestrial environment, "then nothing short of a miracle 
could keep the system away from those states in which the 
variables are aggregatedinto intensely self-preserving 
forras. " (115) 
C-9 The Organization of Complexity 
Central to the system's view of the world is the 
concept of an organizational hierarchy in which systems 
nest in a recursive fashion. In suCh a hierarchy, lower 
level systems form sub-components of more inclusive higher 
order ones. 
From a system theoretic viewpoint this means that 
a fundamental property of systems is manifest in the fact 
that any variable that is identified as a sub-component in 
a system can itself be regarded as a system and similarly 
the system of which it is a part can in turn be regarded as 
a component in yet a larger system. But notwithstanding 
such notions stem-ming from the logic of a general theory of 
systems, there is a definite sense in which we intuitively 
regard the world as a hierarchy extending from the simplest 
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forms of matter to the highest forms of life. It is quite 
common, for example, to find descriptions of physical matter 
which stress an hierarchical order of distinctive levels 
progressing from atomic sub-components to atoms, molecules 
and crystals. Similarlyr biological orqanisms are often 
described as occupying a place in a hierarchy between higher 
levels of populations and whole ecologies and lower levels 
associated with cells and organic macro-molecules respectively. 
According to Simon, (116) there seems to be a con- 
vincing physical basis for the fact that evolution in complex 
systems proceeds in a process that favors the formation of 
hierarchical structures. Simon has shown that the time 
required for the evolution of complex s1tructures will be 
shortened considerably if it W-Ll-1 take place by stages where 
each stage forms a stable sub-system constituting a layer 
in a hierarchy. Computing relative assembly time for sys- 
tems with a large number of components, Simon's results 
indicate that under certain probabil-JL-stic constraints of 
association and decomposition, a system of n components, 
organized in layers of stable sub-assemblies, will be more 
resistent to perturbations, and will thus evolve more 
quickly than will a system containing the saine number of 
components that is not organized hierarchically. Hierarch- 
ical organizations of semi-autonomous stable sub-assemblies 
thus seem to be a fundamental property of complex systems 
and examples for manifestations of "stable levels" are 
typically associated with atoms in a complex substance, 
cells in a biological organism or family units in a social 
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system. As Simon concludes, "Nature is organized in levels 
because hierarchic structures--systems of Chinese boxes-- 
provide the most viable form of any system of even moderate 
complexity. " (117) 
Whi-"Le levels in a hierarchy consist of stable sub- 
assemblies, these are not entirely free from interaction 
with other levels that are immediately higher or lower. 
The difference is in the strength of such interactions. 
They are stronger within each level and weaker between them. 
In fact, the relative strength of relations and their dis- 
tribution with respect to one another gives the concept of 
a distinct level its meaning. Thus, components that inter- 
act to form a specific level are characterized by bonds that 
are especially strong. It is the relative strength of such 
relations which allows for a definition of boundary condi- 
tions and makes the individual integrity of a level stand 
out against the background of it's environment. 
While a typical level in a hierarchy may include 
a few assemblies which are characterized by similar inten- 
sities of internal relations, and are coupled horizontally 
by weaker interactions, a vertical hierarchy will show a 
progressive reduction in strength of interactions as we 
move from lower to higher levels. A particularly clear ex- 
ample is furnished by the hierarchical structure of matter 
in which each level in the hierarchy is associated with a 
energetic interactions. Thus, by far specific intensity of - 
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the most intense forces are found in the sub-atomic level in 
which basic particles interact to form the nucleus. The in- 
tensity of forces in chemical bonds forming molecules are 
very significantly lower, and -they are much lower still in 
the structures combining organic macro-molecules. (118) 
In general, then, complex dynamic systems tend to 
exhibit a web-like structure in which hierarchical levels 
are distinguishable by the overall distribution of interac- 
tions of various intensities. Simon coined the term "nearly- 
decomposable systems" to characterize such systems in which 
weaker bonds operate between levels causing the appearance 
of hierarchies. He sums up this feature of reality as fol- 
lows: "The world is a large matrix of interactions in 
which MOS. 'L-- Of the entries are very close to zero, and in 
which, by ordering these entries according to their order of 
magnitued, a distinct hierarchic structure can be discerned. "(119) 
The concept of organiFational hierarchy is partic- 
ularly amenable to a definition in set theoretic terms. (120) 
In such t-erms a hierarchical structure is seen as a super-set 
containing a succession of ever more encompassing sub-sets. 
In general, a given level in a hierarchy will be defined as 
a set S such that 
fal, a 21 ..., an IR 
Where a,, a2, .., an are elements in a specific level and 
denotes the set of all the relationships r, (i, j= Or 1, 
-L 
i 
n) that operates between them. In a hierarchy, each 
element al, a2l . **I an is itself a set and S is an element 
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in a larger set, corresponding to a higher level. As before, 
the intensity of R is lower between boundaries of successive 
sets. 
An important aspect of "hierarchy theory" relates to 
the fact that in general levels are associated with partic- 
ular properties. Each such level is characterized by unitary 
characteristics that are the synergetic result of its spe- 
cific components and t-he interaction between them. As we 
change the resolution of observation and move up a hierarchy 
towards more inclusive higher-order domains, we encounter a 
progression of emerging new properties. 
The emergence of such new properties with higher 
levels of organization has been variously referred to as 
"neo-genesis"(121) or "emergent evolution. "(122) It re- 
lates to the transition from a component to a set or from a 
set to a super-set. ' In such new collective associations, 
synergetic properties may appear which do not res-ide in indi- 
vidual components, are unpredictable from the viewpoint of 
lower levels, and are interpretable only in the context of a 
reference frame provided by a higher level of integration. 
Even though the precise mechanisms may not yet be entirely 
understood, there is a definite sense in which evolution can 
be interpreted, from an organizational viewpoint, with re- 
spect to a structural hierarchy associated with a progress- 
ive increase in complexity and the respective emergence of 
new synergetic properties. Fuller, for example, expresses 
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the underlying notion quite clearly when he refers to the 
universe as a "synergy of synergies. " In his words, "There 
is a synergetic progression in Universe--a hierarchy of total 
complex behaviors entirely unpredicted by their successive 
subcomplexes' behaviors. It is manifest that Universe is the 
maximum synergy-of-synergies, being utterly unpredicted by 
any of its parts. "(123) 
The structural problem of hierarchical organiza- 
tion and the qualitative aspects of emergent properties 
associated with successive levels inexorably bear upon prob- 
lems of language and description. Different levels of 
reaA-1ty, and the contextual transition that comes with them, 
require alternative levels of de., ýc-i7. ipý'ion'. Thus, for exam. -- 
ple, sub-atomic particles are, described by terms different 
from those used in the description of molecules. Sim--*Lla. rly, 
we use one level of description in dealing with a fertilized 
human egg, another in describing a human embryo, and yet 
another in portraying an adult human being. 
The need for alternative levels of description is 
manifest in the structure of science itself. (124) Accord- 
ingly we have a differentiation of scientific fields into 
specialized branches reflecting specific levels of reCalklity. 
In the physical sciences, for example, this is illustrated 
by sub-headings such as nuclear physics, molecular chemistry, 
molecular biology, and so forth. The hierarchy inherent in 
our description of the world has a deeper structural meaning, 
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however, which emerges as a central issue in mathematical 
logic. Thus, G6del's incompleteness theorum states that in 
principle no language can be complete and self-sufficient 
in itself. There are undecidable propositions encountered 
in a given language which cannot be answerable within the 
frame of reference of that language and can only be resolved 
by a higher order language. The implication is clear. Be- 
cause of the incompleteness inherent in any language, an 
effective description of the world requires a hierarchy of 
languages in which each level serves as a meta-language to 
the one irrinediately below. Undecidable propositions en- 
countered in a language that is associated with a particular 
level are thus resolvable only by a meta-language which is 
associated with the next higher level in that hierarchy. 
Thus emerges an important relation which exists 
between the structure of the world and the structure of our 
description of the world. (125) Questions about the meaning 
of this relation are fundamental to epistemology and have 
provided, over centuries, a topic for an intense discussion 
in the philosophy of science. From the viewpoint of cyber- 
netics, however, this relation is immensely important, es- 
pecially with respect to problems of control. The point is 
that the organizational hierarchy typical to complex systems 
may, in fact, represent a hierarchy of control in which 
levels are associated" with a particular set of constraints. (126) 
Such a control hierarchy can therefore be regarded as a 
hierarchy of command to which alternative levels of descrip- 
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tion are essential. Thus, effective control in complex sys- 
tems depends on an appropriate match between functional 
levels in an organizational hierarchy and the corresponding 
levels of description by which control procedures are speci- 
fied. The point has been discussed at length by Beer in the 
context of management, (127) and it is clearly expressed in 
Pask's learning theory, (128) in which experimental situations 
are characterized by a conversational interaction taking 
place in a stratified language of a control hierarchy. 
In summary, complex dynamic systems typically 
possess a hierarchical Structure. Such a structure seems to 
be essential for func-It-ional reasons which have to do with 
the systcm's viability and evolutionary potential. in addi- 
tion, from a descriptive viewpoint, such complex systems are 
rendered comprehensible only by the use of a stratified lan- 
guage possessed of a hierarchy of successive and progress- 
ively more encompassing levels Of descriptions. 
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APPENDIX D 
THE ORGANIZATION OF BEHAVIOR 
D-1 Systera-Environment Interaction 
From the outset, cybernetics is developed in beha- 
vioral terms, (l) and it approaches various manifestations of 
behavior from a very specialized viewpoint, namely, how these 
relate to the general idea of a system's effective viability. 
That is, a system's dynamic activity, which is associated 
with changes in its states, provides an observer with a 
stream of evidence which is interpreted as the system's be- 
havior. The cybernetic viewpoint is concerned with the 
question of how suCh a behavior could be explained wL -'th re- 
spect to the general criteria of regulating the system's 
survival. The key issue is the nature of viable behavior: 
namely, of maintaining a particular stability, adapting to 
specific circumstances, or evolving as these change. This 
V4, beha. 
-Loral question is bound up with the problem of effective 
regulat tion and is inseparable from a discussion of mechanisms 
that affect, determine or control behavior. 
From the viewpoint of effective regulation, a sys- 
tem cannot be studied in isolation. The notion is essen- 
tially a relative one and it emerges in the context of a 
particular set of parametric constraints which operate upon 
the system, defining -the environment within which it has to 
I surv,, -ve. 
This leads to the conclusion that a system's 
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behavior, and its regulation, have meaning only in the con- 
text of its interaction with an environment. The paradigm 
involved is therefore of two systems, an organism and its 
environment, for example, that are coupled to each other. 
In this respect, an environment may be viewed as a 
complex of events in which local organizations are distin- 
guishable as distinct patterns of semi-autonomous, self- 
stabilizing behavior. The differentiation between organi- 
zation (qua organism) and environment is not always clear- 
cut. It is arbitrary in the sense that it depends on an 
observer's viewpoint, and it involves an ambiguity regard- 
ing the boundaries of the individual system (a psychological 
individual in the sense of Pask is a good example). Never- 
theless, the idea underlines an understanding of behavior 
in so far as the environment is regarded as a source of 
disturbances, with respect to which regulating mechanisms 
operate to maintain a system stable around a particular 
equilibrium. (2) The conceptual distinction between a system 
and its environment is thus essential for the functional ex- 
planation of the operation of control mechanisms. This 
distinction is also inherent in the "sYstem's view of the 
world,, " where it relates to a concept of reality that is 
regarded as a complex hierarchical organization in which 
systems nest recursively. (3) In such a hierarchy, each 
4"or the lower level that level constitutes an "environment" J- 
it coritains - 
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A representation of a systera-environment coupling 
is given in Figure D-11 in which a system S interacts with 
an environment En. The system's behavior is represented by 
an output x that is a function of environmental input y and 
the system. 's internal state Si, Thus, in a typical dynamic 
situation representing such an interaction , the system's out- 
puts and its internal states will change with time as a re- 
sult of variations in environmental inputs or of the action 
of some internal optimization mechanism. 
S 
Figure D. l. A System-Environment Interaction 
The problems of the system's viability, and of its 
effective survival, are interpreted with respect to a spe- 
cific correlation existing between the value of inputs 
originating from the environment and the respective outputs 
that represent the system's response. How change 
in the 
system's output as well as in its internal states relates 
to 
maintaining such a rela4-ion stable, or even optimizes 
it in 
the face of unpredicted'environmental variations, are 
the 
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central questions of the theory of regulation. In this re- 
spect the dynamics of a system-environment interaction with 
its typical feedback characteristics provide the context in 
which problems of stability, adaptation and evolution are 
discussed. 
D-2 The Machine as a Metaphor 
Because of the nature of the dynamic processes that 
are involved, the behavior problems associated with a system- 
envi--onNtent interaction relate very strongly to the concept 
of change, the problem of synchronizing change and of opti- 
mizing such a synchronization. The theoretical framework for 
discussing such problems and, in fact, of discussing behavior 
in the most general sense of the term, is provided by the 
concept of abstract machines and the theory of automata. 
The concept of an abstract machine is due to Ashby 
who tried to capture with it the essence of regularity in 
behavior. We have already mentioned Ashby's insistence on 
the need for a theory which would deal with behavior in gen- 
eral and which would provide a comprehensive conceptual 
framework to which the working of actual systems could be 
related. His notion of a "machine" must be understood with 
this broad objective in. mind. 
While the word "machine" is commonly associated 
with the notion of a mechanical device that immediately 
brings to mind the image of a physical artifact, the concept 
of an abstract machine stresses the essence and nature of 
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processes that underline the behavior of dynamic systems in 
so far as such behavior shows some form of regularity. The 
emphasis is on the processes that are inherent to various 
manifestations of behavior, and on problems of their de- 
scription, rather than on the nature or identity of a sys- 
tem as a "thing. " Accordingly, the interest is with the 
logic and "laws" relating to a succession of orderly beha- 
viors, and not with the materiality, or functional details, 
of the system in question. As Minsky points out, "Our con- 
cern is with questions about the ultimate theoretical 
capacities and limitations of machines rather than with the 
practical engineering analysis of existing mechanical de- 
vices. 
The concept of "machine" thus centers on the prob- 
lem of modeling the fundamental and most general features of 
behavior. This means abstracting the operation of a system 
to the essential structure of sequences of events that repre- 
sent its activity. Such events are associated with "states, " 
representing the unique and recognizable system conditions 
tha-, '-- undergo orderly transformations. In this way, the be- 
havior of a system can be represented by a succession of 
states and the rules for their transformations. Such systems 
, states and 
their transformations are described by the logic, 
structure and dynamics of informational processes, and, in 
fact,, the theory of automata is embodied in various different 
abstract models of information processing machines. In the 
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simplest sense, a machine of this kind can be regarded as a 
device that transforms some incoming messages to outgoing 
messages, according to a given rule of transformation. Its 
activity will consequently be represented by a code depict- 
ing a succession of states. (5) 
The simplest type of machine is a state determined 
machine that is isolated in the sense that no external input 
affects its transformations. It is associated with a finite 
set of possible states and with each transformation, only 
one specific state of that set can occur. It is thus repre- 
sented by a closed single-valued transformation in the sense 
of Ashby, (6) and it can model only the simplest forms of 
strictly determinate behavior. 
A more general type, of which the first is a special 
case, is represented by the typical finite state machine, 
otherwise known as a "machine with input. " In this case, it 
is the machine's internal states at a given time, and the 
states of its environment at that time, which determine the 
next state that it will assume. When the internal state at 
any time. t is designated by Q(t), and similarly the environ- . A. 
mental input and the system's response are designated by 
S(t) and R(t) respectively, a complete description of the 
machine's behavior can be obtained by two functions, say 
and G, one defining the response R at time (t+l) as a func- 
tion F., of the internal states and the inputs at time (t), 
.4 
and the other def ining the internal state Q at (t+l) as a 
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function C, of the internal states and the input at time (t). 
The two functions are written as follows: 
R (t+ 1) =F (Q (t) ,S (t) ) 
(t+l) =G (Q (t) , 
They provide the means for computing the system's states at 
any future time if the inputs are known. (7) 
We have focused a brief attention on the description 
of a typical finite state machine, representing an archetypal 
machine of a great generality. The theory of automata offers, 
however; various other possibilities. For example, there are 
"Markovian" machines which are probabilistic in nature and 
which represent the case where behavior can be only statis- 
tically determined and is therefore gi-ven by a pair of states 
associated with transition probabilities. There is a partic- 
ularly interesting case of finite automata--Neural Networks-- 
that had originally been developed by McCulloch and Pitts 
and represents the logic inherent in discrete processes. 
There are Turing machines, capable not only of "reading" 
features cf their environment (represented by a tape) and 
changing their own internal states accordingly, but also of 
modifying that environment (by altering the print on the 
tape). There are universal Turing machines, able to repro- 
duce any other Turing machine, and there are self-reproducing 
automata in the sense of Von Newman that can reproduce a 
blueprint and assemble available parts to construct machines 
similar to, or even more complex than, 
themselves. There are 
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finite function machines in the sense of von Foerster that 
can similarly reproduce, or selectively modify, a pattern 
representing their own internal states. And there are others, 
all representing different aspects of different problems . 
-associated with various forms and manifestations of behavior, 
but-all sharing a basically similar logic. (8) 
There are, however-, various limitations involved. 
Some have to do with the logic of computation and with the 
very limits of computability. (9) Others, on the other hand, 
relate to variouss features that are inherent in the structure 
of the theory and restrict its usefulness in representing 
certain aspects of complex behavior. For example, the fact 
that the machine state description requires that states will 
be uniquely and precisely defined and the fact that machine 
computation is sequential, represent such difficulties. (10) 
But with the incorporation of concepts that are inherent in 
Petri nets and Holt's concurrent systems, as well as notions 
associated with Zadeh's theory of fuzzy algorithms, the ini- 
tial repertoire can be extended. It can. thus include the 
case of parallel computation, and hence, for example, of co- 
operative interaction between initially asynchtomized auto- 
mata, as well as cases where states in a set are not precisely 
defined but must admit grades of membership. This last con- 
cept is particularly important because it allows the discus- 
Sion of machines with underspecified goals and thus of evolu- 
tionary processes that are typical, for example, to cognitive 
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and social systems. 
Notwithstanding the technical details that are in- 
volved, the important point that needs to be stressed is that 
the concept oi an abstract machine represents the basic cY- 
bernetic Paradigm for a complex system and its behavior. It 
provi eS a central metaphor that on the intended level of 
abstraction links the discussion of various purposive sys- 
tems, whether they are actual machines, biological organisms, 
brains or societies. 
D-3 The O. -aanizational Approach in Cyberne-t-ics 
The concept of an abstract machine is particularly 
important because of its proffound effect on the general dis- 
cussion of the structure and organization of behavior. 
The key notion which ultimately found its way to 
the treatment of the behavior of a great variety of systems 
had been anticipated as early as in 1936 by Turing's work on 
the theory of computability. It was implicit in his faipous 
theorem which stated that any behavior which could be de- 
scribed in precise and unambiguous terms could be simulated 
by a computing machine. (11) Such a description, in other 
words,, can ac-'%-- as a prescription for a given sequence of 
behavior. The important point is not that the computing 
ma, chine will resew-ble in exact details the system whose 
be- 
havior it attempst -to realize, but, rather, that on 
the ap- 
propriate, level of abstraction, the simulation will 
be 
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isomorphic with the essence of the behavior in question, to 
a degree which would satisfy an unbiased observer. 
This idea, that a behavior is realizable in a 
mach-*Lne once there is an effective description of it, con- 
tains the essence of a fundamental concept, central to the 
"organizational approach, " which ultimately connected the 
idea of a stream of actions, or behavior, to the notion of 
an execution of a program. This idea, though not explicit, 
is also implied in Wiener's analysis of the mechanisms in- 
volved in a system's purposive interaction with its environ- 
ment. Earlier we have quoted Wiener's comment on the -func- 
tional similarity between living individuals and the general 
class of Purposive machines. Wiener described the "anatomy" 
of this similarity as follows: "Both of them (the individual 
and the machine) have sensory receptors as one stage of their 
cycle of operations: that is, in both of them there exists 
a special apparatus for collecting info-rmation from -the oute-r 
world at low energy levels, and for Toaking it available in 
the operation of the individual or of the machine. -In both 
cases these external messages are not taken 'neat, but 
through the internal transforming powers of -the apparatus 
whether it be alive or dead. The information is then turned 
into a new form available for the further stages of perform- 
ance. -In 
both the animal and the machine this performance 
is made to be effective on the outer world. 
In both of them, 
their performed action on the outer world, and not merely 
-389- 
their intended action, is reported back to the central regu- 
latory apparatus.,, (12) 
According to the description given above, the 
operation of a purposive system depends on IC-he integrated 
functioning of the following components: 
1. a sensory apparatus for the detection of rele- 
vant external variations, the latter providing 
informational inputs and acting as activating 
sources; 
an evaluation and decision element containing 
the appropriate transformation function by which 
incoming information is operated upon according 
to pertinent internal criteria; 
3. an appropriate affector whose actions, guided 
by the "decision" element, are directed to the 
external world; and 
4. a capability for monitoring such actions by 
feedback. 
From a functional viewpoint, these components are linked 
operationally in what may be termed a "loop of action. " Such 
a loop, which is typical to purposive systems in general, 
consists of a sensing apparatus, an evaluation and decision 
function, and the appropriate affectors together with the 
relevant informational paths and feedback loops. From an 
vLewpoint, however, the emphasis is on the organizational 4 
goal directed structure of purposive actions, on 
the notion 
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that t1ie internal criteria for evaluating incoming informa- 
tion can be interpreted as a goal of the system, (13) and that 
such a goal must therefore contain some form of prescription 
by which actions are mediated. 
Accordingly, the essence of the organizational ap- 
proach is in seeking to model a system's behavior by the 
dynamic interaction of its goal-directed components. In 
Pask's words: "The organizational model is reducible to 
units associated with goal achievement or command interpre- 
tation. ... Hence it is able to explain the working of a 
real system with which it is identified. "(14) This ident -i- 
fication is carried on to a level of abstraction in which the 
operation of functional entities is discussed in terms of 
programs and their execution. A program is meant in the 
sense of a computer program, but essentially it is regarded 
as "a formula for achieving a goal. "(15) It provides a pro- 
cedure, or a "plan, " that regulates the order in which a 
particular sequence of actions is performed. It is not sur- 
prising, therefore, that the organizational model which dis- 
cusses behavior in terms of the execution of such plans is 
often couched in computer progra--Tmming terminology. As 
Miller, Galan-ter and Pribram remark, "The notion of a plan 
that guides behavior is, not entirely accidentally, quite 
similar to the notion of program that guides an electronic 
computer. " 
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D-4 Simulating the Functioning of the Reticular 
Formation --An Illustration 
A particularly elegant illustration which brings 
out the logic of the organizational approach is furnished by 
the work of McCulloch and his colleagues on simulating the 
functioning of the reticular formation. In connection with 
this work, McCulloch's concept of the Redundancy of Poten- 
tial Command is all-important. (17) 
McCulloch coined the term Redundancy of Potential 
Command to describe a network of "decision making" elements 
each of which is potentially capable of assuming command of 
the total net. These elements are coupled in such a way, 
-I ancl their interaction with their environment is such, that 
only one can command at any instant. Which particular ele- 
ment will actually be activated depends on the distribution 
of pertinent information in the whole network at a given 
time. The potential for command is thus distributed over 
a large number of components and the actual location of com- 
mand shifts constantly within the network. There is no 
unique specification that identifies a particular location 
with a speciJEic decision and because of this an observer is 
unable to pinpoint the exact location in which a decision 
is generated. 
Because of its redundancy, such a network is self- 
organizing in the sense of von Foerster, 
(18) and the impli- 
cation of its mode of functioning to 
the general problem of 
-392- 
generating reliable decisions, is profound. (19) For the 
moment, however, we shall be particularly interested in 
looking at the interpretation of the concept with respect 
to the operation of the reticular form. ation. 
The reticular formation of the brain is a network 
of neurons constituting a mechanism which mediates between 
a number of instinctual behaviors in a vertebrate animal. 
It commits the animal, at any time, to one of a few basic 
but incompatible modes of behavior. (20) It directs the 
animal's attention, and reguliates the performance of its 
different possible activities by selecting that mode of 
behavior which seems most appropriate at a particular 
moment. The criteria for selection is furnished by avail- 
able information about the animal's general physiological 
condition as well as by information about relevant condi- 
tions in its environment. 
According to McCulloch, (21) the reticular forma- 
tion can be thought of as a computer integrating signals 
arriving from various parts of the body and from other 
pCarts of the nervous system. In his words, the function 
of this coipputer--"given its knowledge of the state of the 
whole organism and of the world impingent upon it, is to 
decide whether the given fact is a case under one or another 
rule. It must decide for the whole organism whether the 
rule is one requiring fighting, fleeing, eating, sleeping, 
etc. " (22) 
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Thý significant fact about the structure and func- 
tioning of the reticular formation is that it can operate 
effectively in mediating behavior only by virtue of its in- 
herent redundancy of potential command. As McCulloch 
pointed out, "Of necessity, the system must enjoy a re- 
dundancy of potential command in which the possession of the 
necessary urgent information constitutes authority in that 
part possessing the information. "(23) 
On the level of abstraction which concerns us here, 
the working of the reticular formation can be interpreted 
with respect to the notion of regulating the execution of a 
finite set of programs which specify specific behavior se- 
quences. In this sense, as Pask puts it, the concept of 
redundancy of potential coimnand can be taken "to describe 
-isting between a set of goal directed the relationship ex 
sub-systems which compete for dominance. "(24) As programs, 
they compete for being executed. 
Each such program is a goal directed component in 
a set containing the whole behavioral repretoire. Each pro- 
gram is associated with a specific activity that the organ- 
ism may perform. Only one such program can be run at a 
time and the question of which one will actually be exe- 
cuted, which one will momentarily dominate, depends on which 
of these goal directed sub-systems is in possession of the 
Most relevant information. The criteria 
for relevance may 
be generated locally, but generally 
it depends "upon the 
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weight of evidence -in respect to all of the modal computa- 
tions and also upon the feedback from the critical processes 
engendered by the iimuediate commitment. "(25) Ultimately, of 
course, it depends upon serving effectively the overall goal 
of survival. 
Typical to the organizational approach, the theory 
seeks to explain a complex behavior, in this particular case, 
a behavior concerned with the problem of how regulating cer- 
tain activities is achieved by a specific part of the nervous 
system. explanation proceeds by identifying the regulat- 
ing mechanism involved, by resolving its operation into the 
organization of interacting goal directed sub-compopents and 
by pointing out the rules which mediate the operations and 
interactions of these components within the context of the 
whole. 
D-5 The Organizational Model 
The organizational approach has proven particularly 
useful in the discussion of the behavior of systems where 
processes of social interactions and mentation are involved. 
The basic logic of the approach has found expression in 
various fields associated with the life sciences, for ex- 
ample, in ethnology, the social sciences, and psychology, 
and the fact thalt a similar logic underlines the discussion 
of a considerable variety of problems in such diverse 
fields, justifies the notion of an "organizational model" 
providing the consistent conceptual framework 
that is used 
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throughout. 
An extensive discussion of the organizational model 
is due to Paskj(26) who is also responsible for the term. 
The key idea is of regarding the class of systems for which 
the approach is relevant, essentially as general purpose com- 
puting machines and discussing behavior in terms of the 
various classes of programs that are run in such machines. 
The programs -themselves are related to goal directed proc- 
esses in that they are regarded as "formulas for achieving 
goals" in the sense previously discussed. 
In this way, the representation of a variety of 
systems, from brains to societies, can be made in analogous 
terms., all abstracted on the level of discussing programs 
that are being executed in computing mechanisms. The empha- 
sis on functional entities and their respective structures, 
that is tYpical to other possible approaches, is'replaced 
with an emphasis on the content, organization and dynamics 
of such programs and especially on questions of how their 
stability is maintained, how they interact, reproduce and 
evolve. The central role and full extent of the preoccupa- 
tion with the concept of programs is clearly emphasized in 
Pask's definition of the organizational model which states 
that "Orgai-i-izational models prescribe and describe algo- 
rithmic proces)ses, including processes that interpret 
statements about norms or regulations and processes that 
construct norms and issue instructions. "(27) 
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Implicit in the definition is a language from 
which the program processed by a system is constructed. 
The specific "programming" language used is the "object 
language" with which a given system is identified and by 
which it "communicates. " It is quite distinct from an 
observer's meta language by which the actual process of 
communication is described. The system itself is a "lan- 
guage oriented system, "(28) in the sense that it can use 
its object language to interact with other systems of a 
similar kind. In the typical case, a statement in the 
object language, acting as an input to a recipient system, 
is interpreted by that system's evaluation and decision 
"brain" perhaps, with the result 1--hat ac- function, 3-ts 
cording to relevant internal criteria an appropriate pro- 
gram is selected for execution and a particular process is 
set in motion. This, of course, looks immediately useful 
in the discussion of instinctual behavior, but the central 
idea can be extended to cover other and more complex forms 
of behavior. 
The object language itself can assume a great 
variety of forms. It can be associated with any system of 
codes, signs or stimuli, organized in a chemical, audio, 
visual or other domains. It can be a conventional natural 
language, a scientific or a computer language, and 
it can 
also be embodied in the rich 
diversity of subtle gestures 
and symbols which have meaning 
in the context of a culture. 
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The relevant criteria is that the language is recognizable 
by a recipient system, that it is interpretable by it, and 
that it conveys a meaning to it. In this sense, incident- 
ally,, the idea of an input obtains an important qualifica- 
tion in that to be effective an input has to belong to a 
class of statements that is recognizable by a particular 
processor. (29) 
An important consequence that is inherent to the 
logic of the organizational model is a somewhat uncommon 
view of what constitutes the "individuality" of a system. 
As Pask points out, (30) the identification of a system with 
a functional and usually physical entity is replaced with 
an emphasis on the concept of organizati-on. More speci 
f4l_C- 
ally,, on the concept of a particular class of programs 
bearing a specific name. To be sure, the programs are 
executed in a real processor, but the actual line of de- 
marcation is defined by the pertinent range and boundaries 
of informational processes and it may shift according to an 
observer's special interests. It may thus be associated 
with a single system or with a few systems interacting com- 
munally. 
In summary, the organizational model provides a .A 
conceptual tool for analyzing the behavior of systems where 
such behavior is abstracted to a level at which 
it is repre- 
sented by the dynamics of informational -transactions. In so 
far as such systems are associated with social or cognitive- 
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like processes, they are regarded as "language oriented" sys- 
tems, and their behavior is identified with specific classes 
of programs, being executed in complex organizations of in- 
teracting goal directed components. Due to the generality 
of the concepts underlying the approach, various aspects of 
the organizational model have found expression in widely 
different fields. Some typical examples illustra. -L--ing the 
usefulness of the approach in a few selected disciplines 
will be cited below. 
D-6 The Structure and Organization of Behavior 
. 
In behavioral psychology, the approach has been 
lucidly articulated by Miller, Galanter and Pribram in their 
book Plans and the Structure of Behavior. (31) 
In developing their argument, these authors stress 
the inability of the classical behavioral model, based on 
the idea of a stimulus-response sequence, to explain any but 
the simplest forms of behavior. They also point out that 
attempts to extend the classical model by introducing the 
notion of an organism's image of its environment, (32) is not 
sufficient for a comprehensive explanation of complex pat- 
terns of behavior. An internal representation oL'--- the world, 
they feel, cannot, in itself, account for the dynamic activ- 
ity which characterizes an organism's 
interaction with its 
surroundings, and this model, too, 
is lacking. Nevertheless, 
they regard elements of the classical. model., as well as 
the 
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basic notion of an image as fundamentally useful, and they 
seek to retain the essence of both. Their theory attempts 
to generalize the idea of the reflex arch in a way which 
would enrich the behavioral model, provide a comprehensive 
explanation for various observable behaviors, and, above all, 
bridge the gap between cognition and action. 
In order to bridge this gap and link the idea of 
an organism's image of the world with its behavior, Miller, 
Galanter and Pribram introduce the concept of a plan that 
is regarded as the principle which guides behavior. Their 
"Plan" is essentially conceived of as a set of instructions, 
and noting the fact that, typically, behavior is hierarch- 
-, rganized on several levels of complexity, they see ically 
such a Plan as "any hierarchical process in the organism 
that can control the order in which a sequence of operations 
is to be performed. "(33) In so far as a Plan stands for a 
4 
set of hLe5: archically organized instructions which mediate 
a sequence of actions, it fulfills a similar role to a pro- 
gram in a computer and, indeed, throughout the discussion 
both terms, a plan and a program, are interchangeable. 
In their model, the authors combine the idea of an 
Image with the notion of a Plan to form a basic unit of 
analysis, a simple building block, with the orderly compounds 
of which complex behaviors can be described. This 
basic 
building block is their TOTE unit (for Test-Operate-Test- 
Exit) which is essentially a generalization of 
the concept 
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of the reflex action, the alternative they offer to the re- 
flex arch. It is described in the following words: "The 
general pattern of reflex action ... is tc test the input 
energies against some criteria established in the organism, 
to respond if the result of the test is to show an incon- 
gruity, and to continue to respond until the incongruity 
vanishes, at which time the reflex is terminated. Thus 
there-is a feedback from the result of the action to the 
testing phase, and we are confronted by a recursive loop. "(34) 
The idea of the reflex action is embodied in the 
structure of the TOTE unit, and it echoes the fundarriental 
cybernetic contention which identifies the basic building 
block of -the nervous system with a typical feedback loop. 
The concept'- stresses the hypothesis that various aspects of 
behavior are guided by the results of pertinent tests., and 
consequently the diagraim-natic representation of a TOTE unit 
is as follows: 
Ii tv 0 
Figure D. 2. The TOTE Unit (From Miller, Galanter 
and Pribram) 
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Emphasizing the essentially cybernetic characteristics of 
the TOTE unit, the authors propose that it could offer an 
effective model not only for the simple reflex but for be- 
havior in general. This by virtue of two fundamental con- 
tentions that are central to the theory: firstly, the TOTE 
unit can be interpreted on various levels of abstraction. 
On one level, it may represent energy flows and thus be 
identified with the physical anatomy of processes involving, 
for example, the operation of a neuron or the simple reflex. 
On another level, however, it can be identified with flows 
of information and consequently with control processes and 
it can thus be associated with highe-L and more complex forms 
of behavior involving decision making, problem solving, and 
the like. 
Secondly, TOTE units can be combined into hier- 
archies representing the integration of many plans in struc- 
tures of arbitrary complexity, and such h-Lerarchies can be 
identified. with the performance of a continuous stream of 
specific actions depicting complex patterns of behavior. 
The effectiveness of such TOTE hierarchies in 
modeling behavior is enhanced by the fact that a complex 
hierarchy of TOTE units preserves the fundamental character- 
t4 istics of a single unit, in that "the opera Lonal phase of 
a higher order TOTE might itself consist of a string of other 
TOTE units, and each of these, in turn, may contain still 
other strings of TOTEs, and so on. "(35) Similarly: "the 
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'objects' that this coordinating TOTE hierarchy test and 
operate upon, are themselves TOTE hierarchies. ': (36) 
As is typical to descriptive problems associated 
with complex hierarchical organizationsl(37) each given 
level in such a TOTE hierarchy is describable only by the 
next higher level. A TOTE hierarchy may thus represent a 
hierarchy of descriptions, or languages, that are organized 
in successive levels in which each higher level provides 
the metalanguage by which the content of a lower level is 
integrated and by which it can be discussed. 
From the level of abstraction which regards the 
TOTE as a hierarchy of descriptions, the step is small to 
viewing it as an hierarchical organization symbolizing con- 
trol processes. From an operational viewpoint, arrows 
could thus indicate the order of subordination of some 
processes to others and the whole hierarchy of arrows 
stringing units together would specify the succession of 
execution of Plans and consequently the sequence and con- 
ditions for transfer of control. 
A TOTE hierarchy can be interpreted therefore as 
describing processes of regulation. In behavioral terms it 
describes the regulation and execution of a string of ac- 
i tions with which a particular behav-Lor is identified. The 
performance of such actions is directly related to the exe- 
cution of specific plans and in theory, no matter 
how com- 
plex a sequence of actions actually 
is, it could be described 
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by a properly constructed assembly of TOTE hierarchies. The 
problem of constructing such an assembly is in identifying 
the relevant single TOTE units, the rules for their interac- 
tion, and the logic of sequencing their operc-ations. 
The TOTE unit thus of-L"ers a concept of consider- 
able generality with which useful organizational models of 
behavior can be constructed and 41--heir structure analyzed. 
In addition to instinctual behavior, Miller, Galanter and 
Pribram discuss their behavioral model with respect to 
various motor skills and habits, problem of memory, and of 
speech, and they touch upon the problem of learning viewed 
in the sense of the modification of existing plans and the 
formation of new ones. A particularly interesting interpre- 
tation of the model is developed in relation to speech, 
where the authors draw attention to the hierarchical or- 
ganization inherent in most languages, especially in the 
structure of grammar. They raise the general problem asso- 
ciated with the relation between languagles, thought processes 
and behavior, (38) and they conclude with the suggestion that 
"We might speak metaphorically of a general grammar of beha- 
vior, meaning that the grammar of language was only one ex- 
ample of a general pattern of control that could be exempli- 
fied in many other realms of behavior. "(39) 
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D-7__Examples from Biology and Et 
The general characteristics of the argument are 
implicit in various biological studies and they are illus- 
trated particularly clearly in the field of ethology where 
a great deal of animal behavior can be interpreted along 
the lines discussed above. 
From the "organizational" vIewpoing, biological or- 
ganisms can be regarded as computing mechanisms that are 
adapted for functioning in particular environments. Their 
adaptation is manifest in the development of a particular 
set of programs that are characteristic of a given specie 
and on the automatic execution of which, the survival and 
well-being of the organism depends. The development of such 
programs is the selective consequence of a long adaptive 
interaction with an environment, and their content and opera- 
tion can be interpreted on various different levels. For 
example, such programs may relate to internal physiological 
functions, they may have to do with the behavior of an indi- 
vidual organism, or they may be associated with the overall 
behavioral patterns of an entire specie. For each such 
level of resolution an environment can be defined which is 
the source of variations impinging on the sys+.. -em in view. 
Some of these environmental variations provide the stimuli 
which trigger the specific sequence of events 
in the organ- 
ism and others give rise to various manifestations of 
be- 
havior directed -back at 
the external world. 
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Problems of development in biology, for example, 
are discussed by Waddington(40) and Bon. ner(41) in terms which 
clearly bear the prints of cybernetic terminology. Bonner 
speaks of development as of a control process in which events 
occur sequentially and in which specific molecular interac- 
tions continuously create conditions that trigger the control 
action of specific genes, thereby creating new circumstances 
stimulating yet other events and so forth. (42) Elsewhere,, (43) 
Bonner refers to the development of a single cell in4,. -o a 
multicellular organism, as to an hierarchical control process 
requiring several levels of descriptions. Moreover, he finds 
it useful to introduce the concept of developmental tests in 
order to account for particular lines of development. Ac- 
cording to this concept, a cell in a developing organism 
performs various tests on its environment and "it is on the 
basis of the results of such tests that the appropriate 
genes are turned on to conduct the appropriate developmental 
processes. "(44) A hierarchy of control which is associated 
with several levels of descriptions is therefore needed, in 
order to regulate the various successive phases of develop- 
ment. 
4 
While molecular control mechan_LSn, S, which mediate 
developmental processes and operate on the level of chemical 
interactions, may be discussed in terms of "communication" 
between goal directed sub-systems 
in the organism, they do 
not require the use of the concept of 
"language oriented" 
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systems in its full blooded snese. The concept is essential 
however for the discussion of various traits of animal be- 
havior, and, in general, contemporary ethology illustrates 
quite distinctively the logic of the organizational approach. 
Von Holst and Mittelstaedt, for example, (45) stud- 
ied problems associated with an insect's internal control of 
sensory stimu i and its relation to motor response. They 
have explained certain behaviors, in which correction of 
movement follows visual stimuli, by invoking the concept of 
a "template, " existing "in" the organism, and containing a 
representation of what a particular re-afferent stimulus 
"should be. " The difference between the internal representa- 
tion of the "expected" and the actual stimuli dictates the 
response which follows. Similarly, much of animal behavior 
is described in terms quite like those associated with the 
notion of execution of plans in the sense of Miller, Galanter 
and Pribram. The general view is that such programs are 
"turned on" by specific stimuli which may originate from an 
environmen4C-al change or which may be associated with a spe- 
cific pattern of behavior performed by another member of the 
species. 
A typical example is furnished by seasonal changes 
that trigger a specific action or a sequence of behavior. A 
change in the length of day, for example, provides 
the en- 
vironmental stimuli on which the 
initiation of reproductive 
behavior in certain animals depends. As Tinbergen 
has 
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shown, (46) such a behavior is composed of a complex sequence 
of different actions which, once triggered by a particular 
environmental condition, follow sequentially in an orderly 
and rigidly prescribed manner. Dubos describes such behavior 
as follows: "In many animal species, the chemical changes in 
the sex glands that occur as a response to the environmental 
changes associated with spring, initiate the process of 
courting and display. In birds, for example, this process 
is followed by nest building, which begins at a proper time, 
with the choice of the right material. Mating and egglaying 
follow, then breeding and the feeding of the young. "(47) 
The release of a typical pattern of behavior by a 
particular stimulus is associated with the concept of an 
organism's "Ji-nnate releasing mechanism, " attributed to Kon- 
rad Lorenz. The concept refers to the automatic, inflexible 
execution of prescribed plans, the content of which is a re- 
sult of the long experience of a whole specie, transferred 
genetically, and which individual animals do not have to re- 
learn with each generation. Of necessity, behaviors associ- 
ated with such a fully prescribed pattern must be well inte- 
grated with a particular environment in a total ecological 
sense. They are the outcome of millenia of evolutionary 
adaptation. 
Many instances of inter-specie behavior can be 
given a similar interpretation. In such cases, the stimulus 
is provided by a member of a specie performing an act which 
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receives a specific interpretation and elicits a specific re- 
sponse. Courting sequence and love play of many animals 
follow a ritualistic performance, the component acts of 
which clearly convey a meaningful message and trigger spe-. 
cific reactions. Lorenz's description of fighting behavior 
in the fighting fish spells this out very clearly: "When 
two males meet face to face, veritable orgies of mutual self- 
glorification take place. There is a striking similarity 
between the war dance of these fish and the corresponding 
ceremonial dances of Javanese and other Indonesian peoples. 
In both man and fish the minutest detail of every movement 
is laid down by immutable and ancient laws, the slightest 
gesture has its own deeply symbolic meaning. "(48) 
Very similar in principle are the intricate dances 
performed by bees as a means of communicating the location 
of flowers to other members of the hive. In automatic re- 
sponse to a performance of such an instinctive dance, groups 
f ly 4- of worker bees will rush out of the hive and towards the 
indicated source of food. (49) Rituals of self-excitation, 
performed by packs of wild African dogs as they prepare for 
a hunt, offer another typical illustration of the same prin- 
ciple, and there are many more examples. Humans, too, show 
various biologically conditioned, J_nstinctive behavioral 
traits. For example, Oswald and Pelzman who studied infants 
crying, make the following comment: 
"The sound stimulates 
strong feelings and distinct reactions 
from almost everyone 
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within earshot. Undoubtedly, much of the effect of the in- 
fant's cry is biologically determined in order to guarantee 
that the infant receives care and nutrition. "(50) 
In summary, both individual and social instinctual 
behavior in animals can be readily interpreted by the or- 
ganizational model. In both cases, particular patterns of 
behavior are associated with pre-programmed plans of varying 
degrees of. complexity. The execution of such plans, and con- 
sequently of a particular sequence of behavior, depends on 
the interpretation of, and a reaction to, specific "releaser" 
signals. 
D-8 Extending the Organizational Model to Problems 
of Cognition and Lear 
The possibility of extending the organizational 
model to problems concerning cognition and learning is par- 
ticularly significant since demonstrating the cogency of the 
model with respect to these areas would enrich itslt5cope 
considerably. Such an extension would allow the discussion 
of higher forms of behavior, notably where cogn-Ltion, con- 
sciousness and evolutionary processes are involved, thus 
vesting the simpie model consisting of TOTE hierarchies with 
a greatly enhanced generality. In this respect, an impor- 
tant contribution is due to Pask's theory of cognitive sys- 
tems and learning processes. (51) 
Pask has stressed the fundamentally purposive char- 
acter of cognitive systems. (52) The essential point is that 
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cognition in general and intelligence in particular are rela- 
tive concepts which require the notion of a specific goal in 
relation to which they obtain their meaning. A system is 
said to show evidence of intelligence when its behavior is 
interpretable as being effective with respect to a particular, 
goal that it seeks to achieve. Similarly, various processes 
which are associated with cognition can be regarded essen- 
tially as processes involving problem solving, where the no- 
tion of problem solving is related to the effective util--Lza- 
tion of available information in an attempt to bring about a 
particular goal. Because a "Problem solver" can be regarded 
as a controller that operates on a particular environment in 
order to bring about a specific outcome, the idea of a cog- 
nitive system can be represented by a typical goal-directed 
unit that is isomorphic with a simple TOTE. 
Such isomorphism exists because the TOTE unit it- 
self is a goal directed system in which the test phase is 
associated with a specific goal. The unit is activated by 
a comnand to achieve such a goal and the Operation phase 
represents a continuous approximation to attaining that goal. 
Following the Test phase which checks for congruency, an 
Exit phase signifies the achievement of the goal and conse- 
quently the transfer of "computation" to other units. 
Emphasizing its "control" aspects, the generalized diagram- 
matic representation of such a basic goal directed unit 
takes according to Pask the following form: 
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Command 
to achi( 
Goal G 
; Achieved) 
Operate to 
approximate 
Goal G 
Figure D. 3. Goal Directed Tote, or Control 
Unit (from Pask) . 
The simple control unit of Figure D-3 offers the 
basic paradigm for a generalized. cognitive system, and a num- 
ber of such simple units can be combined in structures of 
arbitrary complexity to represent various aspects of behavior 
involving mentation. Such structures are isomorphic with the 
TOTE organizations of Section D-6. Thus, for example, basic 
goal directed units can be joined together in sequential 
strings, or they can be organized in complex hierarchies 
where there is a distinction between goals and sub-goals ac- 
cording to the various levels in the hierarchy. (53) In 
either case, the entire structure,, consisting of goal 
directed components, is goal directed itself. For example, 
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Figure D-4 below represents a two-level hierarchy where: 
Command 
to achiev( 
Goal G 
Figure D. 4. 
(after Pask) 
A Hierarchy of Goal Directed Units 
"The entire system has a goal G, and subgoals G, and G2' In 
order to attain G, the uppermost unit calls for the execution 
of a Gj subroutine and a G2 subroutine, such a predictive se- 
quence being a Plan. "(54) 
The behavioral repertoire that can be modeled by 
organized hierarchies of the goal directed units discussed 
above is greatly enhanced because, as Pask points out, the 
basic unit employed can receive quite a few interpretations. 
We have already seen that a fundamental isomorphism exists 
between the typical goal directed unit and a TOTE, and that 
this unit may also be used to represent a cognitive system, 
a problem solver, and a control procedure. In addition, 
(55) 
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it can represent a concept, where the lat-Cer is interpreted 
as a procedure for "knowing" or recognizing certain patterns 
in an environment, and it can also be identified with a 
game player, and thus be related to various aspects of co-, 
operative or competitive behavior which may develop as a 
result of goal seeking activity in a population of inter- 
acting goal directed systems. 
The notion of a complex TOTE hierarchy represent- 
ing cognitive processes and especially the idea that such a 
purposive organization consists of goal directed sub-com- 
ponents which may interact in various ways, cooperating or 
competing, as the case may be, in the process of seeking 
their goals, involves a structural and behavioral dynamism 
which implies ultrastability in the sense of Ashby. (56) It 
is immediately reminiscent of McCulloch's networks possess- 
ing a redundancy of potential command, and it can be shown 
to possess self-organizing properties in the specific sense 
of von Foerster. It can therefore be quite useful in repre- 
senting various aspects of evolutionary processes, espe- 
cial-', -y 
if we allow for the possibility of parallel in addi- 
ticn to strictly sequential computations. As Pask argues, 
however, a few more refinements are needed if the simple 
cybernetic paradigm involving the basic building 
block of 
the organizational model is to prove satisfactory 
in the 
realm of Problems associated with 
learning, evolution and 
conscious experience. 
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Firstly, the idea of a goal itself requires a fur- 
ther elaboration. (57) Basically, a fundamental distinction 
is made between two types of goal, a specified goal and an 
underspecifJk-ed goal. The one represents the idea of a 
clearly laid down algorithm, the other a general heuristic. 
The one, "normal, " is a precisely prescribed procedure for 
the attainment of a specific goal; the other, "evolutionary, " 
resembles a general guideline, or a general optimization 
principle, directed towards an open-ended objective. The 
basic cybernetic notion of purpose which has been identified 
with the specificity and well defined goal of a simple feed- 
back scheme is thus considerably extended by admitting the 
ambiguity and fuzziness of an underspecified goal. The 
former would represent the case of a straightforward servo- 
mechanism, whereas the latter is typical to systems that 
evolve. It is characteristic of living organisms, for ex- 
ample, that "Whilst each-of the goal-directed subsystems has 
a fully specified goal (for example, 'mediate eating beha- 
vior'), the goal of the system as a whole is underspecified 
('general stability' or 'survival' or something of that 
sort). "(58) 
Next comes the issue that systems described by the 
organizational model, especially those associated with social 
behavior and psychology, are language oriented systems in the 
sense of Section D-5. (59) The crux of the matter 
is that as 
such a system interacts with other similar systems 
by using 
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its object. language for communication, it can describe its 
current state or accept instructions, some of which may re- 
sult in modifying, or adding to, its already available 
repertoire of programs. Depending on circumstances, the 
process can thus be interpreted in the context of. adaptive 
interactions that are typical to some forms of learning. 
Finally there is the important contention that in 
the context of cognitive processes the basic goal directed 
system of L 7 Figure D-3 can be expected to include such proper- 
ties as the ability to interpret, to intend, and to antici- 
pate. (60) It interprets conditions of its environment as 
well as messages directed to it in the appropriate object 
language. It can be said to intend in the sense of contain- 
ing descriptions of classes of attributes that are relevant 
to its existence, and it can anticipatCe in the sense od: con- 
taining instructions for carrying out a given procedure, if 
certain conditions are registered. The implications to 
theories of the psychology of behavior, and particularly to 
a view of man, are significant. For example, in contrast 
to classical behaviorism, Pask suggests that "a human being 
does not so much respond to stii,, iuli as interpret certain 
states of his environment as posing problems, which he makes 
an attempt to solve. "(61) Although the point is stressed 
in 
the context of sychology, where it is particularly 
import- p 
ant with regard to problems of learning, the very same no- 
tions are essential to any theory that attempts a comprehen- 
-416- 
sive description of the dynamic behavior of social systems. 
D-9 The Organization. of Cognitive Systems and 
Learning Processes 
A thorough review of Pask's theory of cognition and 
of his work on a theory of learning must remain outside the 
scope of the present discussion. The basic ideas involved, 
and especially the simple graphical notations that are used 
to represent the learning process, are important, however, 
and they will be discussed briefly below. They provide a 
potent cybernetic model, the logical connotations of which 
reflect the structure and dynamics of regulatory processes 
in a way which is particularly relevant to the generalized 
problems of reproduction and evolution. The model represents 
a particular form of organization that is reducible to con- 
trol units, and while it is constructed and interpreted in 
the specific context of cognitive systems and learning proc- 
esses, it is quite general in nature. The point is that on 
the level of abstraction that is associated with the logic 
of control, it is quite possible to "set a correspondence 
between the appearance and even the nature of conscious ex- 
perience and the operations which go on in an evolutionary 
process. "(62) Moreover, this correspondence can be effect- 
ively transported to the domain of social systems where a 
great deal of control is manifest in various symbolic regu- 
latory processes which can be interpreted 
in similar terms. 
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As we have seen in the previous section, the ap- 
proach is based upon the fundamental contention that "cogni- 
tive systems are certain sort of problem solving or control 
systems; [and) the contention that knowing entails aiming - 
for a goal. "(63) In addition there is the basic notion that 
systems that learn are essentially language oriented systems, 
and as such, they are modeled on a level which is identified 
with the framework of a particular object language. In so 
far as such systems are language oriented, they "can be asked 
or instructed to adopt goals by anyone who knows the object 
language and they may state and describe their own goal. "(64) 
Accordingly, the learning process can be interpreted as a 
"conversational transaction" that takes place between a sys- 
tem and its environment or between a student and a teacher. 
Especially in the context of human psychology, Pask points 
out,, the notion of a conversational transaction replaces the 
simpler model of stimulus and response. Such a conversation 
is a self-organizing process, during the course of which 
well defined concepts can be "transferred" and new concepts 
may evolve. 
Concepts are regarded as goal directed procedures 
that are represented by the typical TOTE of Figure D-3. In 
other words, concepts are identified with a controller 
in so 
far as the latter is able to construct descriptions of 
various features of its environment that are 
then compared 
for congruity with a specific goal. 
Otherwise, a concept can 
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be related to the idea of a procedure constituting a pre- 
scription, or a plan, by which the operations of a controller 
are guided. Because of the identification of "concepts" with 
the notions of control and problem solving, the dynamic . 
"behavior" of- cognitive systems, especially when viewed in 
the context of learning, can be represented by organizations 
of TOTE units, such as in Figure D-4, for example. These 
TOTE units operate upon one another in a process which repro- 
duces, modifies, or builds up new units of a similar kind. 
The process of learning itself is embodied in a hierarchy of 
such interacting "problem solvers" and it is therefore model- 
able by an organization of adaptive controllers. (65) 
A typical control hierarchy of this sort is repre- 
sented by Figure D-5 which constitutes, in fact, a finite 
JýIigure D. 5. A TyPical Control Hierarchy 
(after 
Pask) 
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function machine in the sense of von Foerster. (66) In this 
diagram the boxes labeled Lo and Ll contain an organization 
of TOTE units which may take various forms and various mag- 
4- nitudes of complexity. The crucial poinl_. is that Lo and L, 
represent different levels, or different domains of control. 
The additional symbols are an arrow penetrating a box and a 
crossed circle. The former represents parametric operations 
upon the internal states of a box, while the latter repre- 
pt4 sents a comparator in which a descri &_on of those states 
which are operated upon is compared with a given standard, 
to obtain a measure of deviation. 
EssentiallY, the Lo control sYstem senses the prop- 
erties of various relevant states in an environment and it 
may operate to alter them. The L1 control system, on the 
other hand, senses the properties of, and operates upon the 
Lo controllers. In the context of cognitive systems, level 
Lo may represent an initial repertoire of concepts, regarded 
as programs, whereas level Ll represents higher level pro- 
grams which operate upon Lo programs in various ways. (67) 
It may, for example, reproduce them and maintain a homeo- 
static steady state or it may operate to select among varia- 
tions in Lo programs, in a process that is identifiable with 
some types of learning and with evolutionary processes in 
general. To represent evolutionary processes in the general 
sense, there must be an additional, higher level 
feedback 
from the environment (as shown in Figure D-6 below), which 
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Figure D. 6. The Embodiment of an Evolutionary 
Process in a Control Hierarchy (after Pask) 
corresponds to the operations of level L1 and which provides 
a reinforcing signal essential to the "guiding" operation of 
controllers upon the L0 domain. (68) 
Learning can thus be regarded as an evolutionary 
process that occurs in a symbolic domain in which programs 
are being modified, or written afresh, subject to the guid- 
ance and monitoring action of a mediating higher level con- 
trol. While the tendency will be to selectively reproduce 
those programs that are particularly successful in attaining 
relevant goals, there may be changes in the criteria of 
success due to significant transformations 
in states of the 
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environment, for example, which will encourage a strategy of 
modifying existing programs or constructing new ones. 
In the most general sense of biological evolution, 
it is the environment which poses the problems of survival 
and provides the criteria, as well as measure of success, 
constituting the guiding signal, an "algedonic" loop in the 
sense of Beer. (69) In the more restricted case of a typical 
human learning situation, the evolutionary process is medi- 
ated in the framework of a restricted domain (of certain con- 
cepts,, or a subject matter) by an adaptive teaching machine 
or a human tutor. Here, it is the task of the mechanical or 
human tutor to regulate the learning activity, during the 
course of which goals are being set up and appropriate pro- 
grams constructed in a process of conversational interaction. 
The simplest paradigm for such a learning interac- 
tion is, therefore, a communication process that is embodied 
in the structure of Figure D-7. ' The communication in this 
case takes place in a stratified object language with levels 
Lo and Ll. (70) In a typical situation L. corresponds to se- 
quences of stimuli and responses, in the sense of problems 
that are posed by a "teacher" and the solutions offered by 
the "student. " Level Ll, by contrast, is reserved for a 
higher level of interaction -in which knowledge of results 
indicates a measure of success. The whole process is bound 
by a "mutual agreement" which specifies the rules that are 
pertinent to the domain of problems 
involved and the solu- 
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tions that are deemed appropriate. 
Figure D. 7. The Structure of Communication 
Between Adaptive Controllers (From Pask) 
The basic principles discussed above have been'em- 
bodied in a variety of adaptive teaching Sys-Lems and these 
have been described in a large number of publications. (71) 
From the viewpoint which concerns us here, the key notion 
that merits stressing again is that the principles by which 
learning and evolution are discussed relate to the opera- 
tional logic of regulatory processes. These principles con- 
tribute not only to a better understanding of problems 
associated with learning behavior of individuals, but they 
are also critical to the understanding of the various social 
processes, upon the stability of which the social "well 
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being" depends. The point --'Ls that on the level of social 
systems, human in particular, evolution occurs mainly through 
"externalized" learning, namely, through the selective modi- 
fication of processes that are chiefly symbolic in nature. 
D-10 Relevance to the Study of Social Systems 
Among the various models used in the social and 
behavioral sciences, (72) the organizational model offers a 
particularly useful paradigm. From the outset, the model is 
developed in behavioral terms abstracted to a level which 
makes it suitable for the discussion of social processes. 
It addresses itself to the; structure and modes of organiza- 
tion that underly behavior, emphasizing their regulatory 
characteristics, and providing the concepts and language 
which are essential for the description of viable purposive 
organizations. As it is reducible to units associated with 
regulation, the model is capable, of explaining -the actual 
working of the social processes with which it is identified, 
and it can thus help articulate the principles which underly 
the creative self-organization inherent to. social systems, 
4 in both their str A_Ctly societal and total ecological sense. 
That the conceptual framework underlying the or- 
ganizational model has been proven effective in dealing with 
cognition and learning is particularly significant with re- 
gard to its applicability to the domain of social systems. 
As Pask suggests: "There appears to be an isomorphism 
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. between the algorithmic entity 'cognitive structure' ... 
and the conventions, traditions and role structure that 
characterize a society. "(73) Due to this isomorphism, the 
model provides a suitable terminology, not only for the dis- 
cussion of conditions of steady state regulation that are 
typical to well-adapted societies, but also for the discus- 
sion of problems associated with social evolution and social 
change. 
The approach depends on the idea of identifying 
social- processes with specific classes of programs, on the 
execution of which the achievement and maintenance of vari- 
ous social goals depend. In this respect, two notions are 
crucial. Firstly, that social homeostasis is maintained by 
automatic mechanisms associated with traditions, conventions, 
rituals and so forth, all of which interact to maintain an 
established and proven order operative. Secondly, that 
social evolution can be attributed to inherent self-organiz- 
ing properties that are manifest in the system's response to 
change. They are manifest in the appropriate reorganization 
of social structures and in the modification of social be- 
havior, which may occur as a result of conceptual and tech- 
nological innovations induced by the system "internally, " 
or as a result of fundamental changes in the system's rela- 
tions to its environment. In either case, the processes 
involved can be discussed on a level of abstraction where 
the operation of symbolic regulatory programs receive a 
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societal interpretation. 
Taking the particular approach offered by the or- 
ganizational model, the behavior of a social system would be 
associated with a particular organization integrating the 
specific goal-directed components with which the system's 
activity is identified. Such "components" would be embodied 
in hierarchies of TOTE units, or Pask's units of control, 
and they would be modelable by the interaction of the ap- 
propriate classes of programs representing the processes 
under consideration. A specific behavior would thus relate 
to a specific organization of such goal directed components, 
namely, it would reflect the specific manner in which they 
interact, the structure of hierarchies and modes of control 
that are employed, and the particular character and content 
of programs that represent pertinent processes. 
The stability of the system approached as an inte- 
grated whole entity, itself goal directed though in an under- 
specified and open-ended way, would assume typical homeo- 
static or evolutionary characteristics according to the 
nature of the general conditions underlying its existence. 
Its viability. as a system would depend on its successful 
adaptation to varying circumstances. This end, of maintain- 
ing a continuous viability, would provide the overall, 
albeit fuzzy, goal to which all the processes represented by 
the appropriate classes of programs, operating singly and in 
their combined synergetic interaction, would be directed. 
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The idea of substituting classess of programs for 
various features of behavior implies a theory about the con- 
ditions that generate that behavior. In so far as the or- 
ganizational model represents such a theor% 7 , it may help .L- 
t4 identifY organiza Lonal conditions which underlie various 
social pathologies and it may provide guiding princip'Les for 
the preventive management of such pathologies. This poten- 
tial contribution is particularly significant at a time when 
various manifestations of social behavior are showing signs 
of stress and growing instabilities. 
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